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CHRISTIAN DOGMATICS

WORKS

BY

Rev. JOHN MACPHERSON, M.A.

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REV. JOHN MACPHERSON, M.A.

AUTHOR OF

"COMMENTARY ON ST. PAUL'S EPISTLE TO THE EPHESIANS" ETC.

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PREFACE.

THE need of a comprehensive treatise on Christian doctrine of a scientific character is admitted on all hands. Even the best productions of foreign theologians do not seem altogether suitable as manuals for our theological students. Outlines by British writers of various schools are for the most part too meagre, and in some instances their usefulness is impaired by want of proportion in the treatment of the several doctrines of the system. The attempt has been made in the present work to give a systematic presentation in methodical order of all the leading doctrines of the Christian faith. The standpoint is that of a moderate Calvinism. The history of dogmas has been introduced only in so far as is necessary for the clear and intelligible statement of the positive doctrine. In like manner, no attempt has been made to develop in detail the biblical element, except in so far as this is needed to supply the foundation for the dogmas accepted and formulated by the Church. Special attention has been given to the preparation of the lists of literature placed at the head of the several sections. Only such treatises are mentioned as have been found distinctly helpful in the discussion of the particular subject of the section, and references are made to comprehensive and general works on dogmatics only when the treatment in them of the subject dealt with is more or less remarkable for fulness or suggestiveness.

In regard to the history of dogmatics in the Introduction, objection may be taken to omissions, as well as to some of the names that have been included. It is hoped, however, that the student may find the sketch interesting and instructive, and that it may prove useful as an introduction to the systematic study of Christian doctrine.

JOHN MACPHERSON.

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CHRISTIAN DOGMATICS.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. The Idea and Contents of Christian Dogmatics.

Literature.—Garbett, *The Dogmatic Faith*, London, 1868, pp. 13–26, 263–269. Warfield, *The Right of Systematic Theology*, Edin. 1897 (defines carefully the meaning and place of dogma). Sabatier, *De la vie intime des dogmes et de leur puissance d'evolution*, Paris, 1889; in German, by Schwalb, *Die christl. Dogmen, ihr Wesen und ihre Entwicklung*, Leipzig, 1890 (singularly clear and interesting account of nature and development of dogma). See also Sabatier, *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, London, 1897, bk. iii., "Dogma," pp. 229–343, where the evolutionary treatment of dogmas is carried to the utmost extreme. Rothe, *Zur Dogmatik*, 2nd ed., Gotha, 1869, 1st art.: "Begriff der evang. Dogmatik," especially pp. 1–18. Köstlin, in Herzog, *Real-Encyclop.*[2] iii. 640–656. Similar art. by Jul. Müller in Herzog,[1] iii. Kaftan, *Truth of the Christian Religion*, 2 vols., Edin. 1893, i. 27–120: "The Origin of Dogma." Böhl, *Dogmatik*, Amst. 1887, pp. xiii–xxiii: "Ueber den Begriff des Wortes Dogmatik." Kaftan, *Glaube u. Dogma, Betrachtungen über Dreyer's Undogmatisches Christenthum*, 3rd ed. 1869. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, Edin. 1866, pp. 57–71: "Dogmatics and the Christian Idea of Truth."

Christian Dogmatics is the science of the Christian faith, in which the several dogmas are laid down, classified, and developed.

The Christian faith is "the faith which was once delivered

unto the saints" (Jude 3). It is the sum total of those beliefs, acceptance of which is implied in the appropriation of Christ and his salvation by the individual as an individual and as a member of the community of believers. This Christian faith is thus primarily the *fides quæ creditur*, but it is immediately dependent upon the *fides qua creditur* for giving to its contents their special character. The faith, which it is the task of Christian dogmatics to elaborate and expound, presupposes a personal exercise of faith in Christ. Without faith, in the subjective sense of personal believing in Jesus Christ, we can have no theology. The treatment of Christian doctrine proceeds from the standpoint of faith. The dogmatist is a believer, and he addresses himself to believers. Faith, as a human faculty co-ordinated with knowledge, an endowment of the spiritual nature of man, is a presupposition of the idea of religion, even in its most elementary form, and as such demands careful treatment in the prolegomena to dogmatics. The Christian faith, however, is not coextensive with the province to which this faculty of belief is operative. In all the sciences, and not in religion only, we are required in many things to exercise faith rather than knowledge.[1] The Christian faith, therefore, is not the sum total of beliefs, as contrasted with the facts that have been observed and the truths that have been demonstrated, but only the sum total of beliefs within the radius of Christianity as a revealed religion. Religion and revelation, therefore, are to be treated, not as prolegomena, or as constituting a special department, a fundamental science, or forecourt of dogmatics, but as properly among the sources from which the substance and contents of dogmatics are derived. We do not deal here with any system of Christian certainties, as, from somewhat varying standpoints, is proposed by Beck,[2]

[1] See paper entitled, "Gedanken über Glauben und Wissen," in Jul. Müller, *Dogmatische Abhandlungen*, Bremen, 1870, pp. 1–42.

[2] *Einleitung in das System der christlichen Lehre*, oder Propaedeutische Entwickelung der christlichen Lehrwissenschaft (1st ed. 1838), 2nd ed., Stuttgart, 1870, pp. 1–43.

Frank,[1] and Dorner.[2] Instead of prefacing the whole, as they would do, with a doctrine of faith, or an exhibition of the positions reached by faith, it is better, after the manner of Biedermann,[3] to co-ordinate faith with revelation, and introduce it as a subsection under the general heading of religion. Faith, as thus understood, the act of appropriating the spiritual truths revealed by God in the person of Christ, so as to convert it into the very substance of the religious life of the believer, produces that Christian faith of which Christian dogmatics treats.

Each separate item in this Christian faith is a Christian *dogma*. In the New Testament the word is used of *decrees of rulers* (Luke ii. 1; Acts xvii. 7; Heb. xi. 23), of the *Mosaic ordinances* (Eph. ii. 15; Col. ii. 14), and of *apostolic enactments* (Acts xvi. 4). The verbal form of the same word is used of the *decisions of the elders* (Acts xv. 22, 25, 28). According to its classical and patristic use, the term indicates tenets or precepts of teachers and schools (Cicero, *Acad.* ii. 9; Seneca, *Epist.* xcv. 10, etc.; Ignatius, *Magnes.* 13; Barnabas, *Epist.* 1). In theology, dogmas are the doctrinal positions to which the Church has given authoritative sanction. They are thus distinguished from the opinions of individual theologians, or loose popular statements of religious truths. Dogmas are formed or have expression given them only during the creative periods of the history of the Church. But even then there is no creation of new dogmas, but only elaboration or development of some particular portion or aspect of that faith which, as a whole never to be added to, was once for all delivered to the saints. The Church never proposes to break with the past, or make a new departure by

[1] *System of Christian Certainty*, Edin. 1886, being the translation of the first half of *System der christlichen Gewissheit* (1st ed., 2 vols., Erlangen, 1870; 2nd ed. 1884).

[2] *System of Christian Doctrine*, Edin. (1st ed. 1880–1882), 2nd ed. 1888–1889, 4 vols. (orig. Berlin, 2 vols., 1879–1880, 2nd ed. 1886); see vol. i. pp. 33–168, "The Doctrine of Faith as the Postulate in the Cognition of Christianity as Truth or Pisteology."

[3] *Christliche Dogmatik*, Berlin, 1869, 2 vols., 2nd ed. 1884–1885, §§ 118–137, vol. i. pp. 288–306.

originating any new dogmas. It can only discuss, criticise, and explain dogmas that have been already determined and are handed down.[1] We shall require afterwards carefully to consider the question, whether dogmatics is a purely historical science, and in doing so we shall have to determine more exactly how far dogma is to be defined as a statement made upon the authority of the Church. Here we need only note its early use in the twofold sense of decree and doctrine. As Hatch[2] has shown, it meant originally the expression of a personal opinion or conviction (δοκεῖ μοι), and subsequently came ordinarily to designate the affirmation or dictum of a philosopher, the acceptance of which by any individual constituted him a member of the school of that philosophic teacher. As a statement retaining its place from generation to generation, it ceased to be regarded as a mere personal conviction, seeing that it had become the common possession of a whole community; and in this way it obtained the importance and value of a doctrinal position essential to the maintenance and validity of the entire system.

Every Christian dogma rests upon the authority of a divine revelation in which God communicates the truth concerning Himself and spiritual things necessary for us to know that we may be saved, and impossible for us otherwise to learn. This revelation meets a need in us, and is possible only on the assumption that there exists a certain relationship between God and man; that there is something in man that needs God and yearns after Him. The recognition of the fact that God has some claims upon us, and that there is a longing of our soul which God alone can satisfy, is religion. Christianity claims to be the perfect religion, and Christ undertakes to reveal God and to bring us to Him.

[1] The most thorough investigation of the meaning and significance of *dogma* is to be found in Rothe, *Zur Dogmatik*, 2nd ed., Gotha, 1869, pp. 2–18. See also Lipsius, *Lehrbuch d. evang.-prot. Dogmatik*, Brunswick, 1876, § 6; Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik*, 1884, i. § 2, pp. 2–8; Van Dijk, *Begrip en Methode der Dogmatiek*, Utrecht, 1877, pp. 13, 14.

[2] *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church* (Hibbert Lectures for 1888), London, 1890, pp. 118–123.

As the science of the Christian faith, dogmatics is a religious science, dealing with the truths of the Christian revelation, classifying and defining those dogmas which the Church has accepted as constituting the circle of saving Christian truth. Yet these truths are not to be regarded as so many "intellectual tenets," nor is dogmatics, as the science which sets those truths forth, to be defined as "the science of the *objects* of faith." It is the science of that faith itself. "The doctrine or dogma of the Church must consist of articles of *faith*. . . . The system of belief is the science of the Christian faith, *i.e.* its function is to exhibit that faith with the care and exactness distinctive of scientific work."[1]

The earliest instance of the use of the term dogmatic, as applied to a scientific theological treatise, appears in the title of Petavius's (1583–1652) work, *De theologicis dogmatibus* (unfinished in 5 vols. fol.), Paris, 1644–1650. If we exclude this, for the reason that it is not properly a dogmatic work, but rather a treatise on the history of doctrines, we find the name first used in a comparatively obscure work, *Synopsis theologiæ dogmaticæ*, 1659, by Reinhart, of Altorf.[2] The name, as designation of our science, first gained currency in the earlier part of the eighteenth century, in the *Institutiones theologiæ dogmaticæ* of Buddeus (1667–1712), of Jena, published in 1723. During the sixteenth century, and even in the earlier part of the following century, many of the great systematic writers, especially among the reformed, entitled their works, *Loci theologici* or *Loci communes* (Melanchthon, 1521 and 1543; Musculus, 1560; Peter Martyr, 1575; Steigel, 1582; Chemnitz, 1591; Maccovius, 1626; Chamier, 1653). Calvin gave to his great work the name, *Institutio christianæ religionis*, 1536 and 1559; the same title was used by Selneccer, 1563; and similarly, Francis Turretine entitles his elaborate treatise, *Institutio theologiæ elencticæ*, 1679. In order to mark off the strictly systematic exposition of doctrine from what might more properly be styled polemical theology,

[1] Kaftan, *Truth of the Christian Religion*, Edin. 1894, ii. 409 f.

[2] See Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik*, Freiburg, 1892, § 1.

some introduced the terms "*thetic*" (Hollaz, 1707; revived by Dorner, and used by him to designate the scientific presentation of Christianity as truth, the whole range of systematic theology, embracing dogmatics and ethics) and "*positive*" (König, 1664; Baier, 1686). Others, *e.g.* Döderlein and Tittmann, suggested the designation *theoretic theology*, in order to distinguish the science of Christian beliefs from that of ethics or the Christian life. Dogmatic undoubtedly, as a term, might be quite appropriately applied to the whole system of truth, theoretical and practical, embracing doctrine and ethics, but usage has confined it to the science of the Christian faith as accepted by the Church. Such a limitation of application, according to established usage, is quite admissible, and, as thus understood, the term is the most convenient and suitable for our science. It is the designation most generally used by theologians of the present day.

As science, dogmatics seeks to state in the most precise form possible the several doctrines of the Christian faith. Special care must be taken, in the framing of definitions, to secure accuracy of statement, for only as the several dogmas are expressed in the most exact phraseology can error be avoided when the attempt is made to combine and arrange them into a fully developed and rightly balanced system. Dogmatics as a science must not only state, but also criticise, the dogmas which it receives, so as to vindicate the particular statement of them which is accepted. It must also endeavour to show the consistency existing between one and another of the several dogmas, and the fitness of these dogmas, as conclusions from the more elementary doctrines, and as foundations for those which emerge at a later point in the order of thought. This criticism of the dogma is, in many recent dogmatics, dealt with in a separate section under each division. Thus Biedermann has two distinct main divisions in his *Dogmatik*: i. the historical doctrine of the Faith, which he subdivides into—(1) the scripture doctrine, and (2) the church doctrine; and ii. the rational kernel of the Christian faith, in which he subjects to criticism the

materials supplied by scripture and church, and states the positive residuum.[1] Dorner, under each doctrinal head, has three sections: the biblical doctrine, the ecclesiastical doctrine, and the dogmatic investigation. Fr. Nitzsch, in his recent *Dogmatik*,[2] without following a regular schema of this sort, generally discusses the older church doctrine, and then later theories, and finally gives the criticism and result. Somewhat similar, but with a philosophical discussion prefixed, was the method pursued by Hase and other more or less rationalistic and critical dogmatists.

Such an arrangement seems, in point of method, open to very serious objections. It is really only the third division in such works that can be recognised as belonging to the province of dogmatics proper. But the critical part must have its scope and range very considerably extended, so as to include all that is essential to our science in the conclusions of the biblical and ecclesiastical investigations. We cannot admit a separate section on the biblical doctrine, and then another on the church doctrine, for these subjects are relegated for separate treatment to the subordinate theological sciences of biblical theology, or it may even be biblical dogmatics (so Lutz, *Biblische Dogmatik*, Pforzheim, 1847), and of history of dogmas, in which the development of the biblical material into formulated and scientific statements of the truth is illustrated chronologically and in detail. The strictly scientific treatment of dogmatics, as a science which takes cognisance of both biblical and historical or ecclesiastical theology, but does not simply go over the ground again which these sciences have already covered, is best secured by a clear statement of the dogma from the standpoint of the dogmatist, this being illustrated and vindicated by references to its biblical and historical expression.

[1] This is practically the same as the view specially elaborated by Rothe, who makes dogmatics a historico-critical science.

[2] In this very able and highly interesting work the historical treatment is carried to such an extent that it seems much more a history of dogmas arranged under dogmatic sections than a systematic and scientific treatise on doctrine.

It is an important part of the task of dogmatics to determine what is the central dogma which will supply the principle for the classification of all the dogmas. This has often been done in such a way as to give the appearance of a foregone conclusion to the distribution and elaboration of the whole system. This is particularly noticeable in regard to all attempts to make one or other of the persons of the Trinity the special principle for determining the arrangement of the system. If the Dogmatic be theological, or christological, or pneumatological, in each case some important dogmas find no proper place, and where they are brought in in a forced and unnatural way they can get no adequate or fairly proportioned treatment. The same also is true of the idea of the Kingdom of God (a favourite scheme with various modern theologians occupying very different standpoints, Oosterzee, Ritschl, Candlish), which does not yield a principle wide enough or sufficiently comprehensive to include all the doctrines.[1] The central idea of the Christian system surely is that of redemption. If we accept this position we do not require to twist or alter in any way the place or proportion of any of the Christian dogmas, which may still be treated in the order in which they naturally occur in the ordinary *local* arrangement, only recognising that from first to last God and man are to be thought of, the one as redeeming or offering redemption, the other as redeemed or in need of redemption. When we entitle our science *Christian* dogmatics, we do not claim a christological distribution of its dogmas, but we do require a central place and all-pervading influence for the doctrine of redemption.

The ideas with which dogmatics deal belong exclusively to the domain of religion. It will be necessary, therefore, in the introduction to dogmatics, to indicate distinctly what religion is, and what, according to its essence, it necessarily involves; and then, to discuss the special characteristics belonging to the Christian religion as not only a revealed religion, but a

[1] See a well-considered criticism in Orr, *Christian View of God and the World as centring in the Incarnation*, Edin. 1893, pp. 401–405.

religion which has its revelation in Christ. We have therefore here to treat in order of religion and the Christian revelation.

§ 2. Religion.

Literature.—The best treatment by an English writer of the idea of religion will be found in Principal Caird's *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, Glasgow, 1880, especially chap. vi.: "The Religious Consciousness," pp. 160–186. The subject is also very satisfactorily and comprehensively treated in Räbiger, *Theological Encyclopædia*, Edin. 1885, vol. ii. pp. 310–315; Sabatier, *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion based on Psychology and History*, London, 1897, pp. 3–31; Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik*, Freiburg, 1892, §§ 8–18, pp. 46–116, especially pp. 83–116: "The Right View of the Origin and Nature of Religion." Pfleiderer, *The Philosophy of Religion as the Basis of its History*, 4 vols., London, 1886–1888, especially vols. iii. and iv.: "Genetic-Speculative Philosophy of Religion"; *Religion, ihr Wesen und ihr Geschichte*, Leipzig, 1869. Martineau, *A Study of Religion, its Sources and Contents*, 2 vols., Oxf. 1888, especially the earlier pages, giving a definition and defence of religion. Max Müller, *Introduction to the Science of Religion*, London, 1870; his Hibbert Lectures of 1878, and his Gifford Lectures of 1888 on "Natural Religion," are much less satisfactory, as they endeavour to derive religion from purely empirical data. An admirable popular statement of the nature and contents of religion will be found in Liddon, *Some Elements of Religion*, London, 1872, Lect. I.: "The Idea of Religion." The works of Tiele and de la Saussaye are historical and comparative. So also the very serviceable and convenient handbook of Prof. Menzies, *History of Religion*, London, 1895. The larger systematic works which treat most fully in the introduction of religion, besides Nitzsch, named above, are: Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik*, i. pp. 174–327; Lipsius, *Lehrbuch der evang.-protest. Dogmatik*, pp. 18–107.

Religion consists in the fact of a real relationship subsisting between God and man. The organ of religion is no special faculty in man, but man himself. As personal being, man is conscious of relationship with a power higher than himself. Man as man, not merely as an emotional or intellectual

being, but in the whole aggregate of his faculties, is a religious being. As such he makes acknowledgment, more or less clear, of this relationship subsisting between himself and God, and also seeks to conform his life to such a pattern as his idea of this relationship commends to him as fitting and right. Religion demands from men, with respect to God, knowledge, love, service, the willing surrender of mind, heart, and will to Him who is at once Lawgiver and Friend. Morality is distinctly and necessarily religious. The regulation of the life is determined by the idea entertained of God and of the obligations which man's relationship with God imposes. Religion is both creed and conduct, a mode of life because it is the faith of the heart. Religion has thus a subjective and an objective side. From the objective side, the word may be used to describe an external corporate life, to which one may belong in a purely external way. When we speak of different religions, we are thinking of such visible organisations as owe their existence to the adoption of some special view of the being and character of God, and of the relationship subsisting between Him and mankind.

The idea of religion implies the existence of God, and involves the general idea of His goodness and of His interest in and care for the good. But it does not require, nor indeed does it leave room for, the exhibition of the so-called proofs for the existence of God. These could have place here only if they were strictly logical demonstrations. Being such as they are, they may be dealt with in a philosophy of religion, as illustrating the necessity of religion by showing the impossibility of man's thoughts and reflections stopping short of the Infinite and Absolute as personal and real being; and again, in this dogmatic system, in connection with the discussion of the Christian idea of God, as showing what in man demands and finds in God these qualities which constitute the substance and contents of that idea.

The question of the origin from which this conviction

of religion is derived has given occasion to many and very diverse theories. Naturalism traces it back to mere illusion, springing either from a defect or infirmity in the constitution of men, or from the arts of deceivers, the cunning of priests and others interested in the development of such superstitions. Critias, sophist and man of the world, declared that belief in the gods was the cunning invention of a wise statesman who, by thus wrapping up truth in falsehood, sought to secure on the part of the citizens a more ready and perfect obedience. Euhemeros of Messene represented the worship of the gods as arising out of the respect and veneration shown to the most distinguished men of the earliest ages, and this same theory is still maintained by Spencer and others, who seek the beginning and primitive form of religion in ancestor-worship. Lucian, again, considers the gods to be the prototypes of human faults and follies, and regards the worship of them as resulting from the ignorance of the superstitious, who allow the absurd and grotesque creations of the imagination to be surrounded by a halo of supernatural glory and sentimental romance, or from the cowardice of those who fear to encounter the odium and ill-will which would certainly fall upon any who might venture to dispute the generally prevailing belief in the gods. Now all such naturalistic explanations are evidently no explanations, but involve the practical denial of all religion. The real question in which we are interested here is one that has to do with the nature and true basis of faith. Theories of religion are to be distinguished according as they make faith rest primarily on spiritual truth apprehended by the intellect, or on the inward spiritual intuition or consciousness of God appealing to feeling and experience. The idea of God as relating Himself in some way to the world and man, and as consequently to be feared and worshipped, is not one acquired by education or by any communication from without. In its simplest and most elementary form it is a survival of man's original spiritual endowment.

Our word religion is simply the Latin word *religio*,

derived from *relegere*,[1] and means a careful reconsideration, a brooding over, a giving of the mind and all our faculties to the study of what seems to call for respectful and reverential inquiry. As thus understood, it is practically synonymous with the Greek word εὐσέβεια, used throughout the New Testament for a reverential fear of God. In contrast with this, we have the word θρησκεία used (Acts xxvi. 5; Col. ii. 18; Jas. i. 26, 27) to describe religion in its outward aspect as a form of worship, in which it may be distinguished from other forms of worship.[2] The latter word may be used in a thoroughly good sense as indicating a form of religion and worship quite in accordance with the inward reality, but it calls attention only to the outward organisation or profession. The use of εὐσέβεια, on the contrary, is confined to the conception of religion as indicating a real personal relationship of the individual with God, or of a community only as made up of individuals who are in this true sense religious. A community may be θρῆσκος because of its professed adherence to certain forms of worship, but a community can be εὐσεβής only as made up of pious and godly individuals. In the New Testament the adjective is well rendered in our English version by "devout," "godly," and the substantive by "godliness." This gives the essential and proper idea of religion, which is primarily a purely personal relation of the individual soul to God. The fundamental difference between the views taken of religion by those, on the one hand, who were trained under

[1] So Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum*, ii. 28: "Qui omnia quæ ad cultum deorum pertinerent, diligenter retractarent, et tanquam *relegerent*, sunt dicti religiosi." The derivation from *religare* by Lactantius, *Institt. Div.* iv. 28: "Hoc vinculo pietatis restricti respecti deo et *religati* sumus, unde religio nomen accepit," is discredited by the fact that *religens*, which cannot be from religare, is used in the sense of "pious, revering the gods." With *relegere* may be compared εὐλάβεια (Heb. v. 7, xii. 28), εὐλαβής (Luke ii. 25; Acts ii. 5, viii. 2), which, from meaning generally a careful handling of any thing, passed over to mean a careful, reverential treatment of divine things. See Trench, *Synonyms of the N.T.* §§ x., xlvii., ed. 10, London, 1886, pp. 36, 173.

[2] Hatch, *Essays in Biblical Greek*, Oxford, 1889, pp. 55–57. Also Trench, *Synonyms of the N.T.* pp. 175 ff. "Θρησκεία (=*cultus*, or rather, cultus *exterior*) is predominantly the ceremonial service of religion."

biblical, and those, on the other, who were trained under pagan, influences, is very noticeable.[1] It is brought out in a particularly striking way by a comparison of reasons assigned for their conduct by those, in the early centuries and in the sixteenth century respectively, who persecuted all who refused to worship as they themselves did. Among ancient pagans it was regarded as the duty of the State to enforce observance of religious rites and worship after the manner of their fathers; and so every departure from the old faith was a public offence punishable by law. In the Reformation age, and in preceding Christian centuries, religion was indeed understood to be a matter of conscience and of personal dealing between the soul and God; and it was just the tenacity of personal conviction about religious beliefs that was made the plea for stopping short of nothing that would induce or constrain others to adopt the same faith. The Christian idea of religion is that it pertains to the conscience, and that it can have meaning only as a personal act and a conviction seated in the depths of man's moral being.

Man as man is religious, and not merely in consequence of certain circumstances and surroundings. Religion is essential to man's personal existence. Without it man would not be the spiritual being that he is, for he would not have any sphere in which to exercise his spiritual faculties. His rank, as Rothe puts it (*Ethik*, § 117, vol. i. p. 466), depends upon the fact of his having religion. Apart from religion we could not vindicate for man any position essentially different from that of the mere animal. The fact that man exists as a personal creature necessarily involves the idea and reality of religion. The fact of the necessity of religion as resting upon the simple fact of man's existence is interestingly enforced by Rothe in a note (*Ethik*, § 117, Anm. 5, vol. i. p. 466), where he adduces the opinions of Jacobi, Goethe, Novalis, Baader, Trendelenburg, Weisse, and quotes very striking sayings from each of these thinkers, declaring that religion, in the sense of

[1] See this distinction characterised with admirable clearness and point in Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages in the Christian Church*, 1890, p. 21.

the apprehension of something above to which he is personally related, is essential to all thinking and rational being. It is not enough to say that man is capable of religion, or even that without religion he cannot realise the highest ends of his being. Religion is essential to his very being. It is on the basis of his religious nature and its development that he, as distinguished from the mere animals, has a history.[1]

Religion, as the recognition of the relationship subsisting between God and man, implies on the part of man the willing surrender of self to God. Schleiermacher's definition of religion as the feeling of absolute dependence is objectionable, not on the ground of the absoluteness of the dependence postulated, but simply on account of the one-sided reference to feeling, without emphasising the essential part played by intellect and will.[2] The confession of man's absolute dependence upon God is essential to the very idea of religion. Any revolt against this is irreligious. But it must be remembered that the religious man makes this surrender of his free will. He knows himself dependent because he is conscious of having made this surrender of himself to God. This only, as distinguished from the unintelligent, unreflective, unreciprocal dependence of the natural man, is the dependence of man upon God which constitutes the substance of religion. In the natural man this consciousness of dependence is present; but, owing to a defect of knowledge and of will acting reciprocally on one another, so that ignorance perverts the will, and a perverted will intensifies the ignorance, this consciousness

[1] Delff, *Grundzüge der Entwicklungsgeschichte der Religion*, Leipzig, 1883, p. 13.

[2] As Müller says (*Christian Doctrine of Sin*, from 5th Germ. ed. of 1867, Edin. 1868, vol. i. p. 175): "The fault of Schleiermacher's definition is, that it regards this dependence, which, when viewed side by side with human freedom, is a most profound and suggestive truth, as something immediate and unconditional, and fixed as if by some necessity of nature. Religion is an act of self-surrender to God, but the true consciousness of this entire dependence proceeds in the first instance from this act of surrender." As to the importance of Schleiermacher's protest against the aridness of earlier rationalism and supernaturalism, see Dorner, *History of Protestant Theology*, Edin. 1871, vol. ii. p. 376 ff.

fails adequately to express itself. This adequacy of expression is possible only for the man who knows the Absolute as the being on whom he is dependent, for only that one being who is the Absolute can awaken in and claim from a personal being a confession of absolute dependence. Hence no religion, in the sense of outward worship or *cultus*, that does not recognise God as the Absolute can offer to its votaries any religious sanction for its claims and ordinances. Dependence that is not absolute is not religious, and such dependence can be given only to Him who is the Absolute. Properly speaking, therefore, religion can only be theistic, and theism can only be monotheism.

The religious consciousness of the natural man cannot be taken as the basis of any theological development, nor can it be regarded as the sphere within which, and according to the laws of which, Christian dogmatics can take its rise or be constructed. Man as he now is starts with a sadly impaired religious consciousness. It is not merely, as Butler would have it (*Analogy of Religion*, pt. i. chap. v.), that the spiritual part of man is overlaid by the rebellion and violence of those sensuous impulses and affections which should have been subject to it, but that this spiritual nature in man has itself become depraved. It is only on the hypothesis of a weakening and derangement of man's religious consciousness that we can conceive of those lower impulses ever succeeding in attaining ascendency over it.[1] When this is kept in view it will be easy to understand the close connection between belief and life as two sides of the one fact, the two essential elements in religion. Belief and conduct, where both are honest and real, must correspond. It should, however, be remembered that it is the religious faith which forms the basis of the religious life. The popular cry that religion is a life, not a set of doctrinal beliefs, is shallow and inconsiderate. It does not even present the right issue in any possible conflict. Theology never proposed to define religion as the acceptance of a set of doctrines; but it has affirmed, and does

[1] See Müller, *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, ii. pp. 282–286.

affirm, that the acceptance of certain beliefs regarding God and man, and the relation between God and man, are the first evidences of a religious consciousness out of which a religious life must be developed. To say that religion is a life is even more seriously false, or irreparably defective, than to say that religion is a faith. If the term faith is rightly understood, it already contains the life in germ. Religion is a faith which has its living centre in heartfelt convictions concerning spiritual truth, and its manifestations in works and ways to which these give birth.

We speak not only of religion but also of religions; yet in the treatment of these it is the idea of religion that is sought after. The theory of religion, which provides a sphere for the development of doctrinal belief, interests itself in the ethnic religions only with a view to discover what of the idea of religion they severally contain. The theologian is not interested in the many gods of heathenism but in the divine ideas, the thoughts and views of God which make any national faith a religion in spite of polytheistic superstition and delusion. The history of religions is valuable as a propædeutic to dogmatics, as yielding a sufficient basis for a deduction as to the general idea of religion common to all ages and races.[1] This common element in all religions is the recognition of a relation between men and God, before we have any idea of God beyond that of existence as a superhuman being in some way related to humanity.

The so-called proofs for the being of God are discussed by Dr. Caird in his *Philosophy of Religion*. This is quite a proper position for the discussion, especially for the philosophical investigation as to their force and significance. Similarly, they are discussed and criticised by Kant in his *Critique of the Pure Reason*. The occasion of the introduction of the

[1] This common element of all religions is what may rightly be styled natural religion. See able defence of the division of religion into natural and revealed by Flint in his *Theism*, 2nd ed., Edin. 1878, note 1, pp. 326–329: "Natural religion is the foundation of all theology, as the law of nature is the foundation of all ethical and political science."

subject in such a connection is to determine whether psychologically it may not be found impossible to avoid concluding the existence of an infinite and eternal being. What we have got to deal with here is not the psychological investigation which leads up to the idea of religion, but simply the theory of religion which considers that idea as a fact in history. Now, this idea which we here accept as a fact already assumes the divine existence, and so we are not at this stage concerned with its proof. In many dogmatical works these proofs are discussed in the introduction under the section on religion. Biedermann quite rightly says that these proofs are not as such matters belonging to the religious consciousness itself, but rather constitute the logical demonstration of the way in which the religious consciousness as rational raises itself to God. And therefore, as he also perceives, their discussion belongs to the philosophy of religion (which he wrongly introduces into the introduction to dogmatics), and their critical estimation to the section in dogmatics on the doctrine of God.[1] Nitzsch has shown in an admirable manner that proofs of the existence of God, had these been possible, would have been the task, not of dogmatics but of metaphysics, and that in dogmatics, for what they really are, not proofs but explanations or illustrations of a presupposed fact, their place is in immediate connection with the idea and knowledge of God.[2]

One of the most widespread and long-insisted-upon theories of the origin of religion is that of a primitive revelation handed down through all the ages by tradition. Principal Fairbairn[3] has well shown the thoroughly irreligious character of this theory. If man is supposed to have had no notion of religion until it was communicated to him from without, then we must admit that his original consciousness was practically

[1] Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik*, Berl. 1884, vol. i. 244–253; ii. 470–472. See also Kahnis, *System der Lutherischen Dogmatik*, Leipzig, 1868, pp. 31–35.

[2] Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik*, § 14, pp. 345–351.

[3] *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion and History*, London, 1876, p. 14. See also Flint, *Theism*, pp. 18–29.

atheistic. The revelation could not be understood unless there was already present in him to whom it came a faculty capable of receiving and appreciating its communication. The very idea of revelation, therefore, presupposes the existence of a religious consciousness in man. All tradition represents at least an element of primitive revelation, of which it is a more or less accurate report. But just as education undoubtedly involves the communication of something that has been to some extent handed down from primitive times, yet, as its very name implies, presupposes a faculty that is addressed and appealed to, so also an outward revelation may communicate positive, religious truth to man, which can be handed down from age to age, but only on the assumption that man has a religious nature which comes out to meet and respond to this revelation. The very idea of religion implies not only the existence of God, but also the fact of a real relation between him and man, which is nothing else than the postulating of a communication between God and man; and this, as it must necessarily be from God to man, must also of necessity be a communication from God about Himself. Thus the idea of religion involves and necessarily leads up to the idea of revelation. And this idea of religion is, as we have seen, an essential and vital part of man's nature. Behind the primitive revelation there is the original endowment.

§ 3. Revelation.

Literature.—Harris, *The Self-Revelation of God*, New York, 1887. Caird, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, Glasgow, 1880, pp. 64–79. Fisher, *The Nature and Method of Revelation*, London, 1890. Sabatier, *Outlines of Philosophy of Religion*, Lond. 1897, pp. 32–66. Ewald, *Revelation, its Nature and Record*, Edin. 1884 (1st vol. of *Die Lehre der Bibel von Gott*, 4 vols., Leipzig, 1871–1876). Martineau, *The Seat of Authority in Religion*, Lond. 1890. Stanton, *The Place of Authority in Matters of Religious Belief*, Lond. 1892, pp. 28–69. Bruce, *The Chief End of Revelation*, Lond. 1881. Pfleiderer, *The Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of its History*, 4 vols., Lond. 1886–1888, vol. iv. pp. 46–94. Orr, *The*

Christian View of God and the World as centring in the Incarnation, Edin. 1893, pp. 75–80, 460–465. In the larger systematic treatises special attention should be given to the paragraphs on revelation in the following: Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evang. Dogmatik*, pp. 124–211; Biedermann, *Chr. Dogmatik*, i. 264–288; Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, Edin. 1866, pp. 12–14.

The God whose existence religion postulates is a God who relates Himself to man, who speaks to that part of man's being which is capable of receiving and understanding the communication which He makes. A God that cannot or will not speak to man is not the object of man's religious thought and feeling, nor is He such as can exercise authority and influence over man's will. In the idea and fact of religion, therefore, revelation as the operation of God is the necessary correlate of faith as the spiritual act of man. The distinction sought to be made between natural and supernatural revelation is more correctly described by the terms mediate and immediate. What we have to do with is a *spiritual* revelation, a revelation of spiritual things that is made to the spiritual part of our nature. God's revelation to man is made through those original faculties of man fitted to receive it. Each advance in religious development of the rational spiritual being is an utterance of God's voice heard and appropriated. The amount and clearness of this general revelation evidently depends upon the measure of wholeness in which the religious faculty in man continues to exist. When mankind generally, by reason of the derangement and deterioration of the religious or spiritual part of their nature, ceased to be capable of adequately responding to the voice of the Divine Revealer, God chose out special channels for His revelation. In early times special revelations were made to individuals chosen, we may suppose, for their peculiar fitness for receiving and then imparting to their fellows the truth which God desired to have communicated, or, at least, emphasised. At a later period in the history of the race, a particular nation was chosen, and Israel became the special

vehicle of the divine revelations to man. Within this favoured nation prophets and priests were the divinely appointed organs for communication, whether this came in the form of reminders or of new developments and discoveries. But everything pointed on, and was evidently intended to point on, to the consummation of God's revelations in the person of one who would be in himself, and not in the words given him to speak, an absolutely perfect and adequate revelation of God to man. This was realised historically when God showed Himself to man in Jesus Christ.

Revelation is essentially and necessarily supernatural, in the sense of its being a spiritual communication to the spiritual part of man. It is not concerned with the communication of natural knowledge, and hence allusions to the phenomena of nature that are to be found alongside of the revelation are to be distinguished from it. In the biblical story of creation, for example, we can distinguish the details of nature's processes from the special revelation of the fact that God is the author and upholder of all things.[1] Revelation is not concerned with facts of science, nor yet with philosophical niceties of a metaphysical or psychological kind, but only with facts that directly bear upon the question of the relation between God and man. It is primarily a statement of that relation, and secondarily a discovery of God's nature and of man's nature, in so far as the knowledge of these is necessary for the right understanding of the character of the relation subsisting between them. Revelation is thus the bringing of the objective facts to bear upon the subjective states of man's spiritual being in such a way as to give birth to religion. Hence we say that faith in man and revelation from God are the correlates of one another, which, operating together, find expression in religion.

[1] See Baden-Powell, *The Order of Nature considered in reference to the Claims of Revelation*, London, 1859; Temple, *The Relations between Science and Religion*, London, 1884; Calderwood, *The Relations of Science and Religion*, London, 1881. Also generally, Bruce, *The Chief End of Revelation*, London, 1881.

Among many of the ablest recent speculative theologians revelation has been understood as indicating merely the divine side of that which in man is simply the natural development of his spiritual powers.[1] The distinction made by these theologians, *e.g.* by Lipsius (*Lehrbuch*, § 56), between mediate and immediate revelation is very much the same as that ordinarily intended by the use of the terms natural and supernatural. Mediate revelation is that which comes to us through nature and history; immediate, that which speaks within man's own being of God and divine things. The mediate revelation depends for its validity upon the inner necessity of man's own spirit, which is constrained to recognise intimations of God in those outward things. The weakness and inadequacy of this theory lie in the assumption which it makes that this distinction of natural and supernatural represents two aspects of every revelation. All revelation, according to Lipsius (*Lehrbuch*, § 67), is, in respect of form and contents, at once supernatural and natural,—supernatural, as an original and *immediate* determination of the human spirit by means of the operation of the Divine Spirit in him; natural, as an effectuating, accomplished always both psychologically and historically, of a state of consciousness in itself already embraced within the spiritual nature of man. This necessity resolves itself into a practically deistical theory of the relation of God to the world and man. Notwithstanding certain statements by some of the school represented by Lipsius, the theory of revelation here laid down does not admit of any real living and personal communion between God and the human soul. No mere movement of the human spirit, even though set in motion by some influence or energy of the Divine Spirit, can be regarded as a revelation of God to man of the highest order. It is still a natural

[1] So, for example, Biedermann, *Chr. Dogmatik*, 1884, i. 264–288; Lipsius, *Lehrbuch der evang.-prot. Dogmatik*, 1876, pp. 58–64; Pfleiderer, *Grundriss der christl. Glaubenslehre*, 5th ed. 1893, pp. 17–22. See a luminous statement and acute criticism of this theory in Orr, *The Christian View of God and the World*, Edin. 1893, pp. 75–78.

revelation in the sense of being mediate through nature, the only peculiarity of its form being that it is not through external nature, but in and through man's own nature. It is still natural and mediate. We maintain, on the contrary, that there is an immediate revelation of God to man, in which he not merely sets man's spiritual powers in operation, but actually and directly communicates truth, which man's faculties can simply receive, but not work out from a mere divine stimulation. And we also maintain that this revelation is supernatural in respect of its immediateness, and in distinction from those mediate revelations through nature and history.

The insufficiency of a mediate or so-called natural revelation, even when this is understood of human nature in its highest and most spiritual faculties, is clearly seen when the several modes of this kind of revelation are particularly examined.[1] *Reason* cannot be the originating principle of any religious knowledge, but at most can only discover to us our need of that knowledge. It is properly cognisant of the special laws of our thinking, and criticises everything that is brought it in accordance with those laws of thought, which constitute its original and primary possession. In itself, and of itself, the reason can have no religion. It can only deal with a positive, revealed religion, by applying to its propositions the test of the laws of its own thinking, and classifying them according to the categories which those laws of thought supply. Then again, *conscience* is often called the voice of God in man. It is indeed one of the voices of God, but its sphere is the practical, and it speaks to us of what we must do. It is a principle of ethics rather than of dogmatics. Only indirectly, in so far as life and conduct reflect upon the creed, can it be regarded as influencing our intellectual convictions and spiritual beliefs. Nitzsch also points out that conscience is properly an inner moral tribunal, with authority

[1] See a most admirable criticism of reason, conscience, and the inner light as respectively proposed as the principle of religion, in Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evang. Dogmatik*, §§ 32–34, pp. 168–179.

over the individual, not a universal and purely objective code of laws; also, its sentences are not infallible and invariable, as the voice of God must be, but are in conflict with one another, according to the age, nationality, training, and circumstances generally of the individual in whom it utters itself; and, most important of all, conscientiousness is often quite dissociated from any idea of God, and conscience is found active and operative in irreligious and godless men.[1] The attempt to make either reason or conscience the principle of religion is distinctly naturalistic. But practically the same end is reached, namely, the denial of the necessity of a special revelation where, from the side of mysticism, the *Inner Light* is put forward as supplying such a principle. This, of course, does not apply to those evangelical mystics and spiritualists who make much of the inner light alongside of a hearty recognition of the objective historical revelation. The truth in pietism is simply this, that the inner light must prepare the soul for seeing and appreciating the objective revelation in Christ, as set forth in the Scriptures. In their emphasising of the importance of this inner light that had been too generally overlooked, the pietists were apt to represent what was simply essential to the reception of the outward revelation as essentially constituting that revelation.

The subject and object in revelation, man who receives and God who gives and is that revelation, must not be confounded, otherwise we lose hold of all idea of personality, human and divine, and drift into a pantheism that is unbiblical and unchristian, and which ultimately will be found to be unethical. Guarding against any such confusion, we may express a great truth in the words of Sabatier: "Religion and nature, the voice divine and the voice of conscience, the subject and the object of revelation, penetrate each other and become one. The supreme revelation of God

[1] A notable example of the unsuitableness and insufficiency of conscience as the principle from which a system of Christian doctrine may be constructed is seen in Schenkel, *Christl. Dogmatik vom Standpunkte des Gewissens aus dargestellt*, 2 vols., 1858–1859.

shines forth in the highest of all consciousnesses and the loveliest of human lives."[1]

§ 4. Holy Scripture.

Literature.—P. Ewald, *Ueber das Verhältnis der systematischen Theologie zur Schriftwissenschaft*, Erlangen, 1895. Rothe, *Zur Dogmatik* (1869), pp. 120–349: "Heiliges Schrift." Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, § 7, vol. i. pp. 90–108: "The Certainty of Historic Faith as Faith in the Scriptures." Van Dijk, *Begrip en Methode der Dogmatiek*, Utrecht, 1877, pp. 71–89: "Toetssteen der Dogmatiek." Beck, *Einleitung in das System der christlichen Lehre*, Stuttg. 1870, pp. 197–255: "Die Offenbarungskunde." Holtzmann, *Kanon und Tradition*, Leipzig, 1859. Goode, *The Divine Rule of Faith and Practice* (against Tractarianism), 2 vols., Lond. 1842. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Edin. 1873, i. 151–188: "The Protestant Rule of Faith." Dale, *Protestantism: its Ultimate Principle*, Lond. 1875, chap. ii.: "The Authority of Scripture." Stanton, *The Place of Authority in Matters of Religious Belief*, Lond. 1891, chap. iii.: "The Authority of the Bible," pp. 70–99. Dorner, *Das Princip unserer Kirche nach dem innern Verhältnisse seiner zwei Seiten*, Kiel, 1841; *History of Protestant Theology*, Edin. 1871, vol. i. pp. 245–258; *System of Christian Doctrine*, vol. i. pp. 168–177. Julius Müller, *Dogmatische Abhandlungen*, Bremen, 1870, ii.: "Betrachtungen über das Princip der evangelischen Kirche nach seiner formalen Seite" (1851), pp. 43–65. Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik*, Berlin, 1884, vol. i. pp. 337–344. Lipsius, *Lehrbuch d. evang. Dogmatik*, Brunsw. 1876, pp. 133–155: "Wort Gottes und heiliges Schrift."

Religion and revelation indicate the particular sphere in which the contents of dogmatics must be sought, and Christ Himself is the great theme with which all facts and ideas, and the record of such facts and ideas, that are of interest and importance to dogmatics, must concern themselves. But religion, revelation, and even Christ Himself, the highest form of revelation, are the sources of religious faith generally, rather than of Christian dogmatics. What we inquire after

[1] Sabatier, *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, London, 1897, p. 42.

here are the sources from which the dogmatist directly draws for the execution of his own peculiar task of giving scientific and systematic expression to those beliefs concerning God and Christ in their relation to man which lie within the range of religion and revelation generally. In this definite and restricted sense of the term, we distinguish in order of importance and value as sources of dogmatics: i. Holy Scripture; ii. the œcumenical symbols; iii. the Christian consciousness.

Holy Scripture is recognised by all schools as the *fons primarius* of Christian dogmatics. Discussions on inspiration and the canon belong partly to apologetics, and partly to the science of biblical introduction. Here the dogmatist must assume the results he has won in those preparatory disciplines, and must take as his chief source Scripture in that extent and form which he finds himself, in consequence of his previous studies, able to accept. Holy Scripture is not to be regarded as coextensive with the Word of God, which properly embraces all revelation in whatever way communicated; but it contains the Word of God, and, as the Word of God written, it is the specially authenticated record of revelation for us. Within the volume of Scripture also distinctions are to be made between the different parts, as of relatively greater or less importance, according to the place they occupy in the historical revelation and the special end which they were originally intended to serve. That is of highest value for the construction of the Christian doctrines which most directly and fully sets Christ forth. Hence the New Testament is of more value in dogmatics than the Old. The latter can be used as a source only secondarily, in so far as it illustrates and gives a foundation to what is set forth in the New Testament. On the same principle, certain books in the New Testament are of more importance dogmatically than others.

The primary source of Christian dogmatics is Holy Scripture. From time to time protests have been made against this position in favour of the notion that Christ Him-

self is the primary font of all Christian truth.[1] It is well that the ultimate supremacy of Christ's authority should be distinctly stated and heartily recognised. We should strongly insist that Christ Himself, in His eternal living person, is the centre and norm of the Christian religion. He is indeed *essentially* the founder of Christianity, and not merely the discoverer or first teacher of Christian truth. But to maintain this is one thing, and to make the person of Christ, whether as exegetically recovered from the Scripture record or as intuitively conceived and represented to our own religious consciousness, the primary source of dogmatics is quite another thing. In regard to dogmatics, we cannot intelligently speak of making the Person of Christ the norm and source, except by using the phrase to mean Christ's teaching, or more generally, His life. In the endeavour to get rid as much as possible of the dogmatic element of Scripture, the cry of a particular school has been: Back to the Christ of the Gospels, to the record of His own teaching, so far as that can be discovered from our canonical Gospels, unadulterated by the dogmatic elaborations of the apostles. The objection to this that at once suggests itself is that Christ was not in a position to state the full truth of His own doctrine, seeing that His last sufferings, and death, and resurrection, constituting so important a part of His doctrine, were still in the future. Materials all essential to an adequate statement of doctrine were wanting to Him which were available for those who followed. At the same time, we should heartily admit that the doctrinal development of the apostles is valid only in so far as it stands the test of comparison with the teaching

[1] Fairbairn, *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology*, Lond. 1893, especially pp. 3–21, Introduction: "The Return to Christ," and pp. 186–188: "The Modern Return to the Historical Christ." In his *Die Norm des echten Christenthums*, Leipzig, 1893, Wendt endeavours to show that the real contents of the Christian religion must be determined by the standard of Christ's own teaching, while he is careful to show that even then Scripture as a whole has its own specific worth as a dogmatic source when compared with other Christian writings outside of the canon. This is more or less nearly the attitude of the Ritschlian school generally.

and the life of Christ. They profess to draw all their materials from that source, and they ask for acceptance of the doctrine only on the plea that the source of it all is Christ, and that it is the knowledge of Christ which they set forth. But then, we should observe that the adequate forthsetting of the doctrine of Christ, in such a form as to constitute the basis and authoritative source of dogmatic construction, is to be sought, not in the simple teaching of Christ, but in the apostolic doctrine in which that teaching is unfolded and adequately expressed.

It has been maintained by Dorner (*System of Christian Doctrine*, i. 169) that, while neither faith nor the Scriptures, but only God in Christ and in the Holy Spirit, is the principle of the existence of Christianity (*principium essendi*), faith is properly the principle of the knowledge of Christianity (*principium cognoscendi*), and that for dogmatic theology faith, with its contents appropriated from the Scriptures, constitutes the immediate material. On the contrary, we hold that not faith with Scripture as its contents, but the Scriptures, as the record of a divine revelation, which claim acceptance from man as a believer in God, who there reveals Himself, is the principle of knowledge and the source of dogmatic truth. The position of Frank,[1] which Dorner condemns, is much more in accordance with the true Protestant doctrine of Scripture, which makes Scripture the *principium cognoscendi objectivum* and then places the believing subject alongside, co-ordinated with Scripture, as the *principium cognoscendi subjectivum*, God Himself, as the *principium essendi*, binding these two together in ultimate unity. Christianity thus owes its existence to Christ, the revealer of God, but the knowledge of Christianity, as set forth in Christian dogmatics, is immediately dependent on Scripture, which is understood and received by the heart and mind of the believer.

The distinction between Scripture and the Word of God does not invalidate the claim of Scripture to supremacy or

[1] *System der christlichen Wahrheit*, 3rd ed., Erlangen, 1894, vol. i. pp. 82–99.

uniqueness as the primary source and norm of Christian dogmatics. It is not the Word of God in the wide sense, coterminous with divine revelation, that constitutes the norm of dogmatics, but the Word of God written, as we have it in the canonical Scriptures. In the Scriptures we have a permanent record of the divine revelation in its highest form in Christ Jesus. God does not repeat the revelations of earlier times, but, since the record of those revelations was closed by the completion of the canon of Scripture, he makes use of the Holy Scriptures under the dispensation of the Spirit. The authority of Scripture in the Church is that of an inspired document, transmitting to us in an adequate and authentic form the whole truth concerning God and man in their relation to one another. Many dogmatists in their introductions, or in prolegomena dealing with fundamental doctrine, discuss at length the idea of inspiration. This, as well as the question of the miraculous generally, can only be adequately treated in a separate science of apologetics, except in so far as it falls within the limits of the section on the work of the Holy Spirit in the Church. It is only necessary here to say, that whatever theory of inspiration be adopted Scripture must have the place of primary source of dogmatics. In order to secure this place, Scripture must indeed be inspired, but even when the freest criticism has been applied to the documents the doctrinal material remains practically unaffected. The dogmatist must go to work from his own critical standpoint, and in his dogmatics he must use Scripture as he, on critical grounds, is convinced in regard to the authenticity and integrity of its several parts. In the present treatise, the inspiration, and consequently the canonicity, of all the books of the Old and New Testaments are accepted; and hence, subject to what has been said above of the diversity of dogmatic importance characterising different portions of Scripture, the whole collection of books in both Testaments is received as Scripture of normative authority in dogmatics. It may be well to emphasise here the reservation now made. It would be preposterous to ascribe equal im-

portance to every saying in these books, or even to each of those books as compared with the others. Scripture is the record of the revelation of God in Christ, and the several parts of Scripture contribute, but in very diverse degrees of clearness and distinctness, to the knowledge of God in Christ.

In calling Scripture the norm and primary source of Christian dogmatics, it is not implied that the dogmatist simply carries over from Scripture the doctrines there set forth and arranges them in a systematic order. By doing so he would at best present only a biblical theology of the Old and New Testaments. Nor yet is the dogmatist simply to record the interpretations put upon the Scripture doctrines, and the form given them by the recognised teachers of the Church and in the accepted doctrinal formularies. By so doing he would only give us a history of Christian doctrines. On the contrary, he must have before him both the biblical and the ecclesiastical statements of doctrine as the materials on which he must himself work, contributing, just what those church fathers had contributed, his own highest thought and reflection energised and quickened by the influence of God's Spirit on his heart and mind. Dogmatics is not a purely objective statement of what had been originally revealed, or even of what has been thought and said about that revelation. This objective statement is the material on which he works. Because this objective material is his primary source, he is saved from a reckless and unregulated subjectivism; but he brings with him his own personal spiritual experience, as well as the culture which his studies in history, especially in that of the progress of theological thought, have brought him.

§ 5. The Œcumenical Symbols.

Literature.—Schaff, *The Creeds of Christendom*, 3 vols., Lond. 1877, especially vol. ii.: "Creeds of Greek and Latin Churches." Harvey, *The History and Theology of the Three Creeds*, 2 vols., Lond. 1854. Lumby, *History of the Creeds*, Lond. 1873, 2nd ed. 1880. Hefele, *History of the Christian Councils*, vol. i., Edin. 1872, pp. 262–447, especially pp. 293–

296: "The Nicene Creed"; vol. ii., Edin. 1876, pp. 340–374, especially pp. 348–351: "The Tome and the Creed" (of Constantinople, 381). Von Scheele, *Theologische Symbolik*, 3 vols., Gotha, 1881, vol. i. pp. 42–85, especially pp. 69–76: "The Universal Character of Christianity from the Subjective Point of View."—Directly on confessions as sources of dogmatics: Dunlop, *Collection of Confessions of Faith*, 2 vols., Edin. 1719, vol. i. Preface, pp. 1–154: "Uses and Ends of Confessions of Faith." Macpherson, *Westminster Confession of Faith*, Edin. 1882, 2nd ed., Introd. pp. 1–7: "The Place and Purpose of Confessions of Faith." Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik*, 1884, vol. i. pp. 344–382 (where he shows that dogmatics has as its sources, not only the Scripture canon as fixed by the Church, but the reflection and criticism which the Church itself has expended on the doctrines of Scripture, as recorded in confessions, and all other utterances of the Church community down to the present day). Lipsius, *Lehrbuch d. evang.-protest. Dogmatik*, 1876, pp. 155–161, especially on the distinction between "Confessions" and "Confessional Writings," between substance and details of confessions.

Symbolical writings, or creeds and confessions, constitute a *fons secundarius* of Christian dogmatics. These are of two classes. We have, on the one hand, the great Œcumenical Creeds: the so-called Apostles' Creed (*Symbolum Romanum*), the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan Creed (325, 381), and the so-called Athanasian Creed. These are valuable and authoritative for the whole Christian Church, and represent the Church doctrine on all the leading dogmas of the Christian faith. We have, on the other hand, the distinctive confessions or particular doctrinal testimonies of the several churches (Greek Church, Roman Catholic, Lutheran and Reformed), and those of the several national Reformed churches (Scottish, Gallican, Anglican, Westminster Confession). In dogmatics only the Œcumenical Creeds can properly be used as sources of Church doctrine; but the confessions of particular churches may be employed to illustrate the later development of dogma under pressure of peculiar historical conditions.

The Apostles' Creed[1] received its name in consequence of the legend circulated in the fourth century by Ambrose and Rufinus,[2] according to which it was the work of the apostles in Jerusalem before their scattering. Although this story has no support in fact, the formulary is undoubtedly of great antiquity. Early writers who style it apostolic may have done so on the ground of the apostolical character of its doctrine.[3] That a sum of saving truth was given by apostles and apostolic men to the several churches which they had founded is almost certain from allusions in New Testament epistles to "the good deposit" (2 Tim. i. 14), the profession of "belief in God" (Tit. iii. 8), "the faith once for all delivered to the saints" (Jude 3), etc. We have the express statement of Rufinus, in the latter half of the fourth century, that those who were presented to receive the ordinance of baptism were required to recite publicly the Creed, and that those who were believers before them were so familiar with the formula that no departure from the precise words would be allowed to pass. It may safely be assumed that in apostolic times a very short statement was made of belief in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as a baptismal formula, which was gradually expanded into that formula of twelve articles, under that original trinitarian distribution, which we now have. Of the use of the Creed in its present form at Rome we have distinct traces in the second half of the second century.

[1] The best doctrinal exposition of the "Apostles' Creed" is Pearson, *Exposition of the Creed*, 1659, ed. by Burton, 2 vols., Oxf. 1843. Both history and doctrine are well treated in Harvey, *History and Theology of the Three Creeds*, London, 1854, pp. 1–51, 89–540. The most thorough modern investigations into the history of the Creed are to be found in Caspari, *Ungedruckte Quellen zur Geschichte des Taufsymbols und der Glaubensregel*, 3 vols., 1866–1875; *Alte und neue Quellen zur Gesch. des Taufsymbols u. der Glaubensregel*, 1879. Zahn, *Das Apostolische Symbolum*, Leipzig, 2nd ed. 1893 (a sketch of the history and a discussion of the contents). For an exhibition of variations in form, as well as an exposition of its doctrines, see Westcott, *The Historic Faith*, 3rd ed., London, 1885.

[2] Roman Catholics claim the authority of Augustine for the common tradition, but the sermon in which the statement referred to occurs is certainly spurious.

[3] Calvin, *Institutes*, ii. chap. 16, § 18.

The Nicene Creed was prepared at the council which was convoked by the Emperor Constantine to meet in 325 A.D. at Nicea, a town of Bithynia, by a company of somewhere about three hundred bishops. All who signed it did so on the understanding that it introduced no novelty, but simply proclaimed the universal belief of the Church from apostolic times. It followed the trinitarian order of the Apostles' Creed; but inasmuch as the special occasion which called it forth was the dissemination of christological errors by Arius, and those who more or less fully adopted his views, the section on the Son is elaborated with special care. Its most characteristic pronouncement is the declaration that the Son is of the *same substance* with the Father. In the end all the bishops present, with the exception of two, Theonas of Marmarica and Secundus of Ptolemais, subscribed the Creed and accepted the homoousian doctrine, though the *bona fides* of other three, Eusebius of Nicomedia, Theognis of Nicea, and Maris of Chalcedon, is not above suspicion. The persistency of the Arian heresy in the Eastern Church led to the convocation by the Emperor Theodosius of the second Œcumenical Council at Constantinople in 381 A.D., at which the Nicene Creed was reissued in an expanded and improved form. In the Constantinopolitan edition of the Creed, the doctrine of the Holy Ghost was more adequately expressed, and the subjects of the later clauses of the Apostles' Creed received careful statement.

The so-called Athanasian Creed, also called from its first word the Symbolum *Quicunque*, was originally written in Latin, probably in Southern Gaul. With regard to its date, there has been a long-continued controversy.[1] Some still

[1] In favour of the early date may be named: Waterland, *Critical History of the Athanasian Creed*, Camb. 1724; Harvey, *History and Theology of the Three Creeds*, London, 1854; Caspari, *Alte und neue Quellen zur Gesch. d. Taufsymbols u. d. Glaubensregel*, Christiania, 1879; Ommaney, *The Athanasian Creed*, London, 1875, and *The Early History of the Athanasian Creed*, London, 1880; *Texts and Studies*, iv. 1, Camb. 1896,—Burn, *The Athanasian Creed and its Early Commentators* (see p. xcviii, where 425–430 A.D. is given as probable date). In favour of the later date: Ffoulkes, *The Athanasian*

contend for its early date, assigning it to the fifth century, while others insist that it cannot be traced back beyond the eighth century. The ground on which all arguments about date proceed is the absence of allusion to such heresies as those of Nestorius and Eutyches, which some account for by the supposition that it was composed before these arose, and others by the supposition that before it was drawn up the agitation caused by these had long passed away. The earliest appearance of it in its present form is in a manuscript of Trèves of the eighth century. It consists of two parts: the first treating of the Trinity on Augustinian lines; the second treating of Christ's Person and atoning work on the lines of the Nicene or Chalcedonian conclusions. Its form is controversial, as if written in defence of the writer's orthodoxy. The Greeks in their contest with the Latins repudiated its authority because of its clear statement of the double procession of the Spirit. Thus it is not strictly entitled to be called œcumenical. Vigorous opposition to its liturgical use in the Anglican Church has been shown mainly on account of the presence of the damnatory clauses, and its position that salvation depends upon the acceptance of the articles of a creed.[1]

In the Roman Catholic Church tradition has practically taken the place of Holy Scripture as the primary source of dogmatics. This position is bound up with the Romish doctrine of the Church, and to some extent it may be regarded as the Catholic counterpart of the Protestant atti-

Creed, by whom written, etc., London, 1871; Swainson, *Literary History of the Nicene and Apostles' Creeds, and that commonly called the Creed of St. Athanasius*, London, 1875; Lumby, *History of the Creeds*, London, 2nd ed. 1880. Waterland seeks to prove, from absence of references to Nestorianism and Eutychianism, that it was composed before these heresies arose, and as a polemic against Apollinarianism, probably by Hilary of Arles on entering upon his episcopate in 429 (*Crit. Hist.* chap. vii.). Harvey makes an elaborate attempt to prove an earlier date, assigning it to Victorinus of Rouen in 401 (*Hist. and Theol. of the Three Creeds*, pp. 559–584).

[1] Stanley, *Athanasian Creed, with Preface on Recommendations of Ritual Commission*, London, 1871. For Anglican view of these Creeds generally, see Thirty-Nine Articles, art. viii.; and Browne, *Exposition of Thirty-Nine Articles*, 4th ed., London, 1858, pp. 211–230.

tude toward the œcumenical confessions. The whole Church tradition is, according to the Romish theory, œcumenical, for no other organisation than the papal is recognised as a Church. The voice of the Church speaking in its great teachers, in its councils, and in the pope is accepted as authoritative, not alongside of and in addition to Scripture, but as the infallible interpretation of Scripture. As the absolutely correct rendering of Scripture, it takes the place of Scripture, and is therefore for Catholic dogmatics the *fons primarius*. Protestantism, on the contrary, with its doctrine of the perfection, sufficiency, and perspicuity of Scripture, does not admit the need of such an authoritative interpretation which must inevitably supplant the original which it reproduces and explains; but, at the same time, it heartily acknowledges the need of any help that the treatment of the Word in the Church of all ages is fitted to give toward the right understanding of it (*analogia fidei*). It has indeed to be remembered that the Holy Spirit continues to lead the Church into all truth; but this inspiration, common to all true members of the community of believers, does not give to the deliverances of the community a normative authority, which is the distinctive prerogative of Holy Scripture.

Catholicism claims infallibility and finality for the traditional expression of dogma, but Protestantism makes no such claim on behalf of her standards. "No Protestant Church professes to be infallible. Its most solemn Confessions of Faith have only a provisional value. . . . A Church that would exclude this spirit of reform would cease to be a Protestant Church."[1] All the confessional writings of the Protestant churches profess only to give utterance to the truth of Scripture according to the knowledge and light which the Church at the time of their production possesses.[2] The confessions of particular churches

[1] Sabatier, *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, London, 1897, p. 266.

[2] See Pfleiderer, *Grundriss d. christl. Glaubens- u. Sittenlehre*, § 49, and his references to *Formula concordiæ*, p. 572; Luther on *Visitations-Artikeln* and *Confess. Basil.*

are distinctly authoritative only among the members of the particular Church from which they have issued, and especially as testimonies in regard to that doctrinal peculiarity by which as a denomination it is characterised. They may be considered rather as manifestoes of parties who have combined in order to testify in favour of some important aspect of the truth, and may be distinguished as Calvinistic, Puritanical, Arminian, Evangelical, Sacramentarian, etc. They have therefore an important historical position in the development of dogma, midway between the œcumenical confessions and the utterances of doctrinal opinion on the part of private theologians, as the record of the convictions of more or less considerable sections of the Christian Church.

§ 6. The Christian Consciousness.

Literature.—Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube* (1821), Berlin, 6th ed. 1884, §§ 15–19. Lipsius, *Lehrbuch d. evangel.-protest. Dogmatik*, Brunswick, 1876, §§ 72–115: "Das religiöse Erkennen," pp. 64–89. Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik*, Berlin, 1884, vol. i. pp. 275–283. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, Edin. 1866, pp. 57–64. Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, Lond. 1874, pp. 22–28. Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch d. evang. Dogmatik*, pp. 8–13. Kaehler, *Die Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre*, 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1893, pp. 52–54. Bois, *De la Connaissance Religieuse*, Paris, 1895.

The Christian consciousness is a source of dogmatics, not independently of Holy Scripture and the ecclesiastical confessions, but as the present living expression on the part of the believing Christian community of the truth that is in these. The failure to recognise the Christian consciousness as one of the sources of Christian dogmatics has in many cases caused a confusion between dogmatics and biblical theology on the one hand, and between dogmatics and historical theology on the other. It is essential, therefore, that we claim for it the place not merely of an organ but that of a contributory source of dogmatics. What Christian dogmatics seeks to present is the biblical doctrine as

formulated by the Church in terms of the thought and culture of the present day; and this can be done only when those dogmas find expression through the Christian consciousness of the dogmatist. The statements of Scripture and the doctrine of the Church are not of themselves dogmatic proof, nor indeed within the proper scope of dogmatic science, but, as Frank[1] says, "they present only the necessary coherence in which the consciousness of the Christian truth recognised in the present day stands with the consciousness of the historic rise of the same according to the documents of the Christian faith, and with the likewise historic process of cognition which the Church has passed through in relation to this truth bestowed upon her." It is essential that the dogmatist be no mere chronicler of past thought with reference to revealed truth, whether the more remote past of the biblical revelation, or the less remote past of church doctrinal construction (confessionalism). He must record his own beliefs and give his reasons for accepting or modifying the expression given to scriptural doctrine by the Church, and he must show how, from the Christian standpoint occupied by him, the several doctrines are interrelated, and how they mutually affect one another. He does not merely record the biblical and ecclesiastical position, but shows how these appeal to his own religious consciousness and to that of his age.

It is the special service rendered to dogmatics by Schleiermacher that he gave emphasis to the fact, which had never been denied, but had never been sufficiently recognised, that religion, which forms the subject of dogmatics, is essentially a thing of the heart. In the dogmatics of Schleiermacher we have personal religious experience and the realised relation of the soul to Christ treated as the main source. Such experience is evidently in some respects determined by the objective revelation of Scripture, and in some respects itself determines the content and form of Scripture as the product of the spirit of Christian fellowship. The exposition

[1] *System of Christian Certainty*, Edin. 1886, p. 40.

given of the inwardness of religion is in direct antagonism to that hard doctrinalism represented in the declaration of the Athanasian Creed, that the acceptance of the catholic faith which it records is necessary to salvation.[1] But the emphasis thus laid upon the religious consciousness as a source of dogmatics is useful, not only as a protest against an unspiritual intellectualism, but also as securing permanent recognition for that distinguishing human faculty which makes men capable of receiving a divine revelation. Oosterzee proposes to call the Christian consciousness a *fons internus*, alongside of the *fons primarius et secundarius*. That it is all essential as a source of theological knowledge is unquestionable. The truth must be assimilated, and no measure of accuracy in the presentation of objective religious truth can be of any importance to man as a religious being unless set forth from the point of view of one who has found in it an answer to his own inner religious consciousness. The dogmatist must hold the standpoint of *experimental* acquaintance with that relation to God in Christ which forms the real and central principle of his system.

§ 7. Dogmatics in Relation to the Other Theological Sciences.

Literature.—Rabiger, *Encyclopædia of Theology*, 2 vols., Edin. 1884, vol. i. pp. 308–314, ii. 297–306. Cave, *An Introduction to Theology: its Principles, its Branches, its Results, and its Literature* (1886), Edin., 2nd ed. 1896, pp. 81–92, 521–524. Crooks and Hurst, *Theological Encyclopædia and Methodology, on the basis of Hagenbach*, New York, 1884, pp. 394–398. Drummond, *Introduction to the Study of Theology*, Lond. 1884, pp. 165–177. Doedes, *Encyclopedie der christijlike Theologie*, 2nd ed., Utrecht, 1883, pp. 155–159. Lange, *Grundriss der theologischen Encyclopaedie*, Heidelberg, 1897, pp. 177, 178. Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch d. evang. Dogmatik*, pp. 13–16. Gottschick in Herzog, *Real-Encyclopaedie*,[2] xv. 431 f., art. "Theologie." Gretillat,

[1] The first three sections are: *Quicunque vult salvus esse, ante omnia opus est, ut teneat Catholicam fidem; Quam nisi quisque integram inviolatamque servaverit, absque dubio in æternum peribit, Fides autem Catholica hæc est*, etc.

Exposé Théologic Systématique, Neuchâtel, 1885, vol. i. pp. 200–284. Kaehler, *Die Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre*, Leipzig, 1893, pp. 24–34: "Die Gliederung der Theologie."

Theological encyclopædia is the discipline in which the distribution of the theological sciences and their relations to one another have to be determined. The leading writers in this department in recent times, Hagenbach, Rabiger, Heinrici, have all agreed to a fourfold distribution of the theological sciences, making systematic theology (including fundamental theology or theory of religion, dogmatics and ethics) the third in order, preceded by exegetical and historical theology, and followed by practical theology. Those who, like Hofmann and Gottschick, make a threefold distribution secure the reduction by obliterating the distinction between the exegetical and historical departments. When, on the other hand, Dr. Cave proposes to work out a sixfold distribution, this results from his undue widening of the range of the theological sciences. He agrees with Drummond in extending the term theological encyclopædia to heathen religions as well as to the Christian religion, and understands theology to mean the science of any religion. The German writers on encyclopædia, without exception, restrict it to the treatment of the Christian theological sciences, and for this they are severely reproved by Drs. Flint and Stewart. In accordance with this principle, Dr. Cave prefixes to the ordinary four main divisions of theology two preliminary sections on natural theology and ethnic theology. We cannot agree with the distinguished men who would make theology coextensive with religion, and in the case before us we hold that only ethnic religions can be spoken of, each with a more or less developed theology, but not an ethnic theology. What we have to do with here is the arrangement of the theological disciplines dealing with the Christian religion.

Accepting the fourfold schema, as above described, the relation of dogmatics to the other theological sciences, and more particularly to the other disciplines included under the title systematic theology, is quite evident. As systematic it is based upon the results of exegetical and historical research,

and forms in turn the material made use of or turned to practical account in the various disciplines of practical theology. It has as its sources revelation as Scripture and revelation as sacred history,—the immediate communication of divine truth in the inspired Word or the mediate communication of the same in the consciousness of the Christian community.

Then again, within the domain of systematic theology, dogmatics occupies a position midway between the theory of religion or fundamental theology and Christian ethics. In the science of religion we have the foundation laid for the construction and distribution of the distinctive doctrines of the Christian religion in dogmatics, while Christian ethics is the complement of dogmatics, inasmuch as only when the contents of ethics have been added to those of dogmatics have we a full presentation of all the constituent elements of religion in its perfect form as the Christian religion. In Christian ethics we have, according to Rothe, a history, statistics, and politics of the kingdom of God. It presupposes throughout, not Christian dogmatics, but the Christian faith. Thus it deals with the same elements as dogmatics, and has for its subject the Christian faith in the actions of men who believe, just as dogmatics has as its subject the Christian faith in the saving acts and operations of God. Dorner puts the matter very well: "As dogmatics grows up out of the *Regula fidei* and the Apostles' Creed, so evangelical ethics grows up out of the Decalogue."[1] Hence ethics is a correlate of dogmatics under systematic theology. Dogmatics and ethics, as embracing between them the whole contents of the Christian religion, have been treated together, sometimes amalgamated in one "System of Christian Doctrine,"[2] sometimes only successively in one manual.[3] Now, it cannot be denied that such a presentation of the two elements making up the

[1] In art. "Ethik" in Herzog, *Real-Encyclopaedie*,[2] iv. 361.

[2] As by C. I. Nitzsch in *System der christlichen Lehre* (1844), Eng. trans. *System of Christian Doctrine*, Edin. 1849.

[3] By Pfleiderer, Kaehler, and others.

contents of religious science is instructive and helpful. But there is no more reason why they should be wrought up together or even embraced in one handbook than there would be for thus dealing with psychology and metaphysics. Christian dogmatics and Christian ethics are just as much distinct and separate theological disciplines as psychology and metaphysics are distinct and separate philosophical disciplines. At the same time, we should remember that, as in all similar cases, anything like a complete and exhaustive separation is not possible, nor is it at all to be desired. In the science of dogmatics we have still an ethical element, and in the science of ethics we have still a doctrinal element.

Our definition of dogmatics will materially affect our notion of the relation which it bears to the other departments of theological science, the exegetical, historical, and practical. Those who regard dogmatics as simply the classification and elucidation of church dogma place it among the historical sciences, and in that case it is scarcely distinguishable from what is usually called the history of doctrines. Those, again, who insist upon giving it a purely biblical character, if they do not altogether confound it with biblical theology, make it a sort of methodised biblical theology or biblical dogmatic, and can consistently place it only under exegetical theology. When we rightly recognise the distinctive part played by the religious consciousness in the construction of dogmatics we secure for it its proper place as the positive treatment of the contents of the Christian faith, with biblical and historical elements, yet not an exegetical nor a historical science, but a science treating systematically the material brought to it by exegesis and church history through the medium of the theory of religion.[1] In common with all the disciplines in the first three departments of the encyclopædia, dogmatics and ethics form the basis and supply the contents of practical theology.

[1] The relation of "systematic theology" to biblical theology has been very clearly stated by Prof. Warfield in an excellent paper in *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review* for April 1896, entitled, "The Idea of Systematic Theology." See especially pp. 256–258.

§ 8. Distribution of the Several Dogmas.

Literature.—Cave, *Introduction to Theology*, Edin. 1896, pp. 543–548. Macpherson, "The Idea of Dogmatic Theology and Classification of its Dogmas," art. in *Brit. and For. Evangel. Review* for July 1875, vol. xxiv., espec. pp. 535–543. Lange, *Grundriss der theologischen Encyclopaedie*, Heidelberg, 1877, pp. 180–187. Drummond, *Introduction to the Study of Theology*, London, 1884, pp. 184–207. Smith, *Introduction to Christian Theology*, New York, 1883, pp. 225–231. Crooks and Hurst, *Theological Encyclopædia* (Hagenbach), New York, 1884, pp. 420–424: "Method of Dogmatics." Rothe, *Zur Dogmatik*, Gotha, 1869, pp. 28–37: "Von der systematischen Gliederung der evangelisch-protestantischen Dogmatik."

For the distribution of the doctrines in the Dogmatic it is of first importance to have a principle sufficiently comprehensive to cover the whole ground, and one that will admit of each of the doctrines being introduced in its natural place and expounded in its just proportions. The christological, the trinitarian, and the idea of the kingdom of God are principles which have been found too narrow. The attempt to use the idea of the kingdom of God as the principle of distribution in dogmatics has in recent times, under the influence of the Ritschlian school, been made by many. The best example of this scheme is afforded by Oosterzee (*Christian Dogmatics*, London, 1874, pp. 229–233). But here we have simply the usual modification of the local method—theology, anthropology, christology, soteriology, ecclesiology, and eschatology—designated in terms of the idea of the kingdom of God. Professor Candlish, in the preface to his *Christian Doctrine of God*, says: "The notion of the kingdom of God seems to be that which has the highest authority and is most comprehensive; and it has therefore been taken here as the basis of the arrangement and establishment of the various doctrines of Christianity." Yet even in this case the scheme looks as if artificially laid on, and not as vitally belonging to the exposition. Also Dr. Candlish makes no use of it in his later work on the Doctrine of Sin.

The trinitarian principle of division might seem most comprehensive, yet even here, as seen in Martensen's *Christian Dogmatics*, the doctrines which may be grouped together under the general designation of subjective soteriology (*ordo salutis*), as well as the important details of anthropology, find no suitable or adequate place.

To many, no doubt, the christological principle of distribution commends itself, because they regard this as the natural consequence of their acceptance of the undoubtedly true thought that all genuinely Christian theology must be christocentric. But perhaps, if we considered the matter aright, the very fact that the Person of Christ is the material principle might supply the proof that it was ill fitted to be the formal principle of Christian theology. If it be adopted at all, it can only be in some such way as is done by Schultz (*Grundriss der evang. Dogmatik*, Gött. 1892), who treats of God and the world, of man and sin, as prolegomena, presuppositions of the Christian salvation, and then, as contents of the Christian salvation,—the saving work of the Son of God (Person and work of Christ) and the saving acts of the Spirit of God (Church, means of grace, *ordo salutis*, perfecting of salvation). But the very necessity of dealing with God, the world, men and sin, in sections which are formally outside of the system, is itself the most crushing condemnation of the scheme. It would represent man and his world as ministering to the Son of God, who, as Son of Man, represents Himself as coming not to be ministered unto but to minister. Lange proposes (*Encyclopaedie*, p. 180) to place the revelation of God in Christ at the head of the system, not as constituting its middle point, but as the ideal historical principle, and then presents the following scheme: i. the christological theology (God in relation to man, man in relation to God, mutual relation of God and man); ii. the christological soteriology (life of Jesus, nature of Christ, redemption work of Christ); iii. the universal christology or pneumatology (in the individual sphere, *ordo salutis*; in the social sphere, the Church and its ordinances; in the cosmical sphere,

eschatology). But here it is quite evident that we have merely a christological phraseology artificially laid upon materials which have been already arranged according to another principle. If we were to accept of any distribution determined by the adoption of a single central principle, we should find specially attractive that threefold arrangement, admirably laid out by Philippi (*Glaubenslehre*, i. 104), and adopted by Räbiger (*Encyclopaedie*, ii. 339): The idea of religion is the fellowship of man with God, wrought out in dogmatics, according to Räbiger's phraseology, as—(1) the revelation of God to man, (2) the separation between God and man, (3) the reconciliation of man with God.

It seems better, in order to avoid the artificiality which belongs to all of those schemes, to revert to a modified, and somewhat methodised, form of the old *local* arrangement of doctrines. This will be best secured by a blending of the historical and logical methods in the treatment of the development of man in his relations to God. We propose to arrange the contents of our dogmatics under these six divisions: i. the doctrine of God and the world; ii. the doctrine of man and sin; iii. the doctrine of redemption—divine decree, Person and work of Christ; iv. application of redemption—revelation to and work in us by the Spirit; v. the means of grace—church, sacraments, word, prayer, etc.; vi. the last things—resurrection, eternal states.

§ 9. History of Dogmatics.

Doctrinal investigations and discussions of necessity are coterminous and coextensive with the revelation of divine truth. We therefore have doctrinal statements in the original sources of the Christian faith, and in the simplest discourses and least elaborate writings of the early Christian workers. But the history of dogmatics attends primarily to attempts at framing a full and orderly representation of the whole truth as a system, and only secondarily indicates those discussions on particular doctrines that have significantly affected the further develop-

ment and construction of systematic theology. For convenience of arrangement and presentation we may distinguish six periods: (1) period of the Early Church down to John of Damascus; (2) period of Middle Ages down to Reformation; (3) period of Reformation; (4) period of Protestant Scholasticism; (5) period of spiritual and speculative revival; (6) period of modern theology.

(1) *Period of the Early Church.*

LITERATURE.—Harnack, *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur bis Eusebius*, Berlin, 1893. Krüger, *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur in den ersten 3 Jahrhundert*, 2nd ed. 1894. Harnack, *The History of Dogma*, 5 vols., London, 1894, vol. i. Schaff, *Ante-Nicene Christianity*, A.D. 100–325, 2 vols., Edin. 1883; *Nicene and Post-Nicene Christianity*, A.D. 325–600, 2 vols., Edin. 1884. Donaldson, *History of Christian Literature to the Nicene Council*, 3 vols., London, 1864. Jackson, *Early Christian Literature Primers*, 4 vols., New York, 1879–1883. Pressensé, *Early Years of Christianity*, vol. iii.: "Heresy and Christian Doctrine," London, 1879. Cruttwell, *A Literary History of Early Christianity*, 2 vols., London, 1893. Bartlet, *Early Church History*, London, 1894. Baehr, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur*, vol. iv., Leipzig, 1872. Ebert, *Geschichte der christlich-lateinischen Literatur*, vol i. to Charlemagne, Leipzig, 1874. Lechler, *Apostolic and Post-Apostolic Times*, 2 vols., Edin. 1886.

Much useful, indeed indispensable, preparatory work was done by the members of the Alexandrian catechetical school, especially by Clement of Alexandria, in his three consecutive works: Exhortation to the Heathen, the Instructor, and the Miscellanies, about the end of the second century (trans. in 2 vols., Edin. 1867–1869). The earliest treatise, however, that has any claim to be styled a Dogmatic is the great work of ORIGEN (185–254) entitled *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, *De principiis*. This work was written probably about 218 A.D., and represents a very noble effort of a truly great and thoughtful man to give expression to the leading doctrines of the Christian faith, in such a form as might win the respect and attention of those who were abreast of the culture and science of the age. It is divided into

four books. The first book treats of God, His essential nature, the relation of the three persons in the godhead to man, and the progress of spiritual life in man by the action upon him of Father, Son, and Spirit. He accounts for man's present moral and spiritual position by postulating a pre-existent state in which his use of God's gifts and revelations determined his temporal state. This applied to all rational creatures; to angels as well as to men. The second book deals in detail with the creation and the facts of human life and history. Here Origen applies the hypothesis of pre-existence to account for the inequalities and apparent contradictions of life. These present difficulties which are inexplicable to us just because we see only in part. Sufferings result from what preceded, and wrongs that in this life remain unrighted will be righted in some future system of discipline. In the future state men pass from one sphere to another in a process of gradual and progressive purifying; resurrection is to judgment, and punishment is just and severe that the end may be perfect purification. The third book deals with man's moral and spiritual endowments as those of a creature possessed of free will. Sin is from within man himself. It is for man, who starts with the rank of one made in the image of God, to grow up into the perfect likeness of God. Man's use of freedom leads to complete self-surrender; refusal to make this surrender delays, but cannot prevent, the consummation of all things. The fourth book treats of Holy Scripture as the basis of the whole system. "He examines," says Westcott,[1] "with a reverence, an insight, a humility, a grandeur of feeling never surpassed, the question of the inspiration and the interpretation of the Bible." The defects of arrangement are very apparent. No adequate treatment of christology, or indeed of the great central Christian doctrine of the redemption by

[1] Smith's *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, iv. p. 121. The whole of Westcott's long and exhaustive article, pp. 96-142, is most admirable, and gives the student almost all that he needs to know about Origen and his work. See also interesting and instructive papers by Westcott on "Origen and the Beginnings of Christian Philosophy" in *Contemporary Review* for 1879. Also Bigg, *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, Oxf. 1886 (Lects. iv.-vi. on Origen).

Christ, is possible under the scheme proposed; and the doctrine of the Church is altogether ignored.

Throughout the fourth and fifth centuries there was great dogmatic activity in the Eastern Church in the christological discussions occasioned by the Arian, Apollinarian, Nestorian, and Eutychian heresies. Of chief interest dogmatically are the works of Athanasius (300–373, especially: Epistle of Athanasius in Defence of the Nicene Definition of the Homoousion, The Epistle concerning the Arian Council of Ariminum and Seleucia, and The Three Discourses against the Arians,—all included in Dr. Newman's *Select Treatises of St. Athanasius*, London, 1881) and Gregory of Nyssa (332–398, Λόγος κατηχητικὸς ὁ μέγας; see translation in *Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, edited by Schaff and Wace, vol. v., London, 1893).

The second formal attempt at a Dogmatic was made by Augustine (353–430) in his *Enchiridion ad Laurentium: de fide, spe et caritate.* His *De Civitate Dei* and *De Trinitate* are highly important dogmatic works (translated in Clark's ed. of Augustine, Edin. 1872, 1873). In *De fide et symbolo* (a translation of which appears in the same vol. with that of the *Enchiridion* in Clark's ed., Edin. 1874) we have an exposition of the Creed. Otherwise the dogmatic activity of Augustine was mainly polemical, and is represented by his writings against the Manichæans and Pelagians. The *Enchiridion* makes a formal attempt to present the whole Christian truth in a systematic form under the threefold scheme provided by the Pauline arrangement of the Christian graces of faith, hope, and love. Zöckler (*Handbuch der theologischen Wissenschaften*, 1885, i. 27) calls this book "a miracle of correct and indeed of eloquent system-construction." Under the section *de fide* he deals with the leading Christian doctrines as set forth in the three articles of the Creed; while under the section *de spe* we have not eschatological questions discussed, but the doctrine of prayer according to the several petitions of the Lord's Prayer.

The *Commonitorium* of Vincent of Lerins (*d.* about 450), in which he supports the orthodox doctrine by references to

the church fathers, is not properly a dogmatic, though it did much to give permanent form to the dogmas of the Church. It is mainly occupied with an exposition of doctrine in accordance with the church tradition, of which he gives the famous and oft-quoted definition: *quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est.* He was a pupil of Cassian, and his own theological standpoint is that of Semipelagianism.[1] To the same period belongs Gennadius of Marseilles' *Epistola de fide meâ*, or *Libellus de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus* (translated in *Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, vol. iii., 1893), in which, after professing faith in articles of the Creed, he proceeds rather discursively and unmethodically to treat of various doctrinal and ecclesiastical matters from the standpoint of a somewhat modified Augustinianism. His treatise was originally published among the works of Augustine, and in a separate form first at Hamburg, 1614.

The third treatise deserving of the name of a Dogmatic is *The Summary of the Orthodox Faith*, Ἔκδοσις ἀκριβὴς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως, of JOHN OF DAMASCUS (700–760).[2] This is by far the most considerable attempt that was made by the Eastern Church to construct a doctrinal text-book at once speculative and ecclesiastical, and is regarded by many as the first work really deserving to rank as a treatise on systematic theology. It is the third treatise in a trilogy entitled by himself, *Πηγὴ Γνώσεως*, *Fons scientiæ*, or Fountain of Knowledge, a sort of religious encyclopædia, of which the two which preceded are comparatively unimportant (*Capita philosophica*, short chapters on the categories of Aristotle, and a Compendium of Heresies, numbering 103, in which he closely follows Epiphanius). The *De fide orthodoxa* is John's most important

[1] The *Commonitorium* was translated into Scottish by Knox's opponent, Winzet, in 1563; and into English by Reeves, 1709, and more recently by Flower, London, 1866.

[2] See a very admirable and complete account of the Damascene's life and work by J. H. Lupton in Smith's *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, iii. pp. 409–423. An interesting exposition of doctrine on the basis of the great work of the Damascene, partly by quotation, partly by paraphrase, will be found in Owen, *Treatise of Dogmatic Theology*, London, 1887.

work. It consists of 100 chapters, and in later times, not by its author, it was divided into four books. The first book treats of God, His nature and attributes and tripersonality. The second book treats of the creation, the world and man. The third book treats of the incarnation, and Person of Christ. The fourth book continues the christology in its earlier chapters, and then the author turns back and deals with a variety of subjects — faith, baptism, image-worship, etc., without any principle of order, as if by way of appendix he simply took up subjects that had been overlooked or received inadequate treatment. The division into four books was due probably to a desire to conform the book as far as possible to the arrangement that had become current after the publication of the Lombard's standard treatise in the middle of the thirteenth century. John is in the main orthodox and conservative, a vigorous defender of image-worship and a pronounced sacramentarian, maintaining the change of the elements into the body and blood of Christ, though not dogmatical as to the manner of the change or suggesting anything of transubstantiation.

(2) *Period of Middle Ages.*

Literature.—For a thorough study of scholasticism there is nothing so complete and satisfactory as Werner, *Die Scholastik d. spät. M. A.*, 4 vols., Vienna, 1881–1887, and *Der Augustinismus d. spät. Schol.*, 1884. See also: Hampden, *The Scholastic Philosophy in its relation to Christian Theology*, Oxf. 1832. Kurtz, *Church History*, 3 vols., Lond. 1888, 1889, vol. ii. pp. 77–108, 166–171. Möller, *History of Chr. Church—Middle Ages*, Lond. 1893. Poole, *Illustrations of the History of Mediæval Thought* (Erigena, Abelard, etc.), Lond. 1884. Bach, *Die Dogmengeschichte des Mittelalters*, 2 vols., Vienna, 1874, 1875.—For history of literature see: Traube, *Abriss d. Geschichte d. lat. Lit. im M. A.*, Nördl. 1890. Ebert, *Geschichte d. chr.-lat. Lit.*, vol. ii.: "From Charlemagne to Charles the Bold."

In the period following John of Damascus there was a remarkable dialectic activity, and this philosophical movement, mainly on the lines of Aristotle as then known, was almost exclu-

sively exercised in the domain of theology. The great schoolmen were the leading theologians of the age. The four epochs of scholasticism are admirably defined and characterised by Kurtz (*Ch. Hist.*, vol. ii., Lond. 1889, p. 81): "From the tenth century, almost completely destitute of any scientific movement, the so-called *Sæculum obscurum*, there sprang forth the first buds of scholarship, without, however, any distinct impress upon them of scholasticism. In the eleventh century scholasticism began to show itself, and that in the form of dialectic, both sceptical and dogmatic. In the twelfth century mysticism assumed an independent place alongside of dialectic, carried on a war of extermination against the sceptical dialectic, and finally appeared in a more peaceful aspect, contributing material to the positive dogmatic dialectic. In the thirteenth century dialectic scholasticism gained the complete ascendency, and reached its highest glory in the form of dogmatism in league with mysticism, and never, in the persons of its greatest representatives, in opposition to it."

The earliest name of first-rate importance in the history of dogmatics is that of Anselm (1033–1109). Though he did not compose any comprehensive dogmatic treatise, his separate works traverse a very large part of the territory embraced in dogmatics. As a theologian he has been ranked with Augustine, and all his works show that in him remarkable acuteness of intellect is beautifully blended with deep piety and a rich vein of religious mysticism. In his *Monologium* and *Proslogium* he discusses the nature of God and the proofs for the being of God, developing the ontological proof. He expounds and develops, against the tritheism of the nominalist Roscelinus, the doctrine of the trinity and person of Christ in *De fide Trinitatis et de incarnatione Verbi*. He also writes on the question of predestination from the Augustinian standpoint in *De Concordia*, etc., and takes part in a controversy between the Easterns and the Westerns in his *De processione Spiritus*. He deals with man as subject of redemption in his three dialogues, *De veritate*, *De libero arbitrio*, and *De casu diaboli*. His epoch-making book was a

little treatise on the atonement, *Cur deus homo?* which must always rank as the classical work on the substitutionary view of the atonement, and an important landmark in the great controversy. It is the earliest attempt to construct a theory of the atonement. His position is essentially that of the fathers, stripped of excrescences such as the idea of Christ's sufferings being a ransom paid to the devil. It is, in short, an orderly arrangement of all the conclusions of patristic thought regarding the truth of the atonement which could have a place in a consistent system. It had a powerful and normative influence on the discussions of later schoolmen, so that in it may be discovered the germs of the opposing systems of mediæval and later theologians. In form it is dialectic rather than scriptural, and several of its peculiar positions—such as the notion that Christ's suffering of death is an *opus supererogationis* — are elaborated without any attempt to find for them a scriptural basis; yet as he pursues the main issue in the theory of satisfaction, we feel that Scripture truth and often even Scripture expressions, though not formally quoted, are at the basis of all his reasoning.

The most formidable opponent of Anselm is Peter Abelard (1079–1142),[1] in his writings generally, but specially in his *Commentariorum super S. Pauli epistolam ad Romanos ll. v.*, where he represents Christ's sufferings not as satisfaction to God, but as means of awakening in man a love to God which delivers him from the dominion of sin. In his two principal theological works—*De unitate et trinitate divina*, in five books (condemned at Soissons under the title, *Theologia christiana*), and the *theologia* or *Introductio ad theologiam*—

[1] See an elaborate criticism of the theories of reconciliation proposed by Anselm and Abelard in Ritschl, *Crit. Hist. of the Chr. Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, Edin. 1872, pp. 22–40. That Ritschl is unfair to Anselm and partial to Abelard, I have sought to show in an article on "Anselm's Theory of the Atonement: its Place in History," in *Brit. and For. Evangel. Review*, 1878, pp. 207–232. The most thorough treatment of Anselm's doctrine is in Hasse, *Anselm von Canterbury*, vol. ii.: "Die Lehre Anselm's," Leipzig, 1852. See also Abaelard's 1121 zu Soissons verurtheilter "Tractatus de unitate et trinitate divina." Aufgefunden u. erstmals hrsg. v. R. Stölzle, Freiburg, 1891.

he treats of the Trinity, which is represented as one of the divine attributes.

The first great systematic work of the scholastic age is the *Four Books of Sentences* of Peter the Lombard, a pupil of Abelard, who died Bishop of Paris, 1160. Books of *Sentences* had appeared before, *e.g.* the *Summa Sententiarum* of Hugo St. Victor, and the *Sententiarum ll. viii.* of Robert Pulleyn, in which the propositions or sentences of the fathers commented on are arranged so as to form a system of Christian doctrine. The work of the Lombard soon became the standard treatise on dogmatics, and was adopted by the Lateran Council of 1215 as the authoritative text-book. The first book treats of God; the second, of creatures; the third, of redemption; and the fourth, of the sacraments and the last things. It was less the expression of personal opinion and conviction, and more a statement of what the church fathers and the recognised teachers of the Church had taught, than most of those earlier works, and so it formed a common basis for academical teaching and for the work of commentators.

An important dogmatical work which has not received the attention which it deserves is the *De trinitate et operibus ejus*, in forty-two books, by Rupert, of Deutz (*d.* 1135). In this comprehensive treatise he discusses all the principal doctrines of the Christian faith under the trinitarian division: the work of the Father in creation, books i.–iii.; the work of the Son in revelation and redemption, books iv.–xxxiii.; and the work of the Spirit in sanctification, books xxxiv.–xlii. An interesting episode in this work is the presence of the theory, in opposition to Anslem, that the Son of God would have become incarnate even if man had not sinned.[1]

The *Summa theologica* of the Franciscan, Alexander Hales, teacher at Paris, who died 1245, is the first thorough specimen of the over refinements of scholasticism. It treats

[1] See Westcott, Dissertation on "The Gospel of Creation," appended to *Epistles of St. John*, 1883, pp. 277–280; Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, 1876, pp. 354 ff., 487 f.; Müller, *Dogmatische Abhandlungen*, Bremen, 1870, art. iii. pp. 66–126, especially pp. 71–73.

successively of God and of His work, the creature, of the Redeemer and His work, and of the sacraments. In a further part, not extant, he treated of the rewards of salvation in a future life. Each main division was subdivided into questions, members, articles. In one respect his method resembles that of the most recent dogmatists, though occupying a very different standpoint. Each question is answered affirmatively and negatively, and by *authorities, i.e.* by quotations from Scripture, and from the fathers and teachers of the Church; and by *reasons, i.e.* arguments or illustrations from profane writers of philosophy: and finally, by his own opinion,—essentially the same as the sections: *Scripture doctrine*, *ecclesiastical dogma*, and *critical result* or *rational residuum*, of recent doctrinal systems. His pupil and brother Franciscan, Bonaventura (John Fidanza, 1221–1274), teacher in Paris 1253, added the mystical element to the dialectic acuteness of his master He wrote a commentary on the Lombard, and presents in his *Centiloquium*, in a hundred sections, a brief exposition of the doctrines of grace, sin, and salvation. His *Breviloquium*, in which he seeks to show that the doctrines of the Church and the teachings of reason agree, is rather an Apologetic than a Dogmatic. Another follower of Hales is the Dominican, Albert the Great (1193–1280), whose fame is that of an encyclopædist rather than a theologian. Besides commentaries on the Lombard, he wrote a *Summa theologica* on the lines of Hales. Others of his works show that he was in no respect beyond his age in his conception of physics and the natural world.

From a theological and expressly dogmatical point of view the greatest of all the schoolmen is the Dominican, Thomas Aquinas (1227–1274). His *Summa totius theologiæ* treats of the whole range of dogmatics in three books. In the first book he treats of God as the most perfect being, and of the work which He has produced by His omnipotence. In the second book he treats of man as the image of God, in so far as he, as a free rational being, strives after God as the

one end of his being. In the third book he treats of Christ and the means of grace ordained by Him for the attainment of salvation. The work remains incomplete, ending with Question 90, in the middle of the doctrine of repentance. The section on repentance was completed, and those on the other sacraments and on eschatology were added, from the other works of Aquinas. In this great work he deals with the same themes as those on which he had previously written in his commentary on the Lombard, but in a much more concise and methodical manner, leaving aside many useless and curious questions into which it was customary then to go. Such questions he had himself very fully discussed in his earlier works, *Quæstiones disputatæ* and *Quæstiones quodlibeticæ*. His first attempt at a compact treatise on dogmatics was made in the *Compendium theologiæ*, in three books, in which he followed Augustine in distributing his material under the threefold schema of the Christian virtues: faith, hope, charity. Of this work only the section on faith, in 246 chapters, and 10 chapters of the section on hope, are extant. His masterpiece, the *Summa*, has proved by far the most influential work of mediæval times. The present pope, Leo XIII., after giving the papal imprimatur to the doctrine of Thomas, has caused a new edition of the whole works of the great teacher to be issued (Rome, 1882–1889). His doctrine of the Church, where he founds upon ancient documents, is of little value, since, in consequence of his ignorance of Greek, he had no other source to rely upon than Gratian's decretals. In general, his master in theology is Augustine, and in philosophy, Aristotle.[1]

The only other schoolman worthy of being compared with Aquinas is his rival and opponent, the Franciscan, John Duns Scotus, teacher in Oxford, at Paris 1304, died at Cologne, superior of his order, 1308. He seems to endeavour

[1] A good account of the doctrine of Thomas and its history is given by Landerer and Wagenmann, in Herzog,[2] i. 575–594. See also article by Fr. Nitzsch in *Jahrbücher für protest. Theologie*, 1876, pp. 551–560. Kaftan, *Truth of the Christian Religion*, Edin. 1894, i. 171–187.

at every point to contradict the teaching of Thomas. He was a supporter of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, of the idea of a twofold truth, inclined to modify Aristotelianism by elements borrowed from the Arabian philosophy. While Thomas, in his doctrine of God, made God necessarily will what is good, Scotus made that good which God freely and arbitrarily wills, so that even evil would be good if only God had willed it. Over against Thomas' reproduction of Augustine's doctrine of the divine sovereignty, Scotus emphasises the doctrine of man's freedom, and is distinctly Semipelagian in his doctrine. Thomas regards the work of Christ as God-man of infinite value, but Scotus regarded it as accepted by an act of grace on God's part (*acceptatio gratuita*). His chief work is a commentary on the Sentences of the Lombard, *Quæstiones in iv. Ll. Sententiarum*, which appeared in two forms, the *Opus Oxoniense* and the *Opus Parisiense*.[1]

During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the teaching of religion was chiefly in the hands of the mystics, whose meditations and writings did much to purge theology of the unevangelical accretions of Romish traditionalism. But we have not from any of them treatises which can rank as important and comprehensive theological works, certainly nothing approaching what can be called a system of theology.

Wiclif (1324–1384) is known as a theologian by his *Trialogus s. dialogorum Ll. iv.*, 1382, edited by Lechler, Oxford, 1869, a dialogue in which three disputants take part, in four books: i. The Doctrine of God; ii. The Doctrine of the Universe, including Man and Spirits; iii. On Christian Morals; iv. The Sacraments, and the Church and its Institutions, Eschatology, etc. Scripture is the principal source for theology, and its authority is absolute; but in working out his several doctrinal positions he is sometimes unduly swayed by the scholastic method and principles. It is in his

[1] See a criticism and comparison of the doctrinal positions of Aquinas and Scotus in Ritschl, *Crit. Hist. of Chr. Doctr. of Justification and Reconciliation*, 1872, pp. 41–90.

doctrine of the Church that Wiclif's real Protestantism appears, and also in the decided rejection of transubstantiation, though his attitude here is critical, and he fails to state clearly his own theory, which was neither that of Zwingli nor of Luther, but was probably nearer that of Calvin. With Wiclif is closely associated John Hus (1373–1415), whose chief work, the *De ecclesia*, was largely based upon a similar treatise of Wiclif's.

(3) *Period of the Reformation.*

LITERATURE.—Dorner, *History of Protestant Theology*, 2 vols., Edin. 1871, vol. i. pp. 1–414. Cunningham, *Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation*, Edin. 1862. Herrmann, *Geschichte der protest. Dogmatik*, Leipzig, 1842, pp. 13–21. Heppe, *Dogmatik. d. deutschen Protestantismus im 16 Jahrhundert*, 3 vols., Gotha, 1857. Tulloch, *Leaders of the Reformation*, 2nd ed., Edin. 1860. Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, 2nd ed., Königsberg, 1862, i. pp. 50–71.

The theology of the Reformation is characterised by the special prominence given to the principles of Protestantism,—the normative authority of Holy Scripture and the central significance of the doctrine of justification by faith only. The writings of Luther are not distinctively dogmatic, but rather either practical or polemical. Yet in a sketch of the history of dogmatics, it would be a serious omission to pass over the characteristic work, which reads like a doctrinal manifesto, *De servo arbitrio*, 1525, in which the Augustinian doctrine of absolute predestination is clearly and forcibly expounded.[1]

The principal dogmatic source for the early Lutheranism, and indeed the first Protestant handbook on dogmatics, is the *Loci theologici* of Melanchthon, *Præceptor Germaniæ* (1497–1560). The first edition of this great work appeared in 1521, and a second very much altered edition in 1535. German translations appeared, of the first by Spalatin in

[1] See admirable article on this work of Luther by Dr. Weber in *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1878, ii., translated in *Brit. and For. Evangel. Review* for 1878, pp. 799–816.

1522, and of the second by Justus Jonas in 1536. The last edition issued under Melanchthon's own superintendence was that of 1559. As contrasted with Luther, Melanchthon gives special emphasis and prominence in his exposition and distribution of doctrine to the ethical element in Christianity, and even views faith more as the moral act of the redeemed. He also showed himself less disposed to press the doctrine of absolute predestination, and was more inclined, in a *synergistic* sense, to emphasise the truth of human freedom. He advanced still further in these directions, and also in the way of concessions to Calvin in christology and in the doctrine of the Supper, in the third edition of 1543.[1] His final position may be described as half-way between Luther and Calvin. The arrangement of doctrines in the *Loci* is not determined by any strict logical law of succession: *De lib. arbitrio*, *De peccato*, *De lege* (consiliis), *De evangelio*, *De gratia*, *De justificatione et fide*, *De fidei efficacia*, *De caritate et spe*, etc. We have also from his pen the great confessional works, the Augsburg Confession (*Confessio Augustana*), in June 1530, and the Apology (*Apologia August.*), in September 1530.

The most distinguished early followers of Melanchthon are: Strigel (1514–1569), a strict and narrow Philippist, whose *Loci theologici* (illustrating the *Loci* of Melanchthon) appeared in 4 vols., 1581–1584; Selnecker (1530–1592), who, in his *Institutio relig. christ.*, 1572, followed Melanchthon closely, but in his *Examen ordinandorum*, 1582, drew back to a stricter Lutheranism, and attached himself to the *Formula Concordiæ*; Chemnitz (1522–1586), whose *Loci theologici*, lectures on Melanchthon's *Loci*, were published after his death in 1591, and whose *Examen concilii Tridentini*, 4 vols., 1565–1573, and *De duabus naturis in Christo*, 1571 (on the Communicatio idiomatum), were works of great importance and lasting influence.

[1] *Studien und Kritiken*, 1857, ii., article by Schwarz, "Melanchthon's *Loci* nach ihrer weitern Entwickelung." See also "Melanchthon's *Loci communes* in ihrer Urgestalt," nach G. L. Plitt, in 2 Aufl. von neuem hrsg. u. erläutert von Kolde, Erlangen, 1890.

Zwingli (1484–1531) cannot be described as a great dogmatist, as his aims and genius were of a distinctly practical and organising character. His chief dogmatic work is the *Commentarius de vera et falsa religione*, 1525, in which he sets forth the biblical doctrine, beginning with a discussion of the word religion. He then proceeds in the usual way to treat of the nature of God, etc., laying special emphasis on the omnipotence and sovereignty of God and His absolute predestination. The special difference between Luther and Zwingli was occasioned by the Zwinglian doctrine of the sacraments, according to which they are represented as mere signs of church membership and memorials of a historical fact, without any blending of the mystic element which plays so important a part in the Lutheran doctrine.[1]

In more immediate connection with Zwingli are: Peter Martyr Vermiglius (1500–1562) of Florence, teacher at Strassburg, Oxford 1547, again at Strassburg, and finally at Zurich 1556, author of a *Loci communes theologici*, published after his death, 1575; and Bullinger (1504–1575), brought into connection with Zwingli as teacher at Cappel, whom he succeeded as *Antistes* at Zurich, was most active among the compilers of the First and Second Helvetic Confessions, 1536 and 1566, and a keen controversialist on the doctrine of the Supper against Luther and Brenz, and, besides a great number of separate dogmatic treatises, wrote *Compendium religionis christianæ*, 1556.

The great epoch-making work in the theology of the Reformed Church, and indeed by far the most scientific theological work of the Reformation age, was the *Institutio christianæ religionis* of John Calvin, of Geneva (1509–1564). The first edition of this great work appeared in 1536, and the last, greatly enlarged and improved, in 1559. Calvin's distribution of the doctrines is essentially trinitarian. It consists of four books, divided into 104 chapters. The first

[1] See A. Baur, *Zwingli's Theologie, ihr Werden und ihr System*, 2 vols., 1885, 1889; Christoffel, *Life of Zwingli*, Edin. 1858; "Zwingli and the Doctrine of the Sacraments," in Cunningham, *Ref. and Reformation*, pp. 212–291.

three follow the order of the articles in the Creed, and the fourth book deals with the doctrine of the Church. The central idea of the whole is that of the divine sovereignty, but throughout the whole work ethics and doctrine are closely conjoined, and the practical aspect of the Christian life is made everywhere prominent. Luthardt (*Compendium d. Dogmatik*, 4th ed., Leipzig, 1873, p. 34) characterises the *Institutes* as, from the scientific and literary point of view, by reason of its terseness, clearness, proportionateness of treatment and warmth of expression, the most important Dogmatic of that century.[1] A convenient and accurate modern edition of the text is that of Tholuck, 2 vols., Berlin, 1834, reissued Edin. 1873. Also critical edition by Baum, Cunitz, and Reuss, 2 vols., Brunswick, 1869; English translation by Calv. Transl. Soc. 3 vols., Edin. 1845.

In more immediate connection with Calvin, we may mention the Swiss divines, Ursinus (1534–1583) and Olevianus (1536–1587), authors of the *Heidelberg Catechism*, 1562, a noble work setting forth, under the threefold division —man's misery, man's redemption, thankfulness, the sum of Christian faith from the Calvinistic standpoint, and ranking in history alongside of Luther's Short Catechism and the Westminster Shorter Catechism. Ursinus' explanation and defence of the Catechism was translated into English under the title of "Sum of the Christian Religion," London, 1587. His successor at Heidelberg, Zanchius (1516–1590), a singularly learned and able man, carried on a discussion against the Antitrinitarians (*De tribus Elohim*, 1577; *De natura Dei*, 1877; *De operibus Dei*, 1591; *De primi hominis Lapsu*, 1597). His Commentaries on Eph., Col., Phil., Thess. are largely doctrinal, *e.g.* Eph., ed. Hartog, Amst. 1888, in Proleg. pp. 3, 4, he gives a list of *Loci communes hujus epistolæ*, finding, as he says, almost all the principal doctrines of theology in the Epistle. At least one-half of the work is

[1] See five very able and instructive essays on Calvin and Calvinism in Cunningham's *Ref. and Reformation*, pp. 292–599. See also important article by Köstlin on "Calvin's *Institutio*."

devoted to the explication of these *Loci*. His *De religione christiana fides*, 1585, was translated into English under the title, "Confession of the Christian Religion," 1599. Also closely attached to Calvin: Musculus (1497–1563), author of *Loci communes*, 1564, and Aretius (*d.* 1574), author of *Theologiæ problemata*, 1579. We also name here as belonging to the Calvinistic school, though with a leaning to Lutheran and Melanchthonian views, Hyperius (1511–1564), author of *Methodus theologiæ*, 1568, in three books, a posthumous and incomplete dogmatic.

(4) *Period of Protestant Scholasticism.*

Literature. — Kaftan, *Truth of the Christian Religion*, Edin. 1894, vol. i. 188–229: "Orthodox Dogmatics." The best *summary* of the history of German theology during this period is that of Luthardt, *Compendium der Dogmatik*, 9th ed., Leipzig, 1893, § 18. The fullest and most detailed history is that of Tholuck, *Das akademische Lehre im* 17 *Jahrhunderte*, 2 vols., 1853; and *Das kirchliche Leben des* 17 *Jahrhunderte*, 2 vols., 1861. See also: Dorner, *History of protestant Theology*, Edin. 1871, vol. ii. pp. 98–203. Herrmann, *Geschichte der protestantischen Dogmatik*, Leipzig, 1842, pp. 21–26. Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, Königs. 1862, vol. i. pp. 72–90.—For history of period in Britain: Tulloch, *Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century*, 2 vols., Edin. 1873. Hunt, *History of Religious Thought in England—Reformation to* 1800, 3 vols., 2nd ed., London, 1884. Walker, *Theology and Theologians of Scotland*, Edin. 1872, 2nd ed., 1888.

The theology of the seventeenth century is distinctly polemical, and consequently there is a tendency among the representatives of the several schools to take up a somewhat extreme position. Among the orthodox there was unfortunately an undue sensitiveness and a painful readiness to suspect any phrase that might possibly in the least favour the views of the opposite school. The confessional writings and the utterances of the founders of the different tendencies, Lutheran, Calvinistic, etc., were so put forward as to obscure

and set out of view the plain teaching of Scripture. Also a rigid formalism grew up in which mathematical precision of style and logical method choked all spiritual development. Reaction against the modifications and concessions of Melanchthon led to the introduction of an ultra and exaggerated Lutheranism, and a similar movement in the Reformed Church led to the elaboration of an extreme and hyper-Calvinism. Kaftan blames Protestant orthodoxy for clinging to the principles of Catholic scholasticism and using its theological material. "Such dogmatics as that of orthodoxy, and all that is formed on the model of it, is of no service to the Evangelical Church."

1. *The Lutheran Dogmatic.*—Towards the close of the sixteenth and in the earlier years of the seventeenth centuries there arose a party manifesting fanatical attachment to the early Lutheran faith as set forth in the church symbols, to which documents they ascribed something like inspiration, while practically they made them rather than Scripture their rule of faith. Of this school, one of the earliest and one of the most pronounced was Hutter (1563–1616), whose *Compendium locorum theologicorum*, 1610, new edition by Twesten, 1855, is largely made up of extracts from the *Formula concordiæ*, *Augsburg Confession*, and *Apology*, and Chemnitz, and keenly opposes Melanchthonianism. It consists of thirty-four sections or *loci*: De scriptura sacra; De Deo uno et trino; De duabus naturis; De creatione; De angelis; De imagine Dei, etc. The same position is maintained by John Gerhard (1582–1637), the most learned and able dogmatist of the age, who combines the warmth of a fervent piety with a very wide and accurate acquaintance with historical, exegetical, and doctrinal theology. His *Loci communes theologici*, 1610–1622, in 9 vols., is a great improvement on Hutter in respect of systematic arrangement and philosophical development. He places at the head of dogmatics the doctrine of Scripture, and very carefully elaborates the doctrine of inspiration.

In direct opposition to the attitude of those strict

Lutherans stands Calixtus (1586–1656), who insisted on going back to the Apostles' Creed and the doctrine of the first five centuries, regarding the Lutheran Confessions not as a source, but only as one of the stages in the historical development of doctrine. In his *Epitome theologiæ*, 1619, he made an advance upon the local method by substituting the analytical for the synthetical mode of treatment, and proceeding from end to means: God, man and the means of salvation. This Calixtine movement was vigorously opposed in the interests of strict Lutheranism by Calovius (1612–1686), who, in a somewhat more scholastic style than had been previously used, set forth in his *Systema locorum theologicorum*, 12 vols., 1655–1677, a full and carefully expressed representation of Lutheran orthodoxy. His work is one of great learning, and he specially undertakes to confute those errors that had been put forth by writers after the appearance of Gerhard's great work. Somewhat more dialectical in style, more cold and formal, but essentially on the same lines, is the work of Quenstedt, of Wittenberg (1617–1688), *Theologia didactico-polemica s. systema theologiæ*, 1685. Along with these should also be named Hollaz (1648–1713), who, in his *Examen theologicum acroamaticum univ. theol. thetico-polemicam complectens*, 1707, consisting mainly of extracts from Gerhard, Calovius, etc., but characterised by great precision of definition and orderliness of arrangement, marks the transition from the severely scholastic formalism of the seventeenth century to the pietism of the eighteenth century. He is a strict Lutheran on whom pietism, though it is not discussed nor even named, has a powerful, silent influence. With its prolegomena, including discussions on religion, theology, the Articles of Faith, and Holy Scripture, followed by dogmatics proper treated under the usual four heads, it has more of the form of a modern text-book than any previous theological work.

The theologians of the Jena school took up a position midway between the extremes of Calixtus and Hutter, and set forth a Lutheran system modified and softened in several

important points. The chief representatives of this party are: Musæus (1613–1681), who wrote several treatises on particular topics—on the nature of natural theology and revelation, on Scripture as the primary source of theology, on predestination, the Supper, the Church, opposing equally Calovius and Calixtus; and his son-in-law, Baier (1647–1695), in whose *Compendium theologiæ positivæ*, 1686, which became a highly popular text-book, and was often reprinted, we have a modified orthodoxy set forth in a clear and thoroughly intelligible style, forming one of the very best introductions to a knowledge of the old Lutheran Dogmatic.

2. *The Reformed Dogmatic.*—In the Reformed Dogmatic, to a very much larger extent than in the Lutheran Dogmatic, we find differences and peculiarities. Alongside of the general adoption of the Reformed standpoint, as it appears in the writings of Calvin, especially with reference to the Calvinistic doctrines of predestination and the Lord's Supper, we have schools formed in accordance with the special point adopted as basis for the systematic arrangement and distribution. Just as in the history of Lutheran Dogmatic we have a scholastic development which seeks to outbid the founder in strict logical formulating of distinct doctrines, and others that go to the extreme of explaining away or belittling what has been regarded as fundamental, and yet others who endeavour to present the doctrines as originally set forth in a form suited as far as possible to the philosophical taste and tendencies of the age; so we have in the history of the Reformed Dogmatic what we may fairly call a hyper-Calvinistic school, whose exaggerations led to the enunciation of extreme positions in an opposite direction. We shall here enumerate, first of all, those great and influential theologians of all lands who claim to represent the Calvinistic school, and also more or less closely reproduce Calvin's doctrine; then those who consciously and avowedly seek to modify the strict doctrine of Calvin, *e.g.* the Arminians and Amyraldists.

The movement in the direction of overstraining the Calvinistic position was inaugurated by Beza (1519–1605),

who, though he wrote no distinctively dogmatical work himself, yet powerfully influenced the dogmatists of the early part of the seventeenth century. As most evidently affected by the conflict with Lutheranism, and so retaining the scholastic form which this polemic almost inevitably led the dogmatic of that period to assume, we may name: Wolleb, of Basel (1536–1626), whose *Compendium theologiæ christianæ*, 1626, has all the precision which the scholastic method secures, without yielding to the temptation of lingering over trifling and purely formal questions; and Wendelin, of the Palatinate (1584–1652), whose *Compendium christ. theologiæ*, 1634, and *Chr. theologiæ systema majus*, 1656, are works of great learning, and admirably expound the strict Calvinism of that age.

One of the earliest to carry out the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination with logical precision, to an extreme never contemplated by Calvin himself, was Dr. Wm. Twisse (1575–1646), whose treatises: *Vindiciæ gratiæ, potestatis ac providentiæ Dei*, Amst. 1648, and *The Riches of God's Love unto the Vessels of Mercy consistent with His absolute Hatred or Reprobation of the Vessels of Wrath*, Oxf. 1653, show great speculative power, and afford perhaps the very best example of supralapsarianism developed by fearless application of logic, without the necessary qualifications and reservations, to the doctrinal principles of Calvinism. A somewhat similar, but not altogether so extreme, position was taken up by Francis Turretine, of Geneva (1623–1687), whose *Institutio theologiæ elencticæ*, 1679, 2nd ed., 3 vols., Geneva, 1688–1690 [an Edinburgh ed. of 1847 is very carelessly and incorrectly printed], presents a very complete and full statement of Calvinistic doctrine arranged according to the usual local method, modified in several particulars by the influence of the federal theology. With many distinctive peculiarities, the same high Calvinism is represented by the works of Samuel Rutherford, of St. Andrews (1600–1661), whose writings: *Exercitationes apologeticæ pro divina gratia*, Amst. 1637, another ed. by Schultens of Franeker, 1693 (against

Arminians and Jesuits, *e.g.* Suarez, Molina, Fonseca, and Bellarmine); *Disputatio scholastica de divina Providentia* (against Jesuits, Arminians, Socinians, etc.), 1651; *A Survey of the Spiritual Antichrist* (against Antinomians, Familists, Schwenkfeldians, etc.), 1648; *Examen Arminianismi* (his college lectures, giving an admirable outline of his theological system), published after his death in 1668,—while directly polemical, give clear and emphatic deliverances on all manner of details connected with the characteristic doctrines of high Calvinism.

A successful and thoroughgoing protest against the scholastic method and speculative treatment of the materials by the extreme Calvinists was made by Cocceius, of Bremen, Franeker, and Leyden (1603–1669), whose *Summa doctrinæ de Fœdere et Testamentis Dei*, 1648, 5th ed., 1683, renounced the prevalent scholasticism in favour of a purely biblical method, distributing his materials according to the scheme of the covenants. His ablest disciple was Burmann, of Utrecht (1632–1679), whose *Synopsis theologiæ et speciatim œconomiæ fœderum Dei*, 2 vols., Utrecht, 1671–1681, 2nd ed., Amst. 1699, gives by far the best and clearest exposition of the fœderal system, with none of that strained exegesis which disfigures so many of the works of that school. Witsius, of Francker, Utrecht, and Leyden (1636–1708), is much less valuable and his statements much less guarded and correct than those of Burmann. He made a very noble but unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the federalists and the orthodox or scholastic party. His *De œconomia fœderum Dei cum hominibus*, in four books, Leuwarden, 1685, 2nd ed. 1693, Eng. trans., Edin. 1803, is badly arranged—(i. Of Covenants of God in General; ii. Of the Covenant of Grace; iii. Of the Covenant with the Elect; iv. Of the Doctrine of Salvation).[1]

[1] One of the best accounts of the theology of the covenants is given by Ebrard in his papers in Herzog[2] (iii. pp. 291–296: "Cocceius u. seine Schule"; iii. 16, 17: "Burmann"; xvii. 220–222: "Witsius." Of Witsius, Ebrard remarks that his personality was of more importance than his theology). See also Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, 2nd ed., Königsberg, 1862, i. 77–81.

The English Puritans may be regarded as a whole thoroughly sound Calvinists, occupying standpoints more or less high, but for the most part moderate, though not lax, in their statement of the crucial doctrines. The ablest of their representatives in the domain of dogmatics is John Owen (1616–1683), many of whose works, though primarily polemical or practical, are characterised by a firm hold and clear enunciation of Christian doctrine. His chief works directly in the department of dogmatics are: *Salus electorum, Sanguis Jesu*, 1648; *The Saints' Perseverance*, 1654; *Vindiciæ evangelicæ*, 1655; *The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit* (dealing with inspiration, the eternal generation of the Son, the Trinity, etc.), 1674; *Christologia*, 1679; *Justification by Faith*, 1677. The principal representative of what might be called evangelical Arminianism among the Puritans was John Goodwin (1593–1665), whose *Redemption Redeemed*, 1651, reprinted Lond. 1840 (a monumental work, discussing questions of election, reprobation, and perseverance, to which Owen replied in his *Saints' Perseverance*), and *Imputatio fidei: A Treatise on Justification*, 1642 (greatly valued by Wesley and used by the Wesleyan theologian, Watson), and also his *Exposition of the 9th chapter of Romans*, 1653, as well as his later work, *On being filled with the Spirit*, 1670, reprinted Edin. 1867 (treating of the divinity of the Holy Spirit and the necessity of the gospel ministry),—are all pioneer works in the direction of modern evangelical religion. Less decidedly in opposition to the current doctrines of Calvinism than Goodwin, and yet less inclined than most Calvinists to pronounce definitely on some of the great questions at issue between contending schools, was Richard Baxter (1615–1691), now most widely known for his works in practical religion. Both on questions of doctrine and of church policy he sought to take a mediate and conciliatory position. He distinctly refused, with the high Calvinists, to ascribe reprobation to God, and made Christ's death for all the ground of the universal gospel offer. His chief theological work of a scientific kind is a large Latin treatise, *Methodus theologiæ christianæ*, 1681.

The Arminian or Remonstrant school arose in Holland toward the close of the sixteenth century, and their doctrines were thoroughly discussed at the Synod of Dort in 1618. Arminius (1560–1609), from whom the school is named, a student of Beza, and called on to lead the attack against an opponent of Calvin's doctrine of predestination, became himself suspected, and was also charged with Pelagianism. A collected edition of his works appeared, *Opera theologica*, Leyden, 1629, Eng. trans. in 3 vols., Lond. 1825. The controversy on the Remonstrant side at Dort was carried on mainly by Episcopius (1583–1643), whose *Institutiones theologicæ*, 1643, gives a clear full statement of the Arminian theology. The most distinguished of the party was Grotius (1583–1645), best known by his great apologetical work, *De veritate chr. religionis*, 1627 (Eng. trans. 1782 and 1818), and his *Defensio fidei catholicæ de satisfactione Christi*, 1617 (against Socinians and Pelagians, but upholding the Arminian position), in which he represents God as satisfied with Christ's death, because, as evidence of God's hatred of sin, it afforded a powerful deterrent against sin. The great opponent of the Arminians at Dort was Gomarus (1563–1641), whose writings are wholly devoted to the great controversy. In a more moderate style the contest was maintained by Maccovius (1588–1644) in his *Loci comm. theol.*, 1639; and with even increased violence and bitterness by Voetius, of Utrecht (1588–1676), opponent of Arminians, Cartesians, and Cocceians, in his *Selectæ disputationes theologicæ*, 1648. Limborch (1633–1702), a writer of great clearness and a capable theologian, marks the transition to rationalism. His *Theologia Christiana*, Amst. 1686 (Eng. trans., *A complete System or Body of Divinity*, 2 vols., Lond. 1702), is in seven books: i. Of Sacred Scripture; ii. Of God and Divine Works; iii. Of Redemption; iv. Of God's Predestination; v. Of the Precepts of the New Covenant; vi. Of the Promises and Threatenings of the New Covenant; vii. Of the Church of Jesus Christ.

An admirable statement of Calvinistic doctrine, by one

who took an active part in the controversy at Dort, is to be found in the short treatise of Wm. Ames or Amesius (1576–1633), *Medulla theologiæ*, 1623 (in Eng., *The Marrow of Sacred Divinity*, 1642), of which a convenient edition was issued by Professor Candlish, London, 1874. It proceeds on the old local method, in forty-one chapters, each composed of short sections stating the doctrine in a strict scholastic fashion. This work is the basis of the elaborate treatise of Peter van Mastricht (1630–1706), *Theoretico-practica theologia*, 2 vols., Utrecht, 1698, 2nd ed. 1715.

Besides the Arminian movement, another modification of the strict doctrines of Calvinism was attempted within the Reformed Church by the theologians of Saumur. Amyrault or Amyraldus (1596–1664), in his *Traité de la predestination*, 1634, sought to modify the Calvinism of Dort by a theory of "hypothetical universalism," *i.e.* the doctrine that God wills the salvation of all on condition of faith. A similar theological tendency was shown by his colleague, La Place or Placæus (1606–1655), who, in his *Disputatio de imputatione primi peccati Adami*, 1655, maintains the theory of the *mediate* imputation of Adam's sin, which, though it had Amyrault's approval, was condemned at the Synod of Charenton, 1675. The *Consensus Helveticus*, by Heidegger and Fr. Turretine, in twenty-six articles, is directed specially against the Amyraldist doctrine of universal grace.

3. *Socinian Dogmatics.*—The movement originated in the Reformation age by Socinus and Blandrata was carried out in the seventeenth century by Crell and Schlichting. Crell (1590–1631), a man of high culture and unwearied activity, teacher and preacher in Rakow, wrote a treatise in two books, *De uno Deo patre*, a vigorous attack on the doctrine of the Trinity, included in the *Bibliotheca fratr. Polon.*, 1656, in Eng. trans., *The two Books of Crell touching on God the Father*, 1665. Schlichting (1592–1661) wrote a *Confession of Faith of the Polish Socinians*, 1642, and *De trinitate, de moralibus V. et N. Test., itemque de eucharistiæ et baptismi*

ritibus, 1637. The father of English Unitarianism, John Biddle (1615–1662), wrote tracts on *The Holy Spirit*, 1647, and *Confession of Faith concerning the Holy Trinity*, 1648, which were published posthumously in one volume, *The Faith of one God, who is only the Father; and of one Mediator between God and men, who is only the man Christ Jesus; and of one Holy Spirit, the gift (and sent) of God; asserted and defended in several Tracts*, London, 1691,—the title of which sufficiently indicates its contents.

4. *Roman Catholic Dogmatics.*—During this period of Protestant ascendency and activity in the domain of theology there appeared several distinguished dogmatists in the Roman Catholic Church. In the latter part of the sixteenth century the leading exponent of ultramontane views was Bellarmine (1542–1621). His great work is *Disputationes de controversiis christianæ fidei*, 4 vols., Rome, 1581–1593: vol. i. Of the Word of God, of Christ, and of the Pope; vol. ii. Of Councils and the Church; vol. iii. Of the Sacraments; and vol. iv. Of Grace, Free Will, and Justification by Good Works. His catechism, *Christianæ doctrinæ explicatio*, admirable in form and execution, has been widely used in translations in many languages. Petavius (1583–1652), in the title of his great work (unfinished), *De theologicis dogmatibus*, 5 vols., Paris, 1644–1650, was the first thus to use the term dogmatic. This learned and elaborate treatise is a careful and detailed history of doctrine, defending the idea of the development of dogma. It was highly valued by Reformed theologians. Jansen, Bishop of Ypres (1585–1638), in his *Augustinus s. doctrina Sancti Augustini de humanæ naturæ sanitate, ægritudine, medicina, adversus Pelagianos et Massilienses*, 1640, sought to reproduce the Augustinian doctrine of grace in opposition to the Pelagian doctrines of the Jesuits, which are represented as introduced by the corrupting influence of philosophy, especially that of Aristotle. Bossuet (1627–1704), bishop of Meaux, best known by his controversial treatise against the Protestants, *Histoire des variations des Eglises Protestantes*, 1688 (Eng. trans., Dublin, 1836), and

other similar writings in controversy with Jurieu, is the author of *Exposition de la doctrine de l'église catholique sur les matières de controverse*, 1671, in Eng. trans., London, 1685, written to induce Protestants to embrace the Catholic faith.

(5) *Period of Spiritual and Speculative Revival.*

LITERATURE.—Kahnis, *Internal History of German Protestantism since the Middle of Last Century*, Edin. 1856. Leslie Stephen, *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, 2nd ed., 2 vols., Lond. 1880. Cairns, *Unbelief in the Eighteenth Century*, Edin. 1881. Tholuck, *History of Theology in the Eighteenth Century* (in Princeton Essays, First Series, Edin. 1856, pp. 430–497). Pattison, *Tendencies of Religious Thought in England*, 1688–1750, in "Essays and Reviews," Lond. 1860. A. S. Farrar, *Critical History of Free Thought in reference to the Christian Religion*, Lond. 1862. Ritschl, *Geschichte des Pietismus*, Freiburg, 3 vols., 1880–1886. Hunt, *History of Religious Thought in England*, 3 vols., Lond. 1870–1873, 2nd ed. 1884. Overton, *The Evangelical Revival of the Eighteenth Century*, Lond. 1886. Dorner, *History of Protestant Theology*, vol. ii. pp. 203–320.

In the Lutheran Church the later years of the seventeenth and the earlier part of the eighteenth century were mainly occupied with the pietist controversies. The early pietists made considerable contributions to scientific theology, chiefly in the way of releasing dogmatics from the conventional scholastic formalism, and insisting upon return to biblical simplicity. Spener (1635–1705) supplied a scientific basis for his practical religion in *Allgemeine Gottesgelahrtheit*, 1680, and *Theologische Bedenken*, 4 vols., 1700–1702. Francke (1663–1727) was able, amid all his practical activity, to produce useful doctrinal and scientific treatises: *Idea studiosi theologiæ*, 1712; *Methodus studii theologici*, 1723; *Lectiones paræneticæ* (lecture to his students at Halle), 7 vols., 1726–1736. Breithaupt (1658–1732) wrote a treatise on dogmatics and ethics, *Institutiones theol. ll. duo*

. . . *a. s. scr. demonstrantur*, 1695. Freylinghausen (1670–1739), the sacred poet of the party, wrote, *Grundlegung der Theologie*, 1703, translated into English under title, *An Abstract of the Whole Doctrine of the Christian Religion*, London, 1804. Joachim Lange (1670–1744), of Halle, the keen opponent of Wolffianism and controversialist with the orthodox, wrote *Œconomia salutis evangelica*, 1728. Bengel (1687–1752), whose well-known and highly prized contributions to biblical exegesis had a powerful influence on the theology of his own and subsequent ages, especially by his Gnomon N. T., 1742, wrote no dogmatic. Oetinger (1702–1782), the theosophist, occupying a position between Boehme and Schelling, contributed to dogmatics, *Theologia ex idea vitæ deducta*, 1765.

The most powerful influence in a contrary direction to that of pietism appears in the hard formal method introduced by the mathematician Wolff (1679–1754), who popularised the positions of Leibnitz and reduced all theological statements to rigid mathematically expressed formulæ. He was keenly opposed by the pietists Francke and Lange, who regarded his influence as essentially deterministic and highly dangerous to the interests of evangelical religion. Buddeus (1667–1729), of Jena, an orthodox Lutheran theologian, deeply imbued with the religious earnestness of the pietists and thoroughly versed in historical science, applied the forms of the Wolffian philosophy to doctrinal theology in his *Institutiones theologiæ dogmaticæ*, 1723, and *Historia theologiæ dogmaticæ et moralis*, 1725. S. J. Baumgarten (1706–1757), in his *Evangelische Glaubenslehre*, 3 vols., 1759, applies the Wolffian method to dogmatics. Carpov, of Jena, in his *Theologia revelata dogmatica*, 3 vols., 1737, still seeks to apply the Wolffian philosophy to the strengthening of Lutheran orthodoxy. The influence of Wolff is, however, most conspicuous in the rationalistic tendency known as the *Illumination*, to which theologians, by the independent exercise of the individual reason, reached positions with regard to the church doctrine of satisfaction, partly of a Socinian, partly of an

Arminian, character.[1] The most notable representative of this party is Töllner (1724–1774), a Lutheran, as Ritschl thinks, and not a Reformed theologian, as Dorner had supposed. He passed over from supernaturalism to rationalism, and is remembered chiefly for his denial of the independent value of Christ's action and obedience as a satisfaction to God, in his *Der thatige Gehorsam Christi untersucht*, 1768. His general theological position may be seen from his *System der dogmatischen Theologie*, in four books, 1755. Somewhat similar was the theological position of Semler (1725–1791), of chief importance to theology as a free exegete and founder of modern historico-biblical criticism, whose doctrinal views are set forth in his *Institutio ad doctrinam Christianam liberaliter discendam*, 1774.

The rationalistic movement in England appears in the form of Deism, in the tendency to deny the need of any special revelation and to elaborate into a system the religion of nature. The works of the English Deists are for the most part of no interest in the history of dogmatics, but only in the history of religious opinion and in apologetics.[2] Much more important in its influence on dogmatics was the Unitarian movement, which simply developed the Socinian element already dominant in the works of the more advanced representatives of the Illumination. Priestley (1733–1804), on the basis of a theory of philosophical necessity, developed a system of pure naturalism in his *Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion*, 2nd ed. 1782. The writings of Theophilus Lindsey, Toulmin, and Belsham are mainly controversial, and, like those of the Deists, have no place here.

In Germany the influence of Kant (1724–1804) did something toward arresting the downward progress of

[1] See a remarkably full and instructive account of the Illumination in Ritschl, *Hist. of Chr. Doctr. of Justif. and Reconcil.* 1872, pp. 320-386. Also article by Fr. Nitzsch in *Jahrbücher für protest. Theologie*, 1875, pp. 39–64: "Die gesch. Bedeutung der Aufklärungstheologie."

[2] For the best account of the English Deists see Lechler, *Geschichte des englischen Deismus*, 1841.

rationalism in the direction of Illumination. The first and best representative of this upward movement is Tieftmark, of Halle (1760–1837), who, in his *Censur des christl.-protest. Lehrbegriffes*, 3 vols., 1791, 2nd ed. 1796, sets forth the moral view of the atonement in a way that has proved suggestive to many later dogmatists. Döderlein (1746–1792), occupying the standpoint of supernaturalism, in his *Institutio theologi christiani*, 2 vols., 1780, 6th ed. 1797, showed a strong leaning toward rationalism. Wegscheider (1771-1849), in his *Institutiones theologiæ chr. dogmaticæ*, Halle, 1815, 7th ed. 1833, maintains an advanced rationalistic position, and was long regarded as the principal text-book of rationalism. Bretschneider (1776–1848), occupying a somewhat uncertain and vacillating position midway between rationalism and supernaturalism, that of the so-called rational supernaturalists, was widely influential through his two dogmatical works, *Systematische Entwickelung aller in der Dogmatik vorkommenden Begriffe* (based on the symbolical writings of Lutheran and Reformed Churches, and on the dogmatic works of their theologians), Leipzig, 1805, 4th ed. 1841; and *Handbuch der Dogmatik der evangelischen Kirche*, 2 vols., 1814, 4th ed. 1838, both full of material, clear in definition, and happy in arrangement. Rising above the shallowness and want of spirituality which characterised the Illumination, De Wette (1780–1849), in his treatise, *Ueber Religion und Theologie*, 1815, 2nd ed. 1821, in which he explains his positions laid down in his *Lehrbuch der christl. Dogmatik*, 2 vols., 1813, 3rd ed. 1831, seeks to give its right place to religious feeling while explaining all the leading Christian dogmas as objectified symbolical expressions of subjective truths of personal experience.

The principal theological work proceeding from the Moravian Society of Zinzendorf was that of Spangenberg (1704–1792), entitled *Idea fidei fratrum*, 1782 (Eng. trans., *Exposition of Christian Doctrine*, London, 1784), in which the influence of pietism is very marked, while a warm evangelicism recovers for the doctrines of grace and salvation that

place and meaning of which they had been deprived by the "orthodox" as well as by the rationalists.

In Scotland the covenant theology was represented by Boston (1676–1732), whose principal works: *Human Nature in its Fourfold State*, 1720, and *View of the Covenant of Grace from the Sacred Records*, 1734, present striking points of contrast to Rutherford and the high Calvinists of the previous century,—strictly Calvinistic, but with no tendency to ultra-Calvinism, and everywhere giving prominence to the doctrines of grace.

The Evangelical Revival in England produced no great dogmatic work. John Wesley (1703–1791) was powerfully influenced in his theological views by the evangelical Arminianism of John Goodwin (1593–1665); and his *Sermons* (largely doctrinal) and his *Notes on the New Testament* are generally regarded as the doctrinal standards of the Wesleyan churches.

Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758), most distinguished as a metaphysician and theologian, himself essentially of the old and strict school, and a pronounced necessitarian, as shown by his *Treatise on the Freedom of the Will*, 1754; *The Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin Defended*, 1758; *Dissertation concerning the End for which God Created the World*, 1788, enunciated principles which, as carried out by his disciples, led to the development of the New England school of theology, with its modified doctrines of imputation and atonement. One of the most eminent of Edwards' disciples was Samuel Hopkins (1721–1803), who combined with the doctrines of high Calvinism elements of an Arminian and Pelagian character, as seen in his *System of Doctrines contained in Divine Revelation*, 2 vols., 1793.

(6) *Schleiermacher and his School.*

LITERATURE. — Bender, *Schleiermacher's Theologie* 2 vols., 1876–1878. F. H. R. v. Frank, *Geschichte und Kritik der neuern Theologie seit Schleiermacher*, Erlangen, 1844. Herrmann, *Geschichte der protest. Dogmatik*, 1842, pp. 213–311. Kattenbusch,

Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl, Giessen, 1893. Lichtenberger, *History of German Theology in the Nineteenth Century*, Edin., 1869, pp. 46–166, especially pp. 140–158. Pfleiderer, *Development of Theology in Germany since Kant*, 2nd ed., London, 1893, pp. 44–56, 103–130. Matheson, *Aids to the Study of German Theology*, 3rd ed., Edin. 1880, chap. iv. Dorner, *History of Protestant Theology*, Edin. 1871, vol. ii. pp. 374–395.

Schleiermacher (1768–1834), in respect of his influence upon theological thought, has been compared to Augustine and Calvin. Owing partly to the period in which he lived, partly to his religious and philosophical genius, he occupies quite a unique position, influencing in some direction or other all the schools and tendencies in modern theology. His great dogmatic work, *Der christliche Glaube, nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt*, in 2 vols., appeared in 1821, 1822. In this work, following out the teaching of his earlier *Reden über die Religion*, 1799, he takes up a position equally far removed from that of the old supernaturalists and from that of the rationalists. In opposition to the old supernaturalists, as representatives of church orthodoxy, he understands the Christian faith, not as something given by an external authority, but as a condition of our own self-consciousness; and in opposition to the rationalists, he insisted upon viewing it, not as the result of rational thinking, but as pious Christian feeling having its origin in the heart. This Christian feeling is an experience of the community, and not of the individual merely. Religion is the feeling of absolute dependence. The idea of Christ and redemption is made central to his whole system.

Of Schleiermacher's immediate disciples, the one who carried out his dogmatic principles most thoroughly and faithfully was Alexander Schweizer[1] (1808–1888). His chief contri-

[1] See most interesting and instructive article by August Baur in *Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie*, 1876, pp. 193–238: "Dr Alex. Schweizer: Die christliche Glaubenslehre nach protestantische Grundsätzen; und Dr. A. E. Biedermann: Christliche Dogmatik." The portion on Schweizer, pp. 196–214. Compare also careful and detailed criticism of Schweizer's principles in Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, 2nd ed., Königsberg, 1862, vol. i. pp. 100–104.

butions to dogmatic theology are: *Die Glaubenslehre der reformierten Kirche*, 2 vols., 1844–1847; *Die protestantischen Zentraldogmen innerhalb der reformierten Kirche*, 2 vols., 1854–1856; and *Die christliche Glaubenslehre*, 2 vols., 1863–1872, 2nd ed. 1877. He works out his system on the basis of the Christian consciousness, regarding historical Christianity as the religion in which the ideal is realised. It is objected to his treatment of the doctrine of the Reformed Church, that he confounds the church doctrine of predestination with the theory of philosophical necessity, identifying Schleiermacher's theory of absolute dependence with the doctrine of the divine decree; that he makes the fœderal theory of the natural covenant correspond with the natural theology of the Cartesians; that he perverts and misrepresents the Reformed doctrine of sin as a negation, as if it meant that sin was no positive infringement of man's normal development, but only an incomplete stage in the movement toward the good; that he depreciates the accepted symbols of the Reformed Church, as not giving an accurate account of the Reformed doctrine, and modifies and alters the statement of doctrine in a purely subjective and arbitrary way; and that he frequently puts a false interpretation upon the utterances of the old Reformed dogmatists. In his dogmatic and historico-dogmatic works, Schweizer, from the standpoint of Schleiermacher, constructs his own system, largely influenced by pantheistic principles, and seeks to commend it as a genuine Reformed doctrine. Of a very similar tendency and character is the brilliant and subtle work of the Dutch theologian, J. H. Scholten, of Leyden (1811–1885), *De Leer der Hervormde Kerk in hare grondbeginselen, uit de bronnen voorgesteld en beoordeeld*, Leyden, 1848. This work was suggested and is largely influenced by the similarly named treatise of Schweizer. In the same line of succession may also be placed Daniel Schenkel (1813–1885), who, in his *Die christliche Dogmatik vom Standpunkte des Gewissens*, 2 vols., Wiesbaden, 1858, makes conscience the distinctively religious organ, and seeks, though not very successfully, to give more emphasis to the objective facts of

salvation. Complaint is made that Schenkel does not make it plain whether conscience, as a religious organ, is merely critical and receptive, or whether it is also originative and creative.

Lipsius (1830–1892), of Jena, though occupying a position essentially differing from that of Schleiermacher, may be introduced here as one who sought to develop his doctrinal system purely from the standpoint of the Christian consciousness. In his *Lehrbuch der evangelisch-protestantischen Dogmatik*,[1] Brunsw., 1876, 3rd ed. 1893, he endeavours to retain the religious kernel to be found in the old Protestant theology, subjecting that theology to criticism, in order to discover and reject what in it does not belong to its essence. He insists upon the relativity of human knowledge, and defines science as the knowledge of the finite. In opposition to Schleiermacher, he regards the essence of religion as consisting in not merely the feeling of dependence, but in the consciousness of freedom also. Christianity, as the perfect religion, has for its principle the relation of sonship to God, which is realised in the consciousness of Jesus Christ, and becoming through faith in Him a fact in the individual human consciousness. He distributes his dogmatic system according to the three movements of the God-consciousness: self-consciousness, world-consciousness, and consciousness of salvation. We therefore have the following arrangement:—1. The doctrine of God—the religious idea of God, the philosophical conception of the Absolute, the dogmatic doctrine of God (nature, being, attributes, trinitarian personality). 2. The doctrine of the world and of man—the religious view of the world (creation, providence), man (original condition, man and sin). 3. The doctrine of salvation wrought in Christ—the eternal divine plan of salvation (the economy of the Father), the historical revelation of

[1] A most admirable review of Lipsius' work, and discussion of his doctrinal principles are given by Dr. James S. Candlish in *British and Foreign Evangelical Review* for 1878, vol. xxvii. pp. 177–184. See also article by Ludwig Fürst, zu Solms, "Recht und Unrecht der Metaphysik," in *Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie*, 1877, pp. 398–405.

salvation and the founding of the communion of saints in Christ (the economy of the Son), the historical realisation of the new life in the individual and the community (the economy of the Spirit). The treatment of the important contents of the third part is seriously hampered by the trammels of the trinitarian schema of distribution. The outstanding characteristics of the theology of Lipsius are his theory of knowledge, based on the principles of Kant and Schleiermacher, making the supersensible theoretically unknowable, and limiting our knowledge to phenomena; and his assigning the central place to the idea of the Divine Sonship realised through Jesus Christ. This latter idea he works out in such a way as to dispense with the idea of a unique incarnation of God in Jesus Christ. Christ is simply that Son of Man who lays the foundation in the history of our race of that spiritual community in the membership of which men first realise their divine sonship. He does not create it, but reveals it.

Here also we may place Rothe (1799–1867), who, in a very independent and characteristic way, occupied a position in relation to rationalism and supernaturalism somewhat similar to that of Schleiermacher, by whom probably he was more powerfully influenced than by any other. His very peculiar and original distribution of the theological sciences in the Encyclopædia, and his conception of their proper contents,[1] led him to place Christian Ethics under the head of Speculative Theology in his first division, and Dogmatics under the head of Historical Theology in his second division. In his *Theologische Ethik*, 2nd ed., 5 vols., 1869–1871, he deals with all the doctrines of the Christian faith as the basis and ground of Christian conduct. In his *Dogmatik*, 2 vols., ed. by Schenkel, 1870, he treats simply of the ecclesiastical dogmas and their historical development and arrangement. Here, in

[1] See Rothe, *Theologische Encyclopaedia*, Wittenberg, 1880, where we have a threefold distribution of the theological sciences: i. Speculative Theology—Ethics and Apologetics. ii. Historical Theology—Exegetical Theology, Church History, Positive Theology (Dogmatics, Symbolics, Statistics). iii. Practical Theology—Church Government, Congregation Direction.

close connection with Schleiermacher, he takes as his principle the Christian consciousness, the consciousness of fellowship with God, and that of redemption through Jesus of Nazareth. In accordance with this principle he distributes his dogmas under a twofold division: the consciousness of sin, and the consciousness of redemption.

(7) *The Speculative School.*

LITERATURE.—Pfleiderer, *Development of Theology since Kant*, London, 1893, pp. 57–82, 131–153. Lichtenberger, *History of German Theology in the Nineteenth Century*, Edin. 1889, pp. 221–241, 329, 554, 572. Matheson, *Aids to the Study of German Theology*, Edin. 1874, chap. xi.: "The Hegelian Right and Left."

The philosophical movement during the earlier part of the century, originally started by Kant, and carried out by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, had a powerful and determining influence on the historical development and scientific treatment of theology. In such a theologian as Daub (1765–1836), we can trace successive periods during which he passed under the influence of each of these three philosophers. The most permanently influential on theology of all philosophical systems was that of Hegel (1770–1831). The contemporary of Schleiermacher, the philosopher did almost as much as the professed theologian, though in a different way, to overthrow the old rationalism and to point out what seemed irrational and untenable in the positions of the supernaturalists. But while Schleiermacher insisted upon the clear separation of theology from philosophy, the influence of Hegelianism led to the treatment of theology in terms of and in strict accordance with the principles of the philosophical theory. Those theologians who adopt the Hegelian principles are rightly classed together as speculative theologians; not that other theologians do not introduce a speculative element into their theology, but because, owing to the philosophical principles which they have adopted, their theology is essentially and in principle speculative.

Among these, Marheineke (1780–1846), the colleague of Schleiermacher at Berlin, was a thoroughgoing Hegelian, firmly believing in the possibility of harmonising Hegelian principles with Christian truth, and using these principles for the interpretation and formulating of that truth. In his *System der christlichen Dogmatik* (1st ed. 1819, occupying the standpoint of Schelling), 2nd ed. 1827, and yet more decidedly in the final form of the work as it appeared in 1847, he applied the principles of Hegelianism to the construction of the doctrinal system of Christianity. Using the Hegelian formulæ, he treated of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, under which terms respectively he introduced the ideas of Father, Son, and Spirit: (1) the pure notion of God in Himself, His nature, being, attributes; (2) God, distinguishing Himself from Himself, the God-man, at once substance and subject; (3) God returning out of this distinction into eternal unity with Himself, the Trinity, the operations of grace, the kingdom of God.

If Marheineke be described as representative of the right wing of the Hegelians, as distinctively conservative in his endeavour to preserve old truth under new forms, we have in Strauss (1808–1874) a representative of the extreme left, or one who recklessly applied to theology a destructive criticism and made the new form create for itself either a new content or an utter void. His *Christliche Glaubenslehre*, 2 vols., 1840, is purely critical and destructive; each doctrine is dealt with in succession, and in each case the conclusion is that it cannot stand the test of modern science, the touchstone by which all truth must be established.

In the *Christliche Dogmatik*, 1869, 2nd ed. 1884, of Biedermann[1] (1819–1885), the principles of the Hegelian philosophy are wrought out in a purely pantheistic direction, the personality of God and the personal immortality of man are denied, and no special authority is allowed to Scripture or the Church. The result is not essentially different from that of

[1] Article by August Baur in *Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie*, 1876, on Schweitzer and Biedermann. The portion on Biedermann, pp. 214–238.

Strauss. The positive part of his *Dogmatik* is divided into two parts: i. The Historical Doctrines of the Faith; ii. The Rational Kernel of the Christian Faith. Under the first he states successively, the Scripture doctrine and the ecclesiastical doctrine; under the former we have: (1) the presuppositions of the gospel of Jesus Christ—biblical theology, biblical anthropology, and the old covenant in light of the new; (2) the gospel of Jesus, the Christ—synoptic christology, the Pauline, the Johannine; (3) the realisation of the divine salvation in man—biblical soteriology, eschatology;—under the latter: (1) ecclesiastical christology in its historical development—Person of Christ, work of Christ; (2) the postulate of ecclesiastical christology—ecclesiastical theology, ecclesiastical anthropology, divine preparation of salvation in Christ, with appendix to theology and anthropology: the pneumatology; (3) the consequences of christology—ecclesiastical soteriology, ecclesiastical eschatology. The second division applies the criticism, and indicates the residuum. Under it there are three leading subdivisions: (1) criticism of the ecclesiastical dogma of the Christian principle and its postulate—criticism of ecclesiastical Christology, theology, anthropology; (2) the scientific statement of the Christian principle and its presuppositions—theology, anthropology, christology; (3) the Christian life of salvation—the eternal ground of salvation, the accomplishment in time of salvation, the eternal end of salvation.

Here also we may name Pfleiderer, of Berlin, well known among us by his *Paulinism* and *History of the Philosophy of Religion*, an adherent, with very considerable independence, of the Tübingen school. In his *Grundriss der christlichen Glaubens- und Sittenlehre*, 5th ed., Berlin, 1893, he does not employ the Hegelian terminology, and his principle of distribution is not borrowed from that philosophy, but his criticism is thoroughly in accordance with the principles of that school. His special dogmatic he divides into two parts: i. the presuppositions of the Christian salvation — God, the world, man; ii. the Christian salvation—ground of salvation in grace of Jesus

Christ, the accomplishment of salvation by the Holy Spirit and in the Church, the purpose of salvation in the appropriation of salvation and the completion of salvation.

(8) *Mediating and Confessional School.*

LITERATURE.—Frank, *Geschichte und Kritik der neuen Theologie*, Leipzig, 2nd ed. 1895. Landerer, *Neueste Dogmengeschichte*, Heilbronn, 1881. Schwarz, *Zur Geschichte des neueren Theologie*, 4th ed., Leipzig, 1869. Pfleiderer, *Development of Theology since Kant*, London, 1893, pp. 154–205. Lichtenberger, *History of German Theology in the Nineteenth Century*, Edin. 1889, pp. 467–541.

By this general title we designate a group of theologians who are all warmly attached to evangelical religion, but who incline more or less to a position of compromise, some in the direction of speculation, others in the direction of the older Lutheranism and pure biblicism. It will be convenient to include modern confessionalists who are more or less influenced by the modern spirit. Some historians of theology prefer to distinguish here two schools, according as the individual theologians show a tendency toward the speculative or toward the confessional or biblical standpoint. But it seems impossible fairly to draw the dividing line.

Dorner (1809–1884), while in warm sympathy with the church doctrine, maintains a free critical attitude, and introduces speculative elements which do not always seem reconcilable with the orthodox and biblical view. This appears very prominently in his theory of Christ as the ideal or archetypal man, and also in his elaborate attempt to explain the mystery of the Trinity. In spirit rather than in form he is closely related to Schleiermacher. In his *System der christlichen Glaubenslehre*, 2 vols., 1879–1881 (Eng. trans., *System of Christian Doctrine*, Edin., 4 vols., 1881, 1882), he presents a most instructive mass of doctrinal and historical material and elaborate and acute criticism. The arrangement is peculiar. Instead of the usual Prolegomena, we have an

introductory treatise on pisteology, faith reached after doubt and uncertainty have been conquered. The system of the Christian faith falls into two parts:—i. Fundamental doctrine, embracing: (1) the doctrine of God—(*a*) the doctrine of the Godhead, (*b*) the doctrine of the Holy Trinity (biblical doctrine, ecclesiastical development, economic trinity), (*c*) the doctrine of God's relation to the world (creation, conservation, providence); (2) the creature, especially man (the world as nature, man, angelology); (3) the unity of God and man—(*a*) thetic subdivision (religion, revelation, including miracle and inspiration, consummation of religion and revelation in the Godmanhood—incarnation), (*b*) historic religion (extra-Christian—heathenism and Old Testament religion, religion and revelation consummated in Christianity). ii. Specific Christian doctrine, or doctrine of sin and salvation: (1) doctrine of sin (evil as to its nature, origin of empirical evil, evil in relation to divine government); (2) the Christian salvation—(*a*) doctrine of Christ (in general, preexistence, temporal presence on earth, exaltation of Christ), (*b*) the Church or kingdom of the Holy Spirit (origin of Church, its existence, last things or consummation of the Church).

Alongside of Dorner may be named his friend, H. L. Martensen (1808–1884), bishop of Zealand, whose *Christliche Dogmatik*, 1849 (Eng. trans., *Christian Dogmatics*, Edin. 1866), written in a remarkably attractive style, presents a singular blending of mysticism and speculation with general acceptance of the Lutheran doctrine. He adopts the trinitarian principle of distribution, but his arrangement of doctrines is loose and without any fixed principle. His doctrine of the Kenosis is described as of the *real* but *relative* type; the Logos as incarnate was in possession of the Godhead under the limitations of the human consciousness.

Among the theologians sometimes assigned to a separate class as New Lutherans, or restorers, or reconstructors of Lutheranism, may be named first of all Thomasius (1802–1875), of Erlangen, an able and influential dogmatist, now too much overlooked. In his *Christi Person und Werk*, 3 vols., 1852–1861, 3rd ed., 2 vols., 1888, he presents an evangelical Lutheran

dogmatic, in which the christology occupies the central place, but developing a kenotic theory in his christology [1] which can scarcely be regarded as reconcilable with Lutheran orthodoxy, and is quite incompatible with the favourite Lutheran doctrine of the ubiquity. His Kenosis theory is that described by Dr. Bruce as of the absolute dualistic type. Christ retains all the essential attributes of deity—absolute power, truth, holiness, and love. He parts only with the relative attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence. In his doctrine of the Trinity, Thomasius has scarcely succeeded in avoiding some vacillation between the old Lutheran doctrine and the theory of subordinationism. In his doctrine of the work of Christ he states clearly and maintains firmly the old church doctrine of the vicarious sacrifice of Christ on the basis of Anselm's theory, in opposition to that of Hofmann. As representative of a similar tendency may be named also K. F. A. Kahnis [2] (1814–1888), who maintained a somewhat freer attitude toward Lutheran orthodoxy. In his *Lutherische Dogmatik*, 1875, in which he makes use of the trinitarian principle of distribution, he elaborates a theory of subordination in christology and of Sabellianism in his doctrine of the Trinity. In his *Die Lehre vom heiligen Geiste*, 1847, he develops a kenotic theory of the Thomasian type. Diverging not less seriously, but at different points, from the norm of pure Lutheranism, is F. H. R. v. Frank (1827–1894), of Erlangen, who, in his *System der christlichen Wahrheit*, 2 vols., Erlangen, 1878, 3rd ed. 1894, postulates a twofold principle of dogmatics, objective and subjective, the Scriptures and the believing subject, held in unity by the *principium essendi* (God). He starts from the presuppositions of Christian experience based on the conclusions of his *System of Christian Certainty*. As Christians, we know the facts of

[1] The best account of this christological theory is that given by Dr. Bruce in his *Humiliation of Christ*, Edin. 1876, pp. 179–187, 223–230.

[2] See a very thorough though somewhat hypercritical review of Kahnis' theology in articles by Pierson in *Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie*, 1877, pp. 1–58, 193–284: "Ueber die Dogmatik von Kahnis."

our faith just as men generally know the facts of their common consciousness. The faith of the Christian is the basis of his understanding of Christian doctrine. With the idea of God becoming man as his central thought, he arranges his system under three divisions: i. the principle of becoming —(1) nature, (2) personality, (3) Trinity, (4) attributes of God; ii. the carrying out of this becoming—(1) generation, (2) degeneration, (3) regeneration, including incarnation, Person and work of Christ, means of grace, *ordo salutis*, the Church; iii. the end of the becoming—the Christian hope, resurrection, eternal states. In opposition to Ritschl, Frank claims to be able to reach beyond the certainties of faith to the objects of faith abstracted from experience. His main conclusions are in harmony with those of orthodox Lutheranism. His method is peculiar, and, in contrast with the church teachers, he rejects the schema of distribution of the work of Christ according to the three offices of prophet, priest, and king. His analyses of Christian experience are often most profound and suggestive.[1] The most thoroughgoing representative of pure Lutheranism, or at least the one whose presentation of Lutheranism is most rigidly conservative, is F. A. Philippi (1809–1882), of Rostock, whose *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*, Stuttgart, 1854, 2nd ed., 6 vols., 1864–1879, is an extremely rigid and narrow, but admirably arranged and clearly expressed, statement of church doctrine. Dogmatic has to develop the idea of the restoration of the fellowship of man with God. Restoration implies a breaking off, and a breaking off presupposes an original enjoyment of fellowship. Hence his distribution: i. of the original fellowship with God; ii. of the breach in the fellowship with God; iii. of the objective restoration of the fellowship with God through Christ; iv. of the subjective appropriation or

[1] Vollert, *Gedankengang des Frank'schen System der christlichen Wahrheit*, Leipzig, 1894; Rüling, *Die Grundlagen des christlichen Glaubens auf Grund von Franks System der christlichen Gewissheit*, Erlangen, 1893; Schnedermann, *Frank und Ritschl*, Erlangen, 1893; Seeberg, *H. F. R. v. Frank*, Erlangen, 1894; Kaftan, *Truth of the Christian Religion*, Edin. 1894, vol. i. pp. 320–325.

realisation of the objectively restored fellowship with God: v. of the future completion of the restored and appropriated fellowship with God. Martin Kähler, of Halle, may also be mentioned here as proceeding, in a way somewhat similar to Frank, from the standpoint of Christian experience, postulating for the Christian a special form and kind of knowledge which those who are not Christians do not possess. In his *Die Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre von den evangelischen Grundartikeln aus im Abrisse dargestellt*, 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1893, he treats in three successive parts of apologetics, dogmatics, and ethics. In the second or dogmatic part, pp. 209–438, he makes the doctrine of justifying faith in God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the ground of salvation, and the divine purpose of grace the ground of the certainty of faith. With the doctrine of justifying faith in Christ as the principle of his system, Kähler proposes a threefold division: i. The confession of the need of salvation—(1) the living God and His creature, (2) the holy God and sin. ii. The confession of the possession of salvation—(1) God in Christ the Saviour or the Reconciler, (2) the reconciliation of the world with God in Christ—soteriology, *opus salvificum*, (3) the reconciliation of the sinner with God through the Spirit of Christ—soteriology, *gratia applicatrix*. iii. The confession of the hope of salvation—(1) the Reconciler as Finisher, (2) the completed kingdom of God. After the example of Schleiermacher, Kähler separates his treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity from that of the general doctrine of God, and introduces it later in connection with the historical restoration of redemption by the Son and Spirit. His trinitarian doctrine is regarded by some as tending to Sabellianism.

In this group a place may fairly be claimed for the Reformed theologian, J. H. A. Ebrard (1818–1888), of Erlangen, whose *Christliche Dogmatik*, 2nd ed., 2 vols., Königsberg, 1862, is an attractively written and well-arranged exhibition of the Christian doctrine from a liberal Reformed standpoint. He divides his system into three parts: i. the doctrine of the glorifying of God as Primal

Fount—(1) idea of God as Primal Fount of all temporal being, (2) the being of God as eternal source of all temporal existence (Scripture doctrine of Father, Son, and Spirit, church doctrine of Trinity, relation of doctrine of Trinity to the idea of God), (3) the glorifying of God as eternal source of all temporal existence (the doctrine of creation and upholding, the divine attributes, the divine providence). ii. The doctrine of the glorifying of God as Mediator in the temporal-historical fact of redemption—(1) the idea of the Redeemer (Genesis and history of the idea, history of ecclesiastical development of doctrine of need of redemption and a redeemer), (2) the being of the Redeemer (Scripture doctrine, ecclesiastical construction, speculative treatment of Person of Christ), (3) the glorifying of God as Mediator in time (the three offices of Christ, work of Christ in consecutive stages, work of Christ in the unity of His official calling and personal history). iii. The glorifying of God as the Finisher—(1) idea of the Finisher (postulate of enlightenment, justification, sanctification, requirement of conversion and regeneration—Scripture and church doctrine), (2) the presence of the Finisher in the Church (Scripture doctrine of the Church, development of the dogma, (3) the work of the Finisher (macrocosmic completing in repentance, faith, sanctification, relation of microcosmic completing to macrocosmic saving institutions—free will, sacraments, predestination; the macrocosmic completing—restoration to Adamic perfection, perfecting of the Church into the kingdom of Christ, of the world into the kingdom of God). Ebrard opposed Hofmann's doctrine of the atonement, and insisted upon the doctrine of the vicarious satisfaction of Christ in the full biblical and orthodox sense. His kenotic theory[1] is described as of the absolute semi-metamorphic type, practically Apollinarian, though formally distinguished by making the Logos become a human soul; the Son of God did not give up but disguised His divinity, He did not lay aside omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, but retained them

[1] See Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, Edin. 1876, pp. 197–206, 234–241, 459–462.

in an applied form so that they could be used at will. The two natures are regarded as simply two aspects of the one being.

(9) *Ritschl and his School.*

LITERATURE.—Ecke, *Die theologische Schule Albrecht Ritschls*, Berlin, 1897 (gives a most thorough description of Ritschl's doctrines and of their development by the several members of his school). Orr, *The Ritschlian Theology and the Evangelical Faith*, Lond. 1897. Lipsius, *Die Ritschl'sche Theologie*, Leipzig, 1888. Frank, *Zur Theologie A. Ritschls*, Leipzig, 1891. Pfleiderer, *Die Ritschl'sche Theologie kritisch beleuchtet*, Brunswick, 1891. Kattenbusch, *Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl*, 2nd ed., Giessen, 1893, pp. 70–88. Stählin, *Kant, Lotze, and Ritschl*, Edin. 1889. Lichtenberger, *History of German Theology in the Nineteenth Century*, Edin. 1889, pp. 576–688. Pfleiderer, *Development of Theology since Kant*, Lond. 1893, pp. 185–195.

The one theologian of the present generation who can be said to have founded a school is Albrecht Ritschl (1822–1889), of Bonn. His theological system is most fully elaborated in his great work, *Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, 3 vols., Bonn, 1870–1874, 3rd ed. 1889, especially volume iii., of which a fourth edition appeared in 1895, containing his own system. He insists strongly upon the recognition of the historal Christ as the revelation of God and the acceptance of the Scriptures as the record of that revelation, and claims close connection with Lutheranism and Protestantism; but determinedly rejects all scholasticism, and has a special polemic against metaphysics in the domain of theology. His theory of knowledge is purely empirical, and his scientific attitude that of an agnostic. In his doctrine of God he does not seem to rise above that of the Unitarian. In his doctrine of reconciliation he can regard as tenable only the moral theory of the atonement. The confusion resulting from the false mixing of idealistic and realistic principles in his theory of knowledge, borrowed from Kant and Lotze, reappears in the distinction which he seeks to make between scientific and religious truth. Religious truth,

according to Ritschl, consists only of "value judgments," *werthurtheile*, which are really true and important only as producing certain emotions in the individual as he entertains them. And so generally he would make the emotional value of any religious idea the test and measure of its truth. This evidently is subjectivity of the most dangerous and objectionable kind. For though, of course, to say that the judgment which we form of the divinity of Christ is a "value judgment" does not affirm that this judgment is *not* true of Christ in Himself, it does not affirm that it *is* true. The affirmation only means that His religious worth to me is such as I can best express by calling Him divine. His doctrine of sin is in conflict with that of the Church. According to Ritschl, all sins that can be forgiven are sins of ignorance; but he explains this as meaning ignorance of the character of God, so that redemption is simply the removing of this ignorance by revealing the love of God. He repudiates in every form the idea that Christ bore the burden of men's guilt, or that His sufferings were an offering to take away sin. He complains that the Church has neglected the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, but he fails himself to give it any further development or to awaken more interest in the doctrine. His failure to realise the bondage under which man lies by reason of sin, and his repudiation of the dogma of the sinful nature or inherited sin, necessarily leads to a minimising of the importance of the Spirit's work. Offence has justly been taken with Ritschl's doctrine of prayer. He considers only the effect of prayer on the suppliant, and regards petition as only a form of thanksgiving. This results from Ritschl's frigid conception of God's relation to the world, so that even God's promises to hear prayer are only encouragements to trust in God. Those who are commonly regarded as members of the Ritschlian school are by no means at one in regard to their adoption of the principles maintained by their master. Gottschick, for the most part, and Herrmann also to a large extent, adopt with little variation the leading principles of Ritschl; Hermann Schultz, and perhaps Harnack, may also be named as belonging

to this section of the strict Ritschlian school. Herrmann, of Marburg, is warmly attached to the characteristic Ritschlian doctrines, and in his attractively written work, *Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott*, Stuttgart, 1886, 3rd ed. 1896 (Eng. trans., *The Communion of the Christian with God*, Lond. 1895), he has done much to popularise and make known the leading principles of the Ritschlian theology. If he is more subjective and less biblical than Ritschl, his theological development has been in the direction of rejecting the rationalistic tendency of Ritschl in favour of a certain religious mysticism, and a firmer and heartier recognition of the immediate presence and efficiency of the supernatural. Dorner's successor in Berlin, Julius Kaftan, in several particulars modifies the doctrinal positions of Ritschl, abandoning the use of the term *Werthurtheil*, and repudiating the distinction between scientific and religious truth as usually understood by the critics of Ritschl. His work, *Die Wahrheit der christlichen Religion*, Basel, 1888 (Eng. trans., *The Truth of the Christian Religion*, 2 vols., Edin. 1893), is specially important for its discussions on matters belonging to the Prolegomena of dogmatics, such as the origin of dogma, the development of theology, criticism of the traditional speculative method, and also for its careful treatment of the theory of knowledge from a moderate Ritschlian standpoint. In his *Dogmatik*, Freiburg, 1897, he has given an admirably clear presentation of the theological system under seven divisions: (1) of God; (2) of the world; (3) of man and his sin; (4) of Jesus Christ (Person and work); (5) of the Church and means of grace; (6) of faith; (7) of the Christian hope. One of the peculiarities of conception and arrangement is the treatment of the main contents of the *ordo salutis* under the section on the *Work of Christ*. There, and not in Division VI., have we justification and regeneration discussed. In regard to clearness of expression and orderliness of arrangement, it occupies easily the first place among German handbooks on dogmatics, and the excellence of the matter is quite as high as that of the form. On the questions of sin, redemption, Person of Christ, Kaftan seems inclined

to make considerable concessions to the older evangelical orthodoxy. Bornemann, in his *Unterricht im Christenthum*, Gött. 1893, 3rd ed., is moving in the same direction. Of all the better known members of the Ritschlian school, the one who, on almost all the objectionable points in Ritschl's theology, has returned into closest connection with the church doctrine is Häring. In a series of publications—*Ueber das Bleibende im Glauben an Christus*, Stuttg. 1880; *Zu Ritschls Versöhnungslehre*, Zür. 1888; *Zur Versöhnungslehre*, Gött. 1893; *Δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ bei Paulus*, Tüb. 1896, etc.—he gives important expositions of the Person and work of Christ. Hermann Schultz, so well known for his admirable *Old Testament Theology*, has published an excellent summary of his Dogmatic as basis for his lectures, *Grundriss der evangelischen Dogmatik*, Gött. 1892, 2nd ed. He arranges the doctrines thus: i. Presuppositions of the Christian experience of salvation—(1) God and the world, (2) man and sin. ii. The Christian experience of salvation—(1) the saving work of the Son of God, (*a*) the Person of Christ, (*b*) the work of Christ; (2) the saving operation of the Spirit of God, (*a*) Church and means of grace, (*b*) *ordo salutis*—justification, conversion, and sanctification, repentance and faith, (*c*) the perfecting of salvation.

(10) *Britain and America.*

Literature.—Cave, *Introduction to Theology*, 2nd ed., Edin. 1896, pp. 513–517. Pfleiderer, *The Development of Theology, etc., and its Progress in Great Britain since* 1825, London, 1893, pp. 355–401 (interesting, though quite disproportionate, sketch of Maurice, Erskine of Linlathen, and M'Leod Campbell,—otherwise of no value, judgments utterly untrustworthy).

Thomas Chalmers (1780–1847), a most influential teacher of theology for twenty years, is represented by his *Institutes of Theology*, 2 vols., Edin. 1849, in which, after an introductory treatise on the Christian evidences, a twofold division of doctrinal theology is adopted similar to that of Schleiermacher

and Rothe—the disease and the remedy, the latter being subdivided: (1) the nature of the gospel remedy—atonement, satisfaction, faith, sanctification; (2) the extent of the gospel remedy—doctrines of philosophical necessity, predestination. The addition of supplementary sections on the Trinity, the union of the two natures in Christ, the doctrine of the Spirit, is a confession of the inadequacy of the principle of division adopted. Leonard Woods (1774–1854), professor at Andover, Calvinist of the New England school, well known for his defence of Trinitarianism against the Unitarians, published his systematic theology in "Theological Lectures," occupying the first three volumes of his Works, 5 vols., Andover, 1849. While full of instruction, the lectures are discursive and loose in their arrangement. A sort of topical distribution is followed. Immediately after the doctrine of God we have the Trinity and the christology set forth at great length in the form of a polemic against the Unitarians, then providence, moral agency, etc. A work by Dr. R. J. Breckenridge, of Danville, Kentucky (1800–1871), in 2 vols.,—*The Knowledge of God Objectively Considered*, New York, 1859, and *The Knowledge of God Subjectively Considered*, New York, 1860,—deserves mention on account of its ingenious distribution of the materials of Christian doctrine. He considers that the knowledge of God may be divided or classified under three aspects: (1) as a mere knowledge capable of and requiring purely *objective* treatment; (2) in its intimate and transforming effects on man in his inner life, nature, condition, and destiny, capable of and comprehensible through *subjective* treatment. This covers the whole field of dogmatics. Under the first he treats of man, the Mediator, God, sources of knowledge, sum and result; under the second, the covenant of grace, union and communion with the Son of God, the offices of Christ, communion of saints, gifts of God to His Church. In a third treatise, under the title "Relative Knowledge of God," he proposes to treat of polemical theology, the truth contrasted with various opposing forms of error.

Dr. Charles Hodge (1797–1878),[1] professor at Princeton, one of the best known of modern theologians, a strenuous but thoroughly intelligent defender of the Calvinistic doctrines, sets forth his doctrinal views in a very clear and comprehensive way in his great work, *Systematic Theology*, 3 vols., New York and Edin. 1873. He adopts the common fourfold division, a modification of the old topical arrangement: i. theology proper; ii. anthropology; iii. soteriolgy; iv. eschatology. In this work the doctrine of the Church is passed over, but this omission is to some extent supplied in a separate treatise, *The Church and its Polity*, Edin. 1879, in which Dr. Hodge's lectures on ecclesiology are reproduced. The chief defect of the systematic theology is the inclusion of exhaustive discussions on scientific and philosophical theories, which seem to commit theology to the acceptance or rejection of certain methods of investigation and reasoning which may seriously hamper her own proper procedure. Another full and remarkably clear exposition of Calvinistic doctrine is to be found in the works of Dr. Shedd, of New York, *Dogmatic Theology*, 2 vols., New York and Edin. 1889, supplementary vol. 1894. It is written in an admirable style, and shows great breadth of theological reading and culture. While Dr. Hodge attaches himself by preference to the covenant theology, Dr. Shedd goes back rather to the older form of Calvinism, which proceeds directly from the point of view of the divine decree. This system follows closely the scheme of doctrine formulated by Augustine and Calvin, influenced very perceptibly by the teaching of Edwards. Dr. Shedd differs from Dr. Hodge, and follows Augustine and Calvin in preferring the theory of traducianism to that of creationism, and making it the basis of his theory of Adam's natural headship of the race. The fault of this great work is want of proportion, certain doctrines, or aspects of doctrines, being treated in great detail, and other important points scarcely more than indicated. The *Systematic Theology* of Professor A. H. Strong,

[1] Dr. James Macgregor, "Hodge and the Princeton School," in *Brit. and For. Evangel. Review*, 1874, vol. xxiii. pp. 456–469.

of the Baptist Theological Seminary at Rochester, N.Y., on the basis of an earlier volume of "Lectures on Theology" (1876), was published in New York in 1886, 4th ed. 1893, pp. 600 (apart from 160 pp. of indexes). It gives in its main sections an admirably clear statement of doctrine from a moderate Calvinistic standpoint, and in smaller type an immense mass of useful information is given, partly original, partly in the form of well-chosen quotations. The whole makes an extremely useful students' book. The arrangement and distribution are somewhat loose. After the Prolegomena, in which Dr. Strong treats (1) of the idea, (2) of the matter, (3) of the method of theology, the Christian doctrines are distributed in seven parts: i. the existence of God; ii. the Scriptures a revelation from God; iii. the nature, decrees, and works of God; iv. anthropology, or the doctrine of man; v. soteriology, or the doctrine of salvation through the work of Christ and the Holy Spirit; vi. ecclesiology, or the doctrine of the Church (constitution and ordinances); vii. eschatology, or the doctrine of the last things.

As of a kindred type with the works just referred to, we may here mention the dogmatic treatises of Oosterzee and Böhl. Oosterzee (1817–1882), in his *Christelijke Dogmatick*, 2 vols., Utrecht, 1870–1872 (Eng. trans., *Christian Dogmatics*, London, 1874), after a somewhat diffuse preliminary discussion on religion, revelation, and Holy Scripture (rich in contents and most instructive), gives a full and clear statement of Calvinistic doctrine under the usual divisons—theology, anthropology, christology, objective soteriology, subjective soteriology, ecclesiology, eschatology. Though somewhat diffuse, it is so throughout, and is a well-proportioned exhibition of the whole system. In many respects it is eminently well fitted for use as a theological text-book. Böhl, of Vienna, in his *Dogmatik; Darstellung d. chr. Glaubenslehre auf reformiert-kirchlicher Grundlage*, Amsterdam, 1887, distributes the contents of dogmatics into five divisions: i. theology (God's existence, nature, trinitarian personality, relation to the world); ii. anthropology (original condition, fall, death);

iii. soteriology, doctrine of Redeemer in respect of His Person and work; iv. soteriology, doctrine of the appropriation of redemption through the Holy Spirit (including doctrine of Spirit, Word of God, *ordo salutis*, election, Church and sacraments); v. eschatology. The work is written in a clear and rather interesting style, but the contents are decidedly commonplace, reiterating the familiar statements of doctrine from the Reformed standpoint, with no attempt anywhere at fresh development.

As *compendia* of the positions of the recognised teachers of confessional Protestant theology, those of Hutter, Hase, and Luthardt are the most convenient. Hutter (1563–1616), in his *Compendium locorum theologicorum*, 1610, under the usual *Loci* gave quotations from the Lutheran Confessions, and from Chemnitz and Hunnius. Twesten, in his convenient edition of the *Compendium*, Berl. 1855, 2nd ed. 1863, added quotations from the Reformed theologians, Wolleb and Pictet. A more complete exhibition of Reformation theology was given by Hase (1800–1890) in his *Hutterus redivivus, Dogmatik d. evang.-luth. Kirche*, 1829, 12th ed. 1883. The most complete, and for the purpose a really perfect, manual is the *Compendium der Dogmatik* of Luthardt, of Leipzig, 1865, 9th ed. 1893, in which quotations from fathers, schoolmen, reformers, and later Lutheran and Reformed divines are woven together by a connecting thread of exposition and explanation. Luthardt distributes his materials under six heads: i. the grounding of the divine fellowship in the eternal loving will of God (doctrine of God and His decree); ii. the creation of man and his world as the beginning of the historic realisation of the loving will of God; iii. the rending of the original divine fellowship by sin, and the preparation for its restoration; iv. the restoration of the divine fellowship in Christ Jesus (the Person of the Divine-human Mediator, the threefold office of Christ); v. the appropriation of the divine fellowship restored in Christ Jesus—personal appropriation (grace of Holy Spirit, calling, illumination, conversion, etc.), the Church (means of grace

sacraments); vi. the perfecting of the divine fellowship—*De novissimis.*

The most popular handbooks in theological classes in Scotland during the last generation were those of Hill and Hodge. Dr. George Hill (1750–1819), Principal of St. Andrews University, was long an influential teacher and prominent church leader. His *Lectures in Divinity*, 3 vols., 1821, were edited by his son; a 5th ed., 1850. Though clear in style, there is nothing fresh or remarkable about them, and they take no notice whatever of many of the most pressing questions in theological science, many of which indeed had not emerged, or at least had not awakened interest in this country, when these lectures were written. Professor A. A. Hodge (1823–1886), in his *Outlines of Theology*, New York and Edin. 1860, rewritten and enlarged 1878, reproduces the substance of his father's lectures in a convenient and eminently accessible compendium.

Of recent short handbooks, Banks' *Manual of Christian Doctrine*, 5th revised ed., London, 1895,—with twofold division: i. doctrines presupposed in redemption — the divine existence, divine revelation, divine attributes, creation and providence, sin; ii. doctrines of redemption — Person of Christ, atonement, experience of salvation, the Church, the last things,—is, in respect of matter and proportionate treatment, very far superior to Moule's *Outlines of Christian Doctrine*, London, 1889, which is evidently injured most seriously, in regard both to contents and treatment, by the author's attempt to use what he had originally intended to produce in the form of a commentary on the Anglican Articles. The chapters of Moule's book on God, the Father, Son and Spirit, man, the Church, the ministry, the sacraments, fail to supply suitable places for, or to give adequate expression to, several important doctrines of the Christian faith. The same remark applies to two doctrinal treatises, very excellent in their way, by Professor Mason and Rev. T. B. Strong. In *The Faith of the Gospel: a Manual of Christian Doctrine*, London, 1888, pp. 404, Canon Mason,

discusses Christian doctrine in eleven chapters: i. the being and nature of God; ii. the blessed Trinity; iii. creation through the Word; iv. man and his fall; v. the incarnation of the Word of God; vi. the atoning work of Christ; vii. the risen Lord and the gift of the Spirit; viii. the characteristics of the Church; ix. the means of grace; x. the process of salvation; xi. the last things. Fresh and interesting, devout and spiritual, this course of lectures affords most profitable reading in the family or for personal religious edification, but the treatment is not exact or minute enough for academic use. *A Manual of Theology*, Lond. and Edin. 1892, pp. 424, by Rev. T. B. Strong, is a book of a very different type, and is even less suitable than the previously named work to serve as a students' manual. It is an attempt to restate the Christian doctrines from the standpoint of the incarnation—the knowledge of God, the claims of Christ on His own behalf, the Trinity, man (creation, fall, atonement), and finally, the Church and sacraments, as an extension of the incarnation. There is much that is fresh and suggestive in the discussion of particular points, but at the same time there is a most unfortunate dislocation of the several parts of theology, and want of proportion in the treatment of the several doctrines.

Two volumes of theological lectures, though not professing to give a fully elaborated system of theology, deserve mention here for their scientific worth and comprehensiveness. The Kerr Lecture in the United Presbyterian Church for 1890–1891, by Dr. James Orr, *The Christian View of God and the World as Centring in the Incarnation* (Edin. 1893), from the special point of view of the *Weltanschauung*, deals with the whole circle of Christian doctrine. Establishing, first of all, the central position of Christ as against humanitarian, agnostic, and pessimistic theories, Dr. Orr treats in succession of the doctrines of God, of nature and man, of sin, of the incarnation, of redemption, ending with a discussion of eschatological questions. The work is by far the most complete and informing treatise on doctrinal

theology, dealing with modern problems from a thoroughly evangelical standpoint. The lectures of Dr. James Denney, *Studies in Theology* (London, 5th ed. 1895), originally delivered in Chicago Theological Seminary, do not present so complete a system as those of Dr. Orr, and profess to be only a series of discussions on some of the more important doctrines of the Christian faith. Though we have not here any definite or avowed system, a preference is indicated for an arrangement of doctrines in accordance with the succession of their historical development: christology—including the doctrine of the Trinity; anthropology—with a full discussion of the doctrine of sin; soteriology—Christ's work of reconciliation and man's justification by faith. The standpoint generally is similar to that of Dr. Orr, especially in the criticism of the Ritschlian theology. Specially interesting and suggestive is Dr. Denney's treatment of the doctrines of sin and atonement.

I.—THE DOCTRINE OF GOD AND THE WORLD.

§ 10. Introductory and General.

Literature.—Orr, *The Christian View of God and the World*, Edin. 1894. Flint, *Theism*, Baird Lectures, Edin. 1877. Harris, *The Self-Revelation of God*, Edin. 1887. Hickok, *Creator and Creation, or the Knowledge in the Reason of God in His Work*, Boston, 1872. Bruce, *The Providential Order of the World*, Gifford Lectures, London, 1897. Lotze, *Microcosmus*, 4th ed., 2 vols., Edin. 1894.

From the Christian standpoint, God can have no meaning for us apart from the world, any more than the world can have a meaning for us apart from God. If we attempt to view the one abstracted from the other, what we have before us is neither the world nor God, but mere abstract conceptions for which we can never find any corre-

sponding reality. Acosmism and atheism—one or other of which necessarily results from any attempt to view God and the world apart from one another—are alike opposed to Christianity. The world viewed apart from God allows no place for God; and God viewed apart from the world allows no place for the world. Hence we do not take as the subject of the first division of Christian dogmatics either theology, as some do, or anthropology, as others do; but we take as its subject, God in His relations to the world generally. We have here God, in His transcendence as well as in His immanence, relating Himself to the world as creator and governor. Even when we discuss His being and attributes and determine the limits of our knowledge of His essential nature, the idea of God with which we deal is that of Him who in the beginning created the heavens and the earth.

§ 11. The Christian Idea of God.

Literature. — Fairbairn, *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion and of History*, London, 1876, 1st Part: "The Idea of God, its Genesis and Development." Flint, *Theism*, Edin. 1877, espec. Lects. II., X. Calvin, *Institutes*, bk. i. chap. vi.: "Need of Scripture as Guide in coming to God." Orr, *Christian View of God and the World*, Edin. 1894, espec. pp. 91–96.

What we have to start with in Christian dogmatics is the Christian idea of God. In the science of religion the proper place is found for discussions about absolute being, and for a general inquiry into the philosophical and speculative idea of God; but in Christian dogmatics we have to do with the God of redemption, for only as such is God the subject of revelation. Many dogmatists begin their positive or distinctly doctrinal part with elaborate investigations about God, as considered in Himself out of and apart from all relations, setting forth what they regard as a purely abstract idea of God as pure deity. In all this there is avowedly nothing specifically Christian. It belongs to their plan to state and develop their theories at that stage, without

any colouring of thought or expression borrowed from the Christian revelation. But Christian dogmatics has nothing to do with so-called natural religion. Reference may indeed be made to its conclusions, but only to show that these, so far as they go, are in harmony with the revelations made in and to the Christian religious consciousness. Any statement concerning God, any speculation about His being and essence, that disclaims being distinctively Christian, whatever value it may have in the theory or philosophy of religion, can have no place in a Christian system. Such speculations, whether of a scholastic or of a mystical kind, can yield only negative results. We may be able, by means of philosophical reflection or theosophical dreaming, to produce an idea of God which gives us a being that is not identical with the world, but that stands outside of and above it. A positive idea with truly religious contents is attainable only in the Christian doctrine of God given by revelation. The distinction sometimes sought to be made between God and the Godhead is not valid in Christian theology. Of God in Himself we have, and can have, no idea. It is with God discovered to us in the Christian revelation as the God of salvation that we have to do in Christian dogmatics from the very first. The only knowledge of God that is possible for us, or that can be of any interest or advantage to us, is the knowledge of God as relating Himself to man, and manifesting this relationship in man's own nature, and in that universe to which he belongs. The God of revelation is God speaking and working in and for man, a God who takes to do with us, and with whom we have to do.

In the earliest writings of the Old Testament, as certainly as in the most advanced and mature of the writings of the New Testament, we have the idea of God represented under the category of concrete personal being. The development in the biblical conception of God is in the direction of spirituality, not of personality. Early representations are more anthropomorphic than the later, not because their writers entertained a materialistic

notion of God, or thought of God as belonging to the order of things to which they themselves belonged, but just because they had not yet that revelation, and perhaps were not then capable of receiving that revelation, which would afford them the conception of a purely spiritual being, and enable them to express such an idea. This, at least, we should carefully note here, that from first to last the biblical view of God is that of a living, personal being in immediate relationship with man, above the world yet active and operative in its affairs. His distinctive personal name from the earliest days of Israel's history is Jehovah, the covenant God,—no abstract idea, no mere personification of power, but a personal and moral being, in all His proper concrete distinctiveness, relating Himself to man under the conditions and sanctions of a covenant. The most perfect revelation of God which we have received, or can conceive ourselves capable of receiving, is that of the New Testament,—the Father of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. This is the only New Testament representation of God, and under the Christian dispensation we can have no other. Under this designation He is the same as the Jehovah of Israel. He is the covenant God, only the New Testament name is in terms of the completed revelation of God in Christ.

It is to be observed that the biblical doctrine of God is everywhere represented as a revelation, a discovery or disclosure made by God of Himself, who otherwise remains hidden and unknown, and not as the result of speculations or spiritual searchings engaged upon by religiously gifted men. The most highly endowed spiritually show their high spirituality simply by their transmitting to others the revelations of God that had been made to them. It is from these revelations, especially as they culminate in the personal life and teaching of Christ, that Christian dogmatics must construct its doctrine of God.

It might seem, indeed, that we should not introduce all this fulness of content into our idea of God in the outset of our dogmatics, that we should not speak of God in terms

of the doctrine of redemption, or in respect of his relationship to us in the person of the Redeemer, until we had first introduced the christological and soteriological parts of our system. But we must remember that Christianity is simply the religion of redemption, and that our dogmatics is essentially, and therefore in its first chapter as well as its last, Christian. It is the science of the Christian faith, and our notion of God is the outcome of personal faith in Him, the understanding of Him attained unto by the believing consciousness, which seeks satisfaction in the vision of God and obtains that satisfaction in Christ.

§ 12. The Knowledge of God.

Literature.—Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, Lond. 1893, chap. ix.: "Our Knowledge of the Infinite," pp. 131–144. Iverach, *Is God Knowable?* Lond. 1884. Mansel, *Limits of Religious Thought*, Lond. 1858. Maurice, *What is Revelation?* and *Sequel*, Lond. 1859, 1860. Dorner on the Mansel-Maurice Controversy in *Jahrbücher f. d. Theologie*, vi. 1861, pp. 320–427; also in *System of Christian Doctrine*, i. 206–212. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, §§. 44, 45. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, i. 335–366.

Inasmuch as we are dealing with a God who reveals Himself, it is manifestly impossible for us to think or speak of God either as unknown or as unknowable. The question here is quite independent of any theory of the limits of revelation. Whether God reveals much or little, if He reveals at all, He is not unknown. For a revealing God means a self-revealing God. If God speaks at all, whatever He speaks about, by simply speaking He makes a revelation of Himself. Any utterance of God is in some measure a communication of Himself. Now, we have seen that religion demands a God who speaks. A silent God does not answer the requirements of religion. There is no religion if there is no relationship constituted between God and man, and there can be no such relation unless God makes it by His self-communication. Religion also requires that man, as thus

related to God, will respond by the uttered expression of His love. The communication of Himself to man on the part of God must be sufficiently distinct and definite to enable man to appreciate His spiritual character and moral attributes, and also to convince him of His existence as personal being. Only to a God who has thus spoken, as an intelligent living personality, will man speak back, for he knows that only such a God can listen to and accept his speech, in which he acknowledges God's graciousness in making a communication to him. Religion thus demands a God that speaks and can be spoken to.

The purely philosophical question of the relativity of human knowledge has been quite gratuitously imported into theology. In Christian dogmatics this discussion has no place. The question for us is not, What can man discover of God? but, What does God reveal of Himself? Philosophy considers the limitation of the human faculties and the conditions of human thinking. To think so as to define implies opposition and contrast, and the infinite as a mere negative thought excludes the idea of opposition and contrast. Now, it is evident that this infinite of philosophy is not the God of Christian theology. Such an infinite is the God of Pantheism, but not of Christianity. The Infinite of the Christian religion puts Himself into relation with finite beings. And this therefore shuts out from Christian theology the philosophical question of the Unconditioned and that of the relativity of human knowledge. The religious doctrine of relativity is something entirely different. If we were proposing to discover God, to reach the idea of God by thinking, then the philosophical theory of relativity would effectually bar our way. But when it is a question of God revealing Himself, we have to take from revelation not only the facts made known by God about Himself, but also the doctrine of man's religious consciousness and its capacity for receiving that revelation. The God who speaks addresses Himself to a faculty in man which He Himself has made capable of receiving His communications in that form in which He makes them.

This knowledge of God, then, is the result of our belief in God. *Credo ut intelligam.* Christian theology is a believing science, having its origin in faith and addressing itself to believers. Our knowledge therefore will never be in advance of our belief; but, on the other hand, what we are capable of believing we are also capable of making the subject of knowledge. The knowledge which rests upon faith is the only knowledge that we can have of God. We know Him by believing in Him. Now it is quite evident that this knowledge is not the same as that which results from reasoning and demonstration. It is more and it is less. It is more inasmuch as it is real knowledge, and rational knowledge could at best be only pictorial and symbolical. But it is less inasmuch as it does not undertake in respect of God what the knowledge of demonstration undertakes in regard to finite and sensible things. It is a true knowledge, such as reason and reasoning could never attain in reference to God and spiritual things; but it is not full or adequate knowledge, such as natural science attains unto, in the comprehension and definition of the subject of its investigations. To know in the scientific sense, we must stand above, or, at least, on an equality with, the object, a knowledge of which is sought after; in God, the object of faith is not only far above man, but there is no being above or alongside of Him by means of which we might attain to a defining knowledge of Him. The knowledge, therefore, which is brought to us by faith is true, and it is also adequate to the purpose which God had in view in presenting Himself as the object of faith. It is God's own knowledge of Himself in that form in which His knowledge of us requires that He should communicate it to us.

The Christian knowledge of God is the knowledge of His love to us in Christ. It is this that constitutes the depth of God, and it is just from out of this depth that the Spirit of God brings to us discoveries of the deep things of God. Those things are known only to the Spirit of God, and they are made known to us only by being freely given us of God;

and it is just for this end that we have received the Spirit (1 Cor. ii. 10–16). Still, after the Spirit has made us know the depth of God's love, our knowledge, though wholly derived from the Spirit, is not in the measure of the Spirit, but in our own. He only knows in the absolute comprehensive sense. In that sense the love of God in Christ still, in respect of us, passes knowledge, and must ever pass knowledge. To know this as His Spirit knows, we must be as the Spirit, that is, we must be God. Scripture strongly insists upon the impossibility of a finite being compassing the infinite so as to reach a comprehensive knowledge of His fulness (Job xi. 7; Rom. xi. 33; 1 Cor. xiii. 12). When the modern agnostic goes beyond this, he goes beyond agnosticism into dogmatic nihilism. The biblical representation of God as the infinite, not in the negative sense of philosophy, but in the positive sense of religion, postulates on our part, not ignorance, but real knowledge, communicated by God Himself as something which He might give or withhold according to His own will; which, however, being given, is of necessity a growing knowledge, never complete, but always advancing to greater and yet greater fulness.

Christian dogmatics is not interested in the discussion as to whether a knowledge of God's existence is universal, and whether as such it is innate, or a natural and necessary deduction of reason, or merely the result of tradition. These questions evidently in no way affect the Christian idea of God, which is known only by revelation, and with which alone the Christian dogmatist has to do.

§ 13. Significance of the so-called Proofs of God's Existence.

Literature.—Campbell Fraser, *Philosophy of Theism*, Gifford Lectures, 2nd series, Lects. I–III., Edin. 1896. Caird, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, Glasgow, 1880, pp. 133–159. Lotze, *Outlines of Philosophy of Religion*, Lond. 1887,

pp. 8–34. Kuno Fischer, *Commentary on Kant's Critik of Pure Reason*, trans. and edit. by Mahaffy, Lond. 1866, pp. 252–265. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, together with a Work on the Proofs of the Existence of God*, Lond. 1895, 3 vols. Flint, *Theism*, Baird Lectures, Edin. 1877. Davidson, *Theism as Grounded in Human Nature*, Lond. 1893. Hutchison Stirling, *Philosophy and Theology*, Edin. 1890 (the teleological, cosmological, and ontological proofs). Orr, *Christian View of God and the World*, Edin. 1893, pp. 112–129. Pfleiderer, *Die Religion, ihr Wesen und ihre Geschichte*, Leipzig, 1869, i. 160–195.

The only proof of God's existence, properly so-called, is that drawn from the thirst of the human soul for God, and the answer from God which has satisfied that thirst. The one religious proof of God's being comes to me in my own personal conviction that God Himself has spoken to my soul, and, by what He has done for and in me, has shown Himself to be God. The so-called "proofs" have even a semblance of *demonstrative* power only outside of and apart from revelation. In this aspect, therefore, that is to say as proofs, they are of no interest, and can have no place in Christian dogmatics or in the doctrine of revelation concerning God. Anything in the shape of a proof that God exists is evidently out of place in a science of faith, which starts with the religious consciousness, in which God and man are brought together in relation to one another.

But though, however excellent and even perfect in their way they may be, they can have no place as *proofs*, yet, just at this point in the system of Christian doctrine they may fitly be introduced as illustrations of certain aspects of the nature of God, who can be known to us and affirmed by us only as the subject of direct revelation. It has been well said by Thomas Aquinas (*Summa*, i. 1, 2), that while the existence of God is demonstrable, it is not by strict demonstration, *demonstratio apodeictica*, but by *demonstratio ab effectibus*. The so-called "proofs" show particularly how in detail the needs and longings of man's soul can be met and satisfied only by God. And in order that they may

be valid even for this, we must consider them in their cumulative force.[1]

1. *The Cosmological Proof, a contingentia mundi*, proceeding from the contingency and changeableness of the world, seeks to conclude, in accordance with the principle of causality, to an absolutely necessary and unconditioned ground of all being, which is at the same time *causa sui*, originator and originated. Whenever we discover that the cause of some event or phenomenon is itself the product of a cause, it ceases to be a cause and is regarded as an effect, and so on as far back in the series as we can trace effects to their causes. Our idea of cause demands an uncaused cause, and cannot rest in an infinite series of causes which are themselves dependent on previous causes. As a logical argument, however, this cosmological proof cannot conclude to an infinite but only to indefinitely great cause, a force of which we cannot say whether it is intelligent or not. The cause of the universe must be greater than the universe, but more than this we cannot legitimately conclude from this proof alone.[2]

2. *The Teleological Proof, argument from order and arrangement in nature, the physico-theological proof.*—The world and its whole system and processes show traces of design, evidences of serving a purpose and striving after an end; this cannot be the result of chance, and things cannot have put themselves under this end-serving; therefore there is a designing ground of all things which lays upon them this principle of serving an end and realising a purpose. Kant says of this

[1] In his *Aspects of Theism*, London, 1893, Professor Knight rejects, in the most unqualified manner, all the so-called proofs of God's existence, and seeks a basis for his theistic belief purely in intuition. He has not, however, succeeded in showing that this intuition is more than subjective, while even as such it is possessed only by the few, and by these only in their best moments; see especially pp. 106–130. So, too, Frank, in his *System d. chr. Wahrheit*, in favour of the idea that Christian experience is the basis of all knowledge of God, is as determined as Ritschl, whom in almost everything else he keenly opposes, in denying all importance and validity to the so-called proofs of the being of God. For a good defence of "the proofs" see Julius Köstlin, *Die Begründung unsrer sittlich-religiösen Ueberzeugung*, Berlin, 1893.

[2] Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, 1893, pp. 53–58.

proof, that it deserves always to be spoken of with respect. It appears in germ in the early Greek philosophers Anaxagoras and Socrates, is wrought out in detail by Plato, and in later times has proved a special favourite with writers on natural theology (*e.g.* Paley, "Bridgewater Treatises"). It has been pointed out that we know only a part of the world, and that we meet with many monstrosities and irregularities in nature which disproves the teleological idea. Yet we have here unquestionably a highly probable hypothesis, which is supported by a great array of facts, and which serves to explain most of the phenomena of the natural world, against which only some exceptions occur, many of which might by a further advance of knowledge be reduced to conformity with the underlying presupposition. It represents God as the highest intelligence and will, impressing on the world His own order and purpose, and thus advancing by an important step beyond the mere causal force of the cosmological proof. For in this argument we rise to the idea of a self-conscious and self-determining cause; of His own will He calls the world into being, works out certain ends and purposes which indicate skill and adaptation of means to an end. Hence we infer that the author of the world is no mere force, but an intelligence of infinite wisdom.[1]

3. *The Ontological Proof* proceeds from the imperfect and fragmentary human thought, as the cosmological proof does from the transitoriness and finiteness of the world. It is an argument from thought to existence, from the idea of an all-perfect being to the fact of His real existence. It is stated by Anselm in this form: "The idea of an absolutely perfect being involves the real existence of such a being; for if such a being did not exist, then we could conceive of another who does exist, and who would therefore be more perfect." Otherwise expressed: Existence is a quality of the most perfect being; the idea of the most perfect being carries with it the idea of real existence. The same argument is somewhat

[1] Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, 1893, pp. 59–76.

differently expressed by Descartes: "The idea of infinite perfection could not originate in anything in the finite world, and therefore implies the existence of an infinitely perfect being as its originator." The idea present here is that the highest conception in man's mind postulates some being above man outside of the finite world. The fact that man relates himself to God gives us the assurance that God relates Himself to man. This can be convincing only where the religious consciousness is operative and on the presupposition of a religious experience.[1]

4. *The Moral Proof*, sometimes called more generally the *Anthropological Argument*, has the same relation to the ontological proof as the teleological has to the cosmological. It proceeds from the moral order of the world. The moral law is evidently not originated by the individuals who are subject to it, but is the expression of an absolute will. Then again in man, the correlation between duty and the feeling of satisfaction which arises from the discharge of it does not originate in any natural connection between the thing done and the feeling that follows, but results from the imposing of this correlation between the two by a higher power ruling in the moral world. Kant attaches special importance to this proof. Its imperfection lies in this, that it cannot prove the existence of a personal divine lawgiver, for this imposition of a moral law might be the result of a merely immanent power. But when we presuppose the religious consciousness and man's religious personal experience, then to faith this is the most satisfying of all the proofs. The universe is so made and constructed that, in spite of all hindrances, the fulfilment of the moral law is demanded and is possible. Such an end conceived of by the religious consciousness as the purpose of the world, this religious theory of the universe, is satisfied only by

[1] See Runze, *Der ontologische Gottesbeweis, kritische Darstellung seiner Geschichte seit Anselm bis auf die Gegenwart*, Halle, 1881; also "Die Fortbildung des ontologischen Gottesbeweises seit der Zeit der Vernunftkritik" in *Jahrbücher f. prot. Theologie* (1881), vol. vii. pp. 577–617. Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, 1893, pp. 39–53.

the hypothesis of the existence of a personal moral governor of the world, who is God.[1]

5. *The Historical Proof, e consensu gentium*, concludes from the universality of the belief in God to its necessity and reality. It was used by Cicero and elaborated by Lactantius. Lubbock's assertion that savage tribes for the most part have no religion results from a too restricted definition of religion as necessarily requiring a clear and definite idea of God. It is opposed and rejected by most distinguished ethnologists. "The same holds true," says Saussaye, "of tribes without religion or of tribes without language or without fire. They are to be found in certain systems, because they fit into them; but in reality no one can point them out."[2] The idea of God may scarcely receive expression in some of the lowest of the savage tribes, but superstitious institutions and practices remain which could only originate with those who believed in a God, the persistence of which can be explained only on the presupposition of at least a latent feeling of the existence of some supernatural and superhuman being or beings. This proof is not one of the same kind or on the same level with the others. It is rather, as Dr. Flint well expresses it, evidence that there are direct evidences. It draws its materials from, and is based upon, the facts supplied by the science of comparative theology and the history of religions.

As a whole, the proofs show what confusion and contradiction would arise if one did not assume the existence of God. It is the religious consciousness that first realises the need of overcoming this contradiction and seeking for a hypothesis that will bring harmony into our conception of the universe.

[1] See Katzer, "Der moralische Gottesbeweises nach Kant und Herbart" in *Jahrbücher f. prot. Theologie*, 1878, vol. iv. pp. 482–532, 635–689, espec. pp. 668–689: "Darstellung des moralischen Gottesbeweises." See also Flint, *Theism*, notes xxv. and xxx., 2nd ed., Edin. 1878, pp. 397 ff., 406–412.

[2] De la Saussaye, *Manual of the Science of Religion*, Lond. 1891, p. 18. The reports of travellers regarding the absence of religious belief among certain uncivilised tribes, and the generalisations from those reports by ethnologists like Waitz, Lubbock, etc., have been admirably dealt with by Flint in his *Anti-Theistic Theories*, Lect. VII., Edin. 1879, pp. 250–289.

Apart from the religious consciousness and religious experience they do not yield any demonstration of the being of God.

§ 14. The Nature of God as Absolute Spirit.

Literature.—Harris, *God the Creator and Lord of All*, 2 vols., Edin. 1897, pt. i. chaps. i.–vi.: "God the One Only Absolute Spirit." Frank, *System der christl. Wahrheit*, i. 150–156. Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch d. evang. Dogmatik*, pp. 351–355. Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, Königsberg, 1862, i. 127 f.

The nearest approach to what we might venture to call a definition of God, or at least a statement purporting to tell in a word what God is, is the declaration of the Son of God, who came to reveal the Father: *God is Spirit* (John iv. 24). It is on the ground that God's nature is purely spiritual that Christ insists that only worship rendered by the spiritual part of man's nature can by any possibility affect him or bring him any satisfaction. He is essentially spirit; every characteristic that belongs to the perfect idea of spirit is found in Him, so that He is self-conscious, self-determining being in the absolute sense, free of all dependence on any other, and therefore free of all necessity to stand apart unrelated to all other beings. He only is Spirit, while other beings have their spirits by derivation and gift from Him.

This conception of the spirituality of God of necessity excludes the ascription of anything like corporeity to God,[1] such as early Gnostics and mediæval Mystics fancied in their dreams. Aquinas carries out a very interesting and subtle argument, under three heads, to show that God cannot be conceived as corporeal: because (1) body does not move without being moved by something else; but God is the prime

[1] Dicitur *Spiritus*, 1°. negative; quia non est corpus: 2°. analogice vel per similitudinem quandam; quia in spiritualibus substantiis perfectiones multæ sunt, quæ naturam divinam magis adumbrant, quam corporeum quicquam potest (Amesius, *Medulla*, I. iv. 34).

mover whom nothing else moves; (2) body as body is infinitely divisible, but God is absolutely the first being; (3) body is either living or not living, but body living is more noble than body not living; but body as body is not living, otherwise every body would be living. Christ distinguished spirit, which He Himself says God is, from His own resurrection body: "A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see Me have" (Luke xxiv. 39).

The idea of the divine spirituality is immediately associated with the conclusions reached by those *proofs* of God's being which we dealt with in our last paragraph. The teleological argument leads up to the postulating of an end above nature, and that which is appropriately styled supernatural is only spirit. As thus used to describe the divine essence, spirit is a positive, and not merely a negative, idea. We mean by spirit not only a being not material and not transitory, but the Absolute Being in which all the ideas are present, which find expression in the finite world. As Spirit He has absolute power over His powers, and so all His operations are free and unnecessitated. This ascent to spirit is distinctly involved in the ontological argument. As Dorner says (*Syst. of Chr. Doctr.* i. 285): "Spirit, reason itself, lies nearer to the awakened reason than Nature does, and from the idea of *Knowledge* the spirituality of absolute Being already results. For how can absolute Being, which is to be necessarily thought as the real and original possibility both of what exists or of being and of thought and knowledge, be such a possibility if it is not essentially spiritual?"

Spirituality is not, properly speaking, an attribute of God, but is more correctly designated His essence, to which the attributes belong. God *is* Spirit, He *has* attributes. It can never be said of man that he is spirit, but only that he has a spirit, which again is itself something communicated or imparted by the one Divine Spirit. Man's spirit is the divine breath breathed into him by God, who is Spirit. It is not the soul, but the ground or producing cause of the soul. Hence the spirit of man is not spoken of as the subject of life, but

as the principle of life. The life of the living soul is the spirit. The principle of life belongs originally to God, and is God. Hence Scripture recognises only one source of life throughout all creation. It is the Spirit of God that broods over the face of the waters (Gen. i. 2). Matter owes its existence, plants and animals owe their life, to Spirit, which is God. To the essential nature of God belongs all that is essential to spirit, that is, thought, feeling, and volition. Spirit as spirit thinks, feels, wills. All this Spirit does as spirit, apart from all relation to matter or any material envelopment. Hence, when we say God is Spirit, we affirm that He has none of the properties belonging to matter, so as to be discerned by our bodily senses. Scripture everywhere recognises the dualism of spirit and matter, and assigns reality to both. As little countenance is given to idealistic as to materialistic theories, and monism in every form is in conflict with the Scripture doctrine of God and the world.

God is the Absolute Spirit. Infinity, therefore, as essential to the idea of Spirit, is not to be treated as merely one of the attributes of God. As Absolute Spirit, God is infinite, and it is this infinity, as characteristic of the divine spirituality, which characterises all the divine attributes, and distinguishes them from the attributes of all creatures. Scripture everywhere represents God as infinite. His being knows no bounds or limitation. This idea we should be careful to represent to ourselves as not merely negative, though expressed in terms of negation, but as certainly carrying, and intended to carry, a positive idea. The error of viewing infinity as a merely negative idea is best avoided by remembering that infinity, as applied to the Divine Spirit, is not to be identified with mere indefinite extension, which, however far it may be carried, must always be a mere property of matter. In an important sense, indeed, it is true that all that we can say about God is negative. We cannot say what He is, but only what He is not. Yet in this we have a real and positive knowledge of God reached by the elimination of all such qualities as are not present in the idea of pure spirit, because properties of

matter. The positive knowledge that we have of God is that He is spirit, though we can conceive of spirit only as not material, not discernible by the properties of height, length, breadth, as bodies are, not limited by or occupying space, etc. As pure spirit, God is Absolute Being, but absolute being we can conceive of only by the elimination of those properties which belong to the finite.

The Absolute Spirit, which is God, is the one original source of life; hence God is the only being who has life in Himself and for Himself. He is the living God, to whom it essentially belongs to live. Self-existence (*aseitas*) is of the essence of God. In this sense He may be called *causa sui*, though this designation has been objected to, and is, strictly speaking, objectionable, inasmuch as He is not *causatum*. In respect of being He is self-caused, in the sense of owing His being to no cause outside of Himself. Spirit, as living and self-existent, is perfect being. Thought and existence, the ideal and the real combined, constitute this perfect being, which is spirit (Rothe, *Theol. Ethik*, § 30). And this synthesis of thought and existence, which is the pure spirit, the perfect being, is reached only in a personal being, self-conscious, intelligent, self-determining.

§ 15. The Divine Personality.

Literature.—Illingworth, *Personality, Human and Divine*, Lond. 1895. Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, Lond. 1893, chap. xi.: "Personality and the Infinite," pp. 157–174. Strong, *Manual of Theology*, Edin. 1892, pp. 170–175. Lotze, *Microcosmus*, 4th ed., Edin. 1894, vol. ii. pp. 659–688; *Outlines of Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 58–69. Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, vol. ii. pp. 141–194. Harris, *Philosophical Basis of Theism*, Edin. 1883, pp. 286–292. Seth, *Hegelianism and Personality*, Edin. 1887. Bruce, *Apologetics*, Edin. 1892, pp. 80–84. Ebrard, *Apologetics*, Edin. 1886, i. 216–221. Frank, *System of Chr. Certainty*, Edin. 1886, pp. 371–408. Iverach, *Is God Knowable?* pp. 12–37, 223–233. Boyd Carpenter, *Permanent Elements of Religion*, Lond. 1889, pp. 265–268. Fricke, *Ist Gott Persönlich?* Leipzig, 1895. Strauss, *Glaubenslehre*, § 33,

vol. i. pp. 502–524. Biedermann, *Chr. Dogmatik*, §§ 715–717, vol. ii. pp. 537–547.

A false conception of personality has led many to maintain that there is an inconsistency in ascribing personal attributes to the Unconditioned, the Absolute, the Infinite. If we were to understand the idea of personality in such a way as would make it necessary to conceive of personal being as simply one among many, as a self whose very selfhood depended upon the existence of other beings which it can distinguish as the not-self, and yet as leaving to them a similar selfhood, that is, as bounded off from those other personal beings that constitute the not-self by the same sort of limitations as those by which they are circumscribed, then to such a personality we evidently could not ascribe absoluteness or infinitude. But such an idea of personality is that of personality under certain peculiar limitations that have been imposed upon it. This is the personality of a particular class of persons, and applies only to the personality of those who are subject to the limitations of space and time, and who are distinguished and recognised by such sensible tests as are applicable generally to the material world. Such a personality is not a pure personality, but that of a being whose personality has been effected by the environment and encroachment of matter and sense. God is not *a* personality, but *the* personality. "Perfect Personality is in God only, to all finite minds there is allotted but a pale copy thereof; the finiteness of the finite is not a producing condition of this Personality, but a limit and a hindrance of its development."[1] The personality of God is not built up out of the life of nature, but is itself the personal source out of which all other life springs. If we deny that the Deity as the absolute is personal, then we must of necessity regard Him or it as neither moral nor beautiful nor true.[2] Such an absolute is

[1] Lotze, *Microcosmus*, Edin. 1894, vol. ii. p. 688. See also Schultz, *Grundriss d. evang. Dogmatik*, Gött. 1892, § viii. 16.

[2] Such is the description of the Absolute given by Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, London, 1893, p. 533.

simply the *non ens*, not the infinite. Instead, therefore, of God's infinity being in conflict with the idea of His personality, it is its presupposition.

Personal being is the highest and most perfect form of being. Aquinas[1] defines "person" as that which is most perfect in all nature, as subsisting in rational nature. Hence, since all that belongs to the idea of perfection is to be ascribed to God, because His essence contains in itself all perfection, it is fit that this name "person" be given to God; yet not in such a way as it is given to creatures, but in a more excellent way, just as all other names that are given to creatures are ascribed *via eminentiæ* to God. The term "person" as applied to God is not, indeed, used in Scripture; for the Hebrew and Greek words, which might be supposed to come nearest to the expression of the idea of personality (פנים, *πρόσωπα*), are used strictly of the face in the sense of the *presence* of the person, rather than of the person himself. Yet the idea of the Divine Personality is evidently suggested by the use of even such terms. The presence of God, as described by Old and New Testament writers, is clearly a personal presence. While all anthropomorphic representations of God by biblical writers which ascribe to Him parts and passions are to be interpreted in such a way as not to offend against the doctrine of the pure spirituality of His nature, their employment is capable of justification only on the assumption that the being to whom they are ascribed is a real person with personal attributes, though without those limitations of sense to which human persons as human are subject. Apart from the assumption of the Divine Personality, those biblical representations of God would not only be inadequate, as all representations in human language must ever be, but positively misleading and false.

When we define the nature of God as the Absolute Spirit we already predicate the Divine Personality. Among pantheists, and those inclined to pantheistic modes of thought

[1] *Summa Theologica*, pt. i. § xxix. 3 and 4, ed. Rom. 1886–1887, vol. i. pp. 252–256.

and expression, it is usual to speak of impersonal spirit, as Hegel does of the impersonal reason. But it seems quite impossible to form any conception of a spirit that is not personal. We may think of a power, or force, or mode of motion that is not itself a personal being (though even in this case we think of such as the result of some personal act), but we do not regard any such impersonal movement or impulse as spirit. It is in itself, if we do not go back to its spiritual personal source, a mode of matter. But the impersonal spirit of pantheism is supposed to have a development. If it never produced or became something personal, it could never be recognised as a principle accounting for what really is. Beginning as impersonal spirit, it either attains in the end of its development to a personality of its own, or, remaining itself impersonal, produces finite spirits which have their being in the domain of personality. Either view is inconsistent with the principle of pantheism, which properly rejects, and persists in rejecting, personality at any stage in the development, and in order to do so repudiates the idea of spirit, and identifies the impersonal power with the material forces.

God as spirit is a self-conscious, self-determining being; and the predicates of self-consciousness and self-determination or freedom are those of the Absolute Personality. Pantheists of the genuine type, as represented by Spinoza, object that we have in that case ascribed to God a limitation which contradicts His absoluteness (*omnis determinatio est negatio*). Yet even Spinoza does not hesitate to assign to his Absolute, conceived of as substance, the attributes of thought and extension (*cogitatio* and *extensio*), and, by describing the world as the predicate of God, by his own theory imposes those limits upon the Absolute which he falsely charges against the doctrine of the Divine Personality. All that the *determination* negatives is its own contradiction, what is inconsistent with it. Every definition, therefore, is not a negation, but a negativing of the negation (*negatio negationis*). Hence Hegel has laid alongside of this statement of Spinoza

its corrective in the statement: *omnis determinatio est positio.* When we say that God is personal being, we do not limit His absoluteness, but only negative the notion of that imperfection which the ascription of unconsciousness and want of self-determination or freedom, as the attributes of impersonal being, would imply.

The self-consciousness of the Absolute Personality is not like the self-consciousness of the finite being, a distinguishing of self from a not-self outside. Whatever lies outside of God is there as placed in that position by God Himself, and so if we call the external world a limitation to God, it is a self-limitation. Our conception of God as Absolute Spirit necessarily involves the idea of freedom, and such freedom involves the power to conceive and realise a world of finite existences apart from Himself. A being without this freedom would be limited, and that evidently by no self-limitation, but by a necessity of nature. This pantheistic view of God is happily characterised by Martensen (*Chr. Dogmatics*, p. 81) as an external infinitude or extensive absoluteness, for which is sacrificed the idea of intensive central absoluteness. The God of pantheism is the universe, and not its Lord.

The question has been raised as to the real meaning of personality, whether it involves the idea of limitation and finitude. This is stoutly maintained by leaders of the modern speculative school of theology. In regard to man, it is held that he is a personality not in view of the fact that he is a spirit, but in view of the fact that he is a finite spirit. "Personality and spirit," says Biedermann,[1] "coincide in man, because man is *finite* spirit, not simply because he is spirit: personality and finite spirit are notions of the same extent of significance." But this is just what we cannot for a moment grant unless we adopt the altogether inadequate notion of spirit which Biedermann does when he describes the world as consisting of spirit and material being, and maintains that spiritual being is given us only in and with material being. What he there names spirit may very well be impersonal, but it is not

[1] *Christliche Dogmatik*, Berl. 1885. ii. p. 543.

really spirit. Self-consciousness and freedom, as the attributes of personality, are spiritual qualities, as all admit who give to spirit a real existence as distinct from and independent of all material conditions and surroundings. By the Absolute we simply mean that which is self-constituting, whose consciousness and determining of self are not dependent on anything outside of self. Instead of losing His absoluteness by possessing and exercising self-consciousness and self-determination without passing beyond Himself, it is just in this that God vindicates the reality of His absoluteness. He would not be the Absolute One were He not the Absolute Personality.[1] As Martineau has well said:[2] "Though you might deny His infinity without prejudice to His personality, you cannot deny His personality without sacrificing His infinitude." Self-consciousness and self-determination in their full and proper sense, as attributes of Personality, belong to the Absolute, and can be used only in a restricted sense of finite beings under the category of *finite* personality.

The main objections brought against the idea of the personality of the Absolute result from a persistent belief that finite personality, as we know it in ourselves, is personality of the normal type. It is on this assumption that it is objected that absolute personality is a contradiction in terms. It is assumed that the person must be regarded as distinct from other persons, that this distinguishing is of the very essence of personality, because it is so in the case of human personality. One person is distinguished from another as possessed of a multiplicity of powers by which he is characterised. But the Absolute Personality has these powers not as a multiplicity, but as a unity. Knowledge, feeling, and will are exercised separately by men, but not so by God. Though, as we shall see by and by, knowledge, feeling, and will correspond to certain objective distinctions in God, yet it is His whole being that knows and feels and

[1] See Frank, *System of Christian Certainty*, pp. 406–408.

[2] *A Study of Religion*, Oxford, 1888, vol. i. p. 192.

wills. Personal powers in God and their exercise by Him do not break the absolute unity of His being.

The pantheistic view of God and the world results directly from considering the immanence of God to the exclusion of His transcendence. It ought, however, to be observed that a theory of God's relation to the world that gives place only to the idea of transcendence also leads indirectly to a pantheistic conclusion. It is, of course, quite correct to say that exclusive consideration of the divine transcendence yields a deistic conception, but this again logically carried out ends in a particular form of pantheism. If we think exclusively of the immanence of God we are led directly to pancosmism, while by mere transcendence we are led to acosmism.[1] In either case the Absolute is not free, and therefore is no true Absolute.

The chief religious importance of the doctrine of the Divine Personality lies in this, that if God be not a personal being, and as such self-conscious and free, we cannot think of the divine essence as ethical. An impersonal substance, whether we call it spirit, reason, or force, cannot have moral qualities ascribed to it in any other than a figurative and unreal sense. The God that is to stand in moral relations to man must, in the higher and most perfect sense, be a being who thinks, feels, acts, with absolute freedom.

§ 16. The Unity of God.

Literature.—Strong, *Manual of Theology*, Edin. 1892, pp. 165–170. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, i. 230–235. Klee, *Katholische Dogmatik*, 4th ed., Mainz, 1861, pp. 295–303. Kuhn, *Katholische Dogmatik*, 2nd ed., Tüb. 1862, i. 1088–1098.

That God is one is not a doctrine inferred from His absoluteness, but one involved in it. We cannot possibly think of a real Absolute that is not the only Absolute. This doctrine is quite evidently a necessity of the pure reason in the development of a consistent system, if only the theistic conception is to be maintained. So long, therefore, as we

[1] Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, i. 339–343.

conceive of God as the Absolute Spirit there is no semblance of a reason which can be advanced for the supposition that there are more gods than one. That is to say, if we take the standpoint of theism we have no alternative left. The theistic conception, if partitioned, no longer yields a personality, and, if multiplied, can be no longer recognised as the Absolute. This at least is clear, that only from the theistic standpoint can the doctrine of God's unity be consistently developed, and from this standpoint its development becomes a strict necessity.

It has been shown with special clearness by Klee that the proofs for the *being* of God may be used again for the *unity* of God. The one idea as well as the other is an original and essential element in our consciousness of God. In connection with the cosmological proof, the sufficiency of one God for the world renders a second unnecessary, and therefore not God, and the unity of the world in creation and government requires that the originating and sustaining power be one. In connection with the anthropological proof, human life, with its ethical purpose, the earliest faith of mankind and the deepest convictions of the human spirit, all point to one God as the source and guarantee of the good and the true. And again, in connection with the ontological proof, necessary being as absolute, self-sufficient, highest, the first ground and last end of all, can only be one; the one God fills all with His immensity of being and with His mighty operations, and leaves no room for a second.

The doctrine of the unity of God is undoubtedly the biblical doctrine, even in the very earliest traditions that have been preserved in revelation. In Scripture, indeed, the name of gods is not refused to other powers and principalities; but Jehovah, the God of personality, is above all gods, and demands universal and exclusive reverence. And this biblical development of the idea leads, through a perfectly consistent doctrine of absolute personality, up toward an intelligent appreciation of the unity of God. It has been very properly observed by our older dogmatists, that the unity which we refer

to God is at once numerical and generic. The first and natural reference in such a passage as Deut. vi. 4 is undoubtedly to the numerical, and not, as Lutz (*Biblische Dogmatik*, p. 36) would have it, to the generic unity of God. So far at least as Israel is concerned, and it is only with Israel that the inspired writer has there to do, there are no other gods than Jehovah. In Christian theology we are only interested in the Holy One of Israel, for He it is who is revealed in the New Testament dispensation as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. What relation Israel bore to Jehovah we as Christians bear to the one God and Father (Eph. iv. 6). Discussions of critics as to when and how far the doctrine of abstract monotheism obtained a place in the religion of Israel is of no importance in Christian dogmatics. This is clear, that so soon as the Hebrew worshipper put to himself the question, why is there only one God in Israel? he could give himself only the one answer,—that it was because there was absolutely no other. His God, in contrast to those called gods among the heathen, was at once God of the night and of the day, of the valleys and of the hills, of war and of peace, of life and of death. He was God always and everywhere, in all circumstances, so that there was neither need nor place for another. Evidently the idea of the generic unity of God follows very closely upon that of the numerical unity. If there be only one, whom those who know this one can worship, surely this is so because Jehovah is the one of his kind, unique, than whom no other possesses or can possess the attributes belonging to the divine essence. And this must be kept steadily in view, that in divine revelation the idea of the unity of God has not a speculative, but only an ethical and practical importance. Calvin has, with his usual tact, developed the doctrine of the divine unity in immediate connection with God's demand for the reverence of His creatures: "Whenever Scripture asserts the unity of God, it does not contend for a mere name, but also enjoins that nothing which belongs to divinity be applied to any other, thus making it obvious in what respect pure religion differs

from superstition" (*Institutes*, i. 12, 1). Thus primarily God declares the unity of His being in order to enforce his claim to the exclusive love and reverence of the creature. The doctrine of the New Testament is consciously and literally founded on that of the Old Testament, and is in fact and development the same (Mark xii. 29). God is one in His Fatherly relation (1 Cor. viii. 5, 6; Eph. vi. 4); one as the source of eternal life (John xvii. 2); one as the gracious will devising our salvation (1 Tim. ii. 5); one in all His dispensations (Rom. iii. 29, 30).

In the Early Church a polemic was carried on against polytheism without, and against dualism both without and within. The gods many and lords many of paganism, even where a certain supremacy was ascribed to one, resulted from a failure to understand the generic unity of God. What is characteristic of God, what constitutes His Godhead, is indivisible, incommunicable, undistributable. In the gross form of polytheism, as a doctrine of numerical multiplicity applied to the Godhead, the denial of the divine unity could find no place within the borders of the Christian Church, and found little favour among the thoughtful and cultured even outside of its pale. It was from dualistic theories, in which principles took the place of deities, that most trouble was experienced. Gnostics and Manichæans asserted the existence of an evil principle alongside of the good, two natures, as Augustine puts it, without beginning, one of good, the other of evil, a "race of darkness" which gives origin to our flesh, and which had its own nature without any beginning ever evil. It was argued that if this evil principle were equal to the good, the one would paralyse the other, so that there would be neither good nor evil in the world, which is in contradiction to history and experience; but if one were mightier than the other, then, since there can be no thought of compromise between them, it would destroy its opponent. It was also argued that evil is such, not by nature, but by the misuse of freedom, and therefore is not original, and in consequence is not a principle. Also what comes to an end, as this evil

principle was supposed to do, must have had a beginning; and this beginning, not dualism, but only monotheism, can account for.

§ 17. Attributes of God—Idea and Arrangement.[1]

Literature.—The most thorough and satisfactory discussion of the idea and classification of the attributes is given by Rothe, *Dogmatik*, Tüb. 1870, vol. i. pp. 96–125. Admirable also is the detailed discussion of Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch d. evang. Dogmatik*, Freiburg, 1892, pp. 396–402. See also Strong, *Systematic Theology*, New York, 1893, pp. 115–120; Kahnis, *Die lutherische Dogmatik*, Leipzig, 1868, vol. iii. p. 182 f. Dorner, *System of Chr. Doctrine*, i. 189–206; Kuhn, *Katholische Dogmatik*, i. 761–1088.

The divine essence, as the one Absolute Personal Spirit, constitutes the basis or substratum of the divine attributes which, taken as a whole, represent all that can possibly be known by us of that essence. In enumerating the divine attributes, the endeavour is made to produce a full list of the qualities by which the divine nature is characterised. As Dr. Bruce says,[2] "the divine attributes are the divine essence, and therefore inseparable from it." But it must always be remembered that the sum total of the attributes represent God not as He is Himself, but simply as He has been pleased to relate Himself to the world. What is essential to the conception of God is the idea of Absolute Spirit, which necessarily implies Absolute Personality. And so we have not understood the distinctive idea of God as love, nor as personality, but as that Absolute Spirituality which of itself stands above and outside of all relations and limitations. The attributes represent the modes under which the Absolute

[1] On the attributes generally, Charnock, *Discourses on the Existence and Attributes of God* (1682), Edin. 1864; Jackson, *Treatise of Divine Essence and Attributes*, in his Works, Oxford, 1844; Breckenridge, *The Knowledge of God Objectively Considered*, N.Y. 1859, pp. 260–315; Strong, *Systematic Theology*, 4th ed., N.Y. 1893, pp. 115–143.

[2] *Humiliation of Christ*, Edin. 1876, p. 128.

Spirit relates Himself to that which He Himself has called forth into separate existence as the universe of created being. Such attributes are essential to the idea of God as related to the world. Taken together they constitute the God of revelation. These attributes are all essential to the nature and character of that God with whom alone in any system of doctrine and of human thought we can have to do. Hence we cannot distinguish the attributes according as they are constitutive and essential, or merely accessory and accidental. Neither can we admit the distinction which is sometimes made between general and special attributes, or those that are fundamental and those that are consequential. All attributes are fundamental, for it is only with the original and essential qualities of the divine nature that we have to do. The distinction sometimes made between attributes of immanence and of transcendence is not satisfactory. Spirituality, personality, living power, unity, we do not class as attributes, but as constituting the essence of God, the substratum of the attributes; while the attributes are all attributes of transcendence, indicating in a real way, whether under the form of a negative or of a positive designation, the relation of God to the world of man and finite being.

The question has been discussed at great length, especially by Nitzsch and Dorner, as to whether the divine attributes correspond to objective distinctions in the divine nature. Many, in earlier and later times, have been inclined to favour a nominalistic theory, and to represent the attributes as mere subjective conceptions of our own regarding God, to which nothing objective in God can be supposed to correspond, in consequence of their fear lest, by ascribing a multiplicity of attributes to God, they might seem to endanger the divine simplicity and unity. Aquinas, on the other hand, carefully marks the distinction between what God is in Himself and what He is in respect of His relation to finite being, and defines the divine attributes as relations corresponding to nothing in God viewed in Himself, but to something not merely thought but objectively real in His relation to the

world.[1] This distinction quite sufficiently guards against the danger of breaking up the unity of God by ascribing to Him a variety of attributes, seeing that these represent only the relations in which He places His undivided being with regard to the world.

In the early Middle Ages schoolmen, following the Areopagite (*De div. nom.* vii. 3), proposed a threefold method of reaching an enumeration of the divine attributes: *via negationis, via eminentiæ, via causalitatis,*—rejection of imperfections, exaltation of excellences, and tracing what is found existing back to its ultimate source or ground. Thus to God was denied materiality, to Him was ascribed perfection in power, knowledge, etc., and to Him was assigned spirituality as the source of the spiritual nature in man. It is clearly impossible to keep the *via negationis* and the *via causalitatis* distinct from one another, for the latter is subsumed under the former, and merely repeats positively what was there stated negatively; while the *via eminentiæ* merely reasserts the absoluteness which we have recognised as constituting the divine essence. Against the proposal to distribute the attributes into two classes, negative and positive, it may fairly be objected that all those attributes which are designated by negative terms must be subsumed under some positive conception. Thus we do not require to enumerate immateriality among the divine attributes when we have understood spirituality as belonging to the divine essence. And again, in regard to the distribution recommended by many into *attributa absoluta* and *relativa*, it is to be objected that properly all attributes are relative, as indicating not what God in Himself may be, but only what He is in relation to the world. Even Thomasius, who with some modifications adopts this distribution, remarks that the

[1] This view of the attributes as adopted by the Reformed theologians is well expressed by Hollaz: "*Attributa divina ab essentia divina et a se invicem distinguuntur non nominaliter, neque realiter (quia divina essentia est simplicissima, omnis realis compositionis expers), sed formaliter, secundum nostrum concipiendi modum, non sine certo distinctionis fundamento.*" See also Marckius, *Medulla*, c. iv. 17.

relative attributes are related to the absolute as phenomena are to essence. These so-called absolute attributes are not really attributes at all, but elements in or aspects of the essence of God. The same is true of the division of attributes into incommunicable and communicable. What is incommunicable in God is His essence, the unique personality of the Absolute Spirit. All His attributes properly so called are communicable, in the sense in which any of them is communicable, as His very revelation of Himself by means of them shows. The psychological arrangement under being, understanding, will, feeling, is not sufficiently exact, and admits of a very confusing cross division. The correct principle of classification is undoubtedly that which follows the leading moments in the historical development of the Christian revelation, as given in slightly varying forms by Nitzsch and Hermann Schultz, and most happily by Pfleiderer (*Grundriss*, §§ 62–73).[1] God's attributes are His ways of manifesting Himself in the world and to men, and these manifestations He makes in nature, in the moral world, and in the kingdom of grace.

§ 18. Divine Attributes Manifested in Nature.

Literature.—Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, 2nd ed., Königsberg, 2 vols., 1862, i. 221–246. Schultz, *Old Testament Theology*, Edin. 1892, ii. 142–151. Candlish, *The Christian Doctrine of God*, Edin. 47–56. Mason, *The Faith of the Gospel*, Lond. 1888, pp. 20–25. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, pp. 130–137. Pfleiderer, *Grundriss der Glaubens- und Sittenlehre*, §§ 63–67.

The first class of attributes embraces those which reveal God's nature in the widest field. As creator and upholder

[1] The same principle is somewhat more artificially and less satisfactorily expressed by Philippi (*Glaubenslehre*, ii. 23): (i.) God as absolute substance in relation to the universe—eternity, omnipresence; (ii.) God as absolute subject in relation to the universe and mankind—omnipotence, omniscience; (iii.) God as Holy Love in relation to the universe, mankind, and the Church—wisdom, righteousness, goodness; and finally, as flowing from the whole sum of these attributes, we have God's blessedness and glory.

of the universe, God puts Himself in relation to finite being by calling it into existence. Calling things that are not as though they were and giving a beginning to finite things, He shows His omnipotence by putting it forth. Giving a beginning to time and setting bounds to space, He reveals His eternity and immensity or omnipresence. Exercising the powers of infinite intelligence He reveals His omniscience.

1. *Omnipotence* is that attribute of God by which, through the mere exercise of His will, He can realise whatever is present in His will. Outside of God Himself there are no limits to His power. Whatever is owes its being to Him, and whatever will be can come into being only by the exercise of His creative might. His will, determined purely by those moral qualities belonging to the divine nature, alone sets bounds upon the exercise of His power. The distinction between *omnipotentia absoluta* and *ordinata* is unnecessary. His power is absolute, for His absoluteness is an element in His nature which includes His holy and wise will. Such absoluteness, therefore, is not arbitrariness, but takes into consideration in all cases the order and well-being of the universe as a whole. It is in this sense that it is said absolutely that with God nothing is impossible (Gen. xviii. 14; Luke i. 37; Matt. xix. 26). The one and only limitation is that God cannot deny Himself. He can do whatever He will. What God does shows what He wills to do, not what He can do. Abelard (followed by Schleiermacher and many moderns) says: "*Deus non potest facere aliquid præter ea quæ facit.*" But this equating of the universe of actual existence with the divine efficiency makes, as Hodge (*Syst. Theology*, i. 413) shrewdly remarks, the finite the measure of the infinite. By this refusal to admit that God's power is greater than His will, that He is able to do more than He pleases to do, the distinction between natural and supernatural is destroyed, and all is viewed as natural. It has also the effect of depriving God of all freedom of will, so as to make Him act under an absolute

necessity, though it be a necessity of His own being. This denial of freedom would also deprive God of all true personality. It would also make His power a power above Himself, if He were under the necessity of revealing that power as it is, and expending it all in action.[1]

Omnipotence in its full and absolute sense is a doctrine that is consistent only with a monotheistic creed. None of the heathen deities are regarded as omnipotent, for the power of each is checked by that of the others. The God of the Old Testament as He reveals Himself to Abraham is *El Shaddai*, God Almighty (Gen. xvii. 1). In Scripture God's omnipotence is proved from His works of creation and providence, and the powers of nature are described as serving His irresistible will. The doings of the Almighty are *wonders*, because He alone can do them. These wonders He performs in the physical world and in the moral and spiritual world. The omnipotence of the Godhead is needed in redemption as in creation, and so to the Son as Redeemer is given *all power* in heaven and in earth.

2. *Eternity* is that attribute of God by which He stands superior to time, free from all its limitations, so that to God Himself temporal distinctions of past and future do not apply, and in His life there is no succession. Though time is not a substance, it is not, as Kant would have it, a mere subjective form of our sense perception. It is the universal attribute, or more precisely the invariable concomitant or correlate, of finite being. The relation of the eternal God to a finite world has appeared a difficulty to many from different points of view. This has resulted from a false confusion of eternity with indefinitely extended time. Eternity is often conceived of as embracing simply the *prius* and *posterius* of time (*a parte ante* and *a parte post*). Eternity is not to be defined in terms of time at all, for infinite time would be a self-contradictory idea. And so we cannot speak of the divine works as wrought in time or as produced in temporally successive stages. Not the divine works, but only their effects, take place in time and

[1] See Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, i. 285.

have a succession in relation to one another.[1] If there were succession in the life of God there would be parts, which must be infinite or finite,—if infinite, each part would equal the whole, and each would equal the other; if finite, then the infinite would be the sum of finite things: the conclusion being in either case absurd.[2] The idea of God's eternity naturally suggests itself to men as they reflect on the transitoriness of finite being, and behold the succession and change of things in the world. But as finite beings we can form no positive idea of eternity. As viewed negatively, eternity is simply timeless being, elevation generally above the temporal and changing, freedom from all successions of development. Viewed positively, it is the absolute cause of everything temporal and of time itself. In the Old Testament we have only the negative view of God's eternity, and that often in so vague a form of expression that it does not necessarily imply absolute timelessness, but only indefinitely extended time (Gen. xxi. 33; Deut. xxxiii. 27). The inadequacy here, however, is only in expression, arising from the want of abstract terms. So, too, in Ps. xc., the everlasting is simply before and after time. This idea is expressed absolutely in Isa. xl. 28, and with growing clearness in the Apocryphal Books (Ecclus. xviii. 1, xlii. 21, He who is from everlasting, "unto Him may nothing be added, neither can He be diminished"; 2 Macc. i. 25). In the New Testament the doctrine is clearly expressed, but still only in its negative form (Rom. i. 20, 23, xvi. 26; Tim. i. 17; Rev. i. 8). In Scripture, eternity is generally associated with the idea of unchangeableness, and ascribed to the divine will. Eternity is the immeasurable duration of God, expressing duration in being and negation of all measure. It consists in the exclusion of all changeableness; and the absence of all beginning and of all ending is a consequence of this.

[1] See Kuhn, *Katholische Dogmatik*, Tüb. 1859, i. 773; Jackson, Works, Lond. 1673, vol. ii. pp. 35 f.

[2] See this somewhat scholastic argument well stated in Klee, *Katholische Dogmatik*, 4th ed., Mainz, 1861, p. 269; also Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, i. 10, 4.

3. *Immensity and omnipresence* indicate respectively the transcendence and immanence of God in regard to space. As immense we think of God as incommensurable, and as absolutely superior to all limitations of space. He cannot be enclosed by any limits, however far these may be extended. The terms of extension can in no case be applied to Him. But immensity is the presupposition of omnipresence. Just because He is infinitely above all space, and free from its limitations, neither space nor objects in space can break in upon or interrupt the absolute continuity of His existence. He is essentially present in space as well as out of it. Not only in respect of His knowledge and His creative activity, but also in respect of His essence He is everywhere, filling all things. This immanence of God in nature, however, must be regarded as free, not necessary. The pantheistic doctrine of God's necessary presence in nature fails to recognise the truth that God's presence is not restricted by the limits of space, that His immensity is absolute, and that His immanence in space can be understood only in view of His transcendence over space. Space, like time, is the invariable correlate of all finite being. All finite things are outside of and alongside of one another, *i.e.* they exist in space. Every finite being is somewhere in space, and at one time can be only in one place. But God is without extension. He is never anywhere in the sense of occupying circumscribed space. As He is not excluded from anything, so, on the other hand, He is not included in anything.

Scripture represents God as everywhere, far and near, and that because He is superior to all limitations of space. Just as God's eternity is not indefinitely extended time, so God's immensity and omnipresence are not indefinite extension of space. He fills all space in heaven and earth and sheol by His essential presence, as well as by His knowledge and His activity (Am. ix. 2–4; Jer. xxiii. 24; Ps. cxxxix.; Acts xvii. 27; Eph. iv. 6). He is said to dwell in heaven, but from heaven He beholds, works, fills all things (Ps. xiv. 2, cxiii. 5, 6); yet heaven and earth, all space, all that can be measured, cannot contain Him (1 Kings viii. 27; Isa. lxvi. 1). By some

theologians the soul in its relations to the body has been used to illustrate the relations of God to the world in space. This comparison is not suitable or helpful, because to the soul in the body the limits of the body are its limits; but God is not present in the world so as to be circumscribed by its limits. Socinians, again, have gone to the other extreme, and, in order to avoid the danger of restricting God within the limits of sense, have understood God's essential presence to be limited to heaven; but if heaven does not mean everywhere in the transcendent sense which rises above all space, we have God included in heavenly space and excluded from earthly space. As conceived by the Socinians, the confining of God's essential presence to heaven and allowing only His operative presence in the world must lead to a purely deistic view of God and the world. God is far off and operates from a distance.[1] The scholastic threefold distinction in the doctrine of the divine omnipresence is important: *per potentiam* (subduing all things by His power), *per præsentiam* (all things naked and open before Him), *per essentiam* (in all things as the cause of their being).[2] He is the life of all living being. In Him we live and move and have our being (Acts xvii. 28). We can find God everywhere and always, and we can nowhere and never flee from Him.

4. *Omniscience* is that attribute of God by which the infinite mind occupies itself with the objects of the divine omnipotence, potential and actual, not with the depths and mysteries of His own being, the knowledge of which is an element in His divine self-consciousness and personality (1 Cor. ii. 11). As elevation above all creaturely limits, God's omniscience stands alongside of His omnipotence. Scripture describes the divine omniscience as a knowledge reaching to the innermost secrets of the human heart, and makes this the ground of confidence and holy reverential fear (Ps. cxxxix.; Heb. iv. 13; Matt. vi. 32; Acts xv. 8; John xxi. 17; 1 John iii. 20). It is coextensive with omnipotence, but

[1] Owen, *Vindiciæ Evangelicæ* (1655, reply to Biddle's Catechism), in Works, Edin. 1853, vol. xii. pp. 89–98.

[2] Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, i. 8, 3, ed. Rom. 1886, vol. i. pp. 66–68.

does not depend on the actual operation of the divine power. God's knowledge is intuitive and not the result of reflection or experience; immediate and not discursive or derived, as human knowledge is. The objects of the divine omniscience have been distinguished as the necessary (God Himself and what exists ideally in God) and the free (what has actually come into existence as created being). A more important distinction is that of the Old Lutherans,—*scientia simplicis intelligentiæ*, which embraces the possible, and *scientia visionis*, which embraces the actual.[1] These distinctions, however, result from a gross anthropopathic view of God, to whom nothing can be merely possible, but everything either real or unreal, and, in regard to the future, what will or will not be. The most serious difficulty emerges when we attempt to state the doctrine of the divine omniscience alongside that of human freedom. If God knows everything that will be, then it is already determined necessarily what will be and how it will take place. Socinians (Crell, *De Deo*, cc. 22–24; Martineau, *Study of Religion*, ii. 279), and to some extent certain modern speculative theologians (Rothe, *Theol. Ethik*, § 54; Martensen, *Chr. Dogmatics*, § 116), answer that God does not know what may be done through the exercise of man's free will. In whatever form this idea is expressed, it is a limitation of the doctrine of God's omniscience and a denial of His absoluteness. God as absolute and eternal must know all, and this must apply to the minutest details, as well as to the facts and occurrences of universal significance. But, on the other hand, the deterministic sacrifice of the fact of human freedom is no less disastrous than the denial of the divine absoluteness. God's foreseeing of man's free acting lays no arrest and exerts no restriction on man's freedom; nor does man's free action, seeing that this is already within the range of the divine knowledge, put any limit upon the absoluteness of the divine omniscience. The *scientia media* of the Jesuits Fonseca and Molina [2]

[1] See Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch d. evang. Dogmatik*, pp. 409–413.

[2] *De concordia gratiæ et liberi arbitrii*, Lisbon, 1588; see also Thorndike, *Of the Covenant of Grace*, chap. xxiv., Oxf. 1844.

was an attempt to solve the difficulty by the hypothesis that the future was known conditionally on the fulfilment of certain conditions. But as both the conditioning circumstances and the voluntary act under these circumstances were alike known to God apart from all relations of time, the hypothesis really applies to the divine self-consciousness and not to the divine omniscience.

Though God undoubtedly knows things as past, present or future, His knowledge of things future is knowledge rather than foreknowledge. There is no succession in His knowledge, which is simple, yet it embraces things that are successive and the succession that belongs to them. His knowledge is foreknowledge, not from the divine, but only from the human or temporal standpoint.[1]

§ 19. Divine Attributes Manifested in the Moral World.

Literature.—Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, i. 246–250. Schultz, *Old Testament Theology*, ii. 151–179. Candlish, *The Christian Doctrine of God*, Edin. pp. 80–91. Pfleiderer, *Grundriss d. Glaubens- u. Sittenlehre*, §§ 68–70. Mason, *The Faith of the Gospel*, Lond. 1888, p. 25 ff.

The morally perfect character of God is comprehensively described as that of Holy Love. He manifests this character in His relations to mankind by means of His holiness, righteousness, goodness. His love is not mere easy good nature. It is such as inspires reverence, calls forth trust and confidence, and awakens affection and gratitude, which find expression in words of praise and the devotion and consecration of the life.

1. *Holiness.*—In the Old Testament God is spoken of as "the Holy One of Israel"[2] and "the Holy One,"[3] and by

[1] So Augustine, *De div. quæstt.* ii. 2: "Quid est præscientia nisi scientia futurorum? Quid autem futurum est Des, qui omnia supergreditur tempora? Si enim scientia Dei res ipsas habet, non sunt ei futuræ sed præsentes, ac per hoc non jam præscientia sed tantum scientia dici potest."

[2] Isa. i. 4, v. 19, 24, x. 17, 20, xii. 6, xvii. 7, xxix. 19, 23, xxx. 11, 12, 15, xxxi. 1, xxxvii. 23, xli. 16, 20, xliii. 3, 14, xlv. 11, xlvii. 4, xlviii. 17, xlix. 7, liv. 5, lv. 5; 2 Kings xix. 22; Ps. lxxviii. 41, lxxxix. 15.

[3] Isa. xl. 25; Ps. xxii. 3.

these designations He is represented as the exalted and glorious God who stands apart from and high above all other beings. He is the separate One, unique in His excellence. In this primary sense of the term it would seem that the God of the Old Testament is holy in the same way in which the gods of other nations were described as holy. And so some theologians have sought to understand the divine holiness as simply equivalent to the divine majesty, and refuse to include holiness among the moral attributes of God (so Schultz, *Old Testament Theology*, ii. 167). But we must interpret God's attributes in accordance with His revealed character. The God of the Old Testament is distinctively moral. The revelation of His majesty is the revelation of His relation to us as the morally perfect being. And so we cannot understand God's holiness of mere exaltedness in the transcendental and metaphysical sense, but of moral excellence, which is really the highest and widest perfection of being, and properly includes all possible forms of excellence. It is as the Holy One that God is absolutely free from sin, not only in respect of His own doings, but also in respect of His relations to all other beings. The Holy One demands holiness, in the sense of moral purity, in all who approach Him; and any attempt on the part of the unholy to approach Him unhallowed calls forth His *wrath*. He is jealous of His own honour and of the honour of those who are His. As the Holy One, He must maintain His honour, and cut off every person and thing that would put a stain upon it. This Old Testament conception of the divine holiness is not superseded by but forms the presupposition of the New Testament doctrine. The evangelical doctrine of God's love is based upon this view of God's unique moral perfection. The whole biblical idea of the divine holiness directs attention mainly to the ethical and inward. It is neither merely negative nor merely relative, but includes positive purity, as well as elevation above all defect and separation from all impurity.[1] Holiness as a definite and particular attribute of God is immanent in and essential to

[1] Comp. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, i. 321.

the very idea of God, and so belongs to His being, and not to any special faculty of that being. We should not, therefore, as many do, speak of it as a quality of the divine will. It is an inherent quality of the divine being which manifests itself to us in the operations of the divine will. And the perfection of God's holiness lies in this, that His will gives perfect expression to that which constitutes His being, and that He wills that holiness which is the essential quality of His nature. The Holy God gives expression to His holy will in the moral law. The question was long and eagerly discussed, as to whether God wills and commands the good because it is good (Aquinas), or whether the good is good because God wills and commands it (Scotus). This question should never have been raised. God's will is one with His being, and in His own holy being He has the eternal prototype of all that is good. It is not God's will, still less the declaration of that will, that determines what is good, but the Holy Being by which that will is unchangeably determined. This removes all possibility of arbitrariness in the standard of goodness; for we cannot conceive the possibility of the good being otherwise than it is, seeing that its norm and standard are the eternal being of God which could not have been otherwise than it is.

2. *Righteousness.*[1]—The righteousness of God is defined by some as His transitive holiness, as simply holiness exercised in His relations to men and His attitude toward human conduct. It is that attribute of God which determines Him to take measures for promoting the right and checking the wrong in the world of created intelligences. By means of His righteousness God reveals His omnipotence in the moral world. God's righteousness is the manifest vindication of His holiness (Isa. v. 16). Righteousness is the divine guarantee against all caprice and arbitrariness. As the Righteous One, God's ways are equal. The failure to see this arises from an external and partial estimate of the facts of human life and history, as illustrated in the Books of Job and Ecclesiastes, and in the 73rd and other Psalms. Such

[1] Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, § 24, vol. i. pp. 286–302.

estimate of God's character and doings is irrational, and is soon seen alike by the godly and ungodly to be impossible. That God as God must be righteous, must give to every one what is right, is not only a truth of revelation, but also a conviction of the human heart which no accumulation of apparent exceptions can set aside. And this conviction makes God the object of hope and joy to the godly, and of fear and dread to the ungodly. The divine righteousness has been often (as by Schleiermacher [1]) too narrowly understood of His punitive activity. It is not correct to say (as Klee, *Kath. Dogmatik*, p. 290), that God's holiness where it punishes is righteousness, and where it rewards, goodness. It is really comprehensive of the distribution of rewards as well as of punishments. It is properly defined as including the ordaining and administering of righteous laws for the moral government of the world (*justitia legis laboria, antecedens, dispositiva*), and the executing of judgment in accordance with the sanctions of those laws (*justitia judiciaria, consequens, distributiva*). As a divine attribute this righteousness of God is immutable, and can never be modified. The evangelical idea of the divine righteousness is not in the slightest degree less rigid than that of the Old Testament. Hence, if we are to satisfy it, we must become sharers in it by Christ bringing to us, not an adaptation of it, but God's own righteousness itself.

3. *Goodness.*[2]—The goodness of God is the kindness of the perfectly righteous One, and is immediately dependent on His righteousness (Matt. v. 45; Acts x. 34, 35). It cannot lower in the least the strict standard of the moral law, nor remit the penalty of the breach of that law, but only lead him upon whom it is exercised to repentance (Rom. ii. 4). The end of all God's works is the realisation of the highest good. This He finds in His own being; and therefore His

[1] See *Christliche Glaube*, § 84: "Righteousness is that causality in God by means of which, in the state of universal sinfulness, a connection is determined between suffering and actual sin."

[2] Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, § 26, vol. i. pp. 305–323.

own goodness must have expression given to it in the righteous government of the universe. As there is none good but God (Mark x. 18), He can show His goodness only by communicating Himself. And this He does throughout all creation and to all the creatures, according to their capacity for receiving (Ps. xxxiii. 5, cxix. 64, cxlv. 9). It is a quality essential to the moral perfection of God. The righteousness of a being that is not in his very essence good and kind cannot be the righteousness of God. Hence everywhere in Scripture God's goodness is affirmed in strict and immediate connection with His righteousness. God's righteousness is good and His goodness is righteous.[1]

§ 20. Divine Attributes Manifested in the Kingdom of Grace.

Literature. — Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evang. Dogmatik*, Freiburg, 1892, pp. 420–423. Pfleiderer, *Grundriss d. Glaubens- u. Sittenlehre*, §§ 71–73. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, Edin. 1866, pp. 99–101.

In our knowledge of God from His attributes we advance from the natural world to the moral, and from that again to the religious sphere, in which God acts directly in redemption as the God of salvation. As God relates Himself to men as moral beings in His holiness, righteousness, and goodness, so He relates Himself to men as spiritual beings in need of redemption in His love and wisdom.[2] The love of God the Father quickens and renews in us the likeness of Himself, so that we enter again into the consciousness of the freedom of sons of God. And the wisdom of God so operates in the history of mankind, and so directs and employs the means of grace, that the purposes of redeeming love are accomplished and the kingdom of God realised.

1. *Love.*—The love of God is not His mere moral good-

[1] See Irenæus, *Against Heresies*, iii. 25, 2; Clement of Alexandria, *The Miscellanies*, vi. 14.

[2] See Pfleiderer, *Grundriss d. christl. Glaubenslehre*, § 71, Berlin, 1893, p. 81.

ness and benignity, but that attribute by which He seeks to win men to Himself as sons, and to work in them the spirit of sonship. God's love manifests itself in His self-communication. God shows His love by opening up the way to men for enjoying a share in His own blessedness. It constitutes the motive of His creative activity and of all His care for the world and man,[1] as well as that of His work in redemption. It is the love of God which reveals itself to man even in the religions of nature, but most clearly in the advancing revelation of the Old and New Testament. The final and perfect revelation of God's love is made in Jesus Christ. In the Old Testament it is God's holy and righteous goodwill that is set forth, and inferentially His love. In the New Testament it is expressly said that love is His very essence (1 John iv. 8). God is love as He appears in Christ. As manifested toward sinful men in redemption by the atoning death of the Son, the love of God is specifically designated grace in the New Testament and Christian theology. Grace is the free, unmerited love of God toward sinners (Eph. i. 6, 7, ii. 7–9; Tit. iii. 4–7, 12), which bestows the frank forgiveness that God's debtors need who have nothing to pay. In the gift of Christ Jesus, the love of God is revealed as mercy or compassion for sufferers (Luke i. 54, 72, 78; Rom. xv. 9; Eph. ii. 4; 1 Pet. i. 3), as long-suffering toward the wayward and ignorant (Rom. ii. 4, ix. 22; 1 Pet. iii. 20; 2 Pet. iii. 15); while also He shows that this love is the love of the Righteous One (Isa. xlv. 21; Rom. iii. 26) by delivering men from the punishment of sin only by removing sin itself and producing in them a new spirit.

2. *Wisdom.*—By the wisdom of God is meant that attribute by which He employs and directs all His other attributes for the attainment of that great end of self-communication which His love demands. This love of God is His purpose to communicate Himself, and the wisdom of God secures the realisation of His loving purpose. God is

[1] Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, § 33, vol. ii. pp. 1–20.

wise, not merely as the omniscient, but as the God who directs all His power of intelligence and will to the accomplishment of the purposes of His grace. God's wisdom, just like His love, unfolds itself in advancing stages of revelation and realisation in heathenism, Judaism, and Christianity. Scripture recognises evidences of divine wisdom in His work of creation (Ps. civ. 24, etc.). In the Old Testament especially wisdom is conceived of as that power in God or with God which determines order and measure in nature, and plans and designs the form and relations of things (Prov. viii. 22–31, etc.). And just because in the world the evil there is that which chiefly prevents the attainment of the true end of the world, God's wisdom shows itself pre-eminently in counteracting and defeating the evil. He displays the riches of His wisdom in the plan of salvation by Christ Jesus (Rom. xi. 32), which is therefore fitly described as the revelation of the manifold wisdom of God (Eph. iii. 10); and, as He alone can do this, He is declared to be the only wise God (Rom. xvi. 27; 1 Tim. i. 17; Jude 25).

§ 21. The Divine Hypostases.

Literature.—Bull, *Defensio Fidei Nicænæ*, 1685; Eng. trans., *A Defence of the Nicene Creed*, 2 vols., Oxf. 1851. Waterland, *Importance of the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity Asserted*, 1719, vol. iii. of Works, in 6 vols., Oxf. 1843. Faber, *The Apostolicity of Trinitarianism*, 2 vols., 1832. Augustine, *On the Trinity*, trans. in ed. of Dods, Edin. 1874. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, p. i. qu. xxviii.–xxxii., ed. Rom. 1886, vol. i. pp. 242–275. Petavius, *De Trinitate*, in 8 bks., being vol. ii. of *De theologicis dogmatibus*, Paris, 1644. Dorner, *History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, 5 vols., Edin. 1861–1863; *System of Christian Doctrine*, 4 vols., Edin. 1888 f., vol. i. pp. 344–465. Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit*, 3 vols., Tüb. 1841–1843. Kuhn, *Die christliche Lehre vom d. göttl. Dreieinigkeit*, Tüb. 1837.

The doctrine of the Trinity is essentially a doctrine of the Christian revelation. Reference is sometimes made to

instances in pagan literature of certain triads, where three names of the deity or of chief deities are made specially, or perhaps even exclusively, prominent. But in such cases we have at best no more than a tritheistic substitute for polytheism, in protest against the undue and indefinite multiplying of deities. In none of these, even in such as on the first view appear most remarkable and interesting, is there any indication of a real appreciation of a trinity in unity. There is no ground for speaking of any ethnic revelation of the Trinity. The doctrine of the Trinity is first revealed in the history and work of redemption; and so we must turn to the Old Testament preparation for, and to the New Testament record of, that history as the source of our doctrine, and to the history of the first age of the Christian Church for an authoritative and adequate account of its development.

§ 22. The Old Testament Intimations.

Literature. — Strong, *Systematic Theology*, 4th ed., N.Y. 1893, pp. 152–155. Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, Lond. 1874, p. 287. Stearns, *Present-Day Theology*, Lond. 1893, p. 189 f. Orr, *Christian View of God and the World*, Edin. 1893, pp. 304–306. Harris, *God the Creator and Lord of All*, Edin. 1897, 2 vols., pt. i. chap. viii.: "The Trinity: The Biblical Representation of the Revelation of God in Christ." Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, vol i. pp. 345–349. Philippi, *Kirchl. Glaubenslehre*, vol. ii. 1867, pp. 190–200. Hofmann, *Der Schriftbeweis*, 2 vols., Nördlingen, 1857, i. 85–111. Rothe, *Dogmatik*, Tüb. 1870, vol. i. pp. 39–42. Grimm, *Institutio theol. dogmaticæ evangelicæ*, Jena, 1869, § 125. Reiff, *Die christliche Glaubenslehre*, Basel, 1876, i. 332–338.

It is equally false to maintain that we have anything like a formulated doctrine of the Trinity in the Old Testament, and to deny that there are any traces there of such real distinctions in the Godhead as may legitimately be regarded as *foreshadowings* of the doctrine subsequently developed in the Church. The doctrine of the Trinity is so distinctively

a Christian doctrine that its full statement is possible only in the full light of the Christian revelation. It can have its place only in a system of doctrine which has christology as its centre. Hence we do not look for the doctrine of the Trinity as a formulated dogma in Judaism. Yet there, on the other hand, we find no mere abstract monarchian doctrine of God. The old Hebrew creed is no more unitarian than it is trinitarian. Rather, the monotheism of Judaism looks forward to a trinitarian development. The Old Testament doctrine of God, as a spiritual revelation of the divine unity, —a unity that is not abstract and formal, but living,—points in the direction of the recognition of personal distinctions within the being of the one God.

The Old Testament doctrine of God was very much a protest against polytheism, and hence it emphasises and elaborates with special care the thought of the unity of God. The introduction of the idea of the divine hypostases, where the danger threatened and warned against was the multiplying of gods, would have been only confusing. "The Old Testament," says Gregory Nazianzen,[1] "proclaimed the Father clearly, the Son more obscurely: the New manifested the Son and indicated the divinity of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit dwelleth among us at present, making His manifestation more evident to us. For it was not safe, while the divinity of the Father was not yet acknowledged, that the Son should be clearly proclaimed; nor yet, while that of the Son was not received, that the Holy Spirit should (to use a bold expression) be imposed on us." Any statement made to the Hebrews of ancient times about the tripersonality of God would inevitably have been misunderstood in the gross and heathenish sense of three gods. By means of a gradual unfolding of the trinitarian doctrine, care was taken that the people should not lapse into idolatry. And so we have not, and should not expect to have, anywhere in the Old Testament anything like an explicit doctrine of the essential Trinity. The Spirit of God is indeed often spoken of, but it

[1] Opera, Paris, 1609, Oratio xxxviii. tom. i. p. 608.

is evident that no allusion to the Divine Spirit in the Old Testament necessarily carries us beyond the general idea of the divine power working in the world of nature and man.[1] "If from the mention of Jehovah, the Angel, the Spirit, the Trinity has been discovered in Isa. lxiii. 10, it is hard to say why the 'arm of Jehovah' in the 12th verse should not be taken as a fourth person."[1] Any hints that we have of personal distinctions in the Old Testament revelation of God go no further than economic distinctions, representing the difference of divine manifestations in the history of men and the world. As the Word of God, the Divine Being is represented as active in creation. As the Angel of God (the Mal'each Jehovah), in whom God is seen and who is the immediate visible representative of God (Ex. xxxiii. 11–23), He carries out and executes the government of the world. As the Wisdom of God (the Hochmah of the Solomonic and other so-called wisdom literature), He continues the creative work of the Word of God, and is represented as the divine principle operating in providence as a *creatio continuata*. But here we have no more than a dispensational trinity.

In support of the assertion that we have a doctrine of the Trinity in the Old Testament, it is usual to refer to certain passages and phrases. Names plural in form are given to God, *e.g. Elohim*, *Adonai*, *Kedoshim* (Gen. i. 26; Isa. xxv. 8, etc.), and verbs and pronouns in the plural are used of Him, *e.g.* Gen. i. 26, iii. 22, xi. 7; Isa. vi. 8, etc.; angels sent on special missions sometimes have the divine name, *e.g.* Gen. xvi. 7, etc.; Judg. vi. 14, xiii. 18, etc.; Jehovah seems sometimes to be deliberately distinguished from Jehovah, *e.g.* Gen. xix. 24; also the Angel of the Presence of Jehovah is distinguished from Jehovah (Ex. xxiii. 20, 21, xxxiii. 12–23, xxxiv. 5–9; Isa. lxiii. 9). Some have even thought that in such passages they had formed traces of a primitive polytheism among the Hebrews.[2]

[1] Schultz, *Old Testament Theology*, Edin. 1892, vol. ii. p. 111, note.

[2] Klose, *De polytheismi vestigiis apud Hebræos ante Mosen*, Gött. 1830. Vernes, *Du prétendu polythéisme des Hebreux*, 1891.

But the soundest exegetes—pointing out that the plural Elohim is applied to particular individual heathen deities (1 Sam. v. 7, vi. 5; 2 Kings i. 2), that messengers commissioned to do a work in God's name and by His power may fittingly be referred to under the name of Him whom they represent, and that the repetition of the name of Jehovah is merely equivalent to the use of the reflexive pronoun—find in these passages neither polytheism nor trinitarianism.

The genuine foreshadowings of a trinitarian doctrine of God are found in the Old Testament *theophanies* (Gen. iii. 8, xvii. 1, xviii. 1) and *Messianic prophecies* (Ps. ii. 7, cx. 1, xlv. 7; Isa. vii. 14; Jer. xxii. 5; Mic. v. 1; Dan. vii. 13). Their proper place, however, is in the prelude to the christology of the New Testament. At most, they are modes of revelation of God, and preparations for the New Testament revelation of the trinity of divine persons. Very remarkable, and from our point of view most significant of all, are those passages in which the divine name is solemnly repeated three times (Num. vi. 24–26; Isa. vi. 3; Nah. i. 2; Ps. xxxiii. 6). Most distinctly in the Trisagion of Isa. vi. we have the one Jehovah in the three holy ones. The full appreciation of such a passage is possible only amid the light of the Christian revelation under the gospel dispensation. At the same time, it must be remembered that even the heathen styled their Jupiter τρισμέγιστος, *ter optimus maximus*; and a formula might be repeated three times merely for special emphasis. We would never for a moment think of any conscious revelation of a trinity of divine persons in the story of the creation. Yet that we have there distinguished several representations of the power of the Divine Creator as God, Word, Breath, shows that the monotheism of the Hebrews was not of that rigid sort that would prove incapable of receiving and homologating a trinitarian revelation when it came in the due course of historical development.[1]

[1] Schultz, *Old Testament Theology*, Edin. 1892, p. 184. Forrest, *The Christ of History and of Experience*, Edin. 1897, p. 208 f.

Certain of the fathers[1] represent Moses as proclaiming the doctrine of the unity of God, the prophets the divine duality of Father and Son, and the gospels of the New Testament the fully developed doctrine of Father, Son, and Spirit. But, while there is an element of truth in this, the biblical development is scarcely so regular as the terms of this statement would imply. Upon the whole, we must acquiesce in the view of George Calixt[2] in his contention that the doctrine of the Trinity is not so clearly and distinctly set forth in the Old Testament that it could be known without the support of the New Testament, or that it could be demonstrated against vigorous and earnest opponents of the doctrine who repudiated the authority of the New Testament.

§ 23. New Testament Doctrine of Father, Son, and Spirit.

Literature.—Harris, *God the Creator and Lord of All*, Edin. 1897, pt. i. chap. viii.: "The Trinity: Biblical Representation of the Revelation of God in Christ." Lutz, *Biblische Dogmatik*, Pforzheim, 1847, pp. 391–394: "Apostolische Lehre vom Verhältnisse von Vater, Sohn, und Heiligen Geist." Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Edin. 1888, vol. i. pp. 349–361. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, 4th ed., New York, 1893, pp. 145–151. Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, Lond. 1874, pp. 272–284. Strong, *Manual of Theology*, Edin. 1892, pp. 146–161. Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, Königsberg, 1862, pp. 145–174. Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, bk. i. chap. xiii. 1, 11. Kuhn, *Die Christliche Lehre von der göttliche Dreieinigkeit*, Tüb. 1857, pp. 41–89. Kahnis, *System der lutherischen Dogmatik*, Leipzig, 1868, pp. 206–221. Browne, *Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles*, 4th ed., 1858, pp. 28–59. Reiff, *Die christliche Glaubenslehre*, Basel, 1876, pp. 373–375.

[1] Epiphanius, *Hæres.* 74, n. 10, vol. i. p. 899; *Ancoratus*, n. 73, vol. ii. p. 78, ed. Petavii.

[2] *Num mysterium s. Trinitatis e solius VT. libris possit demonstrari?* Helmstadt, 1649; replied to by Calov, *Scriptura VT. Trinitatis revelatrix*, 1680.

Among the New Testament passages which give *express* testimony to the doctrine of the Trinity, by far the most striking and important is the Baptismal Formula (Matt. xxviii. 19). Dorner has most admirably shown that this formula is incapable of any monarchian explanation, such as has been attempted by Arians, Socinians, and Rationalists. Even the formula represented in Acts ii. 38; Rom. vi. 3, according to which baptism is administered in the name of Christ only, implies the recognition of Christ as an object of divine worship, and assigns to Him precisely that rank which the Trinitarian demands. Whether this abbreviated formula was explained as introduced among Jews who already knew and acknowledged the Father (Cyprian), or as a designation of Christian baptism administered in accordance with Christ's injunction in the name of the Trinity (Theophylact), the words of Christ Himself constitute the only authoritative and complete formula. What we have in it is not a threefold revelation of God as Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifier, but a threefold distinction in the divine essence. What is emphasised here is not a divine work, but the Divine Self. Closely connected with this formula is the Apostolic Benediction (2 Cor. xiii. 13). In it the Father, as co-ordinated with the Lord Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit, is named God, not as exclusively entitled to that designation, but simply because He is God *only*, without that historical manifestation which is characteristic of the Son and the Spirit. And further, in 1 Cor. xii. 4–6 we have the one Spirit, the one Lord, the one God, manifesting themselves in diverse charismata, ministries, and forthputtings of power. The unity is found not in a single Divine Personality, but in the one God, in whose Being there is a triplicity corresponding to the threefold manifestation of the divine principle.

In these three passages, as we have sought to show, there is a statement of trinitarian distinctions in the Divine Being, and not merely a threefold historical manifestation of God in His operations. It is, indeed, maintained by many

theologians[1] that we have nothing more in the New Testament than a historical trinity of revelation, or an economical trinity. In the passages already quoted, when rightly interpreted, we have the ontological trinity, or trinity of essence. Only in the economy of grace does God become known to us as triune, but having so reached this article of faith, the distinctions manifested in the work of salvation are seen to rest upon distinctions in the very essence of God Himself. This is the witness given by the passages referred to. In them we have the consubstantiality of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Only as consubstantial with the Father, as truly and essentially God as He himself is, can Son and Spirit be named with Him in the initiation, conduct, and consecration of the Christian life.

Another group of three texts witnesses to the doctrine of the economical trinity, of which that of the essential trinity is the presupposition ; and, as being equally explicit, may well rank along with those already given as primary proof passages in support of the trinitarian doctrine. In Eph. ii. 18 ;[2] 1 Pet. i. 2 ; and Jude 20, 21, we have Father, Son, and Spirit expressly named in connection with their distinctive operations in the salvation of man. It should be distinctly understood that the ontological and economical trinity, so far from being contradictory to one another and mutually exclusive, are really suggestive of, and complementary to, one another.

Older theologians were wont to place 1 John v. 7 in the very front as a conclusive proof of the trinitarian doctrine. But now, apart from the fact that its genuineness is denied by all critics, it is perceived that at most it could have supported

[1] Rothe (*Dogmatik*, i. 43 f.) maintains that we have no trace in the New Testament of the divine hypostases of the church doctrine. We have the Father as God generally, either as Father of Christ or as Father of those who are Christ's,—a spiritual relationship, and not a metaphysical or essential hypostasis. The theory of three persons in one God he declares to be altogether foreign to the Bible. Compare also similar views in Grimm, *Institutio theol. dogm.* 1869, § 132 ; Pfleiderer, *Grundriss*, § 77 ; Lipsius, *Lehrbuch d. evang.-protest. Dogmatik*, § 242.

[2] Macpherson, *Commentary on Ep. to the Ephesians*, 1892, p. 228.

only the agreement, and not the consubstantiality, of the witnesses. So Grimm (*Institutio*, § 132, note 1): "*Etiam si vero germanus esset, non trium testium ὁμοουσίαν, sed eorum in testando consensum doceret.*"

The New Testament speaks throughout the language of Trinitarianism. Not only does the plan of salvation, set forth historically and didactically in Gospels and Epistles, rest upon the basis of a trinitarian revelation of God, but each of the Divine Persons has divine names, divine attributes, divine operations, divine honours, ascribed to him.[1] Each is God, and God is one; yet each is distinguished from the other. The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God; and yet, while Father, Son, and Spirit are each distinct from one another, there are not three Gods, but only one God. The trinitarian doctrine of the New Testament is the doctrine of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Each of these is represented as possessing and exercising His own special properties. *Patris relativa proprietas est gignere* (Ps. ii. 7; John iii. 16; Heb. i. 6); *Filii est gigni, i.e. a Patre ita procedere, ut ejusdem essentiæ sit particeps, et naturam ejus perfectè referat, et hinc ordine secundus est* (Heb. i. 3); *Spiritus Sancti proprietas est spirari, vel emitti et procedere, et a Patre et a Filio* (John xv. 26; Rom. viii. 9; Gal. iv. 6).[2]

It may very easily be understood that holy Scripture should speak almost exclusively of redemption, and of God the Father, Son, and Spirit, according to the manner in which each is seen in the working out of that scheme. What we need to have revealed to us undoubtedly is the relation into which God enters with us in the dispensation of grace through Jesus Christ. Hence naturally it is the language of economic trinitarianism that is predominant in the Old and New Testaments. The difficulty occasioned by this, and its true solution, are admirably stated by Dr. Westcott.[3] "A mysterious

[1] For examples of Scripture passages illustrative of each of these, see Amesius, *Medulla Theologiæ*, 1623, i. chap. v. 17–20.

[2] Amesius, *Medulla*, i. v. 12–14.

[3] *The Epistle to the Hebrews*, London, 1889, p. 18, end of note on chap. i. 1–4.

question," he says, "has been raised whether the terms 'Son' and 'Father' are used of the absolute relations of the Divine Persons, apart from all reference to the Incarnation. In regard to this, it may be observed that Scripture tells us very little about God apart from His relations to man and the world. At the same time, the description of God as essentially 'love' helps us to see that the terms 'Father' and 'Son' are peculiarly fitted to describe, though under a figure, an essential relation between the Persons of the Godhead. This essential relation found expression for us in the Incarnation; and we are led to see that the 'economic' Trinity is a true image, under the conditions of earth, of the 'essential' Trinity."

§ 24. The Ecclesiastical Development of the Doctrine of the Trinity.

Literature.—Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes*, 3 vols., Tüb. 1841–1843. Bull, *Defensio fidei Nicænæ*, Lond. 1685. Waterland, *Vindication of Christ's Divinity*, 1719, 1723, 1725. Biedermann, *Die christliche Dogmatik*, Berlin, 1885, ii. 268–272. Rothe, *Dogmatik*, Heidelb. 1870, vol. i. pp. 27–39. Grimm, *Institutio theologiæ dogmaticæ evangelicæ*, Jena, 1869, pp. 214–217, 234–243. Stearns, *Present-Day Theology*, Lond. 1893, pp. 193–202. Orr, *Christian View of God and the World*, Edin. 1893, pp. 302–319. Gore, *The Incarnation of the Son of God* (Bampton Lect.), Lond. 1891, pp. 130–137. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Edin. 1888, vol. i. pp. 378–390. Reiff, *Der Glaube der Kirchen und Kirchenparteien*, Basel, 1875, pp. 33 ff. Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, Königsb. 1862, vol. i. pp. 174–190.—Especially on the doctrinal contents of the three Creeds, see: Harvey, *The History and Theology of the Three Creeds*, 2 vols., Lond. 1854. Heartley, *Harmonia Symbolica*, Oxf. 1858. Swainson, *The Nicene and Apostles' Creeds, with some Account of the Athanasian Creed*, Lond. 1875. Du Bose, *The Ecumenical Councils*, Edin. 1897. Lumby, *The History of the Creeds*, Lond. 1873, 2nd ed. 1880. Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*, vols. i. and ii., Lond. 1877. Witherow, "The Three Creeds," in *Brit. and For. Evangel. Review*, vol. xxv. 1876, pp. 205–235.—See also admirable expositions of the trinitarian doctrine of the Apostles'

Creed in: Pearson, *Exposition of the Creed* (1659), ed. Burton, 2 vols., Oxf. 1843; Westcott, *The Historic Faith*, Lond. 1883.

The development of the doctrine of the Trinity was historically the first scientific task laid upon the Christian Church. The Christian doctrine of God is necessarily trinitarian, inasmuch as the Person of Christ is the essential principle of Christianity.[1] In the historical construction of ecclesiastical dogma the Church interested itself first of all in the doctrine of God,—in theological as distinguished from anthropological questions,—and here, properly and necessarily, in the first instance with christological, and therefore trinitarian, problems.

The use of the Baptismal Formula (Matt. xxviii. 19) in the early Church constituted a convenient summary expression of the Church's trinitarian belief. That formula was gradually expanded into the so-called Apostles' Creed (*Symbolum Apostolicum*), in which God as Father is represented as revealing Himself in Christ His Son, and by the Holy Spirit in the Church. This Creed, in a form essentially similar to that in which it has come down to us, was current in the primitive Church as the confession of its faith in the One God who is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth: And in Jesus Christ His only Son our Lord: Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, Born of the Virgin Mary, Suffered under Pontius Pilate, Was crucified, dead, and buried: He descended into Hades: The third day He rose again from the dead: He ascended into heaven, And sitteth on the right hand of God the Father Almighty: From thence He shall come to judge the quick and the dead. I believe in the Holy Ghost: The Holy Catholic Church: The Communion of Saints: The Forgiveness of Sin: The Resurrection of the Body, And the Life everlasting.[2]

[1] Biedermann, *Die christliche Dogmatik*, ii. 268 f.

[2] The Greek text of the *Apostolicum* in its final form is as follows:—Πιστεύω εἰς θεὸν πατέρα παντοκράτορα, ποιητὴν οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς. Καὶ Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, υἱὸν αὐτοῦ τὸν μονογενῆ, τὸν κύριου ἡμῶν, τὸν συλληφθέντα ἐκ πνεύματος ἁγίου, γεννηθέντα ἐκ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου, παθόντα ἐπὶ Ποντίου Πιλάτου, σταυρωθέντα, θανόντα

The doctrine of the Trinity is thus from the first recognised as not only in itself specifically Christian, but also as absolutely essential to the very conception of the Christian faith. The Apostolic Church had the consciousness that its faith could be Christian only as trinitarian. During the period, therefore, of special activity in the construction of church dogma, every speculation which seemed in any way to threaten the purity and completeness of the trinitarian conception of the Christian faith was eagerly discussed, and distinctly repudiated by means of carefully chosen terms embodied in a formula approved by the whole Church. The first Œcumenical Council at Nicæa, in A.D. 325, was interested only in determining the church doctrine of the Trinity on a sound christological foundation. In the Nicene Creed we have simply the primitive Creed, represented in the so-called *Apostolicum*, amplified in view of heretical misinterpretations and possible misunderstandings of the Church's faith.

We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, Creator of all things visible and invisible; and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, Only Begotten of the Father, that is, of the substance of the Father, God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten not made, being of the same substance with the Father, by whom all things were made in heaven and in earth, who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven, was incarnate, was made man, suffered, rose again the third day, ascended into the heavens, and He will come to judge the living and the dead. And in the Holy Ghost. Those who say, There was a time when He was not, and He was not before He was begotten, and He was made of nothing, or who say that He is of another hypostasis or of another substance, or that the Son of God is created, that He is mutable or subject to change, the Catholic Church anathematises.[1]

καὶ ταφέντα, κατελθόντα εἰς τὰ κατώτατα, τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἀναστάντα ἀπὸ τῶν νεκρῶν, ἀνελθόντα εἰς τοὺς οὐρανούς, καθεζόμενον ἐν δεξιᾷ θεοῦ πατρὸς παντοδυνάμου, ἐκεῖθεν ἐρχόμενον κρῖναι ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς. Πιστεύω εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, ἁγίαν καθολικὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἁγίων κοινωνίαν, ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν, σαρκὸς ἀνάστασιν, ζωὴν αἰώνιον. Ἀμήν.

[1] The Greek text of the *Symbolum Nicænum* is as follows:—Πιστεύομεν εἰς ἕνα Θεὸν Πατέρα παντοκράτορα, πάντων ὁρατῶν τε καὶ ἀοράτων ποιητήν· καὶ εἰς ἕνα

This same trinitarian faith was yet more definitely formulated, in view of persistent Monarchian heresies, in the Creed of the Council of Constantinople, A.D. 381 (*Symbolum Nicæno-Constantinopolitanum*). The doctrine of the consubstantiality of the Son *and the Spirit* with the Father was laboriously discussed by the Synod, and is clearly defined in the Creed. An important addition is made to the Nicene statement: *And in the Holy Ghost.* In this symbol the church doctrine of the Trinity as the trinity of essence may be regarded as receiving its final and most perfect form. This Nicæno-Constantinopolitan Creed deserves special attention here as the complete expression of the trinitarian faith of the Church.

We believe in one God the Father Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, begotten of the Father before all times, Light from Light, very God from very God, begotten, not created, of the same substance with the Father, by whom all things were made; who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, and was made Man; who was crucified for us under Pontius Pilate, suffered and was buried, and the third day He rose again, according to the Scriptures, and ascended into heaven, and sat down at the right hand of the Father; and He shall come again with glory to judge both the living and the dead; *whose kingdom shall have no end.* And we believe in the Holy Ghost, *the Lord and Lifegiver, who proceedeth from the Father; who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified; who spake by the Prophets.* And in one Holy Catholic

Κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν τὸν Υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς μονογονῆ, τουτέστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρὸς, Θεὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ, φῶς ἐκ φωτὸς, Θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ, γεννηθέντα, οὐ ποιηθέντα, ὁμοούσιον τῷ Πατρὶ, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο, τά τε ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ· τὸν δι' ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν κατελθόντα καὶ σαρκωθέντα, ἐνανθρωπήσαντα, παθόντα καὶ ἀναστάντα τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ, ἀνελθόντα εἰς οὐρανοὺς, καὶ ἐρχόμενον κρῖναῖζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς. Καὶ εἰς τὸ Ἅγιον Πνεῦμα. Τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας, ἦν ποτὲ ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, καὶ πρὶν γεννηθῆναι οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὐκ ὄντων ἐγένετο, ἢ ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἢ κτιστὸν, ἢ τρεπτὸν, ἀλλοιωτὸν ἢ τὸν Υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀναθεματίζει ἡ καθολικὴ Ἐκκλεσία.

and Apostolic Church. We acknowledge one Baptism for the remission of sins. We look for a Resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to come. Amen.[1]

The statement in this Creed of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is an advance on that of the Nicene Creed, so that here the doctrine of the Spirit is brought more to an equality with that of the Son. Historically, this fuller definition was occasioned by the appearance of Macedonian or Pneumatomachian heresies. The added statement as to the endlessness of Christ's kingdom was required as a repudiation of the error of Marcellus of Ancyra, who was supposed to favour a form of Sabellianism which made the Son a second distinct personality, but not Eternal Son, His kingdom being one that would end and be merged in that of the Father, and so in the end God and His Kingdom would be an undifferentiated unity. If this view of the doctrine of Marcellus be correct,[2] he allowed only what might be called *dispensational* existence to the Son, who could have no place before or after the working out of man's redemption. This is clearly repudiated by the added article of the Creed.

On the doctrine of the Holy Spirit further controversies arose, which ultimately divided the Eastern and the Western

[1] The original Greek text is as follows:—Πιστεύομεν εἰς ἕνα θεὸν πατέρα παντοκράτορα, ποιητὴν οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς, ὁρατῶν τε πάντων καὶ ἀοράτων. Καὶ εἰς ἕνα Κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ τὸν μονογενῆ, τὸν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεννηθέντα πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων, φῶς ἐκ φωτός, θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ, γεννηθέντα, οὐ ποιηθέντα, ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρί, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο· τὸν δι' ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν κατελθόντα ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν, καὶ σαρκωθέντα ἐκ πνεύματος ἁγίου καὶ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου, καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσαντα· σταυρωθέντα τε ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ Ποντίου Πιλάτου, καὶ παθόντα, καὶ ταφέντα, καὶ ἀναστάντα τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ κατὰ τὰς γραφάς· καὶ ἀνελθόντα εἰς τοὺς οὐρανούς, καὶ καθεζόμενον ἐκ δεξιῶν τοῦ πατρός, καὶ πάλιν ἐρχόμενον μετὰ δόξης κεῖναι ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς· οὗ τῆς βασιλείας οὐκ ἔσται τέλος. Καὶ εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, τὸ κύριον, τὸ ζωοποιόν, τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον, τὸ σὺν πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ συμπροσκυνούμενον καὶ συνδοξαζόμενον, τὸ λαλῆσαν διὰ τῶν προφητῶν. Εἰς μίαν ἁγίαν καθολικὴν καὶ ἀποστολικὴν ἐκκλησίαν· ὁμολογοῦμεν ἓν βάπτισμα εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν· προσδοκῶμεν ἀνάστασιν νεκρῶν καὶ ζωὴν τοῦ μέλλοντος αἰῶνος. Ἀμήν.

[2] But see Zahn, *Marcellus von Ancyra*, Gotha, 1867, p. 73. Möller gives a clear account of the doctrine of Marcellus in Herzog, *R.E.*[2] ix. 279–282.

Churches. The special question now was as to the *procession* of the Spirit, the Latins, in opposition to the Greeks, insisting upon the addition of *filioque* to the clause: *Who proceedeth from the Father.* This addition was actually made in the Western copies of the Creed, and also finds place in the so-called Athanasian Creed (*Symbolum Athanasianum*), composed in Gaul, probably about the end of the fifth century. This Creed, though of unknown authorship, undoubtedly gives exact formal expression to the trinitarian doctrine current in the West from the fourth century onwards, and is specially interesting for the use which it makes of the dogmatic terms in which church orthodoxy marked itself off from all possibility of misunderstanding, and sought to close every loophole by which the minutest error might enter. This Creed, which has more of a liturgical form than any of the others, is as follows:—

Whoever would be saved must first of all take care that he hold the Catholic Faith, which, except a man preserve whole and inviolate, he shall without doubt perish eternally. But this is the Catholic Faith, that we worship one God in trinity, and trinity in unity. Neither confounding the persons nor dividing the substance. For the person of the Father is one; of the Son, another; of the Holy Spirit, another. But the divinity of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, is one, the glory equal, the majesty equal. Such as is the Father, such also is the Son, and such the Holy Spirit. The Father is uncreated, the Son is uncreated, the Holy Spirit is uncreated. The Father is infinite, the Son is infinite, the Holy Spirit is infinite. The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Spirit is eternal. And yet there are not three eternal Beings, but one eternal Being. As also there are not three uncreated Beings, nor three infinite Beings, but one uncreated and one infinite Being. In like manner the Father is omnipotent, the Son is omnipotent, and the Holy Spirit is omnipotent. And yet there are not three omnipotent Beings, but one omnipotent Being. Thus the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God. And yet there are not three Gods, but one God only. The Father is Lord, the Son, Lord, and the Holy Spirit, Lord. And yet there are

not three Lords, but one Lord only. For as we are compelled by Christian truth to confess each person distinctively to be both God and Lord, we are prohibited by the Catholic religion to say that there are three Gods or three Lords. The Father is made by none, nor created, not begotten. The Son is from the Father alone, not made, nor created, but begotten. The Holy Spirit is not created by the Father and the Son, nor begotten, but proceeds. Therefore there is one Father, not three Fathers; one Son, not three Sons; one Holy Spirit, not three Holy Spirits. And in this Trinity there is nothing prior or posterior, nothing greater or less, but all three persons are coeternal and coequal to themselves. So that through all, as was said above, both unity in trinity, and trinity in unity is to be adored. Whoever would be saved, let him thus think of the Trinity.[1]

We have in this symbolical definition of the doctrine of the Trinity its final dogmatic expression. Later speculations on the Trinity are of philosophical, not theological, importance. The main points in the church doctrine of the Trinity, as brought out in the gradual elaboration of the dogma in the Creeds, is summed up in the formula: *unus Deus triunus.*

[1] The original of this formulary was certainly Latin and not Greek (see Harvey, *Hist. and Theol. of the Three Creeds*, pp. 542 ff.). The following is the Latin text:—Fides autem catholica hæc est, ut unum Deum in trinitate et trinitatem in unitate veneremur, neque confundentes personas neque substantiam separentes. Alia est enim persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus Sancti; sed Patris et Filii, et Sp. S. una est Divinitas, æqualis gloria, coæterna majestas. Qualis P., talis F., talis Sp. S. Increatus P., increatus F., etc.; immensus P., etc.; æternus P., etc.: et tamen non tres æterni, sed unus æternus; sicut non tres increati, nec tres immensi, sed unus increatus et unus immensus. Similiter omnipotens P., etc.: et tamen non tres omnipotentes, sed unus omnipotens. Ita Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus Spiritus S.: et tamen non tres Dii, sed unus Deus. Ita Dominus Pater, etc. Quia, sicut singillatim unamquemque personam Deum ac Dominum confiteri christiana veritate compellimur: ita tres Deos aut tres Dominos dicere Catholica religione prohibemur. Pater a nullo est factus, nec creatus, nec genitus. Filius a Patre solo est, non factus, nec creatus, sed genitus. Spiritus S. a Patre *et Filio*, non factus, nec creatus, nec genitus, sed procedens. Unus ergo Pater, non tres Patres, unus Filius, etc. Et in hac Trinitate nihil prius aut posterius, nihil majus aut minus: sed totæ tres personæ coeternæ sibi sunt et coæquales, ita, ut per omnia, sicut jam supra dictum est, et trinitas in unitate et unitas in trinitate venerenda sit. Qui vult salvus esse, ita de trinitate sentiat.

The unity of the nature or being (*οὐσία*, *φύσις*, *natura*, *essentia*, *substantia*) and the trinity of persons (*προσώπα*, *ὑποστάσεις*, *personæ*) are the two truths, neither of which may in the very least be infringed upon. In common speech *hypostasis* meant the same as *ousia*. Some, therefore, objected to the term *hypostases* as apt to be understood as meaning three substances, and consequently three Gods.[1] The term *persons* (*προσώπα*, literally *masks*) was sometimes favoured by Sabellians as etymologically giving sanction, or at least plausibility, to their views. The word, owing to its common use, is perhaps unfortunately chosen, as emphasising the distinctions in, rather than the unity of, the Godhead. Augustine made use of the term simply because he could not find a better.[2] The Greek word *Τρίας*, from which the church dogma obtained its designation, seems first to have gained currency in the writings of the Alexandrian school, as already a familiar word in the Platonic philosophy. The equivalent Latin word *trinitas* is first met with in Tertullian:[3] "Nam et Ecclesia proprie et principaliter ipse est Spiritus, in quo est Trinitas unius Divinitatis, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus." The special theological sense of all these terms is now universally known and generally accepted. There is, on the part of the three persons, *æqualitas*, because each has the same substance, nature (*ὁμοουσία*), the undivided divine essence of the one God. There is also on the part of these three persons *distinctio*, because each has his own distinct hypostatic character.

[1] The original meaning of *ὑπόστασις* is, "that which stands beneath." It was then applied by some to the Godhead as the one divine essence; but more generally to each of the three persons, as distinct divine subsistence. "If men looked at the Holy Trinity under the aspect of the one Godhead, there was only one *ὑπόστασις*, one divine essence. If, on the other hand, they looked at each Person in the Holy Trinity, then that by which each Person is what He is, His *ὑπόστασις*, was necessarily regarded as distinct, and there were three *ὑποστασεις*. In the first case *ὑπόστασις*, as applied to the One Godhead, was treated as equivalent to *ὐσία*; in the other case it was treated as equivalent to *πρόσωπον*." —Westcott, *The Epistles to the Hebrews* (on chap. i. 3), London, 1889, p. 13.

[2] *De Trinitate*, v. 9: "Dictum est tamen tres personæ, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur."

[3] Opera, Paris, 1864, *De Pudicitiæ*, c. xxi. p. 574.

This distinction discovers itself—(1) in differences of function in respect of the subsistence of each person in the divine substance (the Father begets, the Son is begotten, the Spirit proceeds, etc.), which are described as *opera ad intra*; (2) in the difference of function in respect of revelation (creatio, redemptio, sanctificatio; the Father sends Son and Spirit into the world, the Son comes into the world and accomplishes redemption, the Holy Spirit carries out the work of redemption in mankind), which are described as *opera ad extra*.[1] This distinction, however, is only relative; *opera ad extra* are properly *indivisa*. While thus indicating clearly the distinctive properties belonging to and characterising the three persons, it was found necessary to maintain explicitly the full *æqualitas* which each possessed in respect of the divine nature or substance. As the *Athanasianum* has it: "in hac Trinitate . . . nihil majus aut minus." At the same time, each person is to be regarded as in the others, the three being, in respect of essence, interpenetrative. The unity of divine essence which characterises all the persons will not allow us to conceive of the Father as without the Son, or of the Son as without the Father, etc. This is indicated by the terms περιχώρησις, circuminsessio, immanentia, inexistentia mutua. Beyond this affirmation of the unity and triunity of God—the one God and the three persons,—the church dogmatic does not seek to advance. It clearly affirms both truths, each with equal emphasis; but the reconciliation of the apparent contradiction it does not attempt. The Church, following holy Scripture, recognises this as the mystery of the Godhead. Any effort that may be made to explain the mystery is speculation, not theology. All such attempts have invariably resulted in the development of tritheistic or modalistic conceptions of the deity, in the denial either of the unity of God or of the essential distinction of the persons. And hence the development of the true ecclesiastical doctrine of the

[1] See this very well put by Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik*, § 445. Compare also the particularly clear and full summary of the church doctrine in Rothe, *Dogmatik* (1870), i. 29–38.

Trinity ends with the construction of the three great Creeds. In the elaboration of the doctrinal definitions which ultimately found place in these, a notable service was rendered by Gregory Nazianzen, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and finally by Augustine.[1] The results of their dogmatic labours, sifted by the discussions in the Synods, and finally expressed with epigrammatic point and brevity in the accepted Creeds, are the heritage of the universal Church through all subsequent generations. The Protestant Confessions heartily accept, and practically incorporate, the exposition of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity given in the Creeds, and acknowledge that nothing may or need be added to what they say.[2]

§ 25. Later Theories Modifying the Church Doctrine.

Literature.—Orr, *The Christian View of God and the World*, Edin. 1893 (Note to Lecture VII.: "Recent Theories of the Trinity"), pp. 516–521. Strauss, *Die christliche Glaubenslehre*, 2 vols., Tüb. 1840, § 32, vol. i. pp. 462–501. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Edin. 1888, vol. i. pp. 397–412. Lipsius, *Lehrbuch der evang.-protest. Dogmatik*, § 365, Brunsw. 1876, pp. 275–278. Biedermann, *Die christliche Dogmatik*, § 629, Berlin, 1885, vol. ii. pp. 456 f. Reiff, *Die christliche Glaubenslehre*, Basel, 1876, pp. 377–381: "Die Trinität und die Speculation." Grimm, *Institutio theologiæ dogmaticæ evangelicæ*, Jena, 1869, § 135, pp. 238 f. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Edin. 1873, vol. i. pp. 478–482. Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik*, Freib. 1892, § 38, pp. 433–438, and his own theory, § 39, pp. 438–446.

During the Reformation age the Socinians proclaimed themselves rejectors of the trinitarian doctrine of the Church. Their position was that of open and avowed Antitrinitarians,

[1] Basil, *Five Books against Eunomius*, *Treatise on the Holy Spirit to Amphilochius*; Gregory Nazianzen, *Orationes*, xxix.–xxxi, Περὶ Υἱοῦ and Περὶ τοῦ Ἁγίου πνεύματος; Gregory of Nyssa, *Against Eunomius*, *Sermo Catecheticus Magnus*, etc.; Augustine, *De Trinitate* (Eng. trans., *On the Trinity*, Edin. 1874).

[2] *E.g.*, in the *Confessio Augustana*, i. 1: "Ecclesiæ magno consensu apud nos docent, decretum Nicænæ Synodi de unitate essentiæ divinæ et de tribus personis verum et sine ulla dubitatione credendum esse."

and as such they carried on their speculations outside of the Church. Their antitrinitarian movement was thus also anti-ecclesiastical. But within the Church there soon arose an equally determined, though not openly avowed, antitrinitarian reaction. The so-called older Supernaturalists, along with the Arminians, wrought out a subordinationist christology and a deistic theology, which soon, through a species of Sabellianism, sank down into what was little better than a revival of the baldest Ebionitism. The rationalism of the eighteenth century was ever wavering between pantheism and deism, between a pagan and a Judaic conception of God; but in every variety it presented an undoubtedly antitrinitarian tendency. Wherever the free loving relation of God to the world is denied or overlooked, the conception of God becomes purely Monarchian, and no place can be found for the doctrine of the essential or ontological trinity, scarcely even for that of the economic trinity.

In order to get out of this way of looking at God, which led only to intellectual barrenness and to spiritual darkness, philosophical attempts were made by Hegel and Schelling[1] to rehabilitate the idea of the Divine Trinity. It is heartily admitted by Dorner that these philosophical systems have achieved something for the metaphysical foundations of the concept of the Trinity. It is, however, quite evident that their trinity does not represent personal distinctions in the Godhead, but only a God in whom there is movement and life, as contrasted with the dead God of deistic rationalism. In this trinity of philosophical speculation the movement of God is only toward plurality in the world (the Son), and then, to unity again as He becomes conscious of Himself in the spirit of man (the Spirit). The Hegelian trinity can never be identified with the Trinity of the Christian system, because the Hegelian *Idea* is not the Christian God, and can never yield the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit of Christian faith and

[1] See Hegel, *Religionsphilosophie*, Berl. 1840, ii. 223 – 251; Schelling, *Philosophie der Offenbarung* (in Sämmtliche Werke), ii. 3, pp. 310 ff.; Strauss, *Glaubenslehre*, i. 487 ff.

experience. No attempt on the part of theologians to state the doctrine of the Trinity in terms of the Hegelian formulæ can ever be successful.[1] Hegelian theology can never entirely rid itself of pantheistic elements.

Recent evangelical theologians like Dorner, Nitzsch, and Kaftan maintain the necessity of asserting the essential or ontological, as well as the economic, trinity; but, inasmuch as their speculation recognises only a threefold mode of existence in the one Divine Personality, we have no real trinitarian distinction of persons, and the result is a virtual surrender of all that is distinctive of the ecclesiastical dogma. Pfleiderer has remarked with perfect justice that here there can be no longer any word of tripersonality. Augustine, indeed, as well as some great theologians since (*e.g.* Aquinas, Melanchthon, etc.), had sought to illustrate the mystery of the Trinity by reference to minor distinctions of faculty and function in man (esse, nosse, velle; memoria, intellectus, voluntas). Such examples are scarcely justifiable even as illustrations, but if used seriously as explanations, they certainly can suggest nothing more than a mere Sabellian distinction of modes of existence in the one personal being.[2] The attempts made, on the other hand, by some mystico-speculative theologians (Sartorius, Liebner, Schöberlein, Lange), following the example of Augustine (*On the Trinity*, viii. 8, ix. 2) and Richard of St. Victor (*De Trinitate*, bk. iii. chap. ii.),[3] to deduce the dis-

[1] Lipsius says (*Lehrbuch*, 277): "Allerlei theologische Versuche, im Interesse des kirchlichen Dogma mit Hegelschen Formeln zu hantiren sind müssige Spielereien." So, too, Biedermann (*Dogmatik*, ii. 456): "Alle desgleichen Speculationen von vornherein etwas anderes sind als die kirchliche Trinitätslehre." And Strauss (*Glaubenslehre*, i. 492): "Blicken wir von hier auf die kirchliche Dreieinigkeitslehre zurück, so werden wir sie freilich in der speculativen, die an ihre Stelle getreten ist, kaum wiedererkennen."

[2] The best exposure of the unsuitableness of all analogies from nature, or from the faculties and movements of the human spirit, is that of Biedermann, *Die chr. Dogmatik*, §§ 627, 628, ii. pp. 453–456. Of Lange's illustration from the human family—father, mother, child—he sarcastically but truly says: "Eine sehr richtige Analogie—für eine heidnische Götterfamilie, die patriarchalisch regiert."

[3] On the trinitarian doctrine of Richard of St. Victor, see Bach, *Die Dogmengeschichte*, Vienna, 1875, vol. ii. pp. 367–370.

tinctions in the Divine Trinity from the idea of love, while successful in maintaining the personal character of these distinctions, seem necessarily to lead to a tritheistic conception of deity. If the Father be represented as the loving subject, the Son as the loved object, the Holy Spirit as mutual or reciprocal love, we have in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, if they be anything more than mere modes of existence of the one Divine Personality, three separate beings with no περιχώρησις, no *inexistentia mutua*, a plurality not of persons only but of Gods.

The subordinationism of Tertullian, and others of the early fathers, may be regarded, perhaps, as simply an inexactness of phraseology, which more or less characterised the expositions of the ante-Nicene writers. It was not until heretics, or those with heretical tendencies, carried to their logical conclusion forms of expression current in simpler times, that the need appeared for careful definition and guarding against possible misconstruction. When repeated in modern times (as it has been, *e.g.* by Kahnis), in face of all the discussions by means of which theological thought and expression had been formulated, a subordinationist view of the nature of the Son must necessarily lead to the impairing and imperilling of the doctrine of the full divinity of Christ, and consequently to the wrecking of the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity.

§ 26. The Positive Christian Doctrine of the Trinity.

Literature.—Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Edin. 1888, vol. i. pp. 412–465. Crawford, *The Mysteries of Christianity*, Edin. 1875. Harris, *God the Creator and Lord of All*, Edin. 1897, pt. i. chap. x.: "The Trinity, its Practical Significance." Stearns, *Present-Day Theology*, Lond. 1893, pp. 189–208: "The Trinity." Reiff, *Die christliche Glaubenslehre*, Basel, 1876, pp. 381–386: "Die Trinität und der Glaube." Mason, *The Faith of the Gospel*, Lond. 1888, pp. 30–55. Strong, *Manual of Theology*, Edin. 1892, pp. 139–200. Owen, *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity* (1669), Works, vol. ii., Edin. 1851, pp. 377–413.

It is the part of the evangelical Christian theologian now to fall back upon the trinitarian doctrine as elaborated in the great Creeds, and, after the example of the theologians of the Reformation, to maintain that we have in these the final definition of the dogma. No place may be allowed to any speculation that would impair the equality and distinction of the three persons, on the one hand, or the unity of the Godhead, the divine substance, on the other. The dogma of the Trinity, as elaborated in the Church's Creeds, is not the outcome of philosophical speculation and refinement. What we have there is simply the Scripture doctrine of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, so defined as to exclude errors which threatened to corrupt the Church's faith by introducing elements that conflicted with the Scripture revelations concerning God. The Christian doctrine of the Trinity is purely a doctrine of revelation, and as such must be described as a mystery. It presents before us a proposition containing two statements which are mutually irreconcilable, that there are *three persons* and *one God*. It is very natural that theologians should desire to commend this fundamental Christian doctrine by means of rational explanations, that they should endeavour to show to human reason the possibility of a solution of the seeming contradiction which a simple statement of the biblical and ecclesiastical doctrine presents. But all such attempts are doomed to failure, whether they be made from the philosophical standpoint by means of the logical process or from the idea of personality, or whether they be made from the purely religious standpoint by means of the idea of love. When all has been done in these directions that it is possible to do, the contradictions still remain unsolved. The Church doctrine insists upon the existence of three persons, each in an equal measure partaking in the divine nature, which yet are not, as human reason would suppose, three Gods. It represents the Father as the originating principle, and yet refuses to regard the Son and the Spirit as subordinate beings, as reason would do. And further, it regards all the three persons as interpenetrative of, or coexisting in, one another

(*περιχώρησις*, *circuminsessio*), and yet does not conclude, as human speculation would do, that the three have but one consciousness and will.[1] Each is in the other by reason of the identity of nature and essence. Arianism has to be guarded against as well as Sabellianism, and yet care must be taken to avoid anything that savours of tritheism. "This pure and distinct equality," says Gibbon,[2] meaning thereby the homoousia, "was tempered, on the one hand, by the internal connection and spiritual penetration which indissolubly unites the divine persons." As united, the divine persons, though not confused, yet inhere to each other. The most intelligible expression of this profound mystery is given in the words of our Lord Himself: "Believe Me, that I am in the Father, and the Father in Me." The scholastic expressions do not go beyond, and indeed mean nothing else than, this. If we hold, as all the Church Confessions do, that this ecclesiastical doctrine is nothing more than the Scripture doctrine, then we must simply accept the statement of it with its unsolved contradictions, just as we do the unsolved antinomy of the divine sovereignty and human freedom. The doctrine of the Trinity as thus stated is the essential presupposition of Christian theology. Only on the basis of this conception of the divine subsistence is it possible to rear a consistent system of Christian doctrine.

[1] See Schultz, *Grundriss der evangel. Dogmatik*, Gött. 1892, p. 45. Schultz attributes all this to the speculations of theologians, and assigns it to the Church doctrine as distinguished from the doctrine of Scripture. "These statements," he says, "are neither grounded in Scripture, nor have they any inward connection with the essence of the Christian revelation, and so it is not right on their behalf to appeal to 'the mystery of revelation.'" His own view of the Scripture doctrine of the Trinity, in keeping with that of Ritschlians generally, is distinctly Sabellian. He recognises in the Scriptures of the Old Testament and New Testament the doctrine of *one* personal God, the Father, who is Father of Christ, whose Spirit, personal because He Himself is personal, goes forth into the Church and the world to further the interests of His kingdom. This is practically the same view as that more carefully and exactly stated by Rothe in his *Dogmatik*, 1870, i. 39–49.

[2] *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. Bury, London, 1896, vol. ii. p. 348 f. In his note Gibbon, after referring to Petavius, Cudworth, and Bull, makes the characteristic remark: "The *περιχώρησις*, or *circuminsessio*, is perhaps the deepest and darkest corner of the whole theological abyss."

§ 27. God as Creator of the World.

Literature.—Orr, *Christian View of God and the World*, 1893, pp. 144–157. Lotze, *Microcosmus*, 4th ed., Edin. 1894, vol. i. 419–442: "Nature evolved from Chaos." Chapman, *Pre-organic Evolution and the Biblical Idea of God*, Edin. 1891. Harris, *God the Creator and Lord of All*, Edin. 1897, pt. ii. chaps. xii. and xiii.: "The Creation" and "God's Chief End in Creation." Iverach, *Evolution and Christianity*, London, 1894, especially chap. i. pp. 1–16: "Evolution and Beginnings," and chap. v. pp. 69–87: "Evolution and Creation." Aubrey Moore, *Science and the Faith*, Lond., 3rd ed. 1892. Fairbairn, *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion and History*, Lond. 1876, Essay II.: "Theism and Scientific Speculation," pp. 61–105. Dr. Ed. Williams' Works, 5 vols., Lond. 1862, vol. iv. pp. 179–183: "On God's Ultimate End in Creation." Jonathan Edwards' Works, 2 vols., Lond. 1834, vol. i. pp. 94–128: "Dissertation on the End for which God created the World." Also rich in subtle, profound thought, and eminently suggestive: Rothe, *Theologische Ethik*, §§ 40–41, Wittenberg, 1869, vol. i. pp. 154–168; and *Still Hours*, Lond. 1886, pp. 113–123.

The Christian doctrine of God represents Him as absolutely self-sufficient, without defect and without superfluity. There was no physical necessity, no necessity of nature, demanding the existence of any other being outside of Himself. He did not need, outside of Himself, the existence of any other substance in order to perfect by supplement His own being, or to afford place for that which could not find a sufficient sphere within the compass of His own subsistence. We have seen that in the tripersonality of His own essence God had in eternity abundant scope for the exercise of His divine powers. At the same time, it is quite true to say that the creation was a necessary act of God. It cannot be truly said that God might have had nothing to do with the creation of a world; for this, as Rothe notes, would introduce an element of arbitrariness into His action as Creator. The necessity, however, is not an external one, is not the result of pressure of a physical or moral kind brought to bear upon Him from with-

out. It is purely personal, but not therefore less real or less stringent than if it were mathematical. This personal moral necessity to create on the part of God is not only not inconsistent with the perfect divine freedom, but, paradoxical as the statement may seem, it is this necessity that makes the act of creation an act of real freedom. The freedom of the divine action depends upon the exclusion of all that is arbitrary or fortuitous. The divine love, as the innermost principle of the divine nature, makes it necessary that God should create. As Rothe says: "Nothing is freer than love, but also nothing is at the same time more necessary." God must create the world because He is love. This is not the necessity of the pantheist which makes the world, not the distinct and separate object of the divine love of a personal God, but a mere moment in the process of the divine evolution.[1] Pantheistic mystics have erred in speaking of the universe of being as if it had been called into existence by God in order to supply the necessary complement of His own being.[2] Such mysticism must lead ultimately to the loss of every trace of personality in God, and to the blending, inseparably and indistinguishably, of God and the world in one impersonal substance.

That view of the world which, on any pretext whatsoever, represents God apart from it as imperfect, requires simply a cosmogony and not a doctrine of creation. The story of the universe which prevailed in paganism, reflected both in its religion and in its philosophy, was that of a development of a purely naturalistic kind, the chaos possessing in itself the power of sending forth fruitful germs, from which, in a dark unconscious way, all beings by degrees came forth, and so a world of inorganic and organic elements was gradually born, light grew out of darkness, and life out of that which had no life. This pagan cosmogony was also in its richer forms a

[1] Rothe, *Dogmatik*, Tüb. 1870, i. 143 ff.

[2] Pantheistic mystics often expressed themselves extravagantly and irreverently. Their paradoxes are justly censured by Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, p. 100. See also Philippi, *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*, Stuttgart, 1867, vol. ii. p. 246.

theogony.[1] The mythology of Greece, especially in its earliest known type as given by Hesiod (*Theog.* 116 ff.), is a good illustration of this. In succession we have introduced to us Chaos, Gæa, Tartarus, and Eros; and Chaos brings forth Erebus (primitive darkness) and Nyx (the night), from which sprang Aether (the pure world of light) and Hemera (the light of day); whereas Gæa of herself brings forth Uranos (the starry heaven, seat of the gods) and Pontus (the depth of the sea), and then, with Uranos as her husband, she brings forth the earth-encompassing ocean and the Titans, and next follows a long succession of divine births. Thus out of chaos first the material heaven and earth are developed, and then through these the whole Pantheon is called into being. That view of the world, on the other hand, which represents God as under necessity, because of the very fulness of His being, to send forth out of Himself into separate existence what He can no longer keep within Himself, describes the origin of the world by emanation, not by creation. This theory can arise only out of an utterly unworthy conception of God. It thinks of the compass of the Divine Being as a finite measure, which cannot contain more than a certain content without overflowing or being rent. In contrast to the theory of evolution, which presents to view a series of gradual advancement from lower stages to higher, that of emanation conceives of the process as one from higher to lower, each successive formation inferior to the preceding as further removed from the primal all-perfect source. In the ancient cosmogonies this view was variously represented. On the other hand, we have the origin of the world described as a self-dividing of the deity in the legend of Brahma; and on the other, we have the beginnings of the world accounted for by the shooting forth of a ray of light from the primal source of light and being. Somewhat similar was the strange theory of Nicolas of Cusa (1401–1464), which described God as the maximum, and the world as the finite condensation or contraction of the maximum. All such theories of emanation oscillate between what

[1] See Dillmann, *Genesis*, 6th ed., Leipzig, 1892, pp. 4–10.

we might call an acosmic pantheism, in which no place outside of God is given to the world,—the world is not separate from God, but still within the compass of the divine substance, —and a materialistic pantheism which conceives of the divine source of things as of like substance with that which issues from it.

While both the evolutionist and emanationist theories of the world's beginnings, especially as mediated by the atheistic conceptions of later Stoics and Epicureans, may be regarded as the precursors of the modern doctrine of monism, we have, in contrast to them, from the earliest times, attempts to account for the origin of the world by means of dualistic theories. The defectiveness and evil of the world made it difficult to conceive of it either as an emanation from God or as the result of an evolution from yet worse and lower forms. It seemed to many profoundly religious thinkers impossible to identify the present world in any way with the will and working of the good God. Hence arose that system of religious philosophy which, especially in the hands of the Syrian gnostics, assumed the coeternity of two opposing powers, the good and the evil principles, the latter in some cases identified with the God of the Jews and the originator of the world. This dualism is most perfectly represented in the religious system of the Persians (Zoroastrianism) and in the philosophical system of Manichæism. In Christian theology a thoroughgoing dualistic conception of the world can have no place. There can be no tampering with the fundamental doctrine of the unity of God. Old Testament monotheism has been in no way relaxed by the New Testament development of the idea of the Divine Trinity. On the contrary, the New Testament doctrine affords further ground for resisting all temptation to speak in other than purely monotheistic terms. Alongside of the one true God there cannot be placed a second who is also another God. A Manichæan dualism can have no place, therefore, in Christian theology. Yet in early Christian times—especially in semi-heretical writings as represented in the Clementine literature—there was a

tendency to look with favour on what might be called a theory of subordinate dualism.[1] In one way or another all the variously modified dualistic theories referred the origin of matter to the evil principle, and sought in this way to account for the presence of evil and defect in the world. As to the mode of origination, that might be either by emanation or by creation. But evidently such origination of the world, whether by emanation or by creation from or by some intermediate being, only thrust the difficulty one step back without effecting any solution. The question immediately arises as to the origination of this intermediate being, or series and succession of beings, which ultimately must be derived emanatively or creatively from God.

The Christian doctrine of creation decidedly repudiates the notion that any other thing or any other being can be regarded as eternal save God Himself. The idea of the eternity of matter, therefore, is distinctly antichristian. But it has been discussed by several distinguished theologians with much subtlety, whether we may not correctly speak of an eternal creating on the part of God, and of the timelessness of the beginning of our world.[2] The ordinary hypothesis of a creation in time certainly suggests many questions which are difficult, if not impossible, of solution. Such difficulties can never be overcome so long as we continue to think of eternity as simply indefinitely prolonged time. An indefinitely lengthened period can never be anything more or else than time, so that no continuation of it can ever be regarded as eternal. What essentially characterises eternity is just this, that it has no parts longer or shorter, and is strictly immeasurable. Hence the question often put, What was God doing in the eternity before time? is quite improper, seeing that to eternity no

[1] See an interesting paper by F. W. Bussell in *Studia Biblica et Ecclesiastica*, vol. iv., Oxford, 1896, pp. 133–188, entitled: "The Purpose of the World-Process in the Problem of Evil as explained in the Clementine and Lactantian writings in a System of Subordinate Dualism." Also Hatch, *Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church*, London, 1890, pp. 194–201.

[2] See this whole subject ably and interestingly discussed in Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Edin. 1888, vol. ii. pp. 28–40.

distinction of before or after is applicable. It is wrong to speak of time as a portion of eternity, for time does not break in upon eternity so as to mark off portions of eternity before and after time. Time is purely relative, whereas eternity is out of all relation. Hence, even if we were to accept the theory of the creation of successive worlds,[1] we should not in any way advance toward a solution of the question about God's doings in eternity, but would only secure room for other time periods measured by the succession of phenomena in other worlds than our own. In any case, time is a creation simultaneous with and conditioned by the creation of substances in which there is movement and life. A finite being can act only in time, for his acts are measures of time; but an eternal being acts in eternity, and his acts are eternal acts. It is therefore correct to speak of God's act of creating as an eternal act, and of time as only a part or element in that creation. Hence we do not say that the world was created in time, but that time was created with the world, so that we can have no world without time and no time without the world. So far as philosophy and natural science are concerned, it is impossible to demonstrate the impossibility of an eternal creation, seeing that the act of creation itself cannot be introduced within the categories of time and space. This has been clearly perceived by Thomas Aquinas and other acute and exact thinkers.[2] The first cause of the world is God's free will, and therefore if God had willed to create from eternity He could have done so, for it is impossible to think of a divine power that was not possessed or could not be exercised from eternity. Con-

[1] Origen, *De Principiis*, 1869, vol. i. p. 255.

[2] Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, i. qu. xlvi. art. 2 (Rome, 1886, vol. i. pp. 376 ff.): "Navitas mundi non potest demonstrationem recipere ex parte ipsius mundi. Demonstrationis enim principium est quod quid est. Unumquodque autem secundum rationem suæ speciei abstrahit ab hic, et nunc; propter quod dicitur, quod universalia sunt ubique, et semper. Unde demonstrari non potest, quod homo, aut cœlum, aut lapis non semper fuit." See also, Esser, *Die Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquino über die Möglichkeit einer Anfangslosen Schöpfung*, Münster, 1895.

sequently, it is purely a doctrine of revelation that God did not realise in eternity all the possibilities of His will, but made a beginning of the material world by creating the heavens and the earth.

The further question as to the creation of all things out of nothing is determined by a correct explanation of what is really meant by the term "nothing" as here used. The biblical doctrine assumes that nothing exists independently and outside of the divine will. It is only in late Jewish literature that this doctrine is expressed in so many words (2 Macc. vii. 28). There, in all probability, we have only the *nihil privativum*, not the *nihil pure negativum*. "Nothing" is not to be regarded as any sort of negative substance out of which the world is made. The source of the world is not "nothing," but the will of God. It is not correct to identify, as Erigena does (*De Divisione Naturæ*, iii. 19), this "nothing" with God's own essence. All that is meant is that God's will expresses itself where nothing else is, and that, by the exercise of his will alone, God calls into being that which owes its existence to nothing besides His will.[1] As Martensen (*Christian Dogmatics*, p. 116) says: "The 'nothing' out of which God creates the world are the eternal possibilities of His will, which are the sources of all the actualities of the world." The thoroughly well established axiom of physics, *ex nihilo nihil fit*, like the physical theory of evolution, applies not to the beginning of the world, but to the succession of phenomena in that world.

In a singularly interesting paragraph in his treatise, *De Fide et Symbolo* (§ 2), Augustine deals with the Manichæan doctrine of the eternity of matter, showing that it really implies a denial of the Almightiness of God. He shows how the view that God made the world out of a material that had always existed and had not been created, reduces God to the

[1] Lotze, *Microcosmus*, vol. ii., Edin. 1894, pp. 700–707. Augustine says (*De div. quæstt.* 28): "Qui quæsit, quare voluerit deus mundum facere, causam quæsit voluntatis divinæ. Nihil autem majus voluntate dei. Non ergo ejus causa quærenda."

position of an artificer, such as the smith or the house builder who works on materials set before him. If, on the other hand, it be allowed that God is Almighty, then nothing can exist of which He is not the creator. If He makes something out of something, as man out of clay, then He also made that out of which He makes some new thing. "And if the very heaven and earth, that is, the world and all things that are therein, He had made out of some material, as it is written, *Thou who hast made the world of matter unseen*, or also, *without form*, as certain copies have (*Wisdom*, xi. 17), in no way is it to be believed that that very matter out of which the world was made, although *without form*, although *unseen*, in whatsoever manner it existed, could have existed of itself, as if coeternal and coeval with God. . . . Wherefore most rightly do we believe that God hath made all things out of nothing; because, even although the world has been made out of some material, that very same material hath been made out of nothing; so that, by the most ordered gift of God, there should take place first a capacity of receiving forms, and afterwards all things, whatsoever have been formed, should be formed." And so he argues that there is nothing inconsistent in Scripture when it says God created all things out of nothing, and that the world was made out of matter without form.

The details of the account of creation given in Genesis are of no importance in dogmatics. The biblical theology of the Old Testament may interest itself in these details, but what really concerns the dogmatist is not what the Genesis-narrative has in common with the highest and best cosmogonies of heathenism, but only that by which it is characteristically distinguished from those. In contrast to all pantheistic and dualistic theories of emanation and evolution, the doctrine of the Old Testament revelation asserts emphatically and unequivocally the fact of creation in the strictest sense. Apart altogether from the etymology of the word "bara," there is no doubt that God is represented in the Old Testament as bringing into existence a new thing when He

created the world. He is not a modeller, working up pre-existent matter into some new form, but He is the prime maker of that matter, to which afterwards diversity of form is given by separation and combination. Christian dogmatics has nothing to say about the order of succession in the work of the six days, about the question of the origin of species or the antiquity of man. It is not with the *how*, but only with the *that*, that the dogmatist has to do,—not with the question of how God, the creator, proceeded in the making of the world, but only with the fact that God actually did create.

Almost all the older divines introduce into their dogmatics full details of the process of creation in connection with an elaborate paraphrase or exposition of the biblical narrative. Some went so far as to work into their system extremely doubtful data of chronology. Thus Schotanus (*Catecheses, sive Elementa Theologica*, Franeker, 1653, p. 45): "Creavit Deus mundum ante annos quinquies mille et sexcentos, non ante, ut ostenderet se creaturis non indigere, alioquin prius condidisset, cum semper potuerit, nec serius, quia sic visum ipsi pro sua libertate." Also Marckius (*Christianæ Theologiæ Medulla*, Leyden, 1690, chap. viii. §§ 20, 21): "Quamquam numerus annorum a mundi creatione præcise determinari nequeat, constat tamen, non nisi 4000 annos circiter ad Christum fluxisse. Qui plures longa supputant apud Gentiles, vel fabulantur, vel alios debent olim annos agnoscere minores. Maxime probabile est, mundum esse creatum circa *Æquinoctium Autumnale*; quia hoc fuit principium anni civilis apud Judæos (Ex. xxiii. 16), et Orientales alios, ac fructus tum sunt maturi, imo tempestas insequens pluviis est inconvenientissima, quæ in diluvio coeperunt mense secundo (Gen. vii. 11)." And then he answers objections raised by those who preferred to date the creation from springtime. In almost all the older works an enumeration is given in detail of the operations of each of the six days, accompanied by an attempt to show a regular progression in the order of creation. In later works which follow the example of those earlier treatises, *e.g.* such works as

Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, i. pp. 570–574; Strong, *Systematic Theology*, p. 194, which, though repudiating literalism, adopts a special theory of interpretation; Bohl, *Dogmatik*, p. 130, etc.; even Martensen to some extent. So, too, Grimm, *Institutio*, § 129, has a section entitled, *Genesis narrationes de mundi creatione*. All these are subjects suitable to commentaries on Genesis, or, it may be, to treatises on Old Testament theology, but quite outside of the range of Christian dogmatics. For all that is a matter of faith concerning the creation is "that the worlds have been framed by the word of God, so that which is seen hath not been made out of things which do appear" (Heb. xi. 3).

The biblical and Christian doctrine of creation is in every way worthy of God. Instead of representing God, as some have reproached it with doing, as working upon gross material after the fashion of a human artificer, it is just the one theory that is furthest removed from any such notion. It assigns to God, what is admitted on all hands to be utterly beyond the power of man or any finite being, the prerogative of calling into existence that which before had no sort of being whatsoever. And here the evolutionist must make his choice between the theory of creation and that of the eternity of matter. Evolution presupposes something that evolves, which in the last resort must either be eternal or created. "Creation is the only theory of the *origin* of the universe. Evolution assumes either the creation or the self-existence of the universe. The evolutionist must choose between creation and non-creation. They are opposite. There is no intermediate term. The attempt to introduce one—the Unknowable—can lead to no result; for unless the Unknowable is capable of creating, it can account for the origin of nothing. All attempts to explain even the formation of the universe, either by the evolution of the Unknowable or by evolution out of the Unknowable, must be of a thoroughly delusive character. Only the evolution of what is known can have significance either to the ordinary or to the scientific mind. Nothing can be conceived of as subject to evolution which is not of a finite and composite nature.

Nothing can be evolved out of a finite and composite existence which was not previously involved in it. And what gives to anything its limits and constitution must be more perfect than itself."[1] The evolutionist may carry us back to a substance the smallest and the simplest conceivable, but yet it is a something which requires to be accounted for. The only theory which undertakes to give an adequate and comprehensive account of the origin of absolutely primitive being is the biblical doctrine of creation by the eternal personal God.

The fundamental points in the Christian doctrine of creation are practically these:[2]—God and the world are not to be confused or identified with one another, but are distinct; God and the world are not two independent beings, so that the world apart from God has any power of self-origination, or that, apart from the laws that express His will, any new forms of life in the world can be evolved; and God and the world are not antagonistic, as if evil, the opposite of God, dwelt in matter, but, on the contrary, that on which God's will operates shows no resistance and is plastic in His hands. The Christian doctrine thus repudiates all pantheistic emanationism, every theory of evolution that would dispense with the operation of a living personal God, every form of dualism, and especially every theory tinged with a Manichæan calumniating of material nature.

The end or purpose of creation is the glory of God. And here it should be observed that the evolutionist theory of the development of the created world, just as surely as the older form of the doctrine of creation, involves the idea of purpose. "A speculation which does not see that evolution spells purpose has not made clear to itself the difference between progress and aimless variation. Such speculation rests ultimately on a purely mechanical view of the universe."[3] This

[1] Flint, *Theism*, Baird Lecture for 1876, Edin., 2nd ed., 1878, note xxii. p. 390.

[2] See especially, Schultz, *Old Testament Theology*, vol. ii., Edin. 1892, pp. 188 ff.

[3] Seth, *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, Edin. 1896, p. 58.

purpose to secure glory to God, whether realising itself in acts or processes, is discoverable in the whole course of the life of the world as this works toward the goal intended by the divine wisdom. Everything in creation is very good as tending to the realising of the good will of God. This excludes all fanciful theorisings about the possibility of God having created a better world; but it is essential to remember that this optimism applies not to the world as affected by the sin of man, but only to the world as it came from the hand of God in accordance with His eternal plan. And to this thought the highest and best expression is given in the teaching of the New Testament, that all things have been created unto Christ (Rom. xi. 36; Col. i. 16; Heb. ii. 10), in whom the original excellence of the world is restored.

§ 28. God as Upholder of the World.

Literature.—M'Cosh, *The Method of the Divine Government, Physical and Moral*, Edin. 1850. Harris, *God the Creator and Lord of All*, Edin. 1897, 2 vols., pt. iii. chaps. xiv. and xv.: "God's Government in its Generic Significance," "God's Providential Government: its Universality." Stearns, *Present-Day Theology*, Lond. 1893, pp. 264–281: "The Providence of God." Bruce, *The Providential Order of the World*, Lond. 1897, pp. 78–139: "Non-Moral Deity," "The Worth of Life." Lotze, *Microcosmus*, 4th ed., Edin., ii. 707–713. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, 4th ed., New York, 1893, pp. 202–220. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Edin. 1873, vol. i. pp. 575–616. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Edin. 1888, vol. ii. pp. 44–62. Calvin, *Institutes*, bk. i. chaps. xvi. and xvii., Edin. 1845, vol. i. pp. 230–266. Lipsius, *Lehrbuch der evang.-protest. Dogmatik*, §§ 389–419, Brunsw. 1876, pp. 292–326. Philippi, *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*, Stuttg. 1867, vol. ii. pp. 258–284.

The Christian doctrine of creation is opposed to all deistic separation of God from the world, as well as to all pantheistic confusion of God with the world. Hence in the Christian system the doctrine of creation is immediately followed by the doctrine of providence. God does not forsake His world, nor is He lost in it. What is true of God in regard to the initial act

of creation is also true of Him in regard to His relation to the world during the whole period of its existence. The doctrine of God's continued presence in the world and control over it, His relation to the world in immanence and in transcendence, is the necessary complement of the doctrine of God's creation of the world. The divine *providence* means the divine care for the world in its widest application, and not merely the *præscientia*, as the etymology of the word might imply. It consists in the persistence of creative power. The execution of the divine purpose requires the continued operation of that same power that called into being the world in which that purpose is to be realised. The foreseeing power of God is the presupposition of His unfailing and unceasing care. The doctrine of providence is not a doctrine purely of revelation, like that of the trinity or even that of creation in the strict sense. It was ranked by the older scholastic divines as one of the *articuli mixti*. It was a truth firmly held by all the more spiritual thinkers of antiquity. It was a tenet recognised and with a prominent place assigned to it in the philosophical systems of all the ancient schools that had not avowedly adopted atheistic principles and repudiated all religion. In its most general form, it is a doctrine of religion and not of the Christian religion exclusively. Yet there is much that is distinctive in the Christian doctrine distinguishing it from that of the most advanced teachings of paganism. "The carnal mind," says Calvin (*Instit.* I. xvi. 1), "thinks on some general agency on which the power of motion depends, exercised in preserving and governing the created world, imagines that all things are sufficiently sustained by the energy divinely infused into them at first. But faith must penetrate deeper. After learning that there is a creator, it must forthwith infer that He is also a governor and preserver, and that not by producing a kind of general motion in the machine of the globe as well as in each of its parts, but by a special providence sustaining, cherishing, superintending all the things which He has made, to the very minutest, even to a sparrow." The limitations of the ethnic philosophy of

religion scarcely permitted this perception of anything further than a conception of God's care for the course of the world as a whole. "Magna dii curant; parva negligunt." It was left for Christian theology, on the basis of the teaching of the Old and New Testament, to work out the doctrine of providence in its application to the personal life of the individual man, and more particularly of the redeemed man. God's providence extends to all that He has made, but its operation is determined by the end which He had in view in creation. The providence of God is directed toward the realising of His end in the history of the world and man. Providence therefore specialises in that in which His purpose in creation is realised, that is, in the redemption and spiritual development of man. This is the justification of the theological distinction of a threefold gradation in God's care for creation: *providentia generalis* toward all creatures, *providentia specialis* toward all men, and *providentia specialissima* toward the pious and believing.

The doctrine of providence has been variously placed in the system, according to the point of view from which it was considered and according to the range of contents assigned to it. Some, after the example of Calvin, introduce the discussion on providence only after the doctrine of man and his original condition. Others, after the example of Melanchthon, treat providence in immediate connection with creation. Melanchthon's second *Locus, De Creatione* has for its contents: "Testimonia scripturæ de creatione et conservatione rerum ac gubernatione Dei," and "Demonstrationes ex opificio mundi de Deo." It is much better thus to associate the two doctrines closely together, dealing with the doctrines of predestination and divine grace, which in a sense may be regarded as parts of the doctrine of providence, in connection with the doctrine of redemption.

In God's care of the world there are to be distinguished two modes, that of preservation (*conservatio*) and that of government (*gubernatio*). Some of the great Lutheran divines sought to make a threefold distinction here by recognising co-operation or *concursus* as a third mode co-ordinate with the

other two. This, however, resulted from a misconception of the nature of *concursus*, which is not itself properly a mode of divine providence, but simply characterises the manner in which, as a rule and for the most part, God carries out His works of providence in the preservation and governing of the world. God does not preserve and co-operate, but He preserves by co-operating; He does not govern and co-operate, but He governs by co-operating. It is by the divine *concursus* that the preservation and government of the world is ordinarily carried on. We therefore have the doctrine of providence under two heads: preservation and government, discussing as subordinate to and involved in each the doctrine of the divine *concursus* and the question of second causes.

1. The preservation (*conservatio*), the maintenance, of the created world by the same power which created it is properly regarded as the continued exercise of that power, and as such is rightly described as a *creatio continua*. It is, however, more than that, inasmuch as the creator has now not only organic materials to work upon, but also rational and spiritual beings through whom and by whose agency He can work. Yet the sufficiency as well as the efficiency of the divine power is just as conspicuous here as in creation. Just as God created all things out of nothing, so that, but for God's creative activity, there would have been nothing outside of Himself, His preserving of the creative world is that continued exercise of creative power but for which all things would relapse into nothingness again. It is a property of God, but not of the creature, to have life in Himself. All derived life is ultimately dependent for its continuance on that underived source from which it is derived. Hence all created beings owe their preservation to their creator. Creaturely life has only a relative independence.[1] This being so, the work of God in

[1] Amesius, *Medulla*, I. ix. 17: "Conservatio Dei est necessaria creaturæ, quoniam creatura omnimode pendet a creatore, non tantum quoad *fieri*, sed etiam quoad *esse*, *existere*, *permanere*, et *operari*: ita ut omnis creatura rediret in illud nihilum ex quo facta fuit, si Deus illam non sustentaret, et ipsa cessatio divinæ conservationis, sine ulla alia operatione, redigeret statim quamlibet creaturam in nihilum."

upholding the world is quite as positive as that put forth in creating it. Conservation is not merely a withholding on the part of God from interference with the course of nature, but an active effectuating of His own ends in nature by His own power. The Arminian view of providence, according to which God is said to sustain all in no other sense than this, that He withholds the exercise of His power to destroy created being, without actually putting forth power to secure the continuation and continued life of that which had been created, is vigorously refuted by Owen.[1] It is only the adoption of such a doctrine of conservation that could warrant the acceptance of *concursus* as a distinct mode of the divine providence co-ordinate with conservation and government. But a conservation by the finite forces of the world themselves is no conservation, and we can only think of annihilation and cessation of being where God withheld the active and positive forthputting of His own power.

2. The government of the world of God (*gubernatio*), in the strict sense divine providence, as distinguished from the maintenance of the world (*conservatio*), is the divine efficiency in and over the natural elements in this world, exercised teleologically, so as to secure the accomplishment of the divine purpose. As governor of the world, God directs the efficiency of those natural powers in which He is Himself actively present, so that the aim which He had in creation is realised. It is quite evident that full autonomy cannot be ascribed to finite things, otherwise the unity of the world could not be maintained. If the natural substances which, as a whole, constitute the world had each and severally the power of acting in accordance with some independent principle of its own, the world would not be a universe, it would not be a cosmos, but only a chaos. It is only the creator of the world that can be its governor, and in respect of dignity the government of the world is worthy of him who made it. The recognition of the fact of the divine government, of God's

[1] *A Display of Arminianism*, Works of John Owen, vol. x., Edin. 1852, p. 30.

direct activity in the ordering of the universe, implies the repudiation at once of fatalism, which denies all freedom either to the creator or to the creature, and of casualism, which makes everything the plaything of a blind, unintelligent chance. And thus we are saved from lapsing, on the one hand, into pantheism and necessitarianism, and, on the other, into atheism and unethical licence.

The Protestant scholastic definition of *gubernatio*, as given by Quenstedt, is as follows: "Gubernatio est actus providentiæ divinæ, quo deus omnes et singulas creaturas suas in viribus, actionibus et passionibus suis decenter ordinat ad creatoris gloriam et universi hujus bonum ac piorum inprimis salutem." As conservation has to do mainly with the powers of men and properties of things, government has to do mainly with the actions and passions of men and the movements of other creatures. Like the divine conservation, it is not only general, but also particular, directing all yet regulating each. The older dogmatists distinguish four different modes of the divine government: (1) *permissio*, where God permits the sinful action of rational creatures, putting no obstacle in their way; (2) *impeditio*, where God constrains the action of the creatures; (3) *directio*, where God so moderates the good actions of creatures, and directs evil actions, that His own purposes are fulfilled; (4) *determinatio*, where God puts limits upon the actions and passions of creatures, within which, in respect of time or measure, he restrains them. This government of God does not destroy or weaken human freedom either in doing good or in doing evil. He governs men as a free personality. Therefore God can be the hearer of prayer, not by allowing any exception to the universality of His government of the world, but by making prayer a factor in that government.[1] It would be wrong to speak of one act of the divine government as mediate and of another as immediate. This distinction is only apparent from man's point of view. Every act of the divine govern-

[1] Luthardt, *Compendium der Dogmatik*, 4th ed., Leipz. 1873, § 34, 3. See also Rothe, *Dogmatik*, i. 167 f.

ment is at once mediate and immediate, as is seen in the *concursus.*

In *gubernatio,* as in *conservatio,* we distinguish the ordinary and the extraordinary, the latter under both modes constituting miracle.

The divine *concursus* (*cooperatio,* συγχώρησις) is an essential and fundamental element in the idea of the conservation of the world. Quenstedt,[1] one of the chief advocates of treating this point as a distinct and separate doctrine, gives the definition thus: "*Concursus* est actus providentiæ, quo deus influxu generali in actiones et effectus causarum secundarum, qua tales, se ipso immediate et simul cum eis et juxta indigentiam et exigentiam uniuscujusque suaviter influit." The active properties of created being are conveniently styled *causæ secundæ,* in contrast to the *causa prima.* The Reformed theologians, in their contest with the Lutheran supporters of the doctrine of *concursus,* denied that the so-called second causes were true causes. This, no doubt, is in one sense correct; but there is little danger of those who for convenience use the phrase making the mistake of understanding the word cause as meaning the same in both cases. Absolutely there is but one cause, just as there is but one self-existent and non-originated life. Secondary causes are causes only in the sense in which creaturely lives are lives. This means that these secondary causes cannot operate without the co-operation of the first cause. And hence it is that, in the ordinary course of providence, nothing happens of which it can be said that it has proceeded either from the first cause or from secondary causes operating independently of one another. There is simply an *influxus* of God's omnipresent power upon the actions and effects of second causes, and thus there is a co-operation of God, a *concursus divinus,* in accordance with which one and the same effect is produced at once by God and by the creature. And these two operating principles are not to be conceived of as separate entities standing externally alongside of or opposite to each other.

[1] *Theologia didactico-polemica, sive systema theologiæ* (1685), i. p. 531.

The *influxus physicus* implied in the omnipresence of God in the substance of the world is not something that gives an external impulse to things, but is a divine working in and with the second causes, and this *concursus* is simultaneous; so that there is not one and the same effect resulting from God alone or from the creature alone, nor partly from God and partly from the creature, but at once from God and from the creature, being therefore wholly divine and wholly creaturely. Lipsius admirably illustrates this truth by a most suggestive comparison of the relation of the *causa prima* to the *causæ secundæ* with the relation of the two natures in the Church doctrine of the person of Christ.[1] As in that doctrine we have in the one person a wholly divine nature and a wholly human nature, so we have in the one operation of the divine *concursus* a wholly divine and at the same time a wholly human activity. Reformed theologians, such as Zwingli and Calvin, when they insisted upon regarding finite causes as not true causes, but only as instruments, failed to give its rights to the human side. Their error might be called *doketic*. Second causes, they held, moved only as moved by God, on whom they depend for being as well as for acting. Such a view is practically identical with the philosophical theory of occasionalism, as expounded by the Cartesians, Geulinx, and Malebranche. It arises out of the mistaken notion that because there is creative power in every act of providence, therefore no distinction is to be made between creation and providence. It implies a *creatio continua* in the strict and absolute sense of the term, whereas that is admissible only in so far as the presence and activity of the creature, as contrasted with non-being, are allowed to modify and enlarge the signification of creation. Then, on the other hand, materialists, who regard finite causes as ultimate, refuse to allow place for the interference of any divine power, either deistically limiting the divine action upon matter to the initial act of creation, or atheistically denying

[1] *Lehrbuch der evangelisch-protestantischen Dogmatik* (1876), § 398; see generally, pp. 298–302.

the presence of God in nature at any point in its history. The difficulties involved in the theory of a divine *concursus* are acutely stated by Julius Müller.[1] He thinks that this doctrine, however carefully guarded, unavoidably drifts into the doctrine of occasional causes. His interest naturally is in the actions of free creatures, and he holds that God gives the *power* to desire and decide, but man himself desires and decides on behalf of the good or the evil. Others have preferred to limit the doctrine of the divine *concursus* to the free acts of man, without applying it generally to the relation of God to second causes. It is, however, just in the latter application that the doctrine is of special importance. By means of it we avoid the extremes of reducing the activity of second causes to a mere shadow, and of giving them such an independence and self-sufficient activity as would do away with all real and substantial action on the part of God.

The truths of the divine transcendence and immanence, which are in a false, one-sided manner set forth in deism and pantheism respectively, have their own place assigned them in the Christian doctrine of the divine conservation of the world. The operation of God is at once from without and from within. In the created world God works by means of the laws and natural forces with which, in their creation, the various elements of that world were endowed; and from without He exerts His divine power immediately by bringing about such combinations and coincidences as are required for the attainment of His purpose in creation. The exercise on God's part of power transcendently in the conservation of the world is the condition of the possibility of miracles.

In the notion of divine providence generally as conservation and government, the distinction is made between *providentia ordinaria* and *providentia extraordinaria*. In His *ordinary* providence, God works by second causes in strict accordance with the established laws of nature. In His *extraordinary* providence, He works immediately or without the mediation of final causes, as we have been accustomed to

[1] *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, Edin. 1868, vol. i. pp. 229 ff.

their operation. A miracle is something done without recourse to the ordinary means of production, a result called forth directly by the first cause without the mediation, at least in the usual way, of second causes. The working of a miracle, therefore, is the performing of a work of creation. Hence only God can work a miracle, and we cannot speak of miracles as greater or less. Every miracle is *præter ordinem totius naturæ creatæ*; but we can distinguish kinds, though not degrees, of miracles. We may have a miracle *supra media*, altogether without reference to, or connection with, any final causes whatever; or it may be the result of such causes, but in such a way that something results quite different from what the usual result had been (*contra media*). And again, in miracles *supra media* we may distinguish such as are called forth without anything in the whole natural world to afford any sort of basis for them (*absque mediis*), and such as come into existence exceptionally in another way from that in which they would have appeared in the ordinary course of nature (*præter media*).[1] God works a miracle when He calls other laws and powers into operation than those hitherto ruling in our world, producing effects for which those laws cannot account.

The possibility of miracle, as thus defined, no one who believes in the omnipotence of God can for a moment doubt. No resistance on the part of the creature can prevent the Almighty from exercising His will and power as He pleases. But the objection is raised, on the other hand, that God Himself has ordained the laws of nature for the attaining of certain ends, and that He cannot, without denying Himself and annulling His own arrangement, set aside, supersede, or ignore the operation of these laws.[2] That God has, indeed, by the constitution of the world, given to it a relative independ-

[1] Lipsius, *Lehrbuch der evang.-protest. Dogmatik* (1876), § 402, p. 305. Compare Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, p. i. qu. cv. Gerhard, *Loci Theologici*, loc. vi. chap. viii., ed. Preuss, Berlin, 1864, ii. 28.

[2] See Ebrard, *Christian Apologetics*, Edin. 1886, vol. i. p. 326. Compare also Frank, *System der christl. Wahrheit*, Leipzig, 1894, vol. i. p. 407.

ence, is very evident; but that relative independence is seen to be relative and not absolute by this, that it enjoys uninterrupted exercise only so long as it succeeds in working toward that end to which it has relation. It is only when these natural laws fail in securing advancement toward the end in view, or when some deviation would further the development of the world in that direction, that the miracle is wrought. It may quite unreservedly be affirmed that God works a miracle only when some special impulse is necessary for the furtherance of His kingdom, and that no miracle has ever been wrought for any other purpose than to advance in some direction the redemption of the world, which could not be accomplished by the operation of ordinary laws. The restraint upon God's working of miracles certainly comes only from Himself, from the fact that, as an ethical being, the exercise of His boundless power is determined by its suitability for the attainment of ethical ends. There is uniformity in God's purpose, but we have no right to assume that this is synonymous with the uniformity of nature. Though God may not change His purpose, it would be a rash limitation of His power to say that He cannot purpose a change.[1] God's purpose is the revelation of Himself to man, and to effect this He exercises His power unrestrained by what may be regarded as the order of nature.

Just as evolution may indeed account for everything in the world but the actual beginning of all, but is for that as dependent as all earlier theories of the world have been on the doctrine of creation, so also what are called the invariable laws of nature are intelligible only on the assumption of the enduring supremacy of the Author of these laws, and His enduring capacity for governing the world so as to accomplish His own creative purpose.

[1] See an admirable discussion on this point in Strong, *Manual of Theology*, Edin. 1892, pp. 68–72.

II.—THE DOCTRINE OF MAN AND SIN.

§ 29. Introductory and General.

Literature.—Orr, *The Christian View of God and the World*, Edin. 1892. Laidlaw, *The Bible Doctrine of Man*, 2nd ed., Edin. 1895. Müller, *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, 2nd ed., 2 vols., Edin. 1868. Tyler, *The Whence and Whither of Man: A Brief History of his Origin and Development through Conformity to Environment* (Morse Lectures for 1895), Edin. 1896.

In this division we deal with all the anthropological questions, apart from redemption, in so far as these come within the scope of Christian dogmatics. There are various most important inquiries concerning the origin and development of man's nature, which can be carried out in detail only in biological or psychological treatises. What we are concerned with here is the religious interest. As to the origin and constitution of man, dogmatics has to do with the fact that he is the creation of God, created with certain faculties for the knowledge of God and the realisation of the divine will and purpose. We must here take into account the well assured results of science in so far as these show what the powers are with which God has endowed man, and the results which the exercise of these powers can produce. We must also discover what God's ideal was in His creation of man from the divine revelation in Scripture and in human consciousness; and from human experience, and the record of it in the Bible, we must trace the actual course of man's development in his refusal or failure to realise the divine purpose. There is an undoubted advantage in thus dealing under one head with all that concerns man apart from redemption, inasmuch as his original condition, as one of probation, requires the consecutive discussion of the question of his primitive endowment and of that of the temptation which opens up to him the possibility of moral being. These are awkwardly separated when, as in Dorner's system, the

doctrine of man is treated as a fundamental doctrine, and so separated from the doctrine of sin, which is treated in the first division of the second part or specific Christian doctrine as the doctrine of sin and salvation. When anthropology is dealt with before theology, as in the systems of Hase and Nitzsch, it is impossible, without anticipating the positions of the theology, to enter satisfactorily on any of the deeper questions concerning man's being, and especially the profounder problems of human sin. The doctrine of angels, in so far as this comes within the range of dogmatics, will be discussed, partly in connection with the doctrine of God's care for man, and partly in connection with that of the temptation through which man has to pass.

This division of our dogmatics will therefore cover that which in the older systems was usually divided into the two sections entitled respectively, *De statu integritatis* and *De statu corruptionis.*

§ 30. Man's Place in Nature.

Literature.—Orr, *Christian View of God and the World*, pp. 143–160, 210–217. Reusch, *Nature and the Bible*, Edin. 1886, vol. ii. pp. 121–180. Delitzsch, *Biblical Psychology*, Edin. 1869, pp. 71–77. Laidlaw, *The Bible Doctrine of Man*, pp. 38–46. Calderwood, *Evolution and Man's Place in Nature*, Lond., 2nd ed., 1896. Seth, *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, Edin. 1896. Fiske, *Man's Destiny*, Lond. 1890. Bruce, *The Providential Order of the World*, Lond. 1897, pp. 24–77: "Man's Place in the Universe." Ulrici, *Gott und Mensch*—1. *Leib und Seele*, vol. i., Leipzig, 1874, pp. 120–160. Lotze, *Microcosmus*, Edin. 1894, vol. i. pp. 465–494. Huxley, *Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature*, Lond. 1863. Darwin, *Descent of Man* (1871), Lond. 1885, espec. chap. vi.: "On the Affinities and Genealogy of Man," pp. 146–165.

As a creature man has his place in nature, and at the head of it. In regard to this, science and Scripture are thoroughly agreed. The biblical account of the creation of man represents him as occupying the highest point in the natural order of created beings, as at once the end of creation

and a connecting link between the material world and the spiritual. His connection with the material world is set forth under the representation of his being formed by the Lord God of the dust of the ground, and his connection with the spiritual world under the representation of God breathing into his nostrils the breath of life (Gen. ii. 7). The other account of man's origin (Gen. i. 26–30) represents the material aspect of his being under the dominion conferred on him over the other animals, and especially in the provision according to which man and beast shared between them for food the vegetable products of the earth, while it represents the spiritual side of his nature under the image and likeness of God in which he was created. Yet it should be carefully noted that nowhere in Scripture is there any countenance given to the notion that man is simply the head of a series of animals, the last in a long chain of graduated forms of animal life. In the narrative that comes first in our Genesis, indeed, man's creation is described as the last in the series of divine creative works; but that this is not intended to represent man as simply the last and best of the animals, whose making is reached through successive graduated stages of animal productions from the lowest type of living organism up to the highest, is seen from this, that in the other narrative the creation of man is distinctly put before that of plants and animals. The placing of these two narratives side by side surely implies at least this, that for the writer of our canonical book of Origins the idea of succession in creation had no meaning, and that both representations of man's origin meant the same thing, namely, that man was at once head and first of the temporal creatures of God. In order to express this idea, it is immaterial whether man be represented as created first or last. He is the head of creation, in whom culminates all the highest and best qualities of the creature, and for him all else is made, that over it he may exercise dominion and put into operation those Godlike powers with which he is endowed. In both narratives great prominence is given to the fact, that in the creation of man the Creator

puts Himself into a relationship with the creature, in respect of predetermination and personal contact, into which He does not enter with any of the other animals which He had made.

The use made of the biblical narrative by the church fathers, and especially by the schoolmen and scholastic mystics, is to emphasise the distinctive rank of man among the creatures. Thus we find Erigena (*De Div. Naturæ*, ii. 3, 23; iii. 37; iv. 5, 10) describing man as the microcosmus, greater than the visible universe, not in respect of strength or multitude, but in respect of the unique quality of his rational nature, so that the excellences of all created substances are gathered together into one in him, and he is the centre of all the visible and invisible creation, the two extremes of the spiritual and the corporeal meeting in him. And thus he understands the purpose and teaching of the sacred narrative: "*Proinda post mundi visibilis ornatus narrationem introducitur homo veluti omnium conclusio, ut intelligeretur, quod omnia quæ ante ipsum condita narrantur in ipso universaliter comprehenduntur.*" In this connection the speculations of Hugo St. Victor (1097–1141) are of special interest and importance. Like Erigena, he regards man as the microcosmus, the centre and end of creation, unto whom all the lower stages of creation point. In his *De sacramentis* (lib. i. pars. 1, c. 25) he says: "Man was created on the last day, of the earth and upon the earth, yet not for the earth and for the sake of the earth, but for heaven and for Him who created heaven and earth. He was not created merely for the adornment of the earth, but to be its lord and possessor; therefore the earth could not be the destination of him for whom the earth was made." Toward all the other creatures man occupies the position of head and representative. All the other creatures find their end in man, but man his end in God. Man is therefore at once in the midst of the creatures as the centre of creation, and in the midst between God and the creatures.[1] Such representations of the

[1] For an admirably clear, full, and methodic statement of the doctrine of Erigena and Hugo St. Victor, see Joseph Bach, *Die Dogmengeschichte des Mittelalters*, i., Vienna, 1874, p. 276, and ii., 1875, p. 311f.

position of man with regard to God and the other creatures are strictly in accordance with the spirit of the Scripture narrative. He is at once first and last, as the double narrative in Genesis most suggestively indicates. He is last, not merely as the final term in a progressive series, but as involving and gathering up in himself all that goes before. He is first as being that for which all these exist, and as the presupposition of the whole of the visible and material creation.

While science agrees generally with Scripture in representing man as the head of creation, the tendency of science in recent times has been to give prominence to the idea of successive development, and to give expression to it in such a way as to obscure, if not obliterate, the lines of demarcation by which it was previously customary to distinguish man from beast. Naturalists like Darwin and Huxley have with great patience traced similarities in physical structure and function in beast and man, but they frankly and readily acknowledge that they have not obtained materials for bridging over the gulf that seems to separate man from the most highly organised among the other animals. This has been regarded by many theologians and writers on Christian apologetics as so far satisfactory, that they are willing to adopt the evolutionary method of regarding the relations of man and beast. But this surely is to confound the scientific with the theological and religious, or at least to allow natural science to interfere and to carry its method into a region beyond its own legitimate sphere. The scientist has something to say about the animal in man; but the animal in man is not the man, and it is with the man, not with the animal in man, that religious science and theology have to do.

A vigorous protest against this way of regarding man from the so-called biological standpoint has been made by Lotze. It is often said that man can be known only after an examination has been made of all the lower orders in the series of animals at the top of which man stands, that if we

are to understand man we must first understand the infusorium, the insect and the frog. But the knowledge gained from such studies does not in the least help us to a knowledge of man as the creature of God, and that is the knowledge which alone is of any value to the theologian and student of religious truth. "Knowledge of man means, above all, knowledge of his destiny, of the means given to him wherewith to fulfil it, and of the hindrances which he has to encounter; if beyond this there is a certain interest in comparing him and his life with the creatures that around him go their own ways, this is an inquiry of too trifling value and influence to be made the foundation of the other and more important one." [1]

Scientists of all schools are at one in pointing out many striking differences between man and beast in respect of physical structure which would seem to be fundamental. The smallest cranium belonging to a man, not an idiot, is said to measure 63 cubic inches, that of the most fully developed of the so-called anthropoid apes, $34\frac{1}{2}$; no human brain of a healthy adult has been found to weigh less than 31 ounces, while no gorilla's brain has been found weighing more than 20 ounces. Man is also physically distinguished from these manlike apes by the upright position, and by the possession of true hands and feet. Yet if man had only this physical structure of a living sentient body, it might be possible to regard him as a species of the animal kingdom mediated, in respect of extant species from which he is so far separated, by a series of species now extinct, which had, by their successive gradations, bridged over the gulf. But any plausibility which such a hypothesis might otherwise have had is taken away when we remember that this living sentient body is not man, and that we have formed no adequate conception of man until we recognise him as a self-conscious personality whose bodily organism cannot be discussed or described apart from the spiritual element which belongs to his being. "No fact in nature is fraught with

[1] Lotze, *Microcosmus*, vol. i. p. 467.

deeper meaning than this two-sided fact of the extreme physical similarity and enormous psychical divergence between man and the group of animals to which he traces his pedigree." [1]

Some theologians have too readily consented to leave to students of psychology and natural science the sole and undisputed right to deal with certain questions which emerge in the consideration of man's nature and history, forgetful of the importance of the answers to those questions in determining vital points in later soteriological doctrines. To this class of questions, supposed to be devoid of any religious and dogmatic interest, Nitzsch,[2] for example, relegates the following: whether there may have been on earth pre-Adamite races of men; whether all rational creatures are spirits provided with bodies, or whether some may be purely spiritual; whether the theory of the pre-existence of souls or that of creationism, or that of traducianism be correct; whether all men are descended from a single pair, the difference of races arising from subsequent development, or whether originally more than one pair had been created, making diversity of races an original difference. Yet these are all questions in which dogmatics has as much interest as natural science and psychology. They all have a religious and dogmatic interest, so that the dogmatist cannot ignore them.

The question of the unity of the human race is of importance in dogmatics.[3] It is not enough to say that all men are similarly organised. It is impossible to avoid making the acknowledgment, that Scripture insists upon the fact of the descent of mankind from a single pair as an

[1] Fiske, *Man's Destiny*, Lond. 1890, p. 29.

[2] *Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik*, Freiburg, 1892, p. 279. As a matter of fact, Nitzsch himself proceeds to state and criticise the Darwinian theory, and to discuss those other psychological questions which he had ruled out of the range of dogmatics.

[3] See a very full and satisfactory examination of the objections against and arguments in favour of the Unity of Mankind in Reusch, *Nature and the Bible*, vol. i. pp. 181–245.

essential presupposition of the Christian doctrine of sin and salvation (Rom. v. 12, 19; 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22), and as the ground for the enforcement of the universal brotherhood of man (Acts xvii. 26). The New Testament doctrine affords the principle for the interpretation of the Old Testament history. Scripture certainly regards *all men* as descended from Adam, and any theory of pre-Adamite man must be described as distinctly antiscriptural. This doctrine of the unity of the human race is also most agreeable to the most recent and most careful researches in ethnology, philology, psychology, and human physiology. Nothing seems to be gained by the acceptance of the unproved hypothesis of several separate and independent centres of origin for the races of man. The variation among races, whether in regard to bodily structure or in regard to intellectual development, are never such as to lend any help to the arguments of those who would see in that variation a continued series in the regular progression of the animal species.

§ 31. The Constitution of Man's Nature.

Literature.—Laidlaw, *The Bible Doctrine of Man*, 2nd ed., pp. 49–108. Beck, *Outlines of Biblical Psychology*, Edin. 1877. Olshausen, *Opuscula theologica*, Berl. 1834, pp. 145–163: "De naturæ humanæ trichotomia N.T. scriptoribus accepta." Heard, *Tripartite Nature of Man*, 3rd ed., Edin. 1870, espec. chap. vii.: "The Unity under Diversity of the Three Parts of Man's Nature," pp. 116–136. Dickson, *St. Paul's Use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit*, Glasgow, 1883, pp. 175 ff. Wendt. *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist im biblischen Sprachgebrauch*, Gotha, 1878. Delitzsch, *Biblical Psychology*, Edin. 1869, pp. 103–142. Krumm, *De Notionibus psychologicis Paulinis*, Gissæ, 1858. Hatch, *Essays in Biblical Greek*, Oxford, 1889, Essay III., pp. 94–130: "On Psychological Terms in Biblical Greek."

In the language of Scripture, and in that of common life, man's nature is described as consisting of body and soul, this latter term being in both cases used to indicate alike the seat of animal life and sensation, and that of the higher

intellectual and moral life of the spirit. At the same time three different terms, body, soul, and spirit, are in common use, and in two passages (1 Thess. v. 23; Heb. iv. 13) they appear together as a description of the constitution of the whole man. Hence has arisen quite a considerable controversy as to whether the constituent elements of human nature should be represented as dichotomic or trichotomic. A careful reading of Scripture would seem to favour the idea of a twofold division of man's nature as material and immaterial, the terms soul and spirit (*ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα*) being often used interchangeably, and the phrases body and soul, flesh and spirit being used to distinguish the whole man. Those who maintain an out-and-out tripartite theory may be compared to those who, in their endeavour to state strongly the doctrine of the Trinity, drift into a tritheistic heresy. Many supporters of the trichotomic doctrine seem to regard the third part in the division, the *πνεῦμα*, as a *superadditum*, so that with *σῶμα* and *ψυχή* the man would be still a man, though only physical and mortal. Not a few, however, of those who are usually classed among the trichotomists are really dichotomists, who emphasise the subdivision of the immaterial part of man as psychical and pneumatical. If place is given to such distinctions in the classification, then other terms, *e.g.* heart, mind, will, etc., might also require to be taken into account. In the Old Testament, in the LXX, and in the New Testament, it will be found that all such terms are used, not in their strictly scientific meaning, but rather in a loose general way as in popular speech. Generally speaking, soul, *ψυχή*, may be said to be the wider term, used for the higher (Mark viii. 36 f.) as well as for the lower element in the immaterial part of man. In the early Church the trichotomist view prevailed among the Eastern fathers until a wrong use of it was made in support of the Apollinarian heresy, whereas the dichotomic view prevailed almost exclusively among the fathers of the West. Luther and all the older teachers of the Lutheran Church are pronounced

dichotomists. Many modern theologians use the language of trichotomists, but almost without exception they recognise only two main elements in human nature, and regard soul and spirit, when used with precision, as terms indicating respectively the lower and the higher aspects of the one immaterial part of man which stands over against the body as the material part.

It should be carefully observed that even when we speak of a dichotomy we do not in any way overlook the essential and fundamental unity of human nature. Though we rightly distinguish body, soul, and spirit, yet we cannot conceive of any one of these three as existing apart from the others. The body, as an organism, is a living body, and this life, all essential to its idea, is the result of the indwelling of the soul; while the soul, as the principle of life, cannot be conceived of apart from that organism to which it imparts life; and the spirit, as the higher subtler form of the soul, is pervasive of the whole man. They must be regarded, therefore, not so much as constituent parts, but rather as the manifold aspects of the one human nature. The union of soul and body which makes man is not external and extensive, but internal and intensive, so that no one can say where body begins and soul ends, or where soul begins and body ends.

Yet this one nature of man has an aspect turned toward that which is beneath and around,—even this, however, is not body without soul, but rather the living body, and an aspect toward that which is above,—which, however, is not spirit alone, but spirit as the higher direction of that principle which gives life to the body. The essential part of man which brings about this unity is soul—ψυχή, the innermost principle of life in man.[1] It is the possession of this ψυχή that imparts to man his special personal life, and gives a distinctive character to his nature. The body, again, is the property of the soul, itself belonging to external nature, and so on its material side outside of us, but

[1] See Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik*, p. 283.

brought into closest relation to us by sharing in the life of the soul.[1] The soul has obtained such control over the body that bodily sensations are immediately communicated to the soul, and at the bidding of the soul the body is made to give immediate expression to its feelings. In the language of the old scholastic theology the body is the *forma formata*, the soul is the *forma formans corporis*. The body is the connecting link between man and nature, and the fact of its belonging to the being of man constitutes him a natural being. As such, the body is at once for man a limit and a means of development. "Through the body, no doubt, the spirit is essentially modified, as limited and receptive, nay accessible to suffering; but through conquest of the body in its limiting capacity, through its permeation by soul, and through the encompassing of the surrounding world by the very means of the bodily senses, the spirit is able to give its eternal essence tangible evidence of an inner illimitableness won by its own effort. In the body the spirit finds, so to speak, its fulcrum, by the aid of which it is able to set itself free for its own life. The process of this self-emancipation is its history."[2]

As to the origin of souls, three different theories have been put forward, those of pre-existence, creationism, and traducianism.

(1) The Theory of the Pre-Existence of Souls.—In order to explain man's present condition, it has been assumed by some thoughtful speculative thinkers that the souls of men had existence in a previous state, and that certain circumstances which occurred in that earlier state of being must account for the condition in which they now are found. The

[1] Too often the body is spoken of as if it could be considered quite apart from soul and spirit. "We have never looked on the body," says Lotze (*Microcosmos*, i. p. 314), "as more than the most intimate piece of the outer world, given by a higher power to be more truly our own property than anything external can ever be made by our own labour." Such a statement is consistent only with a mechanical theory of the relation of the parts or elements of man's being to one another.

[2] Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, ii. p. 70.

most interesting exponents of this theory are Origen, John Scotus Erigena, and Julius Müller. Each of these great thinkers presents his hypothesis in his own peculiar way, each starting from his own peculiar standpoint.—Origen (*De Principiis*, ii. 1, 1), in view of the grossness of the material world, the inequality and multiformity of created beings, and generally all the confusions and irregularities, physical as well as moral, of the present state of things, regards the creation of the world, and of man as a denizen of it, as subsequent to a state of being, or it may be a successive series of such states, in which men performed acts freely which determined their condition in this world. "Our existence in this world is the judgment passed upon our existence in an earlier state."[1] Differences among men correspond to the different measures and degrees in which their souls had respectively fallen in their primitive or ante-temporal state.—Scotus Erigena, about the middle of the ninth century, in his *De Divisione Naturæ* (espec. iv. 3–16, v. 31–38), represents Adam as not a historical individual, but rather as the idea of man in his pre-existent state, regards man's temporal history as beginning with sin, which had made its entrance in the ante-temporal state. So far as this world and man in it are concerned, sin is an original and primitive element. The animal and mortal body in which man's soul is now confined is the punishment of sin committed in that pre-existent state in which man possessed only a spiritual body, without distinction of sex.[2] —Julius Müller,[3] despairing of any reconciliation of the doctrines of the universality of sin and individual guilt

[1] Pressensé, *Early Years of Christianity*, Lond. 1879, iii. 315. For an acute criticism of Origen's standpoint see Müller, *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, Edin. 1868, vol. ii. 77, 158. The best English exposition of the theory is that of Henry More, *Immortality of the Soul*, Lond. 1659, chap. xii.

[2] An excellent statement of the doctrine of Scotus is given by Christlieb in Herzog,[2] xiii. 799. For fuller details see Christlieb, *Leben und Lehren des Joh. Scotus Erigena*, Gotha, 1860. The theory of Scotus is criticised by Jul. Müller, *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, ii. 77, note.

[3] *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, vol. ii. pp. 357–401.

resulting from this by means of the Augustinian or any other exposition of doctrine, has recourse to this theory of the pre-existence of souls. He lays an elaborate foundation for this in his theory of transcendental freedom.[1] In all men there is inborn sinfulness manifesting itself from the dawn of moral consciousness in actual sin, which yet is not a necessary element in human development. Then we have also to confess that each individual is guilty and responsible for his sin, as he cannot be except on the presupposition of a self-determining act by which he becomes author of his own sin. "Thus we are driven to the idea of a sinfulness lying beyond our individual existence in time, a sinfulness which either directly or in its consequences involves guilt, and therefore must have its origin in our personal self-decision. It affects our conduct, our entire development, from the very beginning, and yet it can only have its origin in our own act" (ii. 358). —There is no doubt something very fascinating about these theories, so attractively set forth by men of such high religious character and woven into a more or less consistent system of mystical speculation. But there are two fatal objections to this doctrine of pre-existence of souls. On the one hand, there is no foundation for it. It is *ex hypothesi* transcendental, beyond the range of human experience, and it has not the very least support in Scripture. Then, on the other hand, it really removes no difficulty. It simply pushes back the mystery without solving it; so that, if this ante-temporal existence of souls could be proved, we would just have to meet and deal with there the difficulties that are regarded as insoluble here.

(2) THE THEORY OF CREATIONISM. — According to the

[1] *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, ii. 67–75: "If the moral condition in which we find man, apart from redemption, depends upon himself, and is the result of his own self-determining, if the testimony of conscience, which imputes to us our transgressions, and the witness of religion that God is not the author of sin, but hates it, be true, human freedom must have its beginning in a sphere beyond the range of time, wherein alone pure and unconditioned self-determination is possible. In this region must we seek that power of original choice which precedes and conditions all sinful decision in time."

theory of creationism, each individual soul sent into a human body is to be regarded as an immediate creation of God, owing its origin to His direct creative act. It assumes that every individual soul thus comes from God with that initial purity which belonged to the soul of Adam. This renders the explanation of inherited guilt and natural inborn sinfulness absolutely impossible. It seems also to take away all foundation for the doctrine of the solidarity of mankind. Scripture gives it apparent support in such passages as Ps. cxxxix. 14–16; Jer. i. 5, which represent men as new creations, wrought each separately by God. Yet this may be nothing more than an emphasising of the truth that each individual owes his being to God, who watches over and controls the beginning, as well as the course and end, of his life. This creationist theory was held by a large number of the church fathers and by many of the schoolmen. It is the recognised orthodox doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church, and has been held by most of the older Reformed theologians. It commended itself to Augustine, who vacillated between this view and that of traducianism, because it gave prominence to the idea of the dependence of each individual being upon God.

(3) The Theory of Traducianism.—According to the theory of traducianism, souls are propagated along with the bodies by generation, and transmitted to the children by the parents. As this seemed to afford a ready support for the doctrine of original or inborn sinfulness, it was eagerly championed by Tertullian. In his *De Anima*, written about 208 A.D., building probably on the basis of his earlier Stoic learning, he seeks to show that the souls of all men are derived from one original, the soul of Adam. "The soul, sown in the womb at the same time as the body, received along with it its sex; its growth and development were not an enlargement of substance but of powers, and it reached maturity (*pubertatem*) at the same time and after the same manner as the flesh. The *alimenta* of the soul were immortality, rationality, sensibility, intellectuality, and free will.

Souls, though thus endowed at birth, were attacked and depraved by the evil spirit."[1] Luther and most of the earlier Lutherans, as well as Delitzsch and Philippi in later times, favour this theory as affording apparent support to the church doctrine of original sin. The fault of the theory is, that it makes the individual dependent for his condition upon the whole preceding development of the species, and the conception of the individual is of necessity purely naturalistic. It is supported by such Scripture passages as Ps. li. 5. But if this view were not qualified by a right notion of man's individuality and personal distinctness, we would not rise above the standpoint of Deism. It is better not to decide between the creationist and traducianist theories, but rather to acknowledge that there is an element of truth in both. "The truth to which traducianism may lay claim consists in this: that every human individual is a product of the natural activity of the species, just as this is determined by the peculiarities of the race, the family, and the parents. But the truth of creationism lies in this: that the universal natural activity, by means of which the species propagates itself, and new souls are formed, that this mysterious natural activity constitutes the instrument and means for the individualising activity of the Creator, that each single human being therefore is a new manifestation of the divine will, which thus prepares for itself a peculiar form of its own image. Each of these views is only true when it affirms its own antithesis."[2] In opposition to a one-sided creationism, we must acknowledge that the individual is largely determined by the conduct and experience of his ancestors, and more particularly the fact of such a continuity of species in all human souls as will account for the transmission of inherited qualities; and in opposition to a one-sided traducianism, we must recognise in the individual the appearance of a new

[1] J. M. Fuller in Smith's *Dict. of Chr. Biog.* iv. 852.

[2] Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, Edin. 1866, p. 141. The need of combining elements of truth from both theories is well and popularly expressed by Canon Mason in *The Faith of the Gospel*, Lond. 1888, p. 98 ff.

centre of moral power, a new efficient force issuing from a new creation, and so leave room for the immediate operation of God in the origination of the individual soul, upon which that individual's responsibility to God must rest.

We are dealing here with man as a natural being, and with the purely natural aspect of the life and being of the soul. And just at this point the very important question emerges, as to whether the being whose nature consists of body and soul has in him as a natural being any promise and potence of immortality.[1] The question is that of the natural immortality of the soul which gives life to the body. The general principle laid down by Lotze[2] is no doubt quite correct, that only that will last for ever which from its excellence and special qualities must be a permanent part of the order of the universe, and that all else must perish. It is also here that our human limited judgment cannot determine what mental development does and what does not win immortality by possessing this eternal significance, whether all mere animal souls are perishable and all human souls imperishable. What may be called the teleological argument in favour of man's natural immortality does not seem to carry us any further. For though man's natural capacities of sense and intelligence are evidently capable of a far higher development than they reach in this life, the same may be said of the sensible and perceptive powers of the animals. Viewed merely as a natural being, that is, apart from any consideration of a special destination by God to a spiritual life in fellowship with Himself, it does not seem that man can be regarded as necessarily immortal, or that his life must be defined as of necessity indestructible.[3] Quasi-philosophical

[1] The doctrine of the continuance of man's life after death will be discussed in its proper place in eschatology, and is quite another question than that referred to here.

[2] *Microcosmus*, i. 389 f.

[3] See, on the other hand, a full and careful statement of rational argument in favour of man's immortality in Orr, *Christian View of God and the World*, pp. 177–189. Also Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, § 42, vol. ii. pp. 84–88.

arguments from the assumed simplicity of the soul, the immateriality of the principle of life in man, which therefore does not admit of dissolution and separation of parts in death, can only demonstrate the folly of attempting on purely rational grounds to reach a dogmatic conclusion on either side.

§ 32. Man's Original Condition.

Literature.—Rüetschi, *Geschichte und Kritik der kirchlichen Lehre von der ursprünglichen Vollkommenheit und vom Sündenfall*, Leyden, 1881, espec. pp. 148 f., 192–234. Zöckler, *Die Lehre von Urstand des Menschen geschichtlich und dogmatisch-apologetisch untersucht*, Gütersloh, 1879. Laidlaw, *Bible Doctrine of Man*, chaps. vii.–ix. pp. 141–195. Delitzsch, *Biblical Psychology*, pp. 78–87. Schultz, *Old Testament Theology*, Edin. 1892, vol. ii. pp. 254–263. Orr, *The Christian View of God and the World*, Lect. IV., pp. 141–189. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, §§ 40, 41, vol. ii. pp. 72–84. Rothe, *Dogmatik*, Tüb. 1870, i. 251–254. Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, i. 307–317, 332–335. Kähler, *Die Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre*, Leipzig, 1893, §§ 295–308, pp. 259–269.

From viewing man as a natural being we now pass on to consider him as a spiritual being. Man is not only part of creation, possessing parts and faculties in common with other creatures of that world within which he stands, though indeed at its head, he also stands within the spiritual world by reason of his own higher endowments and the relationship in which he stands to God, made possible by his possession of these. In this section we have to inquire into the nature of those higher endowments of man, and then into the nature of that relationship which he, alone of the creatures of this world, is permitted and required to hold toward God.

The description of the powers and place assigned to the first man given in the Old Testament is summed up in that image and likeness of God which carries with it dominion over the creatures. The image and the dominion are evidently not to be identified with one another, for the dominion results from the possession of the image. Though

etymology does not encourage the attempt made by some older theologians to mark a regular and sharp distinction between the *image* (צֶלֶם, *εἰκών*, *imago*) and the *likeness* (דְּמוּת, *ὁμοίωμα*, *similitudo*), we may yet make use of the words to point out different aspects or sides of the one spiritual endowment: the one indicating the possession of self-consciousness and personality as the ground of all the distinctively human qualities of reason, intellect, and will; the other indicating those moral and religious aims and aspirations which are set before man as the ideal, the attainment of which would bring about a real and perfect likeness to God. This distinction was made by the early Alexandrine theologians, and, as thus distinguished, the image and the likeness were designated respectively by the older Protestant divines as *imago improprie s. generaliter dicta* and *imago proprie s. specialiter dicta*. The divine image, thus comprehensively understood, involved at once a dignity which man actually possessed and an ideal set before him for his realisation.

What man at first possessed, really and not potentially only, was his personality. Man alone of all created beings in this world possessed this quality in common with God. The Divine Personality, as we have seen, is not a limiting conception or anthropomorphic representation superinduced upon the true spiritual idea of God. The true idea of personality is the personality of God, and man's personality is but the image of the Divine Personality. And just here it may be helpful to the right understanding of the nature of the divine image in man to remember that the Eternal Word of God is also represented as the bearer of the image of God. He is "the image of the invisible God" (*εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου*, Col. i. 15; cf. 2 Cor. iv. 4), and is expressly described as being "the very image of God's person" (*χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ*, Heb. i. 3). Redeemed men are said to be transformed into the image of the Son (Rom. viii. 29), that is, restored to the image of God, which has been retained and is now represented only by the Son. That, therefore,

which Christ has and which man wants represents those elements in the divine image which man has lost in the Fall. The Word made flesh retained in His being all that was essential to the perfect image of God; and while He was purging our sins, as well as when afterwards He sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high, He was the very image of God's person. What He and men generally had in common was the possession of a true human personality. But in the Son we have the moral and spiritual likeness to God, which in the first man were ideals to be realised, fully and from eternity realised. As the image of God, therefore, the Son is more than the first man was, the Second Adam is superior to the first, inasmuch as He possesses in reality what man in the beginning had only in potentiality.

Great confusion has resulted from the attempt made both in Roman Catholic and in Protestant theology to distinguish what in the image of God in man is inalienable and what has been lost by sin. If we hold by the distinction of aspects or elements in the idea of the image which has been referred to and explained above, we shall see that the question as to what can be lost and what cannot be lost is unsuitable and inappropriate. It is said of man as man, and not of man as unfallen or fallen, that he is created in the image of God. If that image were lost, he would cease to be man, and, wanting personality and self-consciousness, he would sink to the level of the mere animal. The Protestant theology, which rightly recognises the fact that conformity to God, the *justitia originalis*, belongs to the essential nature of man, would have escaped much confusion and many needless and unconvincing doctrinal refinements if it had not encumbered itself with the idea that it must define sin as the loss of the image, or of something belonging to the image.

The germs of the Roman Catholic doctrine of the divine image appear in Augustine, who, referring to the Pauline saying regarding the new man which is renewed in the image of him that created him, says that this image, which we receive back again by grace, was lost by Adam when he

sinned. In his *Retractations* (ii. 24) he is indeed careful to explain that this is not to be understood as implying that nothing of the image remains, but only that it was so deformed that it required to be reformed. What was lost, and what precisely was meant by saying that it was lost, were subjects which the scholastic theology discussed in great detail and with great subtlety. The idea which ultimately found acceptance in Roman Catholic theology represents man as created by God *in puris naturalibus*, possessed of a rational nature by which he could do good or evil, receiving at the same time the image of God as a supernatural gift of grace, a *donum superadditum*. This supposititious *status purorum naturalium* consisted in a condition of war between the corporeal and the spiritual, for only after the extraordinary gift of the divine image was received could spirit have the ascendency. This divine image, not a part of human nature, but something added, which could therefore be withdrawn without infringing upon the completeness of man's natural being, included original righteousness and bodily immortality, that is, all spiritual movement toward likeness to God, and the possibility of continued existence.

Such a view of the original nature of man does not rise above that of mere naturalism, and can imply nothing more than a mere deistical relation of man to God. Man as man, leaving out of sight any additional, non-essential endowment, is nothing more, according to the Roman Catholic doctrine, than he is according to the bald Socinian doctrine, a being capable of and exercising dominion over the other creatures. This Roman Catholic doctrine is rightly objected to as denying to man as man any religious faculty, and as affirming that man, according to his nature, cannot rise above mere naturalness to religious and moral fellowship with God. The Protestant theology does justice to the dignity of man by representing him in respect of his true nature as rising above nature and aspiring after the divine fellowship. The supernaturalism of Roman Catholicism is of a purely external character. In Protestantism, especially as represented by the

Reformed theology, we have the true supernaturalism, original righteousness being described as a *donum naturale*, belonging to the very nature of the first man, only the restoration of these qualities, blemished and blighted by sin, being regarded as supernatural.[1] Yet, though essential to the nature of man, forming a constituent part of that nature, this *original righteousness* was regarded by the Lutheran theology as mutable and capable of being lost; because, on the one hand, it could be realised even by the first man only through the divine grace, and, on the other hand, it lay with man in the exercise of his free will (*liberum arbitrium*) to decide whether or not he would use that grace. The Reformed theology sought to distinguish in the image the potential, which was inalienable, and the actual, which could be lost, and indeed was lost, by sin, maintaining that the actual image of God was realised only by means of the gift of the grace of perseverance. Biedermann[2] seeks to reproduce what is true in this old Protestant distinction of potential and actual, as well as in the Roman Catholic distinction between *image* and *likeness*, by distinguishing in the image two moments, the formal and the material, the substantial sameness of the finite and the absolute spirit, and the destination of the spiritual principle in man's soul to become spirit. He insists upon the combination of these two moments—the actual and the potential (to use the old Protestant terminology)—inasmuch as attention to the *formal* moment exclusively gives a purely deistic view of a certain divine resemblance, while exclusive attention to the *material* moment gives a pantheistic view of the substantial divinity of man.

The earliest condition of the human race, represented in Scripture as the paradisiacal life of the first human pair, is rightly designated the *status integritatis*. The narrative of Genesis, in common with the higher mythologies of classical heathenism, represents the beginnings of the history of our

[1] Compare Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik*, vol. ii., Berlin, 1885, pp. 287–294.

[2] *Christliche Dogmatik*, ii. 564–566.

race as the Golden Age, during which man lived in beautiful harmony with the rest of the natural world, in peaceful, undisturbed relationship with God. It is pictured as a state of innocence rather than of holiness. There had been as yet no test applied to see whether, in the exercise of the power of free self-determination, man would choose the good. As yet man had no knowledge of good and evil, had had no opportunity of distinguishing between them, because the evil, and therefore also the morally good, had not been before him. The New Testament writers, especially Paul, give dogmatic expression to what the Old Testament had put in allegorical form. The Pauline doctrine of the present sinful condition of man presupposes a primitive condition of the race, which was one of natural or non-moral innocence, and not one of perfect or confirmed holiness.

In regard to the condition of the first man in his unfallen state, considerable exaggeration has prevailed in Protestant as well as in Roman Catholic theology.[1] All such exaggerations are distinctly unscriptural. Neither in the Old Testament nor in the New have we any statement which implies even a hint of physical, intellectual, or spiritual perfection in the person of the first man. The expression of divine satisfaction with man, just as in the case of similar approval of the other parts of His creation, involves no more than this, that He found His creature corresponding to His purpose in creating him. The language of the New Testament regarding the Second Adam has quite commonly been applied to the first. But it is evidently altogether wrong to assume that the first man who was of the earth earthy is, in endowment and in attainment to the likeness of God, equal to the second man, who is the Lord from heaven. The assumption of high attainment, as distinguished from high destination, in reference to the first man unfallen would make

[1] This appears especially Lutheran, even in recent stricter Lutheran theology, and is only too common in popular rhetorical religious writers. South's absurd outburst is well known: "Man came into the world a philosopher. . . . Aristotle was but the rubbish of an Adam."

the Fall, if not impossible, at least inconceivable. Yet we do not picture man as placed originally in a position of equilibrium between the good and the evil. For though his actual endowment of personality, including self-consciousness and self-determination, would not carry him beyond a position of equilibrium, the destination given him to realise, the very fact that attainment unto likeness to God was set before him as the goal of his spiritual development, already imparted an inclination toward the right. The chief difficulty undoubtedly lies here, that when we speak of *original righteousness* we seem to assume a full moral life before the elements necessary to constitute such a life are present. This difficulty disappears if we consider that man unfallen had only good before him. The life that preceded temptation, though not moral in the full sense, was yet one of fellowship with the good, that is, God. The direction of such a life Godward, however, is not the same as that of the tried saint, who has rejected and repelled all attempts to draw him away into disobedience and rebellion, but rather that of the simple child, who clings to his father before any rival claimant upon his affections has appeared.

In the opposite direction from that in which the exaggerations of the church doctrine have arisen, other exaggerations of no less extravagant a character have appeared. Ethnologists and writers on the history of religions have not only objected to the extreme positions of those who regard the primitive state of man as one of physical and moral perfection, but have gone to the opposite extreme of maintaining that that primitive state was one of rude savagery of the very lowest type, and that the earliest religion of man was that of peoples of the lowest intelligence in whom there was only the faintest glimmering of a moral sense. This view has been clearly and concisely stated by Professor Menzies: "The theory that man was originally civilised and humane, and that it was by a fall, by a degeneration from that earliest condition, that the state of savagery made its appearance, is now generally abandoned.

. . . There remain to this day races who are judged to be still in the primitive condition. . . . A multitude of savage tribes remain in all quarters of the globe who do not appear to have been thus [*e.g.* by degeneration] enfeebled, and who are held to be still in that state in which the dwellers in all parts of the earth were before civilisation began. . . . From these races, then, we may learn what the ancestors of all the civilised nations were."[1] It is certainly true that the trend of modern scientific theorising has been toward the introduction of the evolutionary hypothesis in all departments of thought and investigation, and to give prominence to the question of development rather than to that of origin. But the opening words of the quotation given above seem to discover to us the fallacy which underlies such speculations of ethnologists and popular writers on natural science. When the view of Christian theology, as based on Scripture, in regard to the original state of man as created by God, is described as that of a condition "civilised and humane," it is evident that those doing so wish to fasten upon Christian theology the most exaggerated estimate of that primitive state, and so to render the task of accounting for a fall as difficult as possible. If by "civilised and humane" it is intended only to characterise a condition that is not savage and wild, the biblical and Christian doctrine would be quite fairly stated, but if, as seems more likely, it is meant to describe a state of high culture and refinement, then the theologian may justly object to such an account of man's original condition as no fair representation of his view. Much of the plausibility of the writings of ethnologists and evolutionists generally depends upon the assumption that the alternative lies between the hypothesis of an original condition of highest intellectual, moral, and social perfection, followed by a fall in which all this was lost, and that of one of simple, artless, helpless savagery out of which man rose gradually in slow stages through long cycles of inward and outward development. But thus put the case is not

[1] Menzies, *History of Religion*, London, 1895, p. 17.

fairly put. The alternative is really between a primitive condition of simple, undeveloped, childlike innocence, neither civilised nor savage, in which the first human pair occupied a critical position, capable of being and requiring to be determined toward good or evil, in the direction of a development toward civilisation or toward savagery. Those who have "abandoned" the theory of a fall and degeneration from a primitive condition of innocence make very confident appeals to history, and to investigations made by travellers more or less scientific, with reference to the traditions and customs of peoples regarded as in a state of nature. But traditions among savages or semi-civilised peoples regarding a very remote antiquity can carry no weight, and the genealogy of customs is a somewhat precarious product of the imagination exercised on materials afforded by traditionary lore and garrulous gossip. At most it will not carry us back more than a thousand years. But what we want to reach is a period preceding the rise of the most ancient of all the historical civilisations of the most remote antiquity. It is surely quite illogical to conclude, even from the most immense collection of savage customs and traditions, and from relics of prehistoric arts and industries, as to what, not merely the very ancient, but the absolutely primitive state of man must have been. There is here a dogmatism much less excusable than that of the narrowest theologian of the old school. Ethnology and various departments of natural science may teach us much about later developments in the history of men, but they have nothing but guesses, and therefore nothing at all, to give us with respect to the beginnings and earliest movements of the race. These sciences cannot even say *when* in the history of man these discoveries begin, they cannot tell how long men had already existed, and in what condition before the earliest fact occurred of which they have been able to take note. They know nothing about the beginning, and so can say nothing either for or against the theory of a fall.

The likeness of God is properly regarded as the true

destination of man, the ideal held out before him from the first for his ultimate attainment. It is not correct to say[1] that the church doctrine of the divine image is nothing more than the putting in the beginning of the race what properly belongs to its close. It is not a mere poet's dream, which at the outset anticipates the end, and ascribes to the commencement the glories of the consummation. It *rather describes an ideal* that had already begun to be realised, a destination which, in the earliest experience of human life, was beginning to be fulfilled.

§ 33. Angels.

Literature.—Bull, Works, ed. Burton, 8 vols., Oxford, 1846, vol. i. Serms. XI. and XIII.: "On the Existence and Nature of Angels," and "The Office of the Holy Angels." Godet, *Biblical Studies in the Old Testament*, 2nd ed., London, 1882, pp. 1–29. Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, 2nd ed., 2 vols., Königsberg, 1862, i. 276–287. Everling, *Die Paulinische Angelologie und Daemonologie*, Gött. 1888, espec. pp. 118–126. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, Edin. 1866, pp. 127–136. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, vol. ii. pp. 96–103. Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evangel. Dogmatik*, Freiburg, 1892, pp. 392–396. Rothe, *Dogmatik*, Tüb. 1870, vol. i. pp. 205–248. Strauss, *Die christliche Glaubenslehre*, Tüb. 1840, i. 661–675. Schultz, *Old Testament Theology*, Edin. 1892, ii. 214–241.

Mention is made in the earliest books of the Old Testament of spiritual beings other than men in the immediate service of God, and they are referred to in such a way as makes it impossible to suppose that we have to do simply with personifications of the divine attributes or poetical representations of the divine activities. Our Lord and His apostles likewise use language with regard to the angels which makes it evident that they believed in the distinct personal existence of angelic beings. In the earliest times the Israelites regarded angels as without individual names, not sharply distinguished from one another, but

[1] As has been done by de Wette, *Ueber Religion und Theologie*, 2nd ed. 1821, p. 211. See also Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube*, i. 362 f.

viewed as belonging to a class, as though scarcely reaching the stage of full personality.[1] We do not, indeed, have any account of their creation. But we must remember that the revelation which we have relates simply to the world of man, and so, while we have details of the creation of man and his world, we have all that we need expect as to the origin of the angels in the statement that God created not only the earth, but also the heavens. In ancient times it was discussed whether the angels were created before or after man and his world, and many preferred to suppose that the creation of man and angels was simultaneous. Certain fathers assigned the creation of angels to the period of the creation of the heavens on the second day. Some preferred the fifth, some the sixth, while some went outside of the creative period of our world altogether and chose the eighth day. Augustine, in his Commentary on Genesis, fixes upon the first day, associating the angels with an allegorical representation of the light which God called into being by His word. Philippi,[2] after recording a number of opinions, indicates his preference for the view that the angels were created on the fourth day (combining Gen. i. 14 ff. with Job xxxviii. 7). The only point in regard to the creation of angels about which we may be certain is that God, through the Son, was their creator (Col. i. 16 f.). It is not said in Scripture, but only by some of the fathers, followed by the dogmatists of the Roman Catholic Church, that the angels were created in the image of God.[3]

In Scripture the angels are represented as without gross bodies, like those of men, so that they may be invisibly present among men, and do not discharge the ordinary functions of organic beings, and are consequently spoken of simply as spirits. On the other hand, the visible ap-

[1] Gen. xxxii. 30. Or at least the name was unutterable (Judg. xiii. 18). Compare Ewald, *Lehre der Bibel von Gott*, Leipzig, 1871, vol. ii. p. 283.

[2] *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*, Stuttg. 1867, ii. 295.

[3] Compare Klee, *Katholische Dogmatik*, 4th ed., Mainz, 1861, p. 383, who quotes Justin Martyr, *Apologia*, i. n. vi., and Cyril, c. *Anthrop.* c. iv.

pearings of angels are described in the Old and New Testament in such a way as to imply that they were possessed of a certain kind of capacity which could assume a visible form, and again become invisible as occasion might require, similar in this respect to the body worn by our Lord during the great forty days. But such semblances of bodies are really immaterial; they do not occupy or fill space in the way in which the solid flesh of human bodies does. Angels, then, are not pure spirits in the sense in which the uncreated God is, nor yet are they corporeal as men are. "But we cannot," says Bishop Bull, "so certainly and positively tell what kind of spirituality that of the angels is,—whether it be void of all manner of corporeity, as modern divines generally hold; or joined with some certain corporeity, not of the grosser sort, either fleshly, or airy, or fiery, but most subtle and pure, like that of the highest heaven, which is styled their ἴδιον οἰκητήριον, their *proper habitation*, as some of the ancient doctors believed." Beyond expressing a preference for the latter view we can scarcely go. This conception has been well and tersely expressed in these words: "Omnis vero rationalis creatura corporea est. Angeli et omnes virtutes corporeæ sunt, licet non carne subsistant. Ex eo enim intellectuales naturas corporeas esse dicimus, quia loco circumscribuntur."[1] It is certainly nothing short of idle toying with words and dialectic quibbles, to discuss such questions as: "Whether an angel can be in a place," "Whether an angel can be in several places at the same time," and "Whether several angels can be in one place at one time." It seems absurd and meaningless to say with Aquinas: "Angelus non est in loco; Angelus potest esse in pluribus locis simul; Plures angeli possunt esse in uno loco."[2]

[1] Quoted by Medd, *The One Mediator*, London, 1884, p. 412, from an unknown writer whose book, *De Spiritu et Anima*, had been ascribed to Augustine, and also to Hugo of St. Victor.

[2] *Summa Theologica*, pars i. qu. lii. artt. 1, 2, and 3, ed. Rom. 1886, vol. i. pp. 412–414.

The only interest that the dogmatist has in angels arises out of the relations which subsist between them and mankind, in so far as they may be used by God as His messengers to carry out His will in the world and among men. And it is just in regard to these inter-relations of the angels and the human race that the Scripture revelation gives any attention to the questions about the nature and doings of the angels. In respect of rank, they are described as excelling man in strength, beauty, knowledge, and dignity; but as the messengers of God, they become ministering spirits to men, who are heirs of salvation. Yet their greatness is only relative, and not absolute. They possess none of their attributes in that absoluteness which is the peculiar prerogative of God. Their strength is great, but it is not omnipotence; they have *potentia* (greater than man's), but not *omnipotentia*; they can do *mirabilia*, but not *miracula*. Their knowledge is far reaching, but it is not omniscience. Their power of transporting themselves from place to place, as their duty requires, is wonderful, but they have not the property of omnipresence. They change from place to place, as Rothe puts it, not *per operationem*, but *per definitionem*, *i.e.* not by motion, but by the mere exercise of will to be at another point in space, without any *perceptible* interval of time. They know only what is revealed to them, and so they are not acquainted with the deep mysteries of God and the future, which God has kept in His own power. They do not know the secret thoughts of a man's heart, for the searching of the heart of man is the sole prerogative of God Himself.

The angels are represented as standing in close connection with the natural elements and forces of the external world. In certain poetical passages of Scripture, separate angels or classes of angels seem to be assigned to the different elements of nature, and to be regarded as the secret moving and controlling powers. Job, and many of the writers of Psalms, represent God as addressing His commands to nature as to some living rational being who

directs its forces; and the author of the Apocalypse speaks of angels of the winds, of fire, and of the waters (vii. 2, xiv. 18, xvi. 5). It does not appear necessary to assume that in any of these or similar passages anything more is intended than a vivid representation of the immediate and effective control which God has over the operations of nature, whose laws obey His will as the angels do in heaven, so that they may rightly be designated His angels executing His commands. We do not, therefore, with Martensen, class those impersonal powers of nature among the angelic beings. It is altogether too heterogeneous an assemblage to which He would have us give the name of angels, ranging, as it does, "from the tempest which executes the behests of the Lord, to the seraph who stands before His throne." All the poetical passages of the Old and New Testament describing the responsiveness of nature to God's will are to be understood simply as personifications of natural forces and laws, while such passage as Ps. civ. 4, in which winds, fire, and flame are spoken of as His messengers and ministers, must be interpreted as meaning that God endows His angels with the swiftness and penetrating powers of wind and fire. The operation of angels in nature is transcendent rather than immanent. But as to the mode in which it is exercised, or as to the extent to which it is made use of, we are utterly without the means of determining.

With regard to the activity of angels in the history of the world, and in the affairs of men, more has been told us, and the hints that we have are more intelligible. "It is only," as Martensen says, "in so far as they enter into the world of mankind that they have any part in a progressive history." There does not appear to be any solid ground for the Jewish notion, founded on, or giving arise to the peculiar LXX rendering of Deut. xxxii. 8, 9, that God committed the care of the Gentile nations to angels, while He Himself directly attended to the affairs of Israel. The further development of this idea into that of guardian angels

for each nation, Israel herself having Michael as her prince (Dan. xii. 1), seems to belong purely to the region of visions and the writings of Apocalyptic seers. The representations given generally throughout the Old Testament history of the intervention of angels in the affairs of men does not represent them as acting as commissioners, to whom a certain office or province had been assigned, but simply as performing particular tasks which had been severally assigned them. And in the New Testament also they are found busying themselves with particular tasks in the service of Christ, or in the service of His people, for the doing of which they had been specially sent of God. This much may be said as to the appointment of special angels to the discharge of special duties, that St. Paul (Eph. i. 21 ; Col. i. 16) distinguishes different orders of angelic beings, as under Christ and in the service of His kindgom. Principalities, powers, mighty ones, dominions, may represent different orders of beings fitted by endowment and office for service in special departments.[1] They are everywhere described as the unquestioning and unhesitating doers of God's commands, and their dogmatic interest consists solely in their activity as agents of the divine providence. They do not constitute a race, as men do, and are nowhere regarded as having any connection of obligation or responsibility with one another. In this way their personality and freedom, their capacity for a moral life and their actual achievement of a moral development, must essentially differ from those of man.

Philippi, in his argument against the critical objections of Strauss to the doctrine of angels, shows that such opposition is based upon the rejection of the evangelical and scriptural

[1] Dionysius Areopagita, *De Cœlesti Hierarchia*, Paris, 1615, supplied the basis for all mediæval speculations about ranks and orders of angels. It was greatly admired and much used by Aquinas, but Calvin (*Institutes*, I. xiv. 4) ridicules him for seeming to know and tell so much of heaven, where he had never been, whereas Paul, after coming from the third heaven, is silent about these things. He therefore calls the Areopagite's disclosures "nugatory wisdom," and advises his readers to keep to the simple doctrine of Scripture.

doctrine of providence, and the doctrine of a personal God, that the antithesis of the acceptance and rejection of the doctrine of angels is that of theism and pantheism.

The place for the doctrine of angels is properly that of an appendix, not to the doctrine of creation simply, but to that of the works of God in creation and providence. The doctrine of the evil angels comes in fittingly as an introduction to the temptation and fall of man.

§ 34. The Evil Angels.

Literature.—Rothe, *Dogmatic* (1870), i. 214 f., 219–226, 246–248. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics* (1866), pp. 186–203. Philippi, *Kirchl. Glaubenslehre* (1867), iii. 251–354. Davenant, *Determinationes*, qu. xl.: "Pride was the First Sin of Angels," in Davenant, *Treatise on Justification*, trans. by Allport, London, 1846, vol. ii. pp. 429–432. Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch d. evangelischen Dogmatik* (1892), 333–338: "Die Lehre vom Satan." Frank, *System d. christl. Wahrheit* (1894), i. 436–441. Schultz, *Old Testament Theology*, Edin. 1892, ii. pp. 269–280: "Evil outside of Humanity." Schenkel on "Satan und Dämonen" in *Bibel-Lexikon*, v., Leipzig, 1875, pp. 185–191. Owen, *Treatise of Dogmatic Theology*, 2nd ed., London, 1887, pp. 190-197. Whately, *View of the Scripture Revelation concerning Good and Evil Angels*, London, 1851.

There is no definite statement either in the Old or in the New Testament as to the origin of evil spirits, and it is only in the New Testament that we have an absolutely distinct recognition in canonical Scripture of the existence of fallen angelic beings, and of the devil as their personal princely head. Yet Old Testament references to evil powers and principles may fairly be regarded as earlier intimations of a truth that came to have its development in revelation. Schenkel maintains that only the later Jewish theology, under the influence of Persian legends of the serpent Angro-Mainyus, interpreted the serpent of paradise as Satan, the mighty prince of ill; that Azazel was the goat let loose into the wilderness, and nothing more; and that pre-exilian Judaism knew nothing of a world of evil spirits. The nearest approach

to this notion is to be found in the idea that the idols of the heathens were evil beings with restricted powers and a shadowy existence, but even this the greater prophets, at the highest pitch of their monotheistic fervour, denied, representing idols as having no being beyond that of the wood or stone of which their images were made. Satan appears in the Book of Job among the sons of God, executing a necessary though disagreeable duty of inquiring into and exposing the faults of the righteous. While in Job, Satan does not withstand God, but only what is ungodly in those who pass as godly, in the post-exilian Zechariah (iii. 1 ff.) he is represented as standing over against and resisting the angel of the Lord. Schenkel points out that the angel who checks Balaam's progress is called a Satan (Num. xxii. 22). Hence the office was not in itself an evil one. The suggestion, however, is made that the occupation of the angels to whom the duty was assigned of watching for faults in men, and reporting these to the judge for punishment, would produce a one-sided and perverted moral development which would find delight and an evil pleasure in the discovery of faults, so that in time they became a race of evil spirits. This deduction is unsatisfactory, inasmuch as it puts the blame of their fall upon the tasks assigned them by God, and makes that fall a psychological necessity.

In the times of Christ it was the prevailing belief among the Jews that the serpent of paradise was an incarnation of Satan, the prince of evil spirits, that he was man's tempter and destroyer, and that he was ever active in the hearts and lives of men in promoting the interests of the kingdom of darkness. That Jesus and His apostles adopted the current views as to the existence and powers of evil spirits, and as to the access that they had to the hearts and lives of men, is made abundantly plain in gospels and epistles. Strauss treats with well-merited scorn the attempt of some half-hearted apologists who sought to make out that Jesus and His apostles simply used and repeated traditional beliefs without themselves entertaining them. Undoubtedly we have our Lord's imprimatur to the belief in the personality of Satan and his demoniac

hosts, and the same belief forms an important element in the doctrinal system of Paul.

Canonical Scripture nowhere affords us any hint as to the occasion or cause of the origin of evil spirits. It has always been assumed that this origin must have been of the nature of a fall. The monotheism of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures is so thorough that no doctrine like that of evil spirits can be supposed to have arisen out of any sort of dualistic views. Evil is not eternal, still less can any personal evil being be so regarded. Everything not God is a creature of God, and all God's creatures, as they come from His hand, are good. There is undoubtedly a difficulty in laying down a doctrine of Satan which represents his nature as essentially evil and yet not of eternal existence. It may be argued that a finite being cannot be absolutely evil any more than absolutely good, that he may become a sinner in the highest degree, but not the evil one in the absolute sense. The dilemma is that between a devil that is not evil in the absolute sense, and therefore no devil, and a devil which is the evil one absolutely, and therefore eternal, and as such dualistically opposed to the absolute good.[1] This, however, is applying the predicates of being, and their limitations as known to us, to a class of beings to whom we know not whether our metaphysics have any applicability. Besides, Satan is not represented in Scripture as absolutely evil, but, as the first and greatest personal foe of God; he is made the representative and symbol of sin, but not its source.[2] Satan is, after all, not sin, but a sinner. His evil pre-eminence consists in the fact that he was the first personal being who gave sin the rule and control of his nature, and also in the fact that from constitution and position the admission of sin into his being at once produced the direst consequences. Rothe thinks that the fall of any creature

[1] Biedermann, *Chr. Dogmatik*, ii. 512: "Der Satan, als gefallener und essentiell bös gewordener *spiritus purus*, ist ein potenzirter Widerspruch—und damit allerdings geeignet zur Personification des Bösen, dessen Wesen im ethischen Selbstwiderspruch des endlichen Geistes besteht."

[2] So Biedermann, *Chr. Dogmatik*, ii. 56, following Lange, *Positiv Dogmatik*, p. 575.

immediately into the uttermost depths of diabolical wickedness is inconceivable, and that such a condition can be reached only through a series of graduated descents into wickedness. But may not this conclusion have resulted from applying the ethical principles of human psychology in a sphere and to a class of beings where they are unsuitable? We should need to know more about the nature of the angels' fall, and more about the moral and spiritual constitution of the angels and their relation to God, before we could safely conclude whether a fall all at once into the uttermost depths was or was not conceivable.

One favourite theory of the fall of the angels referred it to the story of Gen. vi., and made sensuality the cause of their fall. But putting together John viii. 44 and 1 John iii. 4, we find that the devil, who is a murderer from the beginning, is regarded as the tempter of Cain to the murder of his brother. Some of the fathers and older divines distinguish between the fall of Satan and that of the demons, the former sinning in the beginning and the latter falling at a later period. In John viii. 44, it is not the fall of the devil that is directly spoken of, but simply the fact that he is not standing in the truth (ἕστηκε), a present fact resting on a past. Here, however, a fall is undoubtedly presupposed. It has very generally been assumed that in 2 Pet. ii. 4 and Jude 6 we had a definite reference to the fall of the devil, but from the context of both passages it would rather seem that the reference is to the degradation of "the sons of God" (Gen. vi.). Though nowhere explicitly reported, the doctrine of a fall of spirits from an original position of purity is the presupposition of all the New Testament passages that refer to the subject. We may also gather hints as to the nature of the sin of Satan. It is represented as a direct defiance and rivalry of God, the establishment of a kingdom opposed in every point to the kingdom of God. Hence it may be concluded that his sin was that of deliberately opposing the will of God. He thought to be as God, not in the sense of knowing good and evil, but in the sense of exercising independent and absolute power. The

older dogmatists therefore were led by a true instinct in assuming that pride, *superbia*, was the sin of the devil.[1]

This doctrine of a personal power of evil is of the utmost importance to dogmatics as a foundation for the true doctrine of sin and redemption. As Marheinecke says: "Those who deny the existence of Satan, and represent him as an empty phantasm, assume that Christ came into the world to destroy the works of a mere figment of the brain."[2] And Strauss quite fairly argues, that the idea of the Messiah and His kingdom can dispense with that of an opposing personal head of the kingdom of evil just as little as the north pole of the magnet can dispense with the south pole.

§ 35. Temptation and the Fall of Man.

Literature.—Müller, *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, 2 vols., Edin. 1868, vol. ii. pp. 383–387. Clemen, *Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde*, Gött. 1897, pp. 151–179: "Der Sündenfall der Protoplasten." Laidlaw, *Bible Doctrine of Man*, Edin. 1895, pp. 199–214. Rothe, *Theologische Ethik*, Wittenberg, 1870, vol. iii. pp. 41–57. Schultz, *Old Testament Theology*, Edin. 1892, vol. ii. pp. 269–280. Umbreit, *Die Sunde, Beitrag zur Theologie des A.T.*, Hamburg, 1853. Lutz, *Biblische Dogmatik*, Pforzheim, 1847, pp. 122–134. Edwards, *Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will*, Glasgow, 1790, pt. iv. §. 10, pp. 376–378: "Concerning Sin's first Entrance into the World." Canon Gore, *Evolution of the Christian Doctrine of the Fall*, lecture reported in full in *Guardian* of 17th Feb. 1897, p. 279 f. Principal Simon, "Evolution and the Fall of Man," in *Bibliotheca Sacra* (Andover) for Jan. 1897.

The creation of God, in so far as man and his world are concerned, had been pronounced "very good." This did not mean that each department of created being had reached its

[1] So Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, xii 6, *De Genesi ad lit.* xi. 14, answering Cyprian (de Zelo et Livore), who makes envy the sin of the devil, that envy is not a primary sin, that envy springs from pride, not pride from envy.

[2] *Die Grundlehren christl. Dogmatik* (1819), § 233. Strauss, *Glaubenslehre*, ii. 15. So, too, Philippi, *Kirchl. Glaubenslehre* (1867), iii. 274 f. Against the idea that the doctrine of the personality of Satan has this significance, see Plitt, *Glaubenslehre*, Gotha, 1863, vol. i. p. 255, and Grimm, *Institutio* (1869), p. 282.

destination, but only that each element was in perfect accordance with the mind of the Creator, fulfilling His purpose in respect of the initial stage of each such being. There is no reservation whatever in the divine approval of the work. Whatever in each was destined to a course of development had the capacity and means of that development present in it, and was therefore as such absolutely and unqualifiedly good. This natural goodness of creation, consisting as it did in the harmony between what was and what was meant to be, did not indeed exclude the possibility of evil, but it certainly did exclude the necessity of evil. Had evil been a necessity in the natural development of created being, it must have been in germ present in this first beginning, which in that case could not have been pronounced good. The presence of the most elementary germ of evil, just as surely as that evil at any later stage of its development, would have rendered the approval of God impossible. And so we have already emphasised the position, that the creature endowed with personality and freedom, and therefore destined to a moral development, begins his conscious existence with a knowledge only of the good. There was nothing within him or around him that was not good.

And here it is specially with man as destined to a moral development that we have to do. It is one of the strange vagaries of Jacob Böhme, to assume the presence in the first man of some imperfection resulting from a lapse previous to the fall of revelation, and to regard this as the occasion for the making of woman and the bringing of her to him as a complement to a being who on trial had proved to be incomplete. If we are to make any use at all of the accounts in Genesis of man's creation, we must surely admit that there cannot possibly have been any degeneracy in man between the moment of his creation and that of the woman. If we are to deal seriously with the first two chapters of Genesis, we must regard man as created male and female, brought into being as a first human pair. Upon no sound principle of exegesis, if we take both accounts and not simply the second alone into

consideration, can we regard the creation of woman as separate in time from that of man. Were we to read the second account in a grossly literal fashion, we could not in any honest way accept the first as true. But if we accept the first as true, then in the second we must see a pictorial representation of the divine purpose as to the relation which should subsist between man and woman, and the ends to be served by this duality. There was therefore no time when the man existed without the woman. Of a first perfect human being that was afterwards divided into male and female, there is no idea save in the fantastic dreams of speculative mystics. And so it is quite out of the question to say with Böhme, that man, having been created perfect as a single being, and as such pronounced "very good," by some means fell from this perfection, so that God must say of the being that had been "good" as created alone, that it was not good that he should be alone. This is clearly an attempt to secure currency for an utterly unscriptural notion by the misuse and misquotation of a scriptural phrase. The Scripture pronouncement that man was "very good" was made with reference to the man created male and female. It appears, as everyone knows, not in connection with the second, but in connection with the first account of the creation of man. Such an attempt to shift back the mystery of the fall has really less to say for itself than the theory of an extra-temporal fall of man in a state of pre-existence. Even if it were true, it could not in any appreciable way relieve the mystery of the origin of evil, inasmuch as it still leaves that origin to be accounted for within the limits of time and within the range of man's earthly history.

We start, therefore, with creation unsullied by any declination from the purpose of the Divine Creator. But this purpose, in regard to those beings who were destined to a moral development, embraced the exercise on their part of that self-determination which constituted their characteristic endowment. The presentation of the choice between good and evil, which was essential to man's attaining to moral goodness, did not, indeed, necessarily involve the actual previous

existence of evil. It is quite conceivable that evil might have had a prior existence only in idea, and that the suggestion of evil as a possible mal-development might have been made to man, even although no being existed in whom evil had obtained a personal form. How this could have been done, how evil as a principle merely that no personal being had taken up could present itself to such a personal being as man, we may not be able to conceive; but that it could not possibly have been done, we certainly are not in a position to affirm. The revelation which we have in Scripture, however, assumes that already, not in the world of man, but in the universe of God outside of the world, the evil principle had secured entrance into personal beings. Nowhere in Scripture, as we have seen, is there any account of the appearing of sin and the occurrence of a fall among the angels. This could only have been done parenthetically, seeing we have no account of the creation of the angels, or indeed any definite statement at all as to their nature and conditions of existence. Our interest in the fall of the spirits is only in so far as it may yield instruction regarding the nature and possibility of the fall of man. Indeed, beyond that which is paralleled in the experience and history of man, there can be nothing relating to the angels that would be within the range of our understanding. The parallel between the angels' fall and that of man consists primarily in this, that in both cases it resulted from a perverse misuse of the power of free will and self-determination. The earlier may thus be applied to explain the later.

In despair of any possible answer to the question about the first entrance of sin into the world, some have simply declared a sinful commencement irrational, and therefore incapable of any explanation. But seeing that each step in the historical development of sin is capable of explanation as a natural psychological process, it will not do to deny rationality to the beginning of that which has a rational history. Others, again, acknowledge the necessity for an explanation of the entrance of sin, and yet, concluding that this is impossible, argue that therefore the notion of a primitive fall is unten-

able. An answer to this objection may be obtained by looking, first of all, at the explanations of the origin of sin which are offered instead of that of a fall. We do not require here to deal with theories of the origin of sin that are essentially unchristian, if not irreligious, *e.g.* that of the presence of sin in the original elements of the natural creation, as seen in Buddhism, pessimism, dualistic theories of all kinds, including that of the non-divine character of matter.[1] Scarcely more worthy of consideration, from the standpoint of Christian theism, are the theories which seek to account for the origin of sin by representing it as a mere stage in human development (Hegel), or as the necessary consequence of man's weakness of spirit and will (Schleiermacher, Lipsius), or of ignorance (Ritschl), or as characterising that stage of biological or moral development at which, upon the theory of evolution, we may now have reached. Notwithstanding all disclaimers on the part of the maintainers of these several views, it is impossible, on a fair understanding of any of them, to avoid the conclusion that sin is necessary and unavoidable, with the inevitable consequence of losing all ground for the idea of guilt, and finding in God Himself the ultimate responsible source of sin. All these theories, in contrast to that of a fall, in antagonism at once to Scripture and spiritual religion, assume a psychological or moral necessity of sinning; and the very fact of its escaping this intolerable assumption is *primâ facie* evidence in favour of the theory of a fall.

The real answer to the difficulties raised as to the possible origination of evil desire and action in a being that was the workmanship of the perfectly good creator, is found in the true conception of the primitive stage of the historical development of man as necessarily one of probation. As we have seen, man as a free being could not begin his existence as one whose holiness was confirmed, and his position that of

[1] See these theories, and others not referred to here, explained and classified concisely and clearly in Orr, *The Christian View of God and the World* (1893), pp. 204–210. The most thorough and detailed examination of these theories is that of Julius Müller, *Christian Doctrine of Sin* (1868), vol. i. pp. 268–417.

one who could not be tempted to evil. As a moral being he must come to the knowledge of good and evil. The possession of this knowledge would mean moral maturity. If this position were gained by man through a normal moral development, he would thereby and therewith reach the height in a legitimate way, which the tempter suggested he should seek to reach in an illegitimate way. He who in the fullest and truest sense has the knowledge of good and evil, who knows perfectly and in every case to choose the good and reject the evil, has become as God, in the sense of realising and attaining unto the perfection of the image of God in his soul and in his life. The biblical story of the fall represents the first sinful act as by no means a necessity for man's development. Temptation is, indeed, a necessity thereto, but even this only in the sense of presenting the alternative, so that he might have attained unto a full moral development had he, without any experimental acquaintance with the evil, at the first rejected it and chosen the good, after having seen the evil in all its attractiveness, with the consciousness that he could have chosen it if he had so willed.

The Bible account of man's probation represents man's moral development as taking the form of moral conflict, brought about by the presentation of the evil, which had not before been within man's view, by a personal being in sympathy with that evil, speaking through the neutral medium of a mere animal. There can be no doubt that the teaching of this portion of Scripture involves the existence of a personal being, or of personal beings, already hostile to God, and therefore ready to become tempters of those who were in such a position that they might be drawn away from God. A great deal too much has been made of the serpent. Surely it was never intended that the natural serpent should be the prominent figure here. The principle of evil is only thus furnished with a bodily shape, but the point to be noted is that this principle secured access to man. It is altogether misleading to say, as Martensen does, that Scripture nowhere says that the serpent was the devil, and that it is only "the allegorical

designation for the cosmical principle which opposed itself to man in a temptation." It is also taking quite too seriously the mere framework of the representation to point to the vegetable and animal kingdoms as supplying, in the fruit and the serpent, the elements of the natural world as constituting the content and vehicle of the temptation.

The earlier portions of the Old Testament Scripture undoubtedly ascribed to God what later writers ascribed to evil spirits; and spirits are sent forth by God and for Him as lying spirits to deceive, and spirits of destruction to execute, the divine judgments. Exactness of differentiation comes only later, in accordance with the proper character of a progressive revelation. The Satan of Job and Zechariah, however, is just the same sort of spirit as that which appears in the earlier literature, in both cases closely related to God, but in the latter more clearly defined in regard to his hostility to God. There is not here, as Schultz insists, a representation of Satan as servant of God in any sense contradictory to the view that represents him as in antagonism to God. He is represented, as regards the spirit which controls this whole thought and action, as antagonistic, and yet he is God's servant, who can act only as divinely permitted. Angels are all agents of the divine providence, voluntarily or involuntarily. And the question here as to the personality of the evil angels must be answered precisely as that of the personality of the good angels was. Their personality is not the same in character or degree as that of man. The question of the personality of the devil has been at length and in a most interesting manner discussed by Martensen.[1] He quite unwarrantably identifies the devil with the cosmical principle, and then finds it very easy to maintain that the devil has no personal existence outside of the world of man. As the cosmical principle it is purely impersonal, and yet as such is a tempting principle. It is not evil, but only the possibility of evil, until it obtains entrance into the human consciousness. When man, the personal self-conscious being, adopts

[1] Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, §§ 99–104, pp. 186–198.

this evil principle, then it attains to personality. It would thus seem that it was man's own imagination that first suggested evil to man. But this Martensen will not allow: "It by no means follows," he says, "that man is only his own devil. It is another, a superhuman, principle to which existence is imparted by man, a tempting, seducing, making-possessed, and inspiring power, to which man lends himself, as to a *non ego*. The devil is a spirit which man has conjured to himself, and is not able to cast out." But is not all this a piece of verbal jugglery? It is nothing better than unconfessed mythology. It may do in poetry, but not in science, to speak of cosmical principles and world powers as entering into and operating upon personal beings, and of a transformation of the impersonal into the personal. A principle that is not yet evil, because it has not yet a personality, and so is unethical, cannot tempt, simply because it is nothing at all.[1] The alternative necessarily lies between a personal evil power outside of man as the tempter to sin, and a sinning that begins, without the mediation of any outward temptation, from desires arising within man's own heart. The tempter is a personal evil spirit, not one in whom the evil principle—a pure creation of the fancy—has obtained personality, but one of those who sinned, not having kept their first estate (2 Pet. ii. 4; Jude 6). It is not a superhuman evil, but a superhuman sinful being, who tempted man.

The Christian revelation makes no promise of any solution of the mystery of the origin of evil, does not even hint at the existence of such a mystery. What it deals with is the mystery of the origin of human sin. And what it is chiefly concerned with is the declaration that it has not its origin in God. So far as man is concerned, evil, in the form

[1] Strauss (*Glaubenslehre*, § 541, vol. ii. pp. 16–18) cleverly ridicules rationalistic and philosophic jargon about impersonal evil principles; there is either a personal devil, or there is none. He concludes: "Weg also mit diesen Schattenbildern! lasset uns am vollen concreten Leben fasthalten, in welchem wir zwar keine ganzen Engel, doch dafür auch keine ganzen Teufel, statt dieser aber ganze Wesen, ganze Persönlichkeiten finden, während Engel und Teufel nur halbe, mithin keine sind."

of incitement and temptation to sin, had its origin in the devil. Evil already existed,—not a mere supposititious principle of evil, but a personal being, or multiplicity of personal beings, existed, who had taken up a position of antagonism to God. This being, or class of beings, was not eternal. The Manichæan theory of an eternal antithesis of good and evil, a conflict of the two principles, can only be described as a conflict of nonentities, a struggle between spirits of the air. Now, a dualistic theory of this sort is no solution, but rather an increasing of the difficulty of the problem of evil. By the hypothesis of an impersonal, and therefore unethical, principle of evil, it renders a difficult task more difficult by adding the puzzle of extracting the moral out of the non-moral. The notion which lies at the basis of the whole scriptural representation is the only one that is really helpful, —the assumption of a fall from their first estate of a certain number of angelic personal beings, who retain their personality, but use their powers for evil and not for good, against God and not for Him, yet still, though not in intention and will, His servants, inasmuch as they are but finite created beings under the direction of the supreme will of their Creator. One of these beings is represented as the personal tempter of man. The beginning of evil in man may not even then be fully conceivable, but evidently the transmission of evil from person to person does not present the difficulty which arises when we attempt to postulate its passing from an impersonal, unethical principle into the moral act and moral life of a personal being.

What this personal tempter did was to discover to man the possibility of contradiction. Hitherto man was conscious only of the good, undifferentiated as yet from the evil. The tempter furthers the development of morality by this differentiation, but his purpose is to make the contradiction of the good appear to man a higher good. It, therefore, was not the knowledge that was evil, but the evil knowledge. And the evil of the knowledge brought by the tempter consisted in this, that he claimed and received for it that acceptance that should have been given only to the good, so soon

as good and evil, in the antithesis of obedience and disobedience, were first presented.

The church doctrine of the entrance of sin into the world follows closely in every detail the narrative of Genesis, accepting it as not only true but as actual history. For the purposes of dogmatics, it is a matter of indifference whether we regard the narrative of Genesis as actual history or as a true representation in a pictorial or poetic form of a real occurrence. Philippi and Delitzsch,[1] who are both inclined for exegetical reasons to regard the narrative as actual history, admit that for Christian doctrine the important matter is that the narrative be regarded as true. It is with the ethical and religious element in the recorded facts that the dogmatist has to do, and not with the mere literary and artistic forms in which they may be set forth. As to what must be clung to in those early records if the Christian standpoint is not to be abandoned, no wiser words have been spoken than those of Delitzsch. "Documentary Christianity," he says, "professes to be the religion of the redemption of Adamic mankind, and has for its inalienable premises the unity of the first creation of man, the fall of the first created pair, and the curse and promise by which this was succeeded. Hence, were we even to grant that Gen. i.–iii. speaks of the beginnings of human history with the stammering tongue of childhood, it must still be maintained, if Christianity is to maintain its ground as the religion of the recovery of the lost, and as the religion of the consummation aimed at from the beginning, that man, as the creature of God, entered upon existence as at once human and capable of development in good, but fell from this good beginning by failing to stand the test of his freedom." Man's history begins in the *status integritatis*, and

[1] Philippi, *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre* (1867), iii. 159; Delitzsch, *New Commentary on Genesis*, Edin. 1888, vol. i. p. 58. See also, Müller, *Christian Doctrine of Sin* (1868), ii. 347. Compare the laborious attempt to fasten another meaning upon Gen. iii., or rather, perhaps, to evaporate all meaning out of it, in Clemen, *Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde*, pp. 152–166.

the present *status corruptionis* was reached in the early days of the beginning by the fall.

In considering the Scripture record of the entrance of sin into the world by the fall, it will be necessary to consider what questions this fundamental document undertakes to answer, and what questions, among those that naturally arise in this connection, are passed over. It is quite evident that the main object of the sacred writer is to attempt an explanation of the fact that evil, in the sense of misery, reaching even to death, is present in the world.[1] This is no original element in the world that came perfect from the hand of God, and its appearing in the world can be accounted for only by the sin of man. But how sin could secure its first entrance into man's heart, how a sinful impulse could first rise there, is a question that is not raised, and that did not come within the mental vision of the writer.[2] He simply lays hold of the fact as a fact of experience, that such an impulse did arise, and without waiting to discuss whence it came and how it could be, he simply describes it as there, present and operative. Hence the further question is not raised as to the precise point at which a blameworthy affection makes its first appearance. And thus the narrative of Genesis is not really a history of the earliest origin of sinfulness in the world, but the story of the first actual sin. We are not, however, on this account entitled to say with Rothe, that the thought of man having been originally without a sinful inclination is foreign to the writer, and that this is why he does not seek to explain its origin. Surely the opening of their eyes to a sense of shame (ver. 7), when compared with the statement of chap. ii. 25, proves the entrance of a sinful inclination which had no existence before. That such a sinful inclina-

[1] Rothe, *Dogmatik* (1870), i. 302–306. Müller, *Chr. Doctr. of Sin* (1868), vol. ii. 383–385.

[2] To ask the reason of sin is, according to Augustine, to ask the reason of the unreasonable. See *The City of God*, bk. xii. chap. vi. So, too, Erigena (*De Div. Naturæ*, v. 36) maintains that sin has no ground in human nature, for if it had then it would be necessary.

tion was not original, but had arisen with the appearing of the tempter, is evidently within the range of the writer's vision; but he attempts no explanation of its origin, and confines himself to an explanation of the origin of misery and death in the world. The church doctrine, founding upon the Scripture record, does not by any means, as Biedermann assumes,[1] represent the first sin as an inwardly *unmotived* accident, nor is it fair on the part of the critic to call the theory of man's original condition as one of unconfirmed goodness "a rationalising reduction of the *status integritatis* to a condition of relative innocence." It is altogether a misunderstanding of this only tenable notion of the original condition to represent it as by any means implying that the so-called fall was a necessary step in man's moral development. As we have seen, the course of that development might quite as well have been through the rejection of the evil to the full moral acceptance of the good. The belief in the necessity of temptation and probation surely does not involve belief in the necessity of a fall and a sinful development. The Scripture narrative is far from saying that there was no inner sinful inclination leading to the commission of the first actual sin, only this is left rather as a presupposition, and the question as to what that inclination essentially is, and how it arose in man, is not raised, and so remains without answer or discussion.

This first sin of Adam is properly called *peccatum originale originans*, of which the efficient cause is not God, but immediately man himself by the misuse of his free will, and mediately Satan as presenting the temptation and persuading. The act itself consisted in the transgression of a positive command of God, which evidenced generally rebellious disloyalty and disobedience. No importance is attached to any particular instance, as though the eating implied any intemperance of appetite; but emphasis is laid only on the general disobedience which the particular trial revealed. In this act of disobedience all the faculties of man's being

[1] *Christliche Dogmatik* (1885), ii. 497.

co-operated: his understanding doubted (*incredulitas*) God's truthfulness, his will sought (*φιλαυτία et superbia*) irreverently to snatch equality with God, and his appetites gave way (*fructus retiti concupiscentia*) to inordinate affections. This one sin, when analysed, reveals a breach of the whole moral law of God. The Scripture record and the church doctrine are most careful to show that God is in no sense, not even most remotely and indirectly, the author of sin. "Lapsus Adami non fuit necessarius propter manifestationem justitiæ et misericordiæ divinæ." The one act of disobedience, which was Adam's own act, was not the result, nor even in the strictest sense the cause, of his loss of God's grace, which he had enjoyed in his state of innocence. He fell from the grace of God; his falling was itself that loss. As the older divines have sought laboriously to explain, man did not fall from the absence or refusal of any kind of grace, nor from the presence of any inward languor or defect of nature, but by the abuse of freedom, the will consenting to the persuasion and seduction of the devil from without, and rejecting the influence of divine grace. The real means of probation consisted in the divine prohibition. Satan, as tempter through the serpent, only hastens a decision which sooner or later would have taken place without his interference. The prohibition is the law without which there could have been no sin nor yet any moral virtue. As for the tree itself, it was possessed of no peculiar character. Any tree in the garden, or indeed any other sensible object, would have served the purpose as well. The idea that it was a poison tree implies a ridiculous misunderstanding of the whole scene.[1] That the command was a positive one, and

[1] As, *e.g.*, F. W. Schultz does (following many older writers), in his *Die Schöpfungsgeschichte nach Naturwissenschaft und Bibel*, Gotha, 1865, p. 459: "Death follows the eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, not because God had forbidden it, but God had forbidden it because it wrought death, naturally only bodily death, and even then, if unforbidden and without sin it might have been partaken of, a deadly effect would have resulted which only the power of the spirit abiding uninterruptedly in God, and perhaps also the fruit of the tree of life, could have effectually checked. The tree was a tree of death."

not moral, a prohibition that seemed purely arbitrary and not based upon any principle of right and wrong, instead of being an argument in favour of finding something hurtful in the tree itself, is strictly in accordance with the view which we now maintain. That the command is positive and arbitrary is meant to remind man that he is under a Lord to whom unconditional and unquestioning obedience is due. Not the reasonableness of the prohibition is to be considered, but purely the authority of Him whose word enforces it.[1] The knowledge indicated by the name given to the tree was a knowledge of the moral worth of things and actions, which the prohibition attached to the use of the fruit of this tree would effect, in a guilty or a holy manner, according as that prohibition was obeyed or disobeyed. That the knowledge intended was a moral knowledge, and not a mere advance in culture or experience of the world, is rightly maintained by Dillmann against Wellhausen. Had there been in view merely an advance in culture, it would have been only the simple childish joys of the primitive stage of being that would have been lost, whereas it was really God's favour and continued residence in the garden of God. Besides this, what is won is not culture, but a consciousness of separation from God and the pangs of an evil conscience. Were we to regard the eating of the fruit as a pictorial representation of man's first step in advance toward a higher stage of culture, then the divine prohibition and God's infliction of punishment, when this prohibition was disregarded, would only form a parallel to the purely heathen doctrine of "the envy of the gods."

§ 36. Immediate Consequences of the First Sin.

Literature.—Clemen, *Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde*, Gött. 1897, pp. 216–254: "Die Folgen der Sünde." Delitzsch,

[1] All this has been most admirably discoursed upon by Augustine, *De Genesi ad literam*, viii. 6 and 13. See also Strauss, *Glaubenslehre* (1841), vol. ii. pp. 20–23.

Biblical Psychology, Edin. 1869, pp. 151–170. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine* (1889), iii. 114–132. Kähler, *Die Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre*, Leipzig, 1893, pp. 280–289. Müller, *Christian Doctrine of Sin* (1868), vol. i. pp. 193–267, vol. ii. pp. 286–307. Orr, *Christian View of God and the World*, Edin. 1893, pp. 217–233. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, 4th ed., N.Y. 1893, pp. 306–308, 340–355. Frank, *System der christlichen Wahrheit* (1894), i. 450–459, 486–492. Rothe, *Dogmatik* (1870), vol. i. pp. 306 f. Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, 2nd ed., Königsberg, 1862, i. 500–506. Philippi, *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre* (1867), iii. 355–394.

The immediate consequence of the first human sin was death, as that is understood in its most comprehensive sense. Death as the wages of sin is death spiritual, and this involves death of the body in time and death eternal. The biblical representation of the divine threatening, "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die," announces the truth that the very first act of disobedience will immediately and necessarily be accompanied by the loss of original righteousness, involving an altogether new relationship of guiltiness toward God and a consciousness of guilt, a falling out of that line of development in which immortality might have been won and life eternal secured. It is the doctrine of the Old Testament (Gen. vi. 3, etc.), that it is the fate of all flesh to perish, that man's flesh is naturally corruptible, and that his continued vitality depends upon God's continuing to breathe into him His breath, which He can withhold at any time, and by so doing bring about the dissolution of man's being.

That death was in the world before the appearance of man, and therefore before the entrance of sin, seems to be a well-ascertained fact of natural science. Theological science has only to do with the relations of God and man, or at most with nature and God's relation to it only in so far as these affect man and the relation of God to him. Hence the theologian has nothing to say for or against the view that death was in the world before man; but

if this be ascertained as a fact by the researches of naturalists, then the theologian can say that such a conclusion is to him no surprise. He knows that immortality is the prerogative of spirit, and that only as the psychical being becomes spiritual does he become immortal. Only that creature can have immortality whose destiny it is to become spirit, and even he only in so far as he follows the course of development which culminates in that end. The question, indeed, is still open as to whether there is any such living being as a purely psychical one, or whether there may not be an initial germ of spirit in every creature in whom the *breath* of life is. This, however, is a problem of comparative psychology rather than of theology. If any such doctrine becomes thoroughly established in psychology, as that of the presence of death in the world before man seems to be in natural science, then the speculative theologian might argue that in such predominantly psychical beings no spiritual development had been possible except on the basis of the dissolution of the ultra-material nature. As to man, the theologian regards him as a sensitive animal being, with rational and moral faculties, and spiritual capacities for fellowship with God, to which higher end his nature strives in accordance with the motives and means of his normal development. So long as the normal development is proceeded with, man lives; when sin checks and deflects the course of this development, man dies. The death of the body is therefore simply the concentrated manifestation of the God-forsakenness of man. It is singled out from among all the evils that afflict sinful man as deserving the specific designation, The Wages of Sin, because the abnormal development introduced by sin in this reaches its climax and comes to its temporal end.

Death as the wages of sin has been distinguished by scholastic theologians as threefold, death spiritual, bodily and eternal (*mors spiritualis, corporalis et æterna*). Death spiritual, however, is properly the root of all, including in it, and therefore bringing with it, death bodily and eternal. Spiritual

death is not a mere consequence of the first sin, but the very act of turning away from God, which is the essence of that sin, is itself the death of the spirit. The sin of man is the death of man. It deprives him of spiritual life, which consists in union with God. It involves the loss of the divine image, and this includes in it the corruption of human nature and the deprivation of free will in regard to spiritual things. Such loss is itself the removal of all power to prevent bodily dissolution, so that at once the process sets in which ends in the death of the body. Death eternal, again, is the continuation of that estrangement from God in which sin consists, which human nature, now sinful, has no longer any power to arrest.

In the Old Testament, death is generally spoken of as the necessary or natural accompaniment of and witness to human frailty. Man is but dust and ashes, and all flesh is grass (Gen. xviii. 27; Isa. xl. 6; Ps. lxxxix. 47, 48, ciii. 14, 15). Yet it is to be observed that such statements with regard to man's natural mortality are not given from the point of view of a necessary consequence, but simply as the expression of a matter of fact. It is the universality of the fact of death among the members of the human race that is emphasised, and not any theory as to the origin of that fact. It is by no means asserted that flesh, in the sense of human nature, is constitutionally, or in its very essence, mortal, but only that as an empirical fact all men are subject to death, and are thus perishable and passing on certainly to decay. Especially in Job there are passages which, if taken by themselves, might seem to complain that death, with all that train of evils of which it is the end and the sum, was a natural necessity, man's lot without his leave; yet, as Kübel[1] has remarked, even there such sayings as "man that is born of woman is of few days" are qualified by such others as "who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean." Thus, in even the most pessimistic passages, the truth is acknowledged that sin is the presupposition of death, and that physical evil

[1] In art. "Tod," in Herzog, *Encyclopaedie*,[2] xv. 700.

can be accounted for only as the consequence of spiritual disturbance and moral evil. In the New Testament the same ideas receive a fuller spiritual development. While, according to the teaching of Jesus, particular instances of death bringing calamities are not to be regarded as direct punishment for individual acts of sin, whose heinousness may therefore be compared disadvantageously with that of others on whom no such calamities fall, the exhortation addressed to all without exception, "except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish," clearly implies that our Lord insisted upon the necessary connection between sin and death. The apostolic doctrine recognises death as the universal lot of man (Heb. ix. 27), but this always in view of the judgment and in a direct causal relation to sin (Rom. v. 12, vi. 13, vii. 10, 11). Sin as personified in the prince of the world is the slayer of man, and the death of man is immediately his work (John viii. 44).

The biblical account of the first sin undoubtedly represents death as the immediate consequence involved in that very act. "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die" cannot mean simply that upon man sinning he would become liable to death, or that death would henceforth be a possibility. The first sinful act was not regarded merely as marking the beginning of a course of development culminating in death, but as having death in it, and so bringing death with it. All later systems of positive theology recognise this, though expression is given to it in various ways. Some explain it by saying that, though man lived many years after committing the act of sin, yet in the moment of sinning he began to die, and that the threatening had in view the whole course of development which is fitly described as death.[1] Others prefer to explain it by the supposition that man's body was mortal before the fall, but that only the sin of man secured entrance for death as an actual occurrence, liability to death and the actual suffering of

[1] So Augustine, *De pecc. mer.* i. 21; Müller, *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, ii. 293 f.; Delitzsch, *Biblical Psychology*, p. 151.

death being distinguishable as the possibility of sin and sin itself.[1]

The doctrine of the Church, in accordance with the natural sense of Scripture, constantly maintains that at least the death of man is the consequence of sin. And, as we have already seen, it is only the world with man in it that the theologian is concerned with. Man's world, like man himself, suffers from the presence of sin, and so physical evil affecting sentient beings cannot, on the Christian view of the world and man, be dissociated from moral evil. The early church fathers, whenever they speak deliberately in view of the whole body of the Scripture doctrine, teach that the first sin brought upon Adam death in its fullest sense, and that bodily death in man first appeared as part of the doom of sin. This position does not seem to have been seriously contested until the opening of the Pelagian controversy. In the first canon of the North African General Synod of Carthage, held in 418 A.D., consisting of two hundred African and Spanish bishops, mainly concerned with the struggle against Pelagianism, an anathema is pronounced against any man who says "that Adam, the first man, was created mortal, so that whether he sinned or not he would have died (*ita ut sive peccaret sive non peccaret, moreretur in corpore*), not as the wages of sin, but through the necessity of nature."[2] Rationalism laid hold upon this Pelagian doctrine, and more recently it has been reproduced in the systems of all those theologians, whether

[1] Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, 2nd ed., Königsberg, 1862, i. 445 f. He proceeds (p. 447): "It was on God's part an act of pure grace to deprive man of the use of 'the tree of life'; the continuance in outward form of a life inwardly corrupt, a bodily immortality coupled with an inward death of the soul, a bodily immortality, that is to say, of the sinner, would have turned earth into a hell, and would have made repentance and redemption impossible. The approach to the tree of life therefore was closed, and the body given over to that struggle with the elements in which of necessity it gradually consumes itself in a long-drawn expiration process, even although no positive diseases should enter in. From the moment of the fall onward every breath drawn was a step toward death, a beginning of death. Thus was the word fulfilled: 'In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.'"

[2] Hefele, *History of the Councils of the Church*, vol. ii., Edin. 1876, p. 458.

Kantian, Hegelian, or Ritschlian, who regard sin as practically a necessary moment in man's moral and spiritual development. If man begins as a purely natural being with the will, and therefore morality and religion, as a subsequent growth, sin is postulated as a necessary factor in his education and advancement. In the Reformed dogmatic of the scholastics and federalists the consequences of the fall (*sequelæ lapsus*, or more exactly *effectus peccati in primo homine*) are described as threefold—(1) *corruptio*, (2) *conscientia reatus*, (3) *deplorata spes sanctificationis*.

The corruption is defined as loss of original righteousness affecting the will, the intellect, and the feelings (*amissio rectitudinis in voluntate, intellectu et affectibus*). This corruption extends to the whole man, and so answers to that death in the widest sense which in biblical language is the one comprehensive designation for the consequences of sin. It is to be noted here that this corruption is the consequence of the first sin, and is to be described as death, or at least as a constituent element in death, not (as is done, *e.g.*, by Marck, *Medulla*, xv. 34) as that which brings death as its punishment. This corruption, as affecting Adam himself, consisted in the loss of the *justitia originalis*, which according to the Roman Catholic dogmatic is a *donum superadditum* or *supernaturale*, but according to the Protestant dogmatic the *imago Dei actualis*. In the former case the corruption is only relative, a weakening of the *pura naturalia* by the removal of the restraining influence of that supernatural gift. This view evidently introduces into Roman Catholic theology a very decided Pelagianising tendency. The theology of Protestantism, on the contrary, regards this corruption as not relative, but absolute and complete. It is in the proper sense a *corruptio naturæ*, consisting negatively in the loss of the divine image, in consequence of which man is rendered incapable of doing God's will, so that, in the language of the schools, the *posse non peccare* is changed into a *non posse non peccare*,[1] and positively in concupiscence, which is not merely

[1] Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik*, Berlin, 1885, vol. ii p. 296 f.

a corruption of natural tendencies but an actual perversion of all the faculties in a carnal direction and in opposition to all that is divine. An admirable statement of the Reformed doctrine is given in the Westminster Confession (vi. 2): "By this sin they fell from their original righteousness, and communion with God, and so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body." It is one of the advantages of the Reformed over the Lutheran dogmatic, that it clearly distinguished between those elements in the divine image that might and those that might not be lost (*amissibile* and *inamissibile*). This enabled Reformed theologians much more easily to repudiate the extravagances of Flacius (1520–1575), who had asserted the essentially Manichæan doctrine that original sin—that is to say, the sinful condition into which Adam passed when he sinned (*peccatum originale originatum*)—was an actual substance, and belonged to the nature of man. The corruption which was consequence of the first sin belongs to the accidents, not to the essence, of human nature; and fallen man is still redeemable.

Guilt and the consciousness of guilt are *sequelæ lapsus* accompanying this corruption; for the consequence of sin is not only *macula*, but also *reatus*. Guilt is the expression of the fact that a breach of the moral law as the revelation of God's will renders a man liable to and deserving of punishment. The man who sins is responsible and stands condemned before God. The consciousness of guilt shows itself as consequence of the first sin, in the emotion of fear and the sense of shame manifested immediately after the fall. The corruption which, in its positive and negative aspect, is the consequence of sin is the subject of this consciousness. Guilt attaches not only to the first sin (*peccatum originale originans*), but to the sinful habit or condition which results from it (*peccatum originale originatum*). Adam's original sin, his sinful state after the fall, which is distinctly his own as that of a being who had himself sinned in the exercise of his own free will, where as yet no difficulty of imputation occurs, clearly renders him

responsible, necessarily carries with it guilt and awakens the consciousness of guilt. The sense of guilt involves a consciousness of personal desert of punishment and of personal obligation to yield satisfaction. Guilt and the consciousness of guilt are distinguished as respectively the objective and subjective results of sin. And just because the sense of guilt is proportioned to the sensitiveness of conscience, whereas guilt is directly a relation to God, we cannot expect the consciousness of guilt to be coextensive with guilt, but ordinarily an aggravation of sin, carrying with it enhanced guilt, leads to an effacing of conscience and an enfeebling of the consciousness of guilt. Strictly speaking, we cannot distinguish degrees of guilt, for the guilt of every sin in God's sight is unconditioned. Guilt is infinite, because just at this point the life of the finite creature comes into contact with the infinitude of God.[1]

The third consequence of the fall is inability on the part of the sinner to redeem or restore himself. The *liberum arbitrium* was lost by sin and has given place to the *servum arbitrium*. Sinful man no longer exercises his choice under such conditions as he did before the fall. His will is an enslaved will, acting with a bias toward evil. His inability to regain the favour and fellowship of God is natural and moral, his natural faculties being enfeebled and his will corrupted and averted from God. His freedom of choice is within narrow limits. He may order his outward life according to worldly maxims of a more or less elevated character, but in regard to spiritual things in reaching to faith or coming to God no good works of his are of any avail.[2] Pelagianism denies altogether this disabling effect of sin; synergism admits the inability of the sinner unaided to do anything for his salvation, but insists that he co-operates to this end with the Spirit. Scripture distinctly teaches a

[1] See Kähler, *Die Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre*, Leipzig, 1893, p. 282.

[2] This doctrine is well expressed in *Westminster Confession of Faith*, xvi. 7, and in *Thirty-Nine Articles*, art. x.

doctrine of sin which involves that of total depravity, and a doctrine of the sinfulness of man which involves that of total inability. This total depravity does not mean monstrous wickedness, but simply that the sinner as such is in an utterly false relation to God and that his whole life in every part of it is wrong before God. And total inability, as the consequence not of a whole series of sinful actions and a long course of sinful conduct, but as the consequence of sin and therefore of the first sin, is not a physical or natural inability but a moral inability, which is stronger and more influential upon the life than any physical or natural power could ever be. This inability is absolute helplessness before God in the matter of putting ourselves right with him, total inability in view of any movement toward redemption or recovery.

§ 37. Consequences to the Race.

Literature.—Jonathan Edwards, *A Treatise on Original Sin*, orig. ed. 1758. Müller, *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, Edin. 1868, ii. 226–357. Clemen, *Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde*, Gött. 1897, pp. 57–68. Rothe, *Dogmatik* (1870), i. 284–289, 307–314. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Edin. 1874, ii. 192–277. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, 4th ed., New York, 1893, pp. 308–340. Hase, *Evang.-protest. Dogmatik*, 6th ed., Leipzig, 1870, pp. 63–84. Strauss, *Die christliche Glaubenslehre*, Tüb. 1841, ii. 34–74. Wiggers, *Historical Presentation of Augustinianism and Pelagianism*, Andover, 1840. Mozley, *Lectures and other Theological Papers*, Lond. 1863, pp. 136–162: "IX.—Original Sin"; also *Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination*, 3rd ed. 1883, pp. 100–126, 30–34, 338–350, 378–386. Bruce, *The Providential Order of the World*, Lond. 1897, chap. xi.: "Providential Methods: Solidarity," pp. 310–344. Stearns, *Present-Day Theology*, Lond. 1893, pp. 321–342: "Sin and Man's Race Relations." Orr, *Christian View of God and the World*, p. 198 f. Denney, *Studies in Theology*, Lond. 1895, pp. 79–96.

The fact of the universality of sin has not been seriously questioned. As a matter of experience we see traces of its presence everywhere, no rational individual free from its taint,

no department of the animal kingdom exempt from the blight which it has brought. There is perversion and degeneration more or less in every human life, opposition everywhere between man and God. History, too, and the record of observations made in all lands and under all circumstances, show that, in all ages and in all regions and among all races, sin has been working havoc in every life. Perhaps the most striking testimony of all to the fact of the absolute universality of sin in the human race is the reluctance shown by those who take a purely humanitarian view of the nature of Jesus Christ to admit that even He forms any exception to the general rule. As to the teaching of Scripture, no critic with any regard to his reputation would venture to deny that the doctrine of the universal spread of sin among men was taught, and that the fact of the universality of sin was clearly recognised. "It is not a question," says Müller (ii. 255), "concerning the import of a few isolated texts; the truth runs throughout the whole of the Old Testament, and still more throughout the New." There are passages in the Old Testament in which the doctrine is explicitly stated,[1] and there are others of the strongest description which afford a very powerful support to the doctrine of original or hereditary sin.[2] Similar express statements may also be gathered from various parts of the New Testament. But when it is remembered that Scripture is a revelation of redemption, we have the most convincing proof that Scripture recognises the fact of the universal sinfulness of man, and is based upon the recognition of that fact, in this, that that redemption is everywhere described as needed by all, and therefore offered to all, and that all who do not accept it remain under condemnation, even those who regard themselves as righteous, and who may be acknowledged generally as relatively good. It is quite evident that one great object steadily kept in view by the writers of the Old and New Testaments is to produce in men a deeper sense of their sinfulness. Men find themselves

[1] 1 Kings viii. 46; Ps. cxliii. 2; Eccles. vii. 20.
[2] Ps. li. 5; Job xiv. 4; Gen. viii. 21.

driven out of every refuge of self-righteousness, and see that all forms of righteousness in which they had boasted are only varying measures of sin.

In the earlier books of the Old Testament, and in the notions of early human society as represented there, it would appear as if the family or race rather than the individual was regarded as the subject of sin. Hence, without any apparent consciousness of the unfairness of such procedure, these early writers represent communities as involved in the guilt and punishment of offences committed by any of their members. Even in patriarchal times, indeed, the destruction of the good in a community on account of the wickedness of those around them awakened occasionally a protest, but ordinarily the fact was simply recorded without any indication that it had called forth any question or suggested any doubt of its rightness. In the writings, again, of the prophets, the recognition of individual responsibility for personal action is much more frequent and more regularly determines their point of view, so that neither the righteousness nor the sin of another shall be imputed to any man, but that each one suffers and dies for his own sin. This prophetic reaction reaches its highest point in Ezekiel. See chap. xviii.; comp. also xiv. 13 ff., xxxiii. 12 ff. In the latest of the Old Testament writers, again, it would seem as if there had been a return to the earliest views, which are restated in the crudest and most uncompromising way. The indiscriminate slaughter of communities in which any wickedness had been committed is recorded by chroniclers and later historians, as well as by prophets of the restoration and various psalmists of that age, while in Job and in many of the Psalms the special problem consists in the accounting for this destruction of the righteous with the wicked. It is to be noted, however, that in all the periods of Old Testament literature there is a certain vacillation of view regarding this question, so that those who speak most of the universality of guilt and punishment because of the offences of individuals are not without a consciousness of the moral responsibility of the individual sinner; and those, again, who express most

strongly the truth that the sinner shall die for his own sin are not unaware of the influence which each act of sin has in respect of guilt and punishment on the whole community. In the line of such passages in the canonical books of the Old Testament we do not find any explicit statement accounting for the reckoning of the sin of one or of a few to the many by the doctrine of the solidarity of the race, and the hereditary guilt of all by the transgression of the first father of mankind. This explanation is offered by Jewish writers of apocryphal books, and represents their understanding of the teaching of their sacred Scriptures. This is done explicitly, first of all, by the author of Ecclesiasticus (chap. xxv. 24): "From a woman was the beginning of sin, and because of her we all die." To the same effect is the oft-quoted passage in 2 Esdras vii. 116 ff.: "It had been better that the earth had not given thee Adam; or else, when it had given him, to have restrained him from sinning. For what profit is it for all that are in this present time to live in heaviness, and after death to look for punishment? O thou Adam, what hast thou done? for though it was thou that sinned, the evil is not fallen on thee alone, but upon all of us that come of thee. For what profit is it unto us, if there be promised to us an immortal time, whereas we have done the works that bring death?" It is only by means of the most elaborate and ingenious party pleading that such passages can be made to teach anything else than the doctrine of the sin and guilt of the race as transmitted from the sin of the first man.[1] The whole context of the Esdras passage is most interesting. There we find (ver. 102 ff.) that Ezra is told that in the day of judgment there shall be no intercession on behalf of friends, but every one shall have to bear his own righteousness and unrighteousness. So that here again we have the unsolved antinomy which the Old Testament history presents to view, hereditary guilt and personal responsibility for our individual misdeeds, suffering the penalty of Adam's sin and punished

[1] See the attempt made by Clemen, *Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde*, pp. 49, 50.

for our own offences. The relation of all this Old Testament teaching about sinfulness of race and personal accountability to the Christian doctrine of original sin, is very similar to that of the Old Testament implication of distinctions in the Godhead alongside of the truth of the divine unity to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. In either case, there is an antinomy which the Old Testament does not seek to solve, and which is soluble only in the fuller light of the New Testament revelation. At the same time, it is to be remembered that we are entitled, and indeed required, to read and interpret the Old Testament from the evangelical or Christian point of view. Apart from the light of the New Testament, we might consider that the writer of the 51st Psalm was simply expressing the intensity of his consciousness of sin and guilt, and that his words meant no more than this, that he felt himself to be so thoroughly sinful, so utterly bad, that he could not conceive of evil in him ever having had a beginning, but that it had been there with him from the very first. It is when we accept Christ's teaching about sin that we find that this is true, not as a feeling merely but as a fact, and that it is true of all.

In the New Testament we have the same clear statement of the two sides of the truth, the record of sufferings endured on account of membership in a corrupt and guilty race, and the definite declaration that no one suffers without having personally committed offences which deserve such punishment. But in the New Testament, not only have we the fact of the universal sinfulness of mankind clearly stated, but we have the doctrine of original sin expressly formulated as a theory to account for this universal fact. Besides a multitude of passages in which this doctrine is assumed, or more or less clearly expressed, we have two notable expositions of the doctrine which may be regarded as classical proof passages for this important dogma. These are Rom. v. 12 ff., and Eph. ii. 3. The importance of Rom. v. 12 ff. is shown by the persistency and elaborateness of the attempts made to turn its teaching aside from the traditional interpretation. What

ought to be quite clear is, that the apostle introduces a comparison between Adam and Christ, which begins with a parallel and passes into a contrast. To make Paul teach a doctrine of pure individualism, to insist that he says, "All die because all have sinned personally by their own proper actions," is to make him say that none die until they are capable of moral decision, which is absurd. All the best exegetes of modern times, whatever their own personal views about the doctrine of original sin may be, are agreed that Paul here bases his argument upon the fact of the solidarity of the human race. Clemen's[1] objection,—that the parallel between Adam and Christ as race representatives breaks down because not all, as in Adam, but only those who submit to the condition of believing, are in Christ,—though acute, is quite groundless, for what is insisted on is simply the fact that all who die, die because they had sinned in Adam, and that all who live, live because they have obtained life in Christ. The apostle accounts for the fact of the universality of sin, and

[1] *Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde*. p. 55. Clemen goes into great detail in the examination of texts in the Old and New Testaments which have been supposed to teach our doctrine. The over subtlety of his arguments shows the keenness of the dogmatist rather than the ingenuousness and disinterestedness of a true exegete. He reaches the conclusion that the doctrine of original sin is taught only in the third chapter of Genesis, and that of inborn sin of any description no trace is to be found in holy Scripture. The introduction of the comparison of Adam and Christ is quite pointless, unless we assume that the transmission of sin to all men from Adam is as real as the transmission of righteousness to all believers is from Christ. The objection which many entertain to this doctrine would be removed if it were remembered that Paul is not here speaking of man's eternal destiny, and that the solidarity of the race with its first head is limited to the range of the natural life. "To understand Paulinism," says Dr. Bruce, "we must carefully note the distinction between ἁμαρτία and παράβασις. ἁμαρτία is objective and common ; παράβασις is subjective and personal. ἁμαρτία entails some evil effects, but παράβασις is necessary to guilt and final condemnation." The passage is thus understood by Meyer, Philippi, Godet, Beyschlag, Sanday, and Headlam. The last named, in their *Commentary*, p. 138, show how far Paul may be regarded as agreeing with his Jewish contemporaries. He presents the two sides of the problem: "Man inherits his nature, yet he cannot shift responsibility from himself." An interesting attempt to give another explanation of the passage is to be found in Rothe, *Neuerer Versuch einer Auslegung der Paulinischen Stelle Rom.* v. 12-21, Leipzig, 1836.

of death following, by the sin of the first man, the head and representative of the race, which brought sin and death into the world and race of man. As Dr. Bruce says, "The rendering of the Vulgate, *in quo omnes peccaverunt*, is grammatically wrong, for ἐφ' ᾧ does not mean 'in whom,' but 'because,' yet essentially right." In the Ephesian passage all men, we who are now believers and all the rest of mankind, are described as *by nature* children of wrath. It is not exegesis but only dogmatic prejudice that interprets this passage to mean simply that in the natural state, as opposed to the state of grace, all are under wrath. Paul teaches, indeed, that each man makes his choice, but here he undertakes to explain why it is that all make choice of sin. "They are all dead to God through trespasses and sins, and they have all trespassed and sinned because all have this sinful nature. The nature is therefore evidently something antecedent to all sinful acts consequent upon the sinful choice."[1] We cannot for a moment separate the recognition of personal transgression from that of the inherited sinful taint in our nature, which has descended from the first parent to all the members of the race. Consciousness of guilt carries us back to find beneath sinful actions the corrupt nature out of which they spring.

Differences of view, however, arise when we turn from the consideration of the extensive and that of the intensive spread of sin in man. A great variety of opinions has arisen in regard to the extent of human depravity. Between the extremes of Pelagianism and Flacianism numerous shades of doctrinal opinions intervene, but in evangelical theology the chief interest lies in the conflict between a synergism like that of Melanchthon and the uncompromising doctrine of total depravity in the strict Lutheran and Calvinistic creeds. In its most extreme forms, Pelagianism takes a purely atomistic view of sin, and accounts for its universal spread among men

[1] Macpherson, *Commentary on Ephesians*, Edin. 1892, p. 190. See also Müller, *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, Edin. 1868, vol. ii. p. 279; Philippi, *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*, Stuttg. 1867, iii. 217–219.

by the power of example and the innate principle of imitation. It considers and seeks to explain acts of sin rather than the sinful habit.

We have an interesting revival of the extremest form of Pelagianism in the Ritschlian doctrine of sin. Ritschl makes sin consist in acts, not in states; denies the evidence of original sin, maintaining that it is transmitted, not by nature but by education and surrounding influences. "As a personal propensity in the life of each individual, it originates, so far as our observation reaches, out of the sinful desire and action which as such finds its adequate ground in the self-determination of the individual will."[1] This superficial view of sin, accompanied as it necessarily is by a miserably attenuated doctrine of repentance, and leading on to a most inadequate and unsatisfactory doctrine of redemption, empties the Ritschlian system of all positive contents. The successful polemic of Augustine against Pelagius may be employed against Ritschl with little, if any, modification. It is also very evident that this Ritschlian denial of original sin and of transmission of evil in the nature is in direct conflict with the whole drift of all that is best and most assured in modern thought and science.

From this standpoint no regard is paid to questions of heredity, or to the fact of the transmission of qualities of any kind from generation to generation. There is here, in short, no race problem at all. Such a theory can receive no serious support in modern times. However greatly speculations may vary in their explanation of the meaning and range of heredity, everywhere transmission of qualities to a greater or less extent is recognised. A theory which neglects to recognise, and makes no attempt to account for, such a fact will be repudiated by all as hopelessly inadequate and superficial. It is at best only a superficial, and therefore only a seeming, advantage that the Pelagian theory can ever have. It seems to give a fair field and full scope to human freedom. But it

[1] Ritschl, *Rechtfertigkeit und Versöhnung*, 3rd ed., Bonn, 1889, iii. p. 331. See Orr, *Christian View of God and the World*, p. 109.

does this by ignoring the other side of the problem, avoiding the difficulty by refusing to raise the question as to the invariableness of the decision for evil. It is a theory that fails to account for the facts of the case, and is plausible only so long as these facts are forgotten or ignored. A candid consideration of the facts of experience shows that the freedom exercised is strangely limited and restricted. It might seem as if the facts of the case could really be satisfactorily accounted for on the hypothesis of an actual fall by means of a deliberate evil choice by each individual at the moment when moral consciousness awoke. Even then it might perhaps require a Manichæan doctrine of the flesh to explain why in every case the choice of freedom resulted in a fall, and in that case freedom would be but a phantom. But even apart from this, in order that such a hypothesis should be of any service in the way of affording basis for a doctrine of personal responsibility, it would be necessary that the particular exercise of freedom which resulted in the fall should be to each individual a fact of consciousness in his personal life, and therefore remembered during the course of his subsequent history. Yet it is notorious that no such consciousness exists. Hence Julius Müller felt obliged to postulate an ante-temporal exercise of freedom under no such limiting conditions. But besides the absolute gratuitousness of the hypothesis, the help which it renders in the solution of the problem is not apparent. At most it shifts the difficulty back somewhat, and secures for the transaction unknown instead of known surroundings. Dorner has acutely observed, in his criticism of Müller's theory of pre-existence, that that theory is indeed the necessary complement of the defining of sin as spiritual selfishness. But if we find this to be a wrong or too narrow a definition of the essence of sin, then this theory serves no end. We complain in regard to it, as we do in regard to the Pelagian theory, that it fails to recognise any influence of race, and the only semblance of help in the solution of the enigma of the universal prevalence of sin results from the importation of the idea, utterly

unwarranted by the theory itself, that only spirits who had fallen in that ante-temporal probation make their appearance upon the earth.

These are the two principal theories which seek to account for the universality of sin, without deriving it as an immediate consequence of Adam's first sin,—the superficial Pelagian theory, which so minimises the guilt of sin, and takes so external a view of it, that it regards the influence of example sufficient to account for its universal spread; and the subtler and more promising theory of pre-existence, which supposes men to start in this world from an ethical standpoint, determined for them by something that happened in their own individual case, and not in that of their first parent, according to their temporal history. Under neither of these theories does the fall of Adam hold any very serious or distinctive place. If Pelagianism sacrificed the idea of the intensity of the consciousness of personal guilt in order to be able freely to admit the extensive spread of sin among men, Müller, while on the other hand endeavouring to maintain and even enhance that idea, equally fails to recognise any race sin, or to rise above the consideration of an accumulation of separate sinful acts.

No doctrine of the universal spread of sin can be satisfactory which ignores the fact of the solidarity of mankind. This is no mere theological doctrine or philosophical theory adopted as the basis of a theological position, but a fact of common experience, the presence of which is recognised in physiological psychology as well as in morals and religion. Humanity, as it has been well said, is a macrocosm constituted by microcosms; its life and activity revolve like an ellipse round two foci, the one the individual, the other the organic.[1] In modern science the principle of heredity corresponds to that of original sin in theology. The theologian is not seriously concerned with discussions among scientists as to the extent of the range within which this principle of heredity is applicable. It is not the question as to whether even

[1] See Simon, *The Redemption of Man*, Edin. 1889, p. 101.

acquired qualities are transmitted, or only inborn and constitutional variations, that is of interest in theology, but only the general position that invariably there is transmission from generation to generation, whatever the range of that transmission may be. The acknowledged fact that qualities are transmitted is an acknowledgment that men are not a mere multitude of individuals but a race, that we can speak not only of men but also of man or mankind. But this idea of race necessarily involves that of a head, a first parent, from whom all individual men obtain their generic relation to one another. Questions may indeed arise as to the nature of this headship, the nature of the transmission from the first parent to his posterity. But it is clear that, upon our acceptance of this race conception and its application to man, we necessarily pass from those theories which seek to account for the universal spread of sin by mere imitation of the example of predecessors. Necessarily also we pass from all attempts to account for the fact by means of theories of pre-existence, inasmuch as these recognise no transmission of guilt, and regard only personal acts of sin,—all men who come into the world having committed such acts in an extra-temporal state of existence. The theories of the universal spread of sin, which we proceed now to consider, are all based upon the recognition of the fact that men are members of a race, and that the action of the first parent in some way affects all his descendants.

Reluctance to admit in any true sense the idea of *imputation* of Adam's sin, and particularly the guilt of that sin, to his posterity, has led to the devising of expedients to escape that conclusion. Arminians hold that the descendants of Adam are at birth depraved but yet able to co-operate with the Spirit, that their physical and intellectual constitution is corrupted but that no guilt of Adam's sin is imputed, that only their own acts in opposition to the strivings of the Spirit ratify the deed of Adam. Placeus, of Saumur (1606–1655), disinclined to accept the doctrine of imputation, formulated what has been called the theory of mediate

imputation, according to which men are born with a depraved nature, which is the source of all actual sin and is itself sin. This is not an immediate imputation of Adam's sin, as if he had been our representative head, but mediate in consequence of that corruption which itself is the result of Adam's sin. It is rightly objected to this theory, that it makes man responsible for the effect but not for the cause, that it does not explain the sense of guilt in regard to this inborn depravity, that it fails to vindicate the justice, that it is without support of Scripture.

Those theories which do not to the full extent accept the doctrine of the imputation of the guilt of Adam's sin to his posterity—whether, as in Pelagianism, they deny race responsibility altogether, or, as in Arminianism, so modify the doctrine that what is imputed is nothing more than a corruption which implies no transmission of guilt—entirely fail to account for the appearance of sin from the first in every human life.

The only theory which unreservedly recognises the two sides of the truth, giving unimpaired expression at once to the fact that men are members of a race descended from a first parent who falls, and that they are moral individuals personally responsible for their actions, is that usually called the Augustinian. Augustine (354–430) elaborated a theory in which the views of his contemporaries and chief predecessors, at least among the Latin fathers, were systematised and more sharply and accurately defined. It took form originally in the polemic against Pelagius; and in opposition to the atomistic theory of Pelagianism, in which sin was represented as consisting in particular acts, it set forth the doctrine of a sinful state in which these particular acts had their origin. It was clearly seen that the problem lay in the accounting for the origin of this sinful condition. All men come into the world with a depraved nature, and this corruption has its origin in the sin of Adam. The relation of the first man to the race was that of natural head. All men were in him, not individually, but seminally. The

essence of mankind was summed up in him, to be afterwards individualised and distributed in the several members of the race. Adam was indeed a person, but also human personality. His act, which had a determining influence on his character, was that of the race, producing in all the individuals of it the same effect. The imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, therefore, was not the ascribing to them of something that was another's, but of something that was their own.

An attempt was made by the federal school (Cocceius, Witsius, etc.) to explain the imputation of Adam's sin by the theory of a covenant, in terms of which God constituted Adam representative head of the race. Some sought to justify this by the assumption that God had foreseen that all Adam's descendants would make the same decision as he had made, and that so he had passed judgment upon them, imputing Adam's sin to them, without waiting till separate acts of personal decision had been performed. This attempted solution by means of the *scientia Dei media* as an *imputatio metaphysica* implies at least an ideal pre-existence, men existing in the thought of God, and dealt with as such. But if this principle were to be applied generally, we should expect to see God cutting off those whose persistent rejection of His grace were equally foreseen by Him. Such procedure is not in accordance with God's known way of working. Apart, however, from this, the federal theory of original sin, as distinguished from the Augustinian, accounts for hereditary guilt by assuming, not that all men participated in Adam's sin, but that they were represented by Adam. It has been accepted in recent times by such honoured theologians as Dr. Hodge and Professor Candlish.[1] Yet the introduction of representation instead of participation seems to increase rather than remove the difficulty. By expressly conceiving of original sin as the sin of another, the guilt of which is ascribed to us in terms of a covenant to which we were made

[1] Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Edin. 1874, vol. ii. pp. 196–205. Candlish *The Biblical Doctrine of Sin*, Edin. 1893, pp. 118–121.

parties without our knowledge, the difficulty of attaching to it any idea of personal guilt is greatly enhanced. The idea of a covenant here is really a mere figment. The theory brings no relief, and only introduces further confusion. Besides, it makes use of the word imputation to mean, not as it should, the ascription to men of that which really belongs to them, but the ascription to them by a legal fiction of what is in no sense their own.

Various theories, or at least varying modes of expression, are current among the fathers as explanations of the principle upon which the headship of Adam is based. Tertullian and certain other Latin fathers boldly adopted the Traducian theory, which seemed to afford an easy explanation of the transmission of a corrupt nature from a first who had himself become corrupted. The soul of Adam is *matrix omnium*, and natural propagation carries down the corrupt nature, and with it the moral blame (*culpa*) attaching to it. Augustine saw that this theory was too purely physical, that therefore it does not sufficiently emphasise the moral accountability of men, who are represented by it rather as innocent sufferers of a penalty from Adam's guilty sinfulness. Unmodified Traducianism can be maintained only on the basis of a Flacian doctrine of the substantial sinfulness of human nature. Hence we find Augustine combining with his Traducian theory of physical transmission the idea of voluntary participation, that in Adam men were not passive merely but also active. As first parent of mankind, Adam is *homo generalis*, and our *will* (*voluntas*), if not our person, pre-exists in him.

This theory of Augustine, which is properly the church doctrine, as to the relation of Adam to the race, and particularly as to the effect of Adam's sin upon mankind, undoubtedly has left certain difficulties unsolved, but these would seem to be insoluble. Its commendation is this, that it is a hypothesis which explains the facts as given in experience and Scripture. The biblical doctrine of the sin of mankind as given in the Old and New Testament is un-

doubtedly accounted for by this hypothesis, and by it only. Throughout the Old Testament the universality of sin is everywhere assumed. There are not only isolated acts of sin, but also underlying these a perverted and depraved nature, with a bias against God and holiness. Even righteous men are not sinless. "The individual does not, by any voluntary act of his own, give his animal life with its sensuality and selfishness the predominance it has. He receives it along with his human nature. 'Behold, I was shapen in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me,' is the complaint of the psalmist-poet, who does not mean to represent the mode of ordinary human generation as sinful, but to assert that, from the very first, the human embryo grows in a soil positively sinful. Hence our nature as every one gets it as the basis of his personal development is, from the first, under the influence of a tendency which is preponderatingly sensual and selfish."[1] Strong expression is given to the view that sinfulness is characteristic of the flesh by nature of man, but this need not be regarded, as Schultz would have it, as evidence that these writers considered sin as a necessity in the creature made of dust. It is simply the fact that sinfulness and frailty characterise all men in their present state that is emphasised by such expressions as these. And this conception was one that found a ready response in the hearts of all deep thinkers and earnest-minded men. Everyone not utterly superficial and frivolous must, in the face of the universal spread of sin, insist upon an answer as to the reason of this universality. He can find no beginning of sin in himself or in other men. No other theory is sufficient to account for the only too evident facts but that which holy Scripture offers, that by reason of the fall of the head of the race all men came into existence with a corrupt nature. We begin, therefore, with a tendency to sin which manifests itself in sinful actions whenever an opportunity of choice between good and evil is given.

[1] Schultz, *Old Testament Theology*, Edin. 1892, vol. ii. p. 297.

§ 38. The Nature of Sin.

Literature.—Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Edin. 1888, ii. 373–397. Müller, *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, Edin. 1868, i. 28–192. Clemen, *Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde*, Gött. 1897, pp. 20–42, 179–215. Rothe, *Theologische Ethik*, Wittenberg, 1870, iii. 1–40. Candlish, *The Biblical Doctrine of Sin*, 1893, pp. 58–68. Macpherson, "Christian Doctrine of the Nature and Origin of Sin," in *Brit. and For. Evangel. Review*, vol. xxiii. 1874, pp. 653–660. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, New York, 1893, pp. 283–295. Frank, *System der christlichen Wahrheit*, Erlangen, 1894, i. 447–450. Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik*, Freiburg, 1892, pp. 305, 313–318. Hase, *Evangelisch-protestantische Dogmatik*, 6th ed., Leipzig, 1870, p. 56.

All the words used in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament denoting sin point to some failure to reach a mark or to keep a straight course. Conformity is required to a prescribed rule, and a standard is presented according to which man's life is to be moulded. This canon of rectitude is found in the law as the revelation of God's will addressed to man. Ultimately, indeed, this standard is God Himself in His righteousness and holiness. Hence sin, which is want of conformity to the will of God or transgression of His law, is a turning away from and a rebellion against God. So long as sin is regarded from an objective point of view, it is quite enough to define it as disobedience against God. This sin from its origin is sin in the true sense, as carrying with it guilt and the consciousness of guilt. But in view of the guilt of sin, we cannot rest in an objective definition of sin, in a theory of sin in terms of a divine decree or a divine command. The question arises as to the subjective origin or spring of sin in man, what it is in man that gives the first impulse to the sinful act, and what constitutes the seat of sinful habit or condition in man.

The Fathers for the most part contented themselves with the position that the original principle of sin is pride, connecting this strictly with the account of the fall given in Genesis.

This pride was defined as a perversion of the will in a false striving after independence and renunciation of creaturely dependence upon God. Closely associated with this was a false exercise of the understanding, expressing itself in doubt of God's word and an inordinate longing after possession of what was forbidden. But it is evident that here we have too much. All this cannot be classed together as constituting the primary principle of sin, but much, if not all, must rather be reckoned as the fruit or consequence of sin. We seem to get nearer to the conception of a single ultimate principle of sin when we attach ourselves to the biblical conception of "the flesh" (Old Testament בָּשָׂר, New Testament Σάρξ). In the interpretation of this biblical term, as indicating the original seat of sin in man, two opposing schools arose, one of which made *sensuousness*, and the other *selfishness*, the primary principle of sin. According to the understanding of the one class of interpreters, the tracing of sin back to the flesh meant that sin took its rise in the lower sensuous nature of man, that it began in sense and spread as corruption into the higher parts of man's being. According to the view of the other class of interpreters, it meant rather that the whole man, in that highest part of his being which dominates all the rest, became corrupt by aversion from God and the substituting of self for God, and by seeking the realisation of self apart from God. The leading representatives of the theory of the sensuous origin of sin, in early times, were Chrysostom, and Cyril of Alexandria, and in modern times, Schleiermacher, Rothe, and Hofmann, each of course in his own way and from his own peculiar standpoint. The theory of the spiritual origin of sin as selfishness is that of Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin, reasserted among the moderns most energetically by Julius Müller, who is followed, in a rather more guarded and less one-sided manner, by Dorner, Frank, and Nitzsch. Both theories are adversely criticised by Dr. Hodge (ii. 140–149) in favour of a definition of sin as alienation from God and opposition to His character and will, which seems, like the mode of statement

prevailing among the Fathers, to describe the consequences rather than the primary principle of sin.

The biblical doctrine of the essential character of sin will be most clearly ascertained by a presentation of the Pauline view of the flesh as the seat of sin.[1] It should be borne in mind that Paul in no single instance speaks about "flesh" in the abstract. He is not speculating as to what, viewed in itself, the flesh might be or ought to be; but he is dealing with facts of experience, with flesh as he finds it in himself and in those around. In Paul's use of this term no countenance whatsoever is given to any sort of Manichæan idea of the necessary sinfulness of man's nature regarded from the physical or material side. In all the principle writings of the apostle the word "flesh" (σάρξ) is used in what might seem a very considerable variety of meanings, though this variety consists rather in the wider or narrower application of the one real signification of the word. The term "flesh" is certainly never used as synonymous or coterminous with sin, nor is it in any case identified with the material bodily substance of men. The σάρξ is the whole man, consisting of body and living soul, the whole living organism of sense and intellect, emotions and will. With Paul, "flesh" is stricly convertible with "myself," his whole human personality (Rom. vii. 18). Much confusion might be avoided if it were remembered that Paul speaks of the flesh, not as the source of sin but as the seat of sin's manifestation, not as the spring from which sin issues but as the organ by which sin works

[1] By far the most thorough investigation of the biblical and theological meaning of the word "flesh" is to be found in Dickson, *St. Paul's Use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit*, Glasgow, 1883, pp. 244-343. In this same work (pp. 1-62, 345-448) we have an admirable account of the views of Baur, Holsten, Pfleiderer, Lüdemann, Wendt, and others. See also article Σάρξ in Cremer's *Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek*. Interesting discussions on the Pauline use of the word σάρξ are given in Pfleiderer, *Paulinism*, London, 1877, i. pp. 47-67; Weizsäcker, *The Apostolic Age*, London, 1894, i. 148-154; Köstlin, *Lehrbegriff der Evangeliums Johannis*, etc., Berlin, 1843, pp. 296-298; Daehne, *Entwickelung des Paulinischen Lehrbegriffs*, Halle, 1835, pp. 64-67. For similar use of the word in Philo, see Hatch, *Essays in Biblical Greek*, Oxford, 1889, p. 112.

and comes forth into view. Even in those passages that seem most narrowly to identify sin with the movements of the lower parts of man's nature, where the apostle speaks of the body and its members (Rom. vi. 12, 19, vii. 5, 23), the members (μέλη) are represented as the organs which display outwardly what has been decided upon by an inward purpose. Consequently the sins wrought by the members of the body, *e.g.* by the tongue or the hand, may be sins which have a directly spiritual origin. And hence the Pauline notion of "the flesh" cannot be rationally adduced as a testimony in favour of the theory of the sensuous origin of sin. The real purpose of the apostle's teaching on this subject will appear if we bear in mind and give its proper significance to the fact that the contrast which Paul seeks to emphasise is that between "the flesh" and "the spirit." That this is essentially a contrast between the natural and the supernatural, between the σάρξ and the Πνεῦμα, as the antithesis between the human and the divine, or that of the natural state of man and his regenerate state or ideal Christian condition, will be the conclusion reached from a fair and candid examination of the whole biblical use of the word, and more particularly Rom. viii. 4–13. "The flesh" is "the old man" constituting apart from Christ the whole man, and hence in the regenerate, wherever the sinful element is allowed to survive "the flesh," is represented as thrusting itself into a place that ought to be occupied by the πνεῦμα. It is really this same contrast which presents itself in Rom. vii. 18, 25. What, therefore, "the flesh" stands opposed to is not the higher elements of human nature, as if we should oppose the sensual and spiritual powers or tendencies in man, but all that belongs to fallen human nature as opposed to spiritual power and influence from above. And thus σάρξ, as representing the revolt of the human against the divine, must be regarded as assigning to sin not a sensuous but a spiritual principle. It is important to deny emphatically that "the flesh" is to be regarded as in itself sinful, in order to vindicate the sinlessness of Jesus. It is

contended by Holsten and others that sinful flesh (σάρξ ἁμαρτίας), Rom. viii. 3, means that which from its nature is necessarily and essentially sinful. The true interpretation of Paul's teaching regarding the flesh, as the field in which the principle of sin works, enables us to conceive of Jesus as coming in the flesh and yet knowing no sin.

On the other hand, it must be admitted that in many of the Pauline phrases there is a very distinct suggestion of a sensual element in all human sin. While the flesh as the seat of sin is by no means confined to the grosser parts of human nature, it still includes these, and that in such a way as to indicate that the physical, though not the merely physical, largely determines the character of human sin. No sin of man is purely spiritual any more than it is purely sensual, but in all sin there is a spiritual and a sensual side. Speaking of Paul's use of the term "the flesh," Weizsäcker well says: "The list of the sins which proceed from the flesh proves that he by no means limits it to sensuality or sensuous desire; every revolt against God's command and the higher order is comprehended in it. But yet the revolt was clearly imaged in the strength of the sensuous existence with its independent impulses guided by no command, and directed to unrestricted self-assertion; and this character is inseparably connected with the natural character of man's life in soul and body." [1] At the same time, the assigning to every revolt against God's command a sensuous source would require a very unnatural and strained use of language, and not less so would the assigning of every such revolt to a purely spiritual source. That the attempt to represent the fundamental sin as purely spiritual is altogether incompatible with the conditions of life in this world, and of human consciousness, is shown by the difficulty in which Müller found himself when he persisted in making this reduction of sin to selfishness. In order that sin might be conceived of as purely spiritual, it was necessary to postulate in the case of each individual the exercise of conscious freedom. Thinking to secure the

[1] *The Apostolic Age*, London, 1894. vol. i. p. 153 f.

possibility of this in an extra-temporal state of existence, he postulated a pre-existence in which, *ex hypothesi*, such conscious freedom was exercised by each individual reappearing in time with the same result, thus accounting for the universality of human sin. But, as we have seen, this hypothesis, besides being one that lacks any sort of warrant, is one that affords no help. The fall from God into spiritual selfishness is outside of present consciousness, and for the present consciousness of individual men can carry with it no sense of responsibility and guilt. The consciousness of sin and the consciousness of guilt with reference to any particular act or state must necessarily belong to the same state of consciousness. But if the hypothesis of an extra-temporal fall be repudiated, the theory of the origin of sin as an act of spiritual selfishness, as proposed by Müller, fails, for it describes the temporal fall as one into sensuousness, the temptation to which the human spirit, born into the world weak, is unable to resist. The only fall of which human consciousness can take account is one brought about by temptation addressed to the sensuous side of man's nature. This failure of the most ingenious and elaborate attempt of Müller to establish for human sin a purely spiritual origin already points the way to the true solution. In selfishness, not purely spiritual but embracing sensuous elements, we find the fundamental principle of sin. The selfishness in which the very essence of sin consists does not include all thought of and attention to self. There is a self-love and a self-saving that constitute the highest duty of man. Sin only comes in when self-culture passes over into self-cultus. The creaturely self should seek its self-realisation in God; but sin consists in the seeking of this realisation apart from God, in seeking for self the chief good, not in God but in the creature. Sin is a living to self in the same sense in which the new regenerate life is described as a living to God; it is the worshipping and serving of the creature rather than the Creator (Rom. i. 25). But the creatureliness of the self makes devotion to it a sensuous as well as a spiritual selfish-

ness. Hence in this misplacement of self we have the source at once of sensual and spiritual sins. In either form sin implies a perversion both of will and understanding, which gives abundant ground for the biblical description of all sin as the believing of a lie.

The sinful condition into which this primary act of selfishness brings man is described as one in which man is no longer in the possession of freedom, but is under guilt and condemnation. Sin brings with it not only a consciousness of guilt but also a loss of moral power for determination and performance. We have already interpreted the doctrine of the universality of sin as meaning not only that of no mere man can it be said that he is without sin, but also as affirming that no part of human nature and no act of any individual man is free from the taint of sin. From the loss of moral power which we have inherited all our actions must of necessity be sinful at least from defect. And there is no such thing as guiltless sin.[1] But when we say that all actions of all men are sinful, it is necessary to explain carefully what this means. It does not mean, in the stoic sense of the phrase, that all sins are equal. The stoic sins were vices, failures to attain to or violations of the standard of morality, which of necessity could neither be higher nor lower, less nor more. In Scripture and in Christian theology, sins are violations of a religious standard which may be more or less, higher or lower, because the standard is not an abstract but a living one. As estrangement from God, all sin brings condemnation, so that all men without exception are in need of redemption. The corruption of the whole nature makes it impossible that any particular action in the individual can reach the standard of righteousness before God. From this point of view, Augustine's characterisation of the good deeds of virtuous

[1] Unsuccessful attempts to justify the use of the phrase have been made by Rothe, *Theologische Ethik*, Wittenberg, 1870, vol. iii. p. 60, and by Kaftan, *Das Wesen der christlichen Religion*, Basel, 1888, p. 266 ff.; for as Nitzsch points out (*Lehrbuch d. evangel. Dogmatik*, p. 313), if the child is determined by preponderating tendency toward the sensuous, we must either deny that this bias is sinful, or we must regard the child as the subject of guilt.

heathens as *splendida vitia* may be justified. Practically the same position was assumed by the Reformers when they maintained that unbelief is the one sin that brings down condemnation. There is at least this advantage in viewing the matter from this standpoint, that it emphasises man's need of redemption and gives prominence to the relations of sin and grace. It really means no more in our Church Confessions than the express statement of the apostle: "Without faith it is impossible to please God." It is not the part of the Christian dogmatist to determine or discriminate varieties of degree in culpability either within or without the Christian domain, for that belongs in the one case to Christian and in the other to general ethics. It is within the province of Christian dogmatics only to announce such a doctrine of sin as will prepare the way for the doctrine of the necessity and possibility and reality of redemption. Man has sinned, and his sin is of such a character that he can be delivered from it only by the special interference of God in an act of redeeming love.

III.—THE DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION.

§ 39. Introductory and General.

Literature.—Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, pp. 442–445. Fairbairn, *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology*, London, 1896. Du Bose, *Soteriology of the New Testament*, London, 1892, pp. 1–31. Frank, *System der christlichen Wahrheit*, Erlangen, 1894, vol. ii. pp. 1–8. Kaehler, *Die Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre* (1893), pp. 227–233. Schöberlein, "Erlösung," in Herzog.² iv. 299–309.

The consciousness of sin awakened in man a sense of the need of redemption. The revelation of redemption in Christ Jesus is the divine answer to the cry of human need. Only to a certain extent can a parallel be instituted between the idea of creation and that of redemption, between generation

in the old and regeneration in the new creation. As divine providence is something more than a *creatio continua*, God's love in redemption is something more than His love to the world. The love that decrees redemption is more than the love that creates and then blesses what is good. God is under no necessity, from the perfection of His own nature, to redeem man. If this had been so, every man as created by God might claim from Him redemption. But this is a claim which no man convinced of sin by the Spirit has ever made or ever will make. On the contrary, such a one confesses that God would have been righteous, *i.e.* would have been perfect in His divine character, if He had left him in his sin and condemned him, and that his redemption is the result of a special purpose of divine grace. The doctrine of redemption, therefore, ought not to be treated in the section that deals with sin. When this is done it seems as if sin made redemption a necessity for God as well as for man. A notable instance of this fault is Limborch's *Theologia Christiana* (1686), where the opening chapters of bk. iii., *De Redemptione*, treat in detail of man's sin. The scholastic divines and federalists generally favoured the treatment of "the doctrine of the need of redemption" in immediate connection with the doctrine of sin. So, for example, Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, i. 415–554. Not less objectionable is the course pursued by those who (*e.g.* Schleiermacher, Rothe, Chalmers) go so far as not only to separate the idea of sin and that of redemption, but to make them the two divisions of their systems—the consciousness of sin and the consciousness of salvation or redemption. The treating of the idea of sin in the section which deals with the doctrine of God and His works is at least as unsuitable as treating it in the section which deals with the Redeemer.

§ 40. The Divine Purpose of Redemption.

Literature.—Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, ii. 313–377. Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, pp. 446–485. Stearns, *Present-Day Theology*, London, 1893, pp. 228–247. Mozley, *Augus-*

tinian Doctrine of Predestination (1883), pp. 126–147. Bruce, *Providential Order of the World*, pp. 283–309. Rothe, *Dogmatik*, ii. 3–35. Philippi, *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*, iii. 3–121. Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik*, ii. 307–309. Lipsius, *Lehrbuch der evang.-protest. Dogmatik*, pp. 420–446. Kaehler, *Die Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre*, pp. 220–240. Augustine, *De prædestinatione sanctorum*, Bened. ed. Paris, x. 1690. Owen, *The Person of Christ* (1679), in Works, vol. i., Edin. 1850, p. 54 f. Thomas Goodwin, *Of Christ the Mediator* (1692), in Works, vol. v., Edin. 1863, pp. 3–33.—For the ablest statement of the extreme supralapsarian doctrine, see Twisse, *The Riches of God's Love unto the Vessels of Mercy consistent with His Absolute Hatred and Reprobation of the Vessels of Wrath*, Oxford, 1653. For an exceedingly able and winning exhibition of an evangelical Arminian doctrine, see John Goodwin, *Redemption Redeemed*, London, 1651, espec. chap. iii.: "Concerning the Knowledge and Foreknowledge of God, and the Difference between these and Desires, Purposes, Intentions, and Decrees," pp. 28–40.

Throughout the New Testament, and also to some extent in the Old, we can trace two series of representations of the divine grace manifested toward men—the one describing that grace as offered unrestrictedly to all, and intended by the divine will to embrace all; the other speaking of a selection from among men made by the determinate counsel of God. On the one hand, it is the doctrine of gospels and epistles that it is the will of God that all men should be saved in Christ; and, on the ground of this, assurance is given of God's love as extending to all, and the command to repent and believe is addressed to all, and the blame of failing to obtain this grace is put upon the man who refuses and not upon God, as though He had withheld His gift. But, on the other hand, it is maintained throughout that there is no coming on the part of man apart from this determining will of God, that the will of God determines the coming of the man, that believers are those who were given to Christ by the Father, that no man can come to Christ unless drawn to Him by the Father. Our Lord Himself also distinguishes between the chosen and the called, representing the salvation of the former as absolutely secure.

Quite special importance belongs to Rom. ix.–xi., which has been fitly called the Pauline Theodicy. Various attempts have been made to give the apostle's language the appearance of moderation and to soften down its asperities, but all such efforts have been pronounced by those least inclined to predestinarianism to be utterly futile and perverse. The historical exposition,[1] which sees in it a demonstration of the identity of the will of God in its perfect freedom and the moral principle of history in the temporary rejection of the Jews and the acceptance of the Gentiles, considering the subject dealt with as strictly confined to the present life, or as conveying the intimation that this election of God is of bodies of men or communities,—the Jewish nation, the Christian Church,—to conditions of special privilege and responsibility (Beyschlag, Gore, etc.), seeks to escape the difficulty by denying that we have here any reference to an eternal decree. The description of the apostle's main line of thought is no doubt correct, but it must be remembered that, although special statements must be read in view of the general drift of the argument, these statements must be regarded as themselves severally true in the conception of the writer. All the fairest and most trustworthy exegetes acknowledge that in Rom. ix. 14–25 we have as clear a statement as possible of the absolute sovereignty of God, election originating in the divine will apart from all merit on the part of man, actual or foreseen. It will not do to set over against such passages others which speak in an equally unreserved way of man's freedom and individual responsibility, and to eliminate from the former all that does not seem compatible with the latter. All that is allowable is to give the full and adequate sense of both, recognising the divine sover-

[1] Beyschlag, *Die Paulinische Theodicée* (1868), 2nd ed., Halle, 1895; Gore, "The Argument of Romans ix.–xi.," in *Studia Biblica et Ecclesiastica*, iii. Oxford, 1891, pp. 37–45. See also notes on these chapters, and important excursuses: "The Divine Election," pp. 248–250, and "The Divine Sovereignty in the Old Testament," pp. 257 f., of Sanday and Headlam, *Commentary on Romans*, Edin. 1896. Also Morrison, *An Exposition of the Ninth Chapter of Romans*, Kilmarnock, 1849, 3rd ed., London, 1883.

eignty on the one hand, and the freedom and moral responsibility of man on the other, and acknowledging that Scripture does not attempt any reconciling or harmonising of the two.

In the early Church the freedom of the human will was emphasised in a one-sided manner without any suspicion of a collision between it and the purposings of the absolute will of God. This inadequate view of the Greek fathers found expression subsequently in the West in the doctrine of grace known as Pelagianism. Pelagius, and his colleagues Coelestius and Julian of Eclanum, gave conscious expression to what had been unconsciously set forth before, by deliberately seeking to emphasise the one side after the other side had been brought into view. Augustine was the first to work out a consistent theory in which the absolute will of God had distinct prominence given it. He recognises divine grace as the only ground of man's salvation, the irresistible divine power which works faith in the heart and brings the gift of perseverance to those who are to be saved. Human freedom in believing is the result, not the cause or condition, of grace. Not human freedom, but God's eternal absolute predestination, electing some to life and leaving others in their sin, determines who are and who are not to believe. The praise of the salvation of believers is due wholly to God; the guilt of unbelief attaches only to those who do not believe. Cassian and Faustus, Vincent of Lerinum, and Gennadius, sought to steer a middle course. These so-called semi-Pelagians represented grace and freedom as concurring, so that the initiative might be taken by freedom and the work then carried on by grace, or the initiative by grace and the continuation by freedom. This view, though officially condemned, became the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church. The theory that all baptized persons have power freely to choose the good afforded a basis for the scholastic doctrine of merit, those leaning to Augustinianism admitting only *meritum de condigno*, God's grace being the active principle with which man in Christ freely co-operates; those leaning to Pelagianism

urging a *meritum de congruo*, man working meritoriously, but, owing to the confusion that has arisen in the relations of God and man, fully successful only by the help of divine grace. In the later Middle Ages the tendency was toward pure Pelagianism, but, after the reaction of the Reformation toward Augustinianism, the Council of Trent, rejecting the schemes of Augustine and Pelagius, defined the Roman Catholic doctrine on the lines of semi-Pelagianism.

Luther in *De servo arbitrio*, and Calvin in *Institutio*, iii. 21–24, reproduce the strict Augustinian doctrine of predestination and election. Melanchthon's synergistic tendencies were denounced by strict Lutherans as a surrender to Pelagianism, but later Lutherans, like Hollaz, formulated a moderate doctrine, identifying predestination with the divine prescience, and distinguishing the universal but hypothetical expression of the will of God which proceeded from the foreknowledge of belief or unbelief which followed, and which conditioned the decrees of election or rejection.[1] But modifications of Calvinism were made by opponents, so that, unlike Lutheranism, it has not accepted these, but has preserved the purity and strictness of its characteristic doctrine. Calvin simply carries the Augustinian theory to its necessary and logical conclusion. Predestination is the eternal purpose of God which chooses some and passes over others, not on account of anything outside of the divine will. The purpose of election is carried out in the gospel by the calling of the Holy Spirit, which effectually works faith in the hearts of the elect, but is fruitless or only hardening in those who are not elected. Though often called a supralapsarian,[2] Calvin really never had this distinction

[1] See Pfleiderer, *Grundriss der christlichen Glaubenslehre* (1893), p. 132, where the history of the doctrine is clearly sketched.

[2] So Rothe, *Dogmatik*, ii. 4; Lipsius, *Lehrbuch* (1876), 429 ff.; Biedermann, *Dogmatik* (1885), ii. 308; Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch* (1892), 598; Pfleiderer, *Grundriss* (1893), 133. On the contrary, Dorner, *History of Prot. Theology*, i. 401, admits that Calvin does not go beyond Augustine's infralapsarianism, and that the Lutheran doctrine of original sin and its effects stands essentially upon the same platform.

before him.[1] The distinction, which turns on the question of the order of the divine decrees, is not important. Supralapsarians maintain that in predestination God, electing some to life and passing by others, had in view man unfallen, a race of beings yet to be created;[2] infralapsarians, that He had in view fallen man, man regarded as already fallen.[3] In the Synod of Dort and in the Westminster Assembly, though the majority of members were pronounced infralapsarians, no statement was issued that can be held as decisive on either side. The matter in dispute was intentionally left an open question. The difference is not really over the doctrine of predestination, but only over attempts to explain it. Both parties believe in God's absolute predestination, His foreordaining whatsoever comes to pass, Adam's fall included. Infralapsarians admit the presence of the difficulty, only they think that the theory of supralapsarianism rather adds to the difficulty. "Although all Calvinists admit and believe that God foreordained the fall of Adam, and that He decreed to exercise, and did exercise, the same providence or agency in regard to that event as in regard to the other subsequent sinful actions of men, yet most Calvinists have thought it more in accordance with the general representations of Scripture, and with the caution and reverence with which we ought to contemplate the counsels and actings of Him who is incomprehensible, but of whom we know certainly that He is not the author of sin, to conceive of Him as regarding man as already fallen into a state of sin and misery when He formed the purpose of saving some men and of leaving others

[1] Cunningham, *Reformers and Theology of the Reformation*, Edin. 1862, p. 364. Excellent account of this controversy in this work, pp. 358–371. See also, *Historical Theology*, Edin., 3rd ed. 1870, vol. ii. pp. 435 f.

[2] Eminent supporters of supralapsarianism: Beza, 1519–1605; Gomarus, 1563–1641; Maccovius, 1588–1644; Twisse, 1575–1646, Voetius, 1588–1676. The great work of Twisse, the celebrated prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly, is entitled, *Vindiciæ Gratiæ, Potestatis et Providentiæ Dei*, etc.

[3] Strict Calvinists supporting infralapsarian view: Andrew Melville, 1545–1622; Bishop Davenant, 1570–1641; Francis Turretin, 1623–1687; Charles Hodge, 1797–1878.

to perish."[1] It is interesting to compare with this statement of Cunningham the conclusion reached by Dr. Davenant:[2] "The fall of man is not the cause of reprobation, but man fallen is the proper subject of both election and reprobation." This attempt to push the Augustinian theory to its very uttermost logical extreme may to some extent be responsible for the reactionary movement of Arminius (1560–1609), who makes election dependent upon faith and teaches a universal grace on condition of faith. He maintained that the human will awakened by grace co-operates with divine grace, that when the divine grace comes and appeals to the human will it depends upon the human will whether the divine grace is surrendered to or rejected.[3] Less decidedly in opposition to Calvinism, yet involving a serious modification of it, is this theory of *universalismus hypotheticus* of Amyraldus, of Saumur (1596–1664), whose *Traité de la Predestination* (1634) represents God's purpose as universal, so that all might be saved if they would believe, as all could do were it not for sin, but because of sin no one actually can believe; hence, this universal purpose being ineffectual, God by a second decree acts irresistibly, but only on the elect. The external means of grace are free to all, but the inward effective operation of the Holy Spirit is experienced only by the chosen. Pajonism, the theory of Claude Pajon (1626–1685), simplified matters by assuming that these external means of grace were sufficient to account for the acting of individuals in accepting or refusing the divine grace, which in every case acts upon the will through the understanding. The transition from this was easy, on the part of rationalism, to the bald anti-predes-

[1] Cunningham, *Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation* (1862), p. 361 f.

[2] Determination xxvi., in translation appended to *Treatise on Justification*, London, 1846, vol. ii. p. 359.

[3] The most eminent of Arminius's immediate followers were: Simon Episcopius (1583–1643), Philip van Limborch (1633–1712), Le Clerc (1657–1736). Early English Arminians are: John Hales, of Eton (1584–1656), and John Goodwin (1593–1665). Goodwin's *Redemption Redeemed* (1651) was greatly valued by Wesley, and is the foundation of the so-called Evangelical Arminianism of Wesleyan Methodism.

tinationism of the Socinians, who, as thoroughgoing Pelagians, rejected the dogma of predestination and admitted only the doctrine of a general providence. Prominence, in a peculiar way, was once again given to the doctrine of predestination in the theological system of Schleiermacher (1768–1834). Connecting the doctrine of predestination with that of the final restoration of all, he declares that only from this point of view of time does it appear as if God were passing by any, for those who are passed by now will in some other age and state of existence yield to the influences of grace. There is no divine predestination excluding any one absolutely and for ever from salvation in Christ, and the election of the individual is determined by the foreseen faith of the individual; whereas that of the race is coincident with the general order of the world, and is determined wholly according to the good pleasure of God. The doctrine is thus explained as meaning nothing more than a temporary distinction in the position of individuals according as they are adopted earlier or later into the fellowship of Christ. Biedermann, a thoroughly candid and disinterested witness, has quite correctly observed,[1] that the choice lies between acceptance of the Augustinian-Calvinistic doctrine and the rejection of the idea of God as the personal absolute sovereign of the world. Every attempt to modify the Calvinistic representation of the eternal personal act of the divine will—whether in the form of an Arminian universalism, or of a hypothetical universalism, or by way of the Lutheran distinction of a universal and special decree, or by the semi-Pelagianism of the Roman Catholic Dogmatics, or by the Pelagianism of the Socinians and rationals—has proved utterly futile. The alternative to the Calvinistic doctrine is the denial of the personal divine will, and consequently of any absolute and eternal divine decree. This latter alternative is that, indeed, which Biedermann himself accepts, and he describes his position thus:—Man has in his own nature the conditions for the fulfilling of his destiny, whether he reaches it depends inwardly on his use of these, outwardly on circumstances.

[1] *Die christliche Dogmatik*, Berlin, 1885, ii. 506 f.

The eternal purpose of God must be conceived of by us in such a way as to be in accordance at once with the true doctrine of God and the true doctrine of man. From the point of view of the doctrine of God, this eternal divine purpose is to be considered as an act of the absolute free will of God before all time and being, which expresses itself, in the whole course of creation and providence, as the absolute and original cause of all. From the point of view of the doctrine of man, this eternal absolute divine purpose must be so conceived as to leave unimpaired true human freedom, in so far as this is necessary as the presupposition of moral responsibility. On the one hand, a proper appreciation of the sovereignty and supremacy of God as the Absolute Spirit, together with a right understanding of the position of man as creature, and especially as fallen and sinful, will lead to the acknowledgment that man's salvation cannot be from himself, but must have its foundations wholly in God's grace. To deny this, after the fashion of the Pelagians and Rationalists, would be to ignore the feeling that man has of his need of redemption; and to introduce the idea of co-operation between the Spirit of God and the spirit of man would be to assert the intolerable absurdity that the Absolute and Uncreated could seek and accept the aid of the finite creature and still remain the Absolute, that the perfect God could do a work that would be imperfect but for the help given by faulty and imperfect man. Any theory of co-operation at this point has all the difficulties of a thoroughgoing denial of the operativeness of divine grace, while it adds further and peculiar difficulties of its own. On the other hand, a right conception of human freedom, such as gives scope for the exercise of man's moral nature in the free, though not unmotived, acceptance or rejection of what is offered—room for the fair and honest operation of the will, whose action can alone give a moral character to the life that follows, together with a proper understanding of God's position and character as the moral governor of man's world—will demand recognition of the fact, that salvation cannot be forced upon the individual

man by any arbitrary exercise of divine power, and that the salvation which is owing wholly to God and is the work of the divine will must be received by man by an act of his own will.

The one all-important matter, therefore, in order to maintain the wholeness of the doctrine of God and man as revealed in Scripture, is to affirm with equal emphasis both sides, to conceive of God so as not to place Him out of all relation to man, and of man so as not to weaken the sense of his absolute dependence upon God. If Calvinism were, as its opponents —whether from the pantheistic or from the deistic side—are wont to maintain, a doctrine of *arbitrary* decrees, the Scripture, which emphasises man's moral responsibility and addresses urgent appeals to his conscience and will, would easily afford an overwhelming refutation. Arminianism, as the direct antithesis of Calvinism, lays itself plainly open to the charge of unscripturalness, not only by its neglect of numberless passages, but also by its failure to express the whole tone and tendency of Scripture, which everywhere affirms the doctrine of God as the absolute will, the expression of which is the one originative power in the universe. Our defence of Calvinism lies in this, that we regard it as at least a vigorous attempt to state both sides of the question, and to give to each side its due place. The reconciliation of the two seemingly opposed claims of God and man can never be brought about by making concessions or allowing abatements on one side or another. We dare not attempt to secure consistency of statement by any theory that gives definiteness where Scripture is indefinite. The true and judicious Calvinist offers his theory not as a solution, but simply as a sufficiently comprehensive statement of the unsolved mystery.[1]

[1] See Mozley, *Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination* (1883), p. 45: "Whether regarded as a doctrine or a feeling, predestination is not in Scripture an absolute, but an indefinite truth. Scripture has, as a whole, no consistent scheme, and makes no positive assertion; it only declares, and bids its readers acknowledge, a mystery on this subject. It sets forth alike the Divine Power and man's free will, and teaches in that way, in which alone it can be taught, the whole, and not a part alone, of the truth."

§ 41. Incarnation as Essential to Redemption.

Literature.—Julius Müller, "Untersuchung der Frage ob der Sohn Gottes Mensch geworden sein würde, wenn das menschliche Geschlecht ohne Sünde geblieben wäre," in *Dogmatische Abhandlungen*, Bremen, 1870, pp. 66–126. Westcott, *Epistles of St. John*, London, 1883, Essay on "The Gospel of Creation," pp. 273–315. Fairbairn, *Typology of Scripture*, 6th ed., Edin. 1876, i. 117–135. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, Edin. 1866, pp. 260–263. Medd, *The One Mediator*, London, 1884, pp. 106–130. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Edin. 1888, ii. 205–220, iii. 319–327: *History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, Edin. 1862, div. ii. vol. i. pp. 361–369. Orr, *Christian View of God and the World*, pp. 319–327, 331–343. Forrest, *The Christ of History and of Experience*, Edin. 1897, pp. 185–192. Denney, *Studies in Theology*, 100 f. Edwards, *The God-man*, London, 1895, pp. 59–89. Moberly, in *Lux Mundi* (1890), pp. 217–272: "Incarnation as Basis of Dogma." Wilberforce, *Doctrine of Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ*, London, 1849, pp. 211–218.

The idea of the incarnation is properly introduced at this point in the system of Christian doctrine. The central idea of that system is redemption, and the essential condition of redemption is the incarnation of the Son of God. Yet, because the purpose of redemption has its source in the thoughts of God, the condition of the realisation of that purpose must also have its place in those thoughts, and so the idea of the incarnation is an eternal idea, just as the purpose of redemption is. In the earliest intimations of a scheme of redemption there must of necessity be anticipations of the incarnation, and so human history from the very first is more or less influenced and controlled by that idea.

The question has been keenly discussed, whether the incarnation should be regarded as involved in the idea of redemption, or whether it should not rather be regarded as already involved in the idea of creation. The problem has usually been stated in this form: Would the Son of God

have come in the flesh even if man had not sinned? It is worthy of remark that this question was not definitely raised until the dawn of the scholastic age. Certain general statements occur in the writings of several of the fathers, which show how they might have answered the question if it had been put. Probably Irenæus would have favoured the idea of an incarnation apart from Adam's fall; but Augustine, and those who like him speak of that event as a *felix culpa*, would almost certainly have insisted that the incarnation was the consequence of man's fall. Rupert, of Deutz, clearly and definitely stated the question. Even if man had not sinned, the Son of God, he maintained, would have become man; not, indeed, natal man, but as head and king of the human race. The essential weakness of the theory, however, discovers itself even in the statement given to it by its first regular expositor. If the incarnation is absolute in idea, and would have taken place even if man had not sinned, how can we speak, as undoubtedly Scripture does speak, of the altogether unique glory achieved by the Son of God in redemption? Rupert vainly tries to combine this scriptural view with his own theory. The doctrine of the Apostle in Heb. ii. 9 is utterly inconsistent with the idea of an incarnation apart from sin. Westcott says this inconsistency is in appearance only. But surely the very end contemplated by the theory proposed, viz. to avoid making so great an event as the incarnation dependent upon the fact of man's sin, is altogether missed if the supporters of such a theory are obliged to admit that the Son of God obtained a unique glory, an elevation not otherwise attainable, from that very sin of man which gave occasion for the manifestation of His redeeming love. As to the other schoolmen, with the exception of Duns Scotus, while they heartily appreciate and feel the attraction of the theory of an incarnation apart from the fall, they admit that Scripture, not in occasional texts only, but according to its whole drift, favours the view that the Son of God became man in consequence of sin and for man's redemption. This view is clearly expressed in the

deliverance of Thomas Aquinas: "Si homo non peccasset, Deus incarnatus non fuisset, cum in sacra scriptura ubique incarnationis ratio ex peccato primi hominis assignetur." We can easily understand how Duns Scotus, with his Pelagianising doctrine of man, would be inclined to minimise as far as possible the influence of sin in determining the purpose and manifestation of divine grace. The same remark will apply to certain of the mystics like Wessel, in whose systems the consciousness of guilt had not the prominence which it has in every genuinely evangelical system. Where, again, as in the doctrinal writings of the Reformers Luther and Calvin and their followers, the consciousness of sin had secured strong and vigorous expression, there was no hesitation in regarding the incarnation exclusively from the standpoint of the fall, and as the essential condition of redemption. In the Reformation age, Osiander (1498–1552), basing his doctrine on the thesis of Picus, of Mirandola: "Si Adam non peccasset, Deus fuisset incarnatus, sed non crucifixus," reaffirmed the theory of an incarnation apart from sin in connection with his theory of justification. In 1550, the same year in which he published his treatise on Justification, he issued his tract entitled, "An filius dei fuerit incarnandus, si peccatum non introivisset in mundum." Holding that justification is not a forensic act of God, but an infusion of righteousness brought about by a mystical union with Christ, and that the original destiny of man to be the image of God involved the union of God and man, he argued that this image of God must have primarily existed in an incarnation prior to man's creation, and consequently independent altogether of man's sin. The most thorough answer to Osiander, whose views, as adopted and put to their own uses by Servetus and Socinus, were received with little favour, was given by Calvin,[1] who rightly characterised the theory as a rash speculation devoid of scriptural support and in direct conflict with the whole drift of New Testament teaching. He readily admits that Christ was the image of God when Adam was made in that

[1] *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ii. 12. 4–7.

image, but this by no means implies the possession on the part of Christ of the nature and form of man any more than of angels. Just as the angels enjoy Him as their head without His taking on Him the nature of angels, so could He, "by His divine energy, preside over men, and by the secret virtue of His Spirit, quicken and cherish them as His body until they were gathered into heaven to enjoy the same life with the angels." A good deal of misrepresentation or misunderstanding has arisen over this matter. Westcott seems to think that when he can refer to certain Calvinists, like Polanus and Bucanus, who represent Christ as the one Mediator between God and the sons of God, through whom alone from the beginning the rational creatures of God have had communion with Him, and that therefore unfallen man needed the mediatorial work of Christ to secure and maintain their union with God, he had thereby shown that members of the school of Calvin had separated themselves on this question from their master. Calvin as well as Calvinists would admit all that is quoted here. But that Christ's mediatorial work or mediating function in the case of unfallen man would have required an incarnation, as it did in the case of fallen man, is just what, on behalf of this theory, needs to be proved, but never has been proved. We must guard against the confusion, into which many have been led, of supposing that the assigning to the Son of God the position of determining influence in the counsels and operations of God in creation, and specially in the creation of man, we thereby assume in the absolute sense the necessity of the incarnation.

A candid examination of the New Testament doctrine of sin and redemption will show that the inspired writers invariably treat of the incarnation in idea and fact as the essential condition of the reconciliation of God and sinful man. The Christian revelation concerns itself wholly with man as in need of redemption in consequence of sin. The purpose of God in sending His Son in the flesh into the world is represented as having purely to do with man's redemption. Nothing that is said of Christ as the head of creation

implies that this is realisable only in the Person of the incarnate Christ. Whereas, the classical passage on the humiliation of the Son of God in the incarnation (Phil. ii. 5–11) shows plainly that the self-emptying of the Son of God is the presupposition not of creation but of redemption. It is impossible to accept the New Testament doctrine of the terribleness of sin, without recognising that redemption from it is worthy even of such a stupendous event as the incarnation, as no mere gathering together of the elements of creation could ever be.

§ 42. Preparation for Redemption in Heathenism.

Literature.—Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, Edin. 1866, pp. 224–229. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Edin. 1888, ii. 235–258, especially p. 242. Trench, Hulsean Lectures, *Christ the Desire of all Nations*, Lond. 1846. Cocker, *Christianity and Greek Philosophy*, New York, 1870. Ackermann, *The Christian Element in Plato*, Edin. 1861. Döllinger, *The Gentile and the Jew in the Court of the Temple of Christ*, vol. i. London, 1862. Reiff, *Die christliche Glaubenslehre*, Basel, 1876, vol. ii. pp. 109–114: "Die Anbahnung in der Heidenwelt."

Scripture represents the heathen as upon the whole left by God to take their own way (Acts xiv. 16), yet even among them God is not without a witness. Their God-forsaken condition is represented as the consequence and penalty of their sin. The further back we go into the so-called nature religions, we find in them traces of a consciousness of God and of sin, and of the need of forgiveness and redemption. What strikes one most in the study of early religions is how large a part of the life was devoted to religious exercises and prayer and the offering of sacrifices, and how the celebration of all the events of individual, social, and national development was saturated with religious observances and the recognition of religious obligations. Utter estrangement from God made its appearance at a later stage in the history, as the result of corruptions of religious ideas and practices, leading, on the part of the cultured to scepticism, on the part of the masses

to superstition. The moral earnestness and energy of Platonism and Stoicism led to a partial revival; but in later times of moral and national decay the most hideous and irrational forms of superstition were the only representatives of religion that survived, and in them religion was absolutely divorced from morality, and no longer sought to satisfy ethical demands, or to meet the needs of the sin-laden and God-forsaken souls of men. Yet in all ages the longing after better things found expression in a form and measure more or less distinct and clear. This is witnessed to in a very characteristic way in some of these mystery cults which, originating for the most part in the East, powerfully influenced in these later times the popular religious thought and feeling of the remotest West. In these an attempt was made by heathenism to secure for its devotees the spiritual blessings which Christianity promised and taught to those who accepted the gospel which it proclaimed.

In all the higher forms of ethnic religion, in all the more philosophic developments of religious thought among the cultured nations of antiquity, the moral element becomes more and more predominant. The formal expression of religion advances from custom to law. The growth of the moral sense reflects itself in legal codes which rest on religious sanctions. And the introduction of this moral element leads up to a purified and ennobled type of religion. "In reference even to the heathen world, it is partially true that law became a schoolmaster unto Christ; and this all the more in proportion as law is derived from the Godhead, the idea of God being thus enriched and assuming a more ethical form."[1] In the religions of Greece and Rome the idea of law and right is present in the idea of God as the rewarder of righteousness and avenger of wrong. But even in other religions where the ethical element was much less conspicuous and pervading, the association of the idea of God with that of righteousness was by no means wanting. The degree in which the idea of retribution was made prominent, so as to become an effective factor in

[1] Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, ii. 241.

the moral and spiritual life of the people, determined the relative rank of the religion in which it appeared. That religion which proclaimed most distinctly that human wrong is sin before God, and that the offender is guilty in His sight, was most conspicuously a preparation for Christianity.

The institution of the priesthood and the ritual of sacrificial worship, among savage and cultured races alike, indicated the presence of a consciousness of the need of mediation between God and man. The sense of separation from God and of the need and difficulty of reconciliation is expressed by the costliness and painfulness of the sacrifice demanded by and rendered to God in order to win His favour and avert His displeasure. The question which arose in the hearts of Gentiles as well as Jews, the answer to which was regarded as the most important concern of a man's life, was that so admirably given by the Hebrew prophet: "Wherewith shall I come before the Lord, and bow myself before the high God? shall I come before Him with burnt offerings, with calves of a year old? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil? shall I give my firstborn for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?" It is impossible to understand the terrible sacrifices of the heathens as originating in an idea that was a pure delusion without any foundation in truth. "It could not have been merely an empty superstition which produced the resignation necessary for offering to the gods whole hecatombs; it could not have been ordinary madness which induced the priests of Cybele to make themselves eunuchs; it was not low carnal lust which induced the noblest virgins to give themselves up to any stranger in the temple of Mylitta, nor was it want of love to their children or unfeeling cruelty which induced parents to throw their children into the arms of Moloch."[1] The error that is apparent in the sacrificial rites of paganism is the notion that submission to material loss, or the endurance of physicial suffering, or of mental agony in causing and looking upon the physical suffering of those nearest and dearest

[1] Kurtz, *History of the Old Covenant*, Edin. 1859, vol i. p. 120.

to them, could, as the performance of meritorious works, secure the acceptance and ward off the anger of a righteously offended God. This again results from an imperfect and superficial view not only of sin, but also of the consequences of sin. Instead of acknowledging that the consequences of sin are misery in its extremest form and death itself, both temporal and spiritual, heathenism thought only of outward evils and inconveniences which may be removed by the surrender of some equivalent good or the enduring of some counterbalancing evil. Improvement of the life or the abandoning of some pleasure-giving possession can be regarded as sufficient only so long as man's consciousness of guilt and of the divine righteousness does not exceed what human endeavours can make good. This in turn led to a lowering of the idea of God, so that He might appear such as could be satisfied with a propitiation of this finite and material character. In this way heathenism, after reaching a certain elevation, always tended to fall back to the lower level, through its want of the proper balance for securing a steady equilibrium.

In the heathen religions the need of reconciliation found expression not only in the institution of the priesthood and in the presentation of gifts and expiatory sacrifices, but in the introduction of deities who played the part of mediators, delivering the guilty by bearing the burden of his guilt, and submitting to humiliation and defilement in order to secure a higher good for men. In the classical religions the development of this idea did not reach to the pure conception of an actual incarnation, and the deity was only represented as stooping to perform certain humble offices, while still retaining the form of divinity. An important advance upon this is found in the more spiritual developments of ethical philosophy. The just men of Plato's republic and the wise men of the Stoics are confessedly ideal creations, in which many features of the divine character and attributes of deity are combined with all that is best in actual human nature. We find a yet further advance in the direction of the truth as brought to light in the Christian revelation, in certain Oriental

religions in which actual incarnations are regarded as giving explicit expression to the need of a union between God and man. We have thus in heathenism distinct foreshadowings of the doctrines of incarnation and atonement, each originally expressing itself crudely as a sort of experimental endeavour on the part respectively of God and man. But gradually it is discovered that God cannot serve man as a Saviour without becoming man, and that man cannot reconcile himself to God, but must be reconciled to God by God Himself in the form and nature of man.

§ 43. Preparation for Redemption in the Old Testament.

Literature.—Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Edin. 1888, ii. 259–275, iii. 145–155. Grimm, *Institutio Theolog. Dogmaticæ*, Jena, 1869, pp. 322–325. Schultz, *Old Testament Theology*, Edin. 1892, ii. 333–450. Schürer, *Jewish People in Time of Jesus Christ*, Edin. 1885, 2nd div. vol. ii. pp. 126–187. Pope, *Person of Christ*, London, 1875, pp. 91–111; *Lux Mundi*, ed. 10, London, 1890, art. "Preparation in History for Christ," pp. 150–175. Medd, *The One Mediator*, London, 1884, pp. 132–279. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, Edin. 1866, pp. 229–236.—Generally: Delitzsch, *Messianic Prophecies in Historical Succession*, Edin. 1891. Briggs, *Messianic Prophecy*, New York and Edinburgh, 1886. For the older view: Hengstenberg, *Christology of the Old Testament*, 4 vols., Edin. 1854. Gordon, *Christ as made known in the Ancient Church*, 4 vols., Edin. 1854. Walsh, *The Angel of the Lord, or Manifestations of Christ in the Old Testament*, London, 1876.

In view of the theocratic form of the Hebrew State, we might expect among the Hebrews a clearer anticipation of Christian ideas of God and man, and more distinct foreshadowings of Messianic hopes and the Messianic kingdom. It has been rightly observed that these higher hopes won the hearts of the people chiefly after the division of the kingdom of Israel, and secured fullest expression during periods of national disaster, when men began to despair of realising their expectations in any satisfying measure in a temporal

national institution. Yet the blessings longed for and expected in the Messianic realm were conceived of usually and pre-eminently as consisting in the abundance of external goods and freedom from any foreign yoke. There were not wanting, however, more spiritual views, according to which, in addition to such material and temporal advantages, the subjects of the Messianic kingdom would enjoy the blessedness of having all their past sins forgiven, and the Spirit of God present with them and enabling them to render acceptable worship to God.

As to the Old Testament doctrine of the Messiah, the representation made is generally that of a powerful and victorious human prince, described simply as of the lineage of David, his method of government righteous and his reign peaceful, but the benefits resulting from his rule material and political rather than spiritual. Even in Daniel the Messianic kingdom is numbered along with other monarchies, from which it is distinguished, indeed, by eternal endurance; but the Messiah Himself is not represented as of supernatural origin, or of a nature superior to that of man. The name given to the prince who was seen in the night-visions coming to the Ancient of Days, "the Son of Man," is evidently intended to symbolise the fifth empire, which succeeds the other four represented by animal figures, and is destined to endure for ever. This we must observe, however, that the later Jews treated this name as synonymous with that of the Messiah or the Christ. The adoption of the name by Jesus indicates that in the popular Jewish theology of His times it has become a favourite designation of the Messiah.

The practice of sacrifice among the Hebrews was distinguished from its practice among the heathens by this, that with them it assumed a much more highly spiritualised form. The supernatural revelation which they possessed, and the supernatural guidance which had been very manifestly bestowed upon them throughout their whole history, had brought to them purer ideas of doctrine and life than those who possessed only the revelation of nature could possibly have. They had

a better knowledge of God and man, a purer and deeper conception of holiness and sin. Hence their sacrifices, which spoke of expiation of sin and communion with God, meant more to the Hebrew than to the pagan, just in so far as the Hebrew knew God and sin as the pagan did not. And this relative purity in the ideas to which sacrifice gives expression indicates the approach in this direction toward the Christian doctrine generally and the Christian idea of the incarnation in particular. The Hebrew knew better the extent and character of his need, and therefore realised more distinctly the futility and vanity of human help.

It is characteristic of the Old Testament references to the Messianic future, and of the hints given in it as to the conditions of life and conduct in the Messianic kingdom, that not only is each incomplete and imperfect, but also that incompleteness and imperfection characterises those representations even when taken together and viewed as a whole. Failure to recognise this vitiates almost all earlier work done in the departments of Old Testament typology and christology—conspicuously in the christologies of Hengstenberg and Gordon, but also in the more scientific and thorough treatises of Oehler and Fairbairn. The Messianic ideal is realised in the New Testament, but it is only pointed to and more or less darkly indicated in the Old Testament. And yet it is very evident that we have in the Old Testament prophecy—using the word in a large sense—a progression toward the nearest approximation to the New Testament revelation of redemption that was possible before the actual coming of the Redeemer. "We have in the Messianic prophecy of the Old Testament an organic system constantly advancing on the original lines, and expanding into new and more comprehensive phrases with the progress of the centuries. Vast and complex that organism is—so complex that the wisest sages of Israel could not comprehend it—as vast as the difference between a divine advent and a human advent, as contrasted as a suffering or a reigning Messiah, as an advent of grace and revival, and as an advent of judgment

and perdition; and yet there is a unity in all this variety and complexity that no one could discern until Jesus Christ was born, God manifest in the flesh; until He passed through the experience of a suffering Messiah and advanced to His throne as the reigning Messiah; until the advent of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost warned of the advent of the great and terrible day of judgment. In Jesus of Nazareth the key of the Messianic prophecy of the Old Testament has been found. All its phases find their realisation in His unique personality, in His unique work, and in His unique kingdom. The Messiah of prophecy appears as the Messiah of history."[1]

The most obtrusively distinct anticipation of the Messianic revelation and foreshadowings of the personal Messiah in the Old Testament undoubtedly are the manifestations usually called theophanies. Augustine, alarmed by the false conclusions drawn from the ordinary interpretation of these appearances by some of the Arian controversialists, attempted to show that these so-called theophanies might be manifestations either of Father or Spirit rather than the Son.[2] With the exception of a very few influenced by the great Western father, students of Scripture in all ages have recognised in these manifestations foreshadowings of the incarnation of the Son of God. The theophanies are not to be confounded with the merely anthropomorphic representations that we have of God throughout the Old Testament, in which the deity, without distinction of persons, is described under the figure of a man in respect of His emotions and actions. The theophanies proper are those occasional manifestations of God at special crises in the history of individuals, families, or nations, in which the Divine Personality is distinctly prominent, and some special message is brought or some

[1] Briggs, *Messianic Prophecy*, p. 497 f.

[2] See a very interesting and full history of opinion on this question, from Justin Martyr down to the present time, in Medd, *The One Mediator*, Appendix, note vii. pp. 426–502. Liddon is inclined to adopt the Augustinian view, because he thinks that, though not unaccompanied by considerable difficulties when we apply it to the sacred text, it seems to relieve us of greater embarrassments than any which it creates.

special act of deliverance is performed. The most outstanding of them all is that series of manifestations in which the communicator of the divine message is described as "the Angel," sometimes of Jehovah, sometimes of the covenant, sometimes of the presence (Gen. xv., etc.; Zech. i. 12, iii. 2; Mal. iii. 2; Isa. lxiii. 9). The angel of Zechariah is evidently a created angel, but the angel of Malachi and Isaiah is plainly the Messiah. The angel who appeared to the patriarchs is called God and Jehovah, as no created angel could be called; and it is natural and reasonable to suppose that these manifestations were at least some of the things concerning Himself which the Risen Lord expounded out of the Scriptures to His disciples on the way to Emmaus.[1] In each of these manifestations we have some features which cannot be consistently referred to deity, and others which cannot consistently be referred to any created being. And there is no attempt made to relieve the difficulty, but rather the angel is spoken of at one time as God, at another as an angel of God. And in this we have the two sides of the divine human personality, a distinct foreshadowing of the incarnation of the Son of God. "Though the idea of the incarnation of God is not attained, still the Messiah promised is a sprout of Jehovah or Immanuel, *i.e.* is the consummation of revelation, whilst at the same time He is a sprout of David and the righteous servant of God,—*i.e.* is the consummation of humanity."[2] In the historical revelation of the Old Testament we have a progressive development of the idea of communion with God, and this development takes a twofold course: on the one hand, along the line of a discovery of God manifesting Himself to men, and in the experience and history of mankind; and on the other hand, along the line of an unfolding of human capacity for becoming a receptacle of the divine indwelling Spirit, and a vehicle for the divine manifestation. We can trace a growth in the

[1] See Burton, *Testimonies of the Ante-Nicene Fathers to the Divinity of Christ*, Oxford, 1826, § 23.

[2] Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, vol. iii. p. 145.

divine presence operating in the world, from the early representations of the Spirit of God as a principle immanent in the world and influencing the affairs of men, and the doctrine of Wisdom, in the later books, as an objective being that we can think of only as personal. Not only is God revealed, but the revealer is also God. Then, again, under such names as the Son of God and the Servant of God, as applied to the Israel of God, we have the human side of the incarnation made prominent. And in all this surely we have the highest attainment possible until the reality of a substantial incarnation has been fully accomplished. The redemption of man is possible only by means of Him in whom perfect manhood and perfect godhead meet. The Old Testament shows that both are needed; the New Testament first presents them united in Jesus Christ.

§ 44. New Testament Doctrine of Incarnation.

Literature.—Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Edin. 1889, iii. 155–196, 300–308. Gess, *Scripture Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, by Reubelt, Andover, 1870, pp. 244–291. Grimm, *Institutio Theolog. Dogmaticæ*, pp. 328–331. Pope, *Person of Christ*, London, 1875, pp. 21–31. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, pp. 239–242. Böhl, *Dogmatik*, Amsterdam, 1887, pp. 299–308. Denney, *Studies in Theology*, pp. 24–73. Forrest, *The Christ of History and of Experience*, Edin. 1897, pp. 43–73. Wendt, *The Teaching of Jesus*, Edin. 1892, vol. ii. pp. 122–183.

The story of the coming of Jesus Christ, the son of God in the flesh, constitutes the sum and substance of the New Testament. It is the telling of this story that is characteristic of the gospel as distinguished from the old dispensation. In the earlier forms of revelation everything was incomplete; but each part of the revelation, as well as the collective effect of the whole, was intended to prepare for and point on to Him who was to come, who, having come, was recognised as the consummation of the revelation of God. The New Testament revelation is therefore simply the unfolding of the fact of the

incarnation, the story of the coming of the Christ who is God manifest in the flesh. The gospel necessarily begins with the appearing in the world of Him, whose coming in the fulness of time had been promised, for whom all had been longing who waited for the consolation of Israel. It is the task of the evangelists to describe in life and action the person of Him who unites in Himself what, in the old dispensation, could only be sporadically and imperfectly represented in a multitude of symbolic types and finite personalities. The simple repetition of this story constituted the substance of apostolic preaching, and even the later didactic writings of apostles only unfolds what is already implicated in the fact of the incarnation.

The New Testament doctrine of the Person of Christ may be discovered from the names given to Him in whom the Messianic hopes and prophecies were fulfilled and realised. He is called Christ in recognition of His official appointment by the Father, who anointed Him with His Holy Spirit and with power. This is simply the Greek equivalent of the Hebrew Messiah. He is called Jesus, Saviour, as the author of salvation for His people. And as Jesus Christ, He is described at once as the servant of God and the servant of man, holding His office from God, and fulfilling it in ministering to men. The title of Lord implies recognition on the part of those who use it of His authority to govern and direct their life and conduct. The two titles most frequently given to Jesus Christ in the New Testament are "the Son of Man" and "the Son of God." He Himself, by preference, uses the title "Son of Man," whereas His disciples avoid the use of it. The disciples of Jesus, again, on all solemn occasions on which they express their faith in Jesus, give Him the title "Son of God." We shall best reach an understanding of the meaning of these titles by considering carefully in order the testimony of Jesus regarding Himself, in His general self-consciousness and in His conception of Himself as the Son of Man and the Son of God, and then the testimony of the apostles regarding Him.

The Messianic consciousness of Jesus is the most important contribution that we have, or can have, to the Christian doctrine of the incarnation. What impresses us most is the vastness of the claims which He makes, and the quiet confidence with which He makes them. He deals with individuals, and demands from them the absolute surrender of themselves, and insists upon obtaining the full control of their lives. His first and last words to His disciples—to all who receive Him—is, Follow Me; and in order to do this they must forsake everything else. These claims and demands are unique. Only He could advance them who was self-conscious of His Messianic rank and calling. In no other way can the self-assertion of Jesus be reconciled with the idea of perfect goodness, save on the theory that His goodness was something else and something more than human. The highest human goodness reveals itself in self-forgetfulness. The scribes, insisting upon judging Jesus from the purely human standpoint, were quite self-consistent in saying, that He who bare witness of Himself could not be true. Otherwise Dr. Martineau, who wishes to think of Jesus as perfect human goodness, assigns these utterances of what in a human life we would call self-assertion to the mistaken reflection of later Christian ages. But we must call attention to this, that it is not in isolated and occasional phrases or statements that this note is struck. It pervades and rings through the whole story. It constitutes an essential feature of the life set forth in our gospels. We see at every point in His career that Jesus cannot be content that His memory should perish, if only His words should be remembered. It is the memory of Himself, of His own Person, that is to be perpetuated. His claims all centre in His personality. He is not a mere voice crying in the wilderness. It is not to an impersonal message that attention is called, but to Himself, the Messenger, who claims the love, obedience, and full surrender of those who follow Him. He claims to discharge Messianic functions. He is the perfect revealer of God; He is the one Saviour of man; He is the judge of the whole world.

The revealer here is Himself the revelation; the Saviour is Himself the salvation; the judgment turns upon the acceptance which the judged have given to the judge. There is no word of instruction or counsel ever uttered by Him that does not directly call attention to Himself. In all this Jesus showed that He claimed not merely to have an interest and a share in advancing the cause of the Messianic kingdom and in contributing to the realisation of the Messianic idea, but distinctly to be Himself the personal Messiah, in whom and not merely by whom the kingdom of God among men must come. The faith of Jesus was in Himself, and not merely in the cause for which He wrought. Lovers of truth, who have consecrated their lives to the promotion of the interests of truth in the world, have been willing to perish and be forgotten if only truth should prevail; but Jesus says, I am the truth, and when I bear witness to the truth, I bear witness to Myself, and my witness is here. Now it is quite evident how distasteful all this must be to humanitarians like Dr. Martineau.[1] To such, a self-conscious Messiah can be no Messiah. But we have only to consider what the evangelical idea of the Messianic function is, in order to see that it is an office to which no merely self-conscious man would ever aspire. In the Messianic claims the suffering and humiliation of the victim were inseparably connected with the honour of the high priest. And in consequence of this, the Messianic office was one which no man could take as an honour to himself. We must look at the Messiahship "on the side of duty rather than on the side of dignity."[2] Christ's exaltation of Himself was to a pre-eminence in suffering which only the Divine Son could undertake and undergo in order to attain unto a joy and glory, however great, which was set before Him as the condition of first passing through such an ordeal. It is only as we keep this truth in mind that we can present to ourselves in any intelligible way the claims which Jesus

[1] *The Seat of Authority in Religion*, London, 1890, pp. 577–585.

[2] Bruce, *Apologetics*, Edin. 1892, p. 365. See also *Kingdom of God*, Edin. 1889, pp. 158–160.

makes for Himself, and the unique prominence that He gives everywhere to His own Person. It is only as the possessor of an altogether unique personality that Jesus can address to men the call to make to Him a complete and absolute surrender of themselves. His call to men to surrender themselves to Him is just as essential an element in the gospel as His gift of Himself to them. It has been well said that "Christ never betrays the faintest hesitation in asking the most stupendous sacrifices for His own sake, in demanding the most unhesitating trust and obedience for Himself."[1] The first and best requirement which He makes of all disciples is "Follow Me"; and His whole teaching shows that He understands this as including or consisting in such a self-surrender as implies, not a merely figurative, but a very literal, identification of themselves with Him. And it should be observed that the demand is made wholly on personal grounds. Hence the surrender is to the person and not to an idea. In spite of all that has been said of late, not the idea of the kingdom of God, but the Person of Jesus Christ, is the centre and core of the gospel. His mission is the development of the kingdom of God, but it is His Person that forms the foundation of that kingdom, and attachment to His Person which secures admission into its membership. Hence Wendt, in a thoroughly admirable way, gives prominence to the fact that the uniqueness of Christ's Person, and of His relation to God, evidences His Messianic mission. He had the Messianic consciousness, He was assured of His capacity and vocation as Messiah, because of His possessing those personal qualities which resulted from His peculiar relation to God.

The Messianic consciousness of Jesus finds expression in the names which He ordinarily and by preference applied to Himself. The favourite designation of Himself, according to the synoptic report of His sayings, was The Son of Man. Considerable diversity of opinion prevails as to the precise meaning in which Jesus used the name, and what view of His Person He wished to impress upon those amongst whom He

[1] Denney, *Studies in Theology*, London, 1895, p. 29.

made use of it. If we inquire first of all as to the probable source of the name, we find some referring to its employment in the canonical Book of Daniel, and others to its occurrence in the apocryphal Book of Enoch. The Son of Man in Dan. vii. 13 is the representative of Israel's saints. He is not the personal Messiah, but the symbol of an empire which, as a spiritual power, in contrast to the empires represented under animal forms as maintained by brute force, deserves to be represented under the figure of a human form.[1] In the Book of Enoch (chap. xlix. ff.) the Son of Man is the Messiah conceived of from the apocalyptic point of view as the Chosen One appointed to judge and reign. The use of the phrase by Jesus as a personal designation discountenances its derivation from the passage in Daniel, where it is used in a purely impersonal sense; and the circumstances of His life, as described in the context of the passages in which He makes use of it, show that the idea which it connotes in the Apocalypse of Enoch is not such as could have suggested the use of it to Him. Whatever suggested the name to Jesus, certainly His use of it is quite original. It was not a common designation of the Messiah among the Jews before and during the time of Christ, and if it was in use among them at all, then, on the basis of its use in Daniel and Enoch, it would not carry with it any idea of human weakness, but rather that of divine and triumphant power under the figure of a human form.[2] If we think it necessary to discover an Old Testament suggestion of the name, we might perhaps find it in a combination of the representations of a conquering and suffering Messiah scattered over the Old Testament under a designation the comprehensive suitability of which first appeared to Jesus Himself.

[1] See Bevan, *Short Commentary on Daniel*, Cambridge, 1892, pp. 118, 119. Stanton, *The Jewish and Christian Messiah*, Edin. 1886, pp. 109–118. Schürer, *History of the Jewish People*, Edin. 1885, II. ii. 158 f. Principal Edwards, on the other hand, regards the Son of Man in Daniel as "a human prince descending from heaven and succeeding to kingdoms symbolised by four beasts" (*The God-man*, London, 1895, p. 61).

[2] For the opposite view see Sanday, "On the Title 'Son of Man,'" in *Expositor*, 4th Ser. vol. iii. p. 29 f.

When applied by Jesus to Himself, it does not seem to have been understood by those who heard Him use it as though, by appropriating it as a designation, He were laying claim to the Messiahship. Whatever the signification of the phrase may have been in apocalyptic literature, it clearly had not become a recognised designation of the Messiah among the Jewish people. Upon the whole, we may conclude that the Old Testament afforded suggestion of the name, not by its occasional and accidental use of the term, but by presenting the Messianic idea in such a form as Jesus found He could best express by the title "Son of Man." As to our Lord's use of the name, a careful study of the passages in the Gospels where it occurs will show that Jesus invariably employed it, not as a mere designation for which another term might do as well, but by express preference as in the circumstances most appropriate. In all the passages in which Jesus is represented as applying this name to Himself, it expresses the lowliness of mind and meekness by which He was characterised, and the glory and majesty to which He who exercises such qualities must rise. "It announced a Messiah appointed to suffer, richly endowed with human sympathy, and destined to pass through suffering to glory. In all these respects it pointed at a Messianic ideal contrary to popular notions. For that very reason Jesus loved the name, as expressing truth valid for Himself, as fitted to foster just conceptions in acceptive minds, and as steering clear of current misapprehensions."[1] It is not enough to say that the Son of Man is the ideal man in whom humanity has its perfect representative. The ideal man is nothing more than man; for the man who is not up to the ideal is something less than man. But the Son of Man is the ideal man and something more; for it is as Son of Man that Jesus claims to be the Christ, the Son of the living God. He asks His dis-

[1] Bruce, *The Kingdom of God*, p. 176 f. The three groups of texts represent "the Son of Man" as the Man of Sorrows, Matt. viii. 20, etc.; as the Man of Sympathy, Matt. xi. 19, etc.; as coming at last in glory to judge and reign, Matt. xvi. 27, xix. 28, xxv. 4. See *Kingdom of God*, pp. 172–175.

ciples, As being the Son of Man, who am I? And He accepts the answer of Peter as one given Him by the inspiration of God. If, under the designation "the Son of Man," Jesus calls attention to His human aspect, this evidently implies that behind this aspect there lies a nature of which only one side is revealed in this humanity. The very emphasis given to the manhood renders the implication of His divinity an absolute necessity. Only as "*the* Son of God" can He be "*the* Son of Man."

Though Jesus does not anywhere among His utterances recorded in our Gospels expressly designate Himself "the Son of God," yet He receives this name from God Himself, and listens approvingly to His disciples as they apply to Him this name. This Sonship, too, is of an altogether unique kind. It is not one that He shares with man. No man, but He Himself alone, by virtue of His Sonship, knows the Father. It indicates a personal, and not merely an official relationship to God. This relationship involves a knowledge of the mind of God which raises Him not only above man, but also above the angels. But He is not only Son of God by way of eminence, above other sons, yet with a sonship like theirs. If men are to become sons of God, as He is Son of God, it must be in Him. It is quite evident, from John v. 18, that He was understood as claiming a unique relationship to God when He called Himself "the Son of God." And upon this at last the charge against Him of blasphemy was founded.

The New Testament doctrine of the incarnation is expressed in a more developed or more strictly theological style by Paul when, instead of the designation "the Son of Man," he applies to Jesus Christ the name of "the Second Adam." It is a common objection of Unitarians that the Jesus of the synoptic narrative would not have recognised Himself in "the Second Adam" of Paul. Gess (*Christi Person und Werk*, ii. 368) and others, on the contrary, regard this phrase as a most happy interpretation by the apostle of our Lord's own favourite name, "the Son of Man." It is surely at least quite in the line of that earlier phrase in which Jesus

declared His Messianic consciousness. Just as "the Son of Man" is as such necessarily "the Son of the living God," so also "the Second Adam" is from heaven and becomes a quickening Spirit (1 Cor. xv. 47, 48). In the incarnation, the pre-existent Christ, the celestial man, comes down from heaven to carry out and complete the work of redemption, and at that moment introduces a new living and vitalising force into humanity. The likeness of sinful flesh in which He comes is no mere doketic appearance, but actual human flesh subject to all the infirmities and natural consequences which the sin of the race had entailed upon man. The flesh which He took was indeed that flesh which in us is sinful flesh, but in Him flesh did not dominate His being as we had sinfully allowed it to dominate us. Hence, while in the flesh, and for us become flesh, Christ did not stand in the same relation to flesh as we do. And thus the fact that the flesh which is sinful in us was not sinful in Him makes us think of His incarnate nature as like but not identical with our own. Yet the difference is not in the flesh which He assumed, but in the relation in which it is placed to the other parts of the being. In the flesh Christ becomes subject to law, which is the will of God with regard to the flesh. He becomes subject to all the physical consequences of being in the flesh, to all moral obligations of obedience to the demands of righteousness, and to the doom which sin had called down upon flesh, though in His own flesh He was personally guiltless.[1] In his later Epistles, Paul gives more purely metaphysical representations of the Christ as "the image of the invisible God," and "the first-born of every creature," who empties Himself of His eternal form of existence and takes on Him the existence form of a man.

In the Johannine christology the procedure is strikingly different from that of Paul. Whereas Paul presents us with the man Christ Jesus, and then traces Him up to His heavenly source and origin, John begins with the eternal postulates and introduces at once the divine eternal Logos,

[1] Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik*, ii. 98.

in the beginning God and with God. The Logos of John is not the Logos of Alexandrian speculation, but simply the representation which he had formed in his own mind of the metaphysical relation in which Christ stood to God. He thoroughly identifies the historical Christ with the Logos. The whole Johannine doctrine of the incarnation is set forth in the words, "The Logos became flesh." The historical Jesus Christ is the only begotten Son of God come into the world of man. He is become man without ceasing to be eternal. He who dwells among men in the flesh is the eternal Logos of God. John proposes no theory as to how this incarnation takes place. In contrast to the synoptic evangelists, he does not give any account of the supernatural birth of Jesus without human paternity. Jesus Christ is Son of God, not because the Spirit of God takes the place in His begetting of a human father, but simply because He is the Divine Logos come in the flesh. He does not think of a natural man Jesus who has received the Divine Logos, but he thinks of the man Jesus as being Himself the Logos in the flesh. Hence we do not find in John any theory of the depotentiation of the Logos. As incarnate He has in Him that glory which He had with the Father, and if this glory is not seen it is because men have become darkened through their hatred of the light. In His relation to the Father, again, He is at once equal and subordinate. He is sent by the Father, but for the world and for men He is all that God is. He is the perfect revealer of God, because men may see all that can be seen of God in Him.

In the ideal or archetypal man of the Epistle to the Hebrews we have the Son of Man as the second and last Adam, in whom the eternal idea of man is realised, who is before all worlds and above all creatures, and in time receives from God the high but burdensome office of the high priest who is also the sacrifice. In this we have a blending of the Pauline and Johannine christologies, and the perfected form of the New Testament doctrine of the incarnation.

§ 45. Development of the Consciousness of Jesus.

Literature.—Gore, *Dissertations on Subjects connected with the Incarnation*, London, 1895: "III.—The Consciousness of our Lord in His Mortal Life." Moorhouse, *The Teaching of Christ: its Conditions, Secret, and Results*, London, 1891. Powell, *The Principle of the Incarnation*, London, 1896. Mason, *The Conditions of our Lord's Life on Earth*, London, 1896. Forrest, *The Christ of History and Experience*, Edin. 1897, pp. 91–106. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iii. 328–339.

The Messianic consciousness of Jesus, as set forth in the Gospels, affords room for a thoroughly natural development, and involves submission to such limitations as mark off and characterise the natural life. In His early days He appeared to His mother and those about Him a child who required to be taught like other children. The threefold growth characteristic of the sound and healthy development of every human child—growth in body, in intelligence, in moral and spiritual capacity—is ascribed to Him. "The child grew, and waxed strong, filled with wisdom: and the grace of God was upon Him." "And Jesus advanced in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God and men." Before considering what this growth implies, it may be well to examine the question, whether it can be understood as applying to His Messianic self-consciousness. It is very confidently affirmed by some that only in the hour of His baptism did Jesus attain to the idea of His Messianic calling and dignity. Such a conclusion can be drawn only from the silence of the gospel narrative with regard to the details of our Lord's spiritual development during the years preceding His public appearing. Reasoning from silence is always hazardous, and in this case the sudden flashing upon heart and mind of so great a thought as that of the Messianic vocation is a violent infringement of the laws of natural development which only the most urgent and manifest necessity could at all justify. On the contrary, a fair and unprejudiced examination of the whole circumstances leaves upon us the impression that the Messianic consciousness of Jesus was

really with Him from the dawn of moral consciousness, and, like all the other contents of that consciousness, was the subject of growth in the matter of clearness as the experience of life increased. It is in accordance with the whole tone of the gospel representation of our Lord's life on earth, as well as in harmony with the principles of a sound psychology, to assume this Messianic consciousness of Jesus was, at each stage in His mental and spiritual advancement, at a similar stage of development. As a child of twelve years old, He had evidently that unique sense of His Divine Sonship which characterised His Messianic consciousness throughout. Yet He had it, and gave expression to it, as a child might do. That even during the years of His public ministry there was a growth in His consciousness of His divine mission and Messianic calling, is a truth that needs to be very carefully stated, so as to avoid misunderstanding and error. It can scarcely be doubted by anyone who accepts the evangelical narratives as we possess them, that from the earliest period in His recorded life He was conscious of at least the main features of the life-course that lay before Him. He is not represented as even in the earliest days of His ministry giving way for a moment to the illusions by which so often the disciples were carried away. On the contrary, we are made to feel that all possible careers other than that which He did take, with its inevitable ending, were indeed illusions which He must always treat as temptations to be put behind Him. But, while this is so, it is equally evident that the altogether unique experience of life which Jesus had during those years, eventful as the years of no other life had ever been, did of necessity lead to a most marked development in His spiritual life, and to an increased clearness of perception of the end to which all was leading up, and to a fuller comprehension of the purpose of His Father in making the cross the earthly goal of the incarnation.

It is extremely important that we should maintain the reality and integrity of the humanity of Jesus, by admitting in His case those limitations of knowledge which must of

necessity characterise faith and temporal being. The fathers were wont to explain away everything which seemed like a confession of ignorance on His part; but when they represented Him as acting a part, and seeming not to know what really was within the range of His knowledge, their representation was far less honouring to Him than that which they repudiated.[1] On several occasions we find that Jesus expressed surprise at what happened. Sometimes the circumstance which excited this surprise was similar to something which on other occasions He seemed to have known instinctively. He knew what was in man, and so did not require anyone to testify of men. And yet He wondered at the obstinate unbelief of some, and at the ready and full faith of others. His wondering was not feigned, and so we must interpret the knowledge professed in the light of such admissions of limitation. His knowledge of what was in man resulted from the absolute purity of His heart, and was the same in kind, though, just in consequence of His moral perfection, greatly superior in degree and more constant than that of any other man. It consisted, therefore, in a capacity for detecting any insincerity on the part of those whom He met, and an unequalled insight into the inner movements of those with whom He had to do. It was a purely human gift raised to its utmost possible pitch. Hence we find Jesus making confession of weakness and ignorance as viewed simply in Himself, and claiming knowledge and strength only as He is in the Father, and in this fellowship or union has these given unto Him.

When the Son of God, the Divine Logos, became flesh, He submitted Himself to the limitations of time and space, and surrendered the eternal mode of existence in assuming the temporal mode of existence. This of necessity meant

[1] So, too, some of the schoolmen who most closely followed the fathers. Thus Anselm says: "The Lord is said to have grown in wisdom and favour with God, not because it was so, but because He acted as if it were so. So He was exalted after death, as if this exaltation were on account of death" (*Cur Deus Homo*, i. 9, 19). And he supports this view by quoting the saying of Jesus: "I came not to do My own will, but the will of Him that sent Me."

that the limitations of His mode of manifestation gave no room for the exercise of those attributes of God which do not recognise the restrictions of time and space. It is quite distinctly implied in the gospel story, and throughout all the New Testament, that Jesus Christ in His incarnate life was absolutely without the divine attributes of Omnipotence, Omniscience, and Omnipresence. He puts Himself, like other men, under His Father, and in prayer seeks power from Him; and when He shows His possession of all power, He speaks of it as given to Him. In His miracles, too, the power given is exercised upon definite objects which present themselves under the forms of space and time. As to His knowledge, not only His expression of surprise at what happened, but also His distinct profession of ignorance, *e.g.* of the time of the end of all things, His gradual discovery of the particular nature of His own sufferings, show that He laid no claim to the divine attribute of omniscience. And, more particularly in His relations to space, we find that, like other men, He could only be in one place at a time, and, like them, He could pass from one place to another only by travelling over the space that lay between them. On the other hand, Jesus retained all the essential and ethical attributes of God—righteousness, holiness, faithfulness, truth. The relative attributes He had of necessity to surrender under temporal limitations; the essential attributes are for time as well as for eternity, and in the life of Jesus in time they appear as full and perfect as in the eternal life of God Himself.

§ 46. Sinlessness of Jesus.

Literature.—Ullmann, *Sinlessness of Jesus*, Edin. 1870. Rothe, *Theologische Ethik*, Wittenberg, 1870, iii. 135–137. Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, Königsberg, 1863, ii. 4–13. Lobstein, *Die Lehre von der übernatürliehen Geburt Christi*, Freiburg, 1896. Hering, "Die dogmatische Bedeutung und der religiöse Werth der übernatürlichen Geburt Christi," in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1895, i. pp. 58–91. Brown, "The Miraculous Conception," in *Expositor*, 3rd Series, vol. vii.

1888, pp. 293–308. Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, London, 1874, pp. 497–506. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, Edin. 1866, pp. 284–286. Strong, *Manual of Theology*, Edin. 1892, pp. 273–291. Denney, *Studies in Theology*, London, 1895, pp. 64–69. Gore, *Dissertations on Subjects connected with the Incarnation*, London, 1895: "I.—The Virgin Birth of our Lord." Frank, *System der christlichen Wahrheit*, ii. 109–117. Forrest, *The Christ of History and of Experience*, Edin. 1897, pp. 17–35. Reiff, *Die christliche Glaubenslehre*, Basel, 1876, ii. 206–210. Du Bose, *The Soteriology of the New Testament*, London, 1892, pp. 188–229: "The Human Sinlessness of Jesus Christ."

In the witness of Jesus concerning Himself nothing is more conspicuous than His consciousness of moral perfection. It is quite evident that He lays claim to a pure heart and a stainless life. The elaborate and altogether futile attempts of Martineau and others of his school to interpret isolated sayings of Jesus, so as to represent Him as making confession of sin and refusing the ascription of sinlessness, are only a confirmation of the evangelical view. The earlier Socinians held that Jesus was sinless, while they regarded this as the sinlessness of a mere man. Martineau[1] feels that absolute sinlessness cannot be attributed to the mere man, but requires the postulating of a distinct moral type, that a sinless being would be a unique personality. And, inasmuch as he is not prepared to ascribe such a unique personality to Jesus, he cannot admit that His life was any more than *relatively* good. Partial witnesses gave their impressions of His life, but His own self-judgment rejected the ascription to Him of absolute goodness, which He acknowledged was due to God only. No capable exegete will now support such an interpretation of our Lord's saying to the young ruler. To use the words of one of the latest and most scientific expositors,[2] the saying does not mean, "the epithet is not applicable to me, but to

[1] *The Seat of Authority in Religion*, London, 1890, p. 651. One of the best replies to charges of moral imperfection against Jesus is that of Godet, in his *Defence of the Christian Faith*, Edin. 1883, pp. 193–200.

[2] Bruce, on Matt. xix. 16, in *Expositor's Greek Testament*, London, 1897, p. 248.

God only," but it means, "do not make ascriptions of goodness a matter of mere courtesy or politeness." Throughout the Gospels we do not find Jesus making any confession of moral error or shortcoming. We never find Him joining the disciples in prayer to God, since in doing so He would have shared with them their confession of sinful infirmity and sinful transgression. On the contrary, He occupies a position of moral isolation in His consciousness not only of avoiding the commission of anything sinful, but also of leaving undone nothing the doing of which lay within the sphere of His moral obligation. His sinlessness had not merely the negative character of Adam's innocence, but the positive character of a holy life, tempted yet without sin.

Edward Irving, of London, and Menken, the pietist, of Bremen, with men of a very different type in modern times, Holsten and Pfleiderer, have interpreted Rom. viii. 3 as meaning, that the flesh which the Son of God assumed was sinful flesh.[1] The best expositors are agreed in understanding this passage to mean that Christ's flesh is *like* that flesh which in us is sinful flesh. "Neither the Greek nor the argument requires that the flesh of Christ shall be regarded as *sinful flesh*, though it is His flesh—His incarnation—which brought Him into contact with sin."[2] Irving's theory was a revival of the principle underlying the adoptionist heresy of Felix, of Urgel, in the end of the eighth century. It represented Christ as taking human nature as it was after the fall, and by the power of the Holy Spirit, not only keeping it from committing any actual sin, but also gradually purifying it till its original depravity was perfectly overcome and a perfect union with God effected. The human nature of Christ was thus the sinful nature of Adam, corrupted by the taint of original sin. Irving says that Christ took our fallen nature

[1] Irving, *The Doctrine of the Incarnation Opened*, in his Collected Writings, London, 1865, vol. v. p. 146. Menken, *Homilien über das neunte und zehnte Capital des Briefes an die Hebraer*, Bremen, 1831. Holsten, *Zum Evangelium des Paulus und Petrus*, Rostock, 1868, p. 436. Pfleiderer, *Paulinism*, London, 1877, vol. i. pp. 152–159.

[2] Sanday and Headlam, *Commentary on Romans*, Edin. 1896, p. 193.

because there was no other to take, and that His sufferings came not by imputation merely, but by actual participation of the sinful and cursed thing. Pfleiderer perceives that there is another view presented by Paul, and argues that the presence of both representations is an inconsistency, and that there are elements in the New Testament christology of such a heterogeneous kind that they cannot coalesce to form the real unity of a person. "Absolute sinlessness belongs to Christ as the substantiated ideal of the spiritual man, and to Christ as the empirical man living in the flesh belongs the sinfulness which is inseparable from the essence of all flesh" (p. 158). And Pfleiderer is surely right in this, that these two representations cannot be true of one and the same subject. Our answer is, that the second representation has no support whatever from Scripture rightly interpreted. Du Bose, in his *Soteriology of the New Testament*, argues that the holiness of Jesus Christ was truly by the Holy Ghost *in Him*, and not merely *in His nature*. He was the cause of the holiness of His nature, and so His sinlessness is His own. He would find no difficulty in regarding Christ's human nature as real, even had it been unfallen nature that He had assumed, but His holiness would not have been salvation, which is deliverance from an evil into a good. Jesus Christ is salvation because in Him—in His personal holiness, righteousness, and life—humanity is saved. If He is to be man's redemption He must become the thing to be redeemed, the redemption of that thing, and in His own Person that thing redeemed. It does not seem that Du Bose has succeeded in rising in any respect above the standpoint of those already named. Even when he seeks to avoid difficulties, by sharply distinguishing nature and personality, or, as he puts it, the fact of the nature as prior to His act in the nature, he only claims for his theory what Irving and his followers do for theirs. He seeks thus to hold by the scriptural and Church doctrine of the absolute sinlessness of Jesus, by refusing to call that sinful which is not allowed to go out into overt act. The error in this theory arises from laying emphasis ex-

clusively on the proposition, *potuit non peccare*, which makes sinlessness for Christ only a possibility.[1] In His nature is the possibility of sin, but in act it is never realised. The full truth is expressed only when the other proposition is added, *non potuit peccare*, which affirms the impossibility of His sinning, because the bond between the divine and human natures is not relative but essential.

The question has been raised whether, as the presupposition of this idea of the absolute sinlessness of Jesus, we must maintain the doctrine of His supernatural virgin birth. It is true, indeed, that our only witnesses are the opening sections of the First and Third Gospels. Attempts are made by Lobstein and other Ritschlians to discredit these sources. Basing their criticism upon the reports of apostolic discourses given in Acts, they hold that the tradition of the life of Jesus prevailing until after the close of the first Christian century began with John's baptism and ended with the resurrection, and contained no trace of the history of the birth and childhood. Even the Gospels of Matthew and Luke do not in any subsequent passage show that the contents of these first two chapters have influenced or even been known to the authors. The genealogies again trace the descent of Jesus from David through Joseph, so that in the sense of the genealogists Jesus is the son of Joseph. His mother and brethren so regarded Him as by birth like themselves, that when He began to mark out a course for Himself they said, He is beside Himself. Paul seems ignorant of the dogma. When he speaks of Christ coming into the world, he makes no reference to the Matthew and Luke story of the miraculous birth. No hint is given that His birth was regarded as different from other human births. Even the writer of the Fourth Gospel seems to have preceded the construction of this dogma. Further, the idea of the preexistence and that of the miraculous conception seem to be inconsistent with one another, and are not reported by the same writers. "The belief that Jesus was born of a virgin,"

[1] See Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, Edin. 1876, pp. 288–295.

says Harnack, "sprang from Isa. vii. 14. . . . Those who suppose that the reality of the virgin birth must be held fast, must assume that a misunderstood prophecy has been here fulfilled."[1] It is argued that the consecration of the Holy Ghost, and not the absence of a human father, is the real condition of the true divinity of Jesus Christ. Even Meyer, whose personal belief is quite different, protests against putting it in the form of a dilemma, and making the idea of God-man and of the virgin birth stand and fall together; and Julius Müller expressed the hope that the Evangelical Church would never expel one from her ranks who with a heart knowledge of repentance and faith, and preaching of the Saviour of the world as Son of God and Son of Man, was yet unable to accept the dogma of the supernatural birth. In accounting for the early spread and almost universal acceptance of this dogma of the virgin birth of Jesus, attention is called by Hering and others to the manner in which it was used in the interests of the veneration of Mary. With the growth of the sentiment which regarded virginity as the virtue *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, the veneration of Mary advanced from the assumption of her *virginitas ante partum* to the maintaining of her *virginitas in partu* and *post partum*. "The origin of the thought of the abiding virginity of Mary lies in the doketic conceptions of gnosticism about the birth of Christ, and, like so much else of gnostic origin, was at a later period received by the official church."[2] From Clement of Alexandria onwards the fathers, for the most part, represented the marriage with Joseph as a sham marriage, and by and by any theory which would in the least throw doubt upon the perpetual virginity of Mary was treated as a heresy and a blasphemy. What we are specially interested in here is the connection between this dogma and that of the sinlessness of Jesus. This connection was first definitely affirmed by Justin Martyr in his *Dialogue with Trypho*. Christ is born as man of man, but *δίχα ἁμαρτίας* by the Virgin Mary of Abraham's seed.

[1] *History of Dogma*, London, 1894, vol. i. p. 100.

[2] Hering, in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1895, p. 75.

Augustine, again, speaking of the complete human nature assumed by Christ, yet free from sin, describes it as "not such nature as is born of both sexes through the lust of the flesh with the bond of sin, the guilt whereof is washed away by regeneration, but such as that it was fitting He should be born of a virgin, whom the faith of His mother, not her lust, had conceived; by whose very birth even were her virginity impaired, now no longer would He be born of a virgin; and falsely, which God forbid, would the whole Church confess Him born of the Virgin Mary; she who following His mother daily brings forth His members and is a virgin still."[1] This combination of the idea of the virgin birth and that of the sinlessness of Jesus was universally accepted in the Church. Calvin rightly calls attention to the important part performed by the sanctifying presence of the Holy Spirit. "We do not," he says, "hold Christ to be free from all taint merely because He was born of a woman unconnected with a man, but because He was sanctified by the Spirit, so that the generation was pure and spotless, such as it would have been before Adam's fall."[2] It is well to emphasise this point, for if exclusive importance be put on the virginity of Mary as the presupposition of the sinlessness of Jesus, we should require to predicate sinlessness of Mary, and consequently her own sinless birth back through all the generations of her descent. In regard to the scriptural foundation of the dogma, while admitting that it is only in the opening chapters of Matthew and Luke that the story of the virgin birth is given, it should be remembered, however, that these chapters are integral parts of the Gospels in which they are found. They were omitted by none but by the heretic Marcion, who omitted the opening chapters of Luke to serve his own ends. The narratives have all the appearance of reports taken down from the lips of an eye and ear-witness,—in all probability from Mary herself, who kept these

[1] *Enchiridion ad Laurentium*, c. xxxiv., in *Seventeen Short Treatises of Augustine* (Lib. of Fathers), London, 1885, p. 108.

[2] *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, bk. ii. chap. xiii. § 4.

things and pondered them in her heart.[1] The omission of the story by Mark and John is naturally accounted for by the limits which they impose upon themselves; nor can Paul's silence in regard to this matter, in his preaching to Gentiles, be regarded as a proof that he did not know it or hold it as a fact of his own faith. As to the preaching of the apostles, it should be remembered that they were pre-eminently witnesses of the resurrection; and when once the superhuman character of Jesus as proved by the resurrection was admitted, the truth of His superhuman birth would be received without hesitation. And just as in the apostolic age, so now the dogma of the resurrection of Christ and that of His miraculous birth stand and fall together. As to the dogmatic importance of the fact of Christ's miraculous birth, it seems that what most concerns us is this, that only by means of it do we secure in Jesus Christ, not a mere individual in the race, but a true representative of the race, the Second Adam.[2] Opponents of the doctrine, like Hering, seek to put supporters of it in a dilemma, as if the subject of a supernatural birth must either want all individuality, etc., and so be no true man, or have an individuality, and in that case not require the postulating of a miraculous birth. But, as Rothe says (*Still Hours*, London, 1886, p. 208): "The Redeemer formed for Himself an individuality by an abnormal development. The individuality of Christ is the universal individuality in which as such all forms of individuality are to be found." His mere individuality sets Him in contrast to all others, and thus while universal in His personality He is at the same time unique. This uniqueness could not belong to one born from the marriage of two members of the family of Adam, with their human and limited individuality. Such a one could be no Second Adam, the head of a new

[1] See Dr. Ince, "The Miraculous Conception and Virgin Birth of Christ," in *Expositor*, June 1895, pp. 401–411. Also Godet, *Commentary on Luke*, Edin. 1875, vol. i. pp. 151–163.

[2] See especially: Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Edin. 1889, iii. 344–349; Rothe, *Theologische Ethik*, Wittenberg, 1870, iii. 135 f.; Frank, *System der christlichen Wahrheit*, Erlangen, 1894, ii. 109–117.

humanity. And the peculiarity of the birth of Jesus by a virgin no more separates Him from the race, as its new head, than does the creation of the first Adam separate him from the race which has its origin in him. Jesus could not have been born of a human pair without inheriting the taint, at least in some measure, which is the heritage of all the members of the fallen race. If this initial miracle be denied, the only alternative, if we are to maintain the sinlessness of Christ's life, will be the adoption of Irving's theory of a tainted nature gradually sanctified, and from the first prevented from developing into sinful acts by the presence and power of the Holy Spirit; or the postulating of a stupendous miracle of divine intervention, in the annulling of nature so that absolutely a clean thing may be brought out of an unclean.

§ 47. Pre-Existence of the Son of God.

Literature.—Somerville, *St. Paul's Conception of Christ*, Edin. 1898, pp. 181–220, Lect. VI.: "The Eternal Nature of Christ." Schultz, *Die Lehre von der Gottheit Christi*, Gotha, 1881. Gess, *Scripture Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, Andover, 1870, pp. 13–243. Lobstein, *La Notion de la Préexistence du fils de Dieu*, Paris, 1883. Wennagel, *La Logique des disciples de M. Ritschl*, Strassburg, 1883. Godet, "Person of Christ," art. in *Monthly Interpreter* for 1886, vol. iii. pp. 1–31. Forrest, *The Christ of History and of Experience*, Edin. 1897, pp. 76–79. Treffry, *Inquiry into the Doctrine of the Eternal Sonship of our Lord Jesus Christ*, London, 1818. Kidd, *The Eternal Sonship of Christ*, 2nd ed., London, 1872; *Princeton Essays*, 1st Series, Edin. 1856, pp. 30–56: "The Sonship of Christ." Candlish, *Fatherhood of God*, Edin. 1866, pp. 135–163: "The Fatherhood of God as manifested in the Person of Christ." Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Edin. 1889, iii. 283–299. An admirable account of the Pauline doctrine is given in Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik*, Berlin, 1885, ii. 93–96; also of doctrine of the Logos, pp. 112–119. Denney, *Studies in Theology*, London, 1895, pp. 51–58. Wendt, *Teaching of Jesus*, Edin. 1892, vol. ii. 168–178. Beyschlag, *New Testament Theology*, Edin. 1895, vol. i. pp. 249–255.

The doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ is involved in

the very terms in which the fact of the incarnation is proclaimed. When Christ is spoken of as sent by God, as become flesh, some sort of pre-existence is clearly presupposed; but whether this be a real and personal, or simply an ideal, pre-existence has yet to be discussed. At the very outset, however, we must call attention to those passages in which that worship is claimed for and accorded to Jesus Christ as was claimed for and given to Jehovah. In 1 Cor. i. 2 and Rom. x. 12 the calling upon the name of the Lord Jesus Christ is recognised as the characteristic practice of all Christians. But among the early Christians great care was taken to make it plain that they offered worship to Jesus Christ, not as to a man but as to God. It was emphatically declared that no creaturely being could receive such worship (Rev. xix. 10, xxii. 9), but only He who was uncreated and eternal (i. 17 f.). It could not possibly have been given by the apostles to any mere man raised to divinity, which to those trained in the Jewish religion would have been an intolerable thought, but only to Him who was true God from all eternity. They were led to render this worship to the glorified Christ, not from any mere theoretical or theosophical conception that study of the Old Testament or familiarity with Greek legends might have fostered, but from the impression made upon them by the facts of the earthly life of Jesus, and from His own witness concerning Himself, especially as set forth in the Gospel of John. The impression made upon the whole body of the disciples, to which expression was given in every section of the Apostolic and post-Apostolic Church is that which is given utterance to by John (i. 14–18): "We behold His glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. . . . And of His fulness have we all received. . . . No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him." In all this the disciples were simply abiding in Christ's words. Our Lord Himself declares this truth of His own eternal pre-existence when He says: "Before Abraham was, I am" (John viii. 58); and when

He prayed to the Father to glorify Him with that glory which He had with Him before the world was (xvii. 5). This also is the presupposition of His claim to be the Light of the World, and to a right to be honoured and worshipped, even as the Father (chap. v. 23). And not only in John, but also in the Synoptic Gospels, we find, especially in His appropriation to Himself of figures used in the Old Testament of Jehovah, —shepherd, physician, bridegroom,—that Jesus claimed to rank with the eternal Father, while in Matt. xi. 25 ff. He claims a knowledge of God, and consequently power to reveal God, which is altogether beyond the capacity of any creature.

In 2 Cor. viii. 9, Christ is described as giving up a state in which He was rich for one in which He became poor. In Phil. ii. 6, He who became incarnate is represented as "being originally" (*ὑπάρχων*), *i.e.* before His incarnation, "in the form of God." In Col. i. 15 ff., compared with 1 Cor. viii. 6, we see that the Christ who secured for us the attaining to the end of our being was the condition and end of all creation, and as such existing before all worlds. That in Paul's intention a real and personal, and not a merely ideal, pre-existence is meant is almost universally admitted, *e.g.* even by Biedermann. It is also undisputed that the pre-existence of the divine Word in John represents a real personal eternal being who is God and is with God.

Beyond this point the Scripture representations do not carry us. When the question is raised by those who accept the doctrine of the pre-existence, as to the form of being in which the Christ pre-existed, we are launched upon the sea of pure speculation. The theory of the Pre-existent Man has against it its evident incompatibility with the whole tone of the Scripture representations, which require that He should be conceived of as more than man, even if that man be thought of as clothed with a celestial body. It is impossible to find any support for this theory in 1 Cor. xv. 47, in which, not the preincarnate, but the risen and exalted, Christ is spoken of. It is also evident that the historical incarnation is everywhere described, not only as the

first appearance of Christ in the form of man but as His original assumption of man's nature. Another theory has been proposed which represents the pre-existent Christ as already the God-man. This makes the incarnation eternal, so that the birth in Bethlehem is nothing more than the revelation to man of what had existed from all eternity. In common with the previous theory, it introduces an idea of human nature which knew nothing of that flesh and blood form of existence of which alone man has experience. Is anything gained, in the way of bringing the Christ nearer to us, by assuming for Him a form of existence in His pre-incarnate state in which He has the name of man without any of those attributes by which we know ourselves and are known to others? So far as I can understand the meaning of those who support the theories referred to, the Pre-existent Man or God-man is simply God wanting, like the Christ in His incarnate life, the relative divine attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence. But why, in heaven and all through the ages of eternity, such a being should be limited as only under the conditions of space and time any being need be limited, is not apparent. The fatal objection to both theories is, that they make this pre-existent Christ less than God, with the consequence that the Christ of the incarnation cannot be held as God. We can regard the incarnate Christ as God only if we believe that the limitation of His powers was temporal and not eternal. If only for the years of His temporal existence He was self-emptied of the divine omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence, we may still call Him God in the fullest sense; but if, from all eternity, He never had these attributes, then He never was, and of course never can be, truly God. Whatever difficulty may arise in conceiving of the union of the human and divine natures in the Person of the incarnate Lord, it cannot be lessened by a theory which practically eliminates the divine altogether. The only position compatible with Scripture is that which regards the pre-existent Christ as the second Person of the Trinity, possessed of the full divine

nature, and exercising unrestrictedly all the attributes of God. This is the truth set forth under the doctrine of the eternal Sonship, and its maintenance is indispensable in any trinitarian system of doctrine.

In recent times the doctrine of the pre-existence has been persistently assailed, especially by members of the Ritschlian school. Schultz, in his work on the Godhead of Christ, went beyond all the more moderate adherents of Ritschl in repudiating the incarnation altogether, and in its place introducing the representation of a man becoming God by a sort of apotheosis. By means of His life on earth, morally and religiously victorious, Christ obtains as a price elevation to Godhead, which entitles Him to the worship of the Church. It is not shown what enabled Him to live a life which could win such a reward, and the idea of apotheosis itself is a purely pagan and not a Christian one. The theory accepted by Ritschlians generally is expounded in a singularly clear and attractive manner by Lobstein. He seeks to show that the doctrine of pre-existence does not belong to the teaching of Jesus Christ Himself, that it is no more than a theological corollary, and that it is incompatible with the real humanity of Jesus. He discards the testimony of John, and lays great stress upon the silence of the Synoptists; but we have seen how the very terms in which His coming into the world is described implies real pre-existence. Again, far from being the result of mere metaphysical speculation, the doctrine is of high religious value as affording the presupposition of the adequacy of Jesus Christ as our Redeemer. The eternal Sonship can in no way impair the humanity of Jesus, if we do not introduce confusion by any theory of a pre-existent manhood. It is satisfactory to find that Lobstein recognises clearly the insufficiency of the notion of an *ideal* pre-existence of Christ. Instead of this He proposes the teleological conception of the eternal and personal election of the Son of God, as corresponding, in view of the work of salvation, to the postulates of the Christian faith and to the exigencies of theological thought.

This certainly is better, from the evangelical point of view, than Wendt's attempt to understand the pre-existence of John's Gospel as purely ideal. Yet Lobstein's position is only transitional, and from it, as he cannot fall back upon the old Ritschlian notion of a purely ideal pre-existence, he must advance to that of a real and personal pre-existence, who, only as having such eternal personal pre-existence as the Son of God, can be the subject of a teleological election.

§ 48. The Divine Nature of Christ.

Literature.—Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, London, 1874, pp. 506–512. Wilberforce, *Doctrine of the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ*, 2nd ed., London, 1849, pp. 113–180. Perowne, *Godhead of Jesus*, London, 1867. Owen, *Person of Christ* (1647), Works, i. (1850), 29–44. Edwards, *The God-man*, London, 1895, pp. 3–30. Godet, *Studies on the New Testament*, 6th ed., London, 1884: "The Son of God," pp. 123–134. Dale, *Christian Doctrine*, London, 1894. Orr, *Christian View of God and the World*, Edin. 1893, pp. 272–280. Biedermann, *Die christliche Dogmatik*, Berlin, 1885, ii. 180–190.

Christ is proved to be divine by having divine names and attributes assigned to Him. He is expressly called God (John i. 1; Rom. ix. 5; Tit. ii. 13; Heb. i. 8; 1 John v. 20). The "form of God," ascribed to Him in Phil. ii. 6, is the nature and being of God. In John i. 18, He is "the only begotten God." He is represented, especially in John, as exercising all divine attributes in His preincarnate state, as possessed of all the essential attributes of God during His life on earth, and as entering again after death on the full possession and exercise of all divine properties. Besides the power of miracle-working generally, He Himself lays claim to power to perform two works, which are never delegated but always reserved exclusively for the operation of God Himself,—to raise the dead at last, and to judge those who are raised up. Equality with God is predicated of Him, and worship, such as belongs by right to God only, is enjoined upon man and is rendered to Him.

Among the early Christians a party grew up among the converts from Judaism attached to the old hard Jewish monotheism, and these Jewish Christians, carrying their Judaistic tendencies into their Christianity, introduced a bald Monarchianism which denied the divinity of Christ. Those who repudiated the virgin birth of Jesus and regarded Him as a mere man, only at His baptism endowed with divine gifts and so constituted Messiah, were called Ebionites. As contrasted with the more moderate Nazarenes, they were Jews of the most conservative type. They looked to the coming again of Christ for the setting up of the Messianic kingdom. An Ebionistic taint appears in many of the gnostic systems. The connecting link between the Jewish and Gentile gnosticism is found in Cerinthus. With the Ebionites, he regards Jesus as born in a natural way, the son of Joseph and Mary, the Christ descending upon Him in baptism, giving Him all the power and wisdom which He showed in word and deed, and finally leaving Him before the passion, so that only the man Jesus suffered. The Monarchianism of the second and third centuries was developed in two directions, the one deistic and rationalistic, the other pantheistic and modalistic. To the former belonged Artemon, Theodotus, Paul of Samosata, precursors of Socinus and the humanitarians and anti-trinitarians of later times. To the latter belonged Praxeas, Noetus, Beryllus, and Sabellius, who recognised the full and essential divinity of Christ but denied His hypostatic distinction from the Father, affirming that He was but a form of manifestation of the one Godhead. In opposition to this twofold tendency the Church has in every age maintained, on the one hand, the essential Godhead of Christ, and on the other, His personal distinction from the Father. The church doctrine has also equally opposed the theory of Arius, according to which He who is Son and is begotten cannot be conceived of as eternal and a purely spiritual being, so that the Logos is not eternal and not truly divine, but only a created being, though indeed the greatest and the first begotten. Against this heresy, and all modifications of it, the Church proclaimed its doctrine of *ὁμοούσια*, declaring Christ's

consubstantial divinity, and proclaiming Him very God of very God. Biedermann recognises the Church's judgment on Arius through Athanasius as just. Arianism is on one side Judaistic in its bold monotheism, on the other side heathenish, inasmuch as the creaturely Logos, who is above all other creatures and becomes a creator, is in the pagan sense a lower deity. In opposition to modifying theories of every sort, the church doctrine proclaims the full divinity of Jesus Christ, His subordination being official and not essential.

§ 49. The Human Nature of Christ.

Literature.—Strong, *Systematic Theology* (1893), 364–367. Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, London, 1874, pp. 493–497. Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, ii. 42 f. Biedermann, *Die christliche Dogmatik* (1885), ii. 190–195. Böhl, *Dogmatik*, Amsterdam, 1887, pp. 309–320. Reiff, *Die christliche Glaubenslehre*, ii. 176–179.

Scripture insists upon the completeness of the human nature of Jesus Christ. He was mentally and physically truly man. He had a true body, compounded as the bodies of other men are, and a reasonable soul which was sensitive to pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow, like those around Him. In respect both of body and of soul, He passed through the usual experiences of human life, and was developed by means of these. The integrity of Christ's human nature consisted in the perfect balance and equipoise of these two essential elements, the material and the spiritual. In early times erroneous teaching was introduced denying the true human character either of body or of soul. Various forms of Doketism prevailed among the gnostics. The body of Christ was represented either as the mere semblance of a body which served to give visibility to the spiritual Christ, or as the body of the man Jesus in which the Christ dwelt for a time without any real personal union. The doketic denial of a real body to Christ naturally arose first among the gnostics of Manichæan tendencies. In the gnostic system of Basilides, the Christ is represented as wearing a phantom body, and no human experi-

ence attributed to Him was any more than seeming. These views, so far as they were entertained within the Church, were no doubt a reaction from the naturalistic error of Ebionism. But in Romanism a doketic representation of Christ led men to feel the need of the presence and help of a more really human being in the person of the Lord's mother. While doketists denied to Christ a real human body, the integrity of His manhood was impaired by the Apollinarian theory, according to which the Divine Logos took the place of the human spirit in the Christ. Apollinaris, who was otherwise orthodox, accepting the Platonic doctrine of the human trichotomy of body, soul, and spirit, gave to Christ a human body and a human soul, but assigned to Him, in place of the human spirit, the Divine Logos, which was itself the original pattern of that spirit. It was rightly alleged against Him, that by denying to Christ a human *νοῦς* He made the incarnation incomplete, and that *σὰρξ* and *ψυχή*, as they did not together constitute a full man, could only form a tabernacle or temple for the indwelling of the Logos, but not a human nature in union with it. In many points, however, his opponents, Athanasius and the Gregories, misunderstood his position, which was probably only an attempt to show how in Christ there are indeed two natures but only one personality. Apollinarianism is toward the humanity what Arianism is toward the divinity of Christ.

§ 50. The Divine-Human Personality.

Literature.—Dorner, *System of Doctrine*, iii. 308–318. Strong, *Systematic Theology* (1893), 368–380. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, ii. 387–397. Shedd, *Dogmatic Theology*, ii. 289–308. Strauss, *Christliche Glaubenslehre* (1841), ii. 99–135. Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik* (1885), ii. 195–216. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics* (1866), 258–274. Frank, *System der christlichen Wahrheit* (1894), ii. 127–140. Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evangel. Dogmatik* (1892), p. 515 f. Orr, *Christian View of God and the World* (1893), 282–286. Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ* (1876), 171, 427–430.

The distinction of the two natures in Christ was affirmed by the Church in opposition to all forms of Ebionism and doketism; but with equal emphasis the Church also maintained the perfect union of the two natures in one divine human personality. During the first three centuries the simple analogy of the union in man of body and soul seemed to suffice, but with the Apollinarian controversy the difficulty emerged as to the representation of such a union in one personality without impairing the completeness of the human or of the divine. Apollinaris said: If ye ascribe a human νοῦς to Christ, either you must define it as possessed of free will, and then you have no personal unity of the God-man, or you must conceive it as mere acceptivity for the divine νοῦς, and then it is no longer a complete human νοῦς. Athanasius sought to represent Christ on the divine side as the realisation of the eternal ideal of manhood, and on his human as the attaining unto the image of God. In the Antiochean school stress was laid upon the humanity; in the Alexandrian school, upon the divinity. Nestorius, in emphasising the distinctness of the natures, imperilled the doctrine of the personal union; and Eutyches, in emphasising the personal union, confused the natures and introduced Monophysitism. Both tendencies were condemned and declared heretical at the Council of Chalcedon in 451. A certain revival of Monophysitism in the Monothelete controversy was finally condemned in 680. John of Damascus completed the ancient Church doctrine by his theory of ἐνυπόστασις and περιχώρησις, according to which the union of the two natures in the one person is brought about by a mutual communication of attributes, in which the divine nature is active and the human passive, and participation in the human attributes is regarded as only relative with a view to the work of redemption. In modern theology the question of the *impersonality* of the human nature of Christ has been taken up again and discussed in detail. The perfect union of the natures in the one God-man is the position from which we must proceed. If we start with the two natures separate and complete, no

fusion of the two into one personality, without the impairing of one of the natures or of both, is conceivable. In the one personality of the God-man, however, we find both natures complete, without finding any necessity for speaking of the *impersonality* of the human natures. It is characteristic of human nature, as created after the image of God, that its personality, without any impairing of its essence, can be made to embrace the divine consciousness of the Logos; and it is characteristic of the Logos consciousness, that without the destruction of its essence it can enter into the mould of the human personality.[1] The self-modifying of the divine consciousness which this implies cannot be regarded as peculiar to the state of humiliation, since it continues with the exalted Christ. The union is thus effected without any essential impairing of the divine consciousness. A similar modification of the human personality, not on the side of activity but on that of receptivity, must also be postulated in order that the union may be conceived of as real. But this does not make the human nature impersonal, any more than the self-modifying of the Logos consciousness impairs the fulness of the divine personality. Dorner says: No considerable theologians any longer think of the humanity of Christ without personality. This, no doubt, makes the personal union of natures in the God-man a mystery, but such it must be allowed to be on any theory that recognises honestly the distinction of natures.—This personal union, not being a confusion or combination, but a communion of natures, has as its result the *communicatio idiomatum* in the Person of the God-man, the mutual communication of the properties of both natures to one another in His Person, the divine activity and the human receptivity. A threefold mode of communication has been expressed in these scholastic terms: (1) *genus idiomaticum*, the imparting of the attributes of both natures to the one person; (2) *genus apotelesmaticum*, imparting of attributes of the one person to both natures: (3) *genus auchematicum*, or *majestaticum*, imparting of attri-

[1] So Frank, *System der christlichen Wahrheit*, ii. 129.

butes of one nature to another, the divine to the human. This last, peculiar to the Lutheran Church, is rejected by the Reformed as obliterating the real distinction of natures. By the Lutherans this notion was used as the basis of their doctrines of Christ's ubiquity and of consubstantiation. The Reformed theologians rightly contend that a human nature which has divine properties communicated ceases to be human, and that such communication of attributes can only be to the divine-human person. Dorner and Rothe have sought to explain the union as one that was only gradually effected. The human nature appears first as that of the man Jesus with a receptivity for the Divine Logos, and with the development of the human consciousness there is a proportionate advance in the appropriation of the divine. His entrance upon exaltation marks his attainment to full God-manhood. Here we really begin with two persons who gradually grow into one another, and become at last one person. In this we have a pantheistic confusion of the natures and the recognition of a double personality of Christ during His earthly life, which is in conflict with the consciousness of Jesus Himself and with the whole christology of the New Testament. Gess, Ebrard, and others seek to represent the Person of Christ as made up of divine and human elements rather than of the divine and human natures. Unlike Apollinaris who proceeded from a trichotomous view of human nature, they represent human nature as made up of material and immaterial parts. In Christ the material part is human, the immaterial part is divine. The God-man is not properly a divine-human person, but a personality made up of human and divine elements. The Divine Logos in the incarnation assumes a human body. This theory also tends to pantheism, since a personality cannot be made up of elements from two natures unless these two are essentially one. In contrast to these attempts to represent the Person of Christ as arising out of an ultimate essential oneness of God and man, Scripture describes our Lord Himself as recognising this communion of natures only on the basis of the one

divine-human personality. In the Person of the God-man, the Son of God has the self-consciousness of the Son of Man, and knows and wills as the Son of Man, and the Son of Man has the self-consciousness of the Son of God, and knows and wills as the Son of God. When Christ designates Himself as the Son of Man, He ascribes to Himself predicates which cannot be said properly to belong to the human personality as such—He is the Son of Man who is in heaven (John iii. 13). He also represents His human ego as the subject of such properties and experiences as properly belonged to Him as Son of God in His eternal divine state of pre-existence (John xvi. 28, xvii. 5). The same conception meets us in Paul's description of Christ as the second *man* from heaven (1 Cor. xv. 47). Thus without impairing the human consciousness of Christ by introducing the notion of the impersonality of His human nature, we have in the God-man a single consciousness expressed in one divine-human personality in which the human personality and the divine personality are united, so that the attributes of both find equal expression in its utterances and activities.

§ 51. Doctrine of the Two States.

Literature. — Schneckenburger, *Zur kirchlichen Christologie—Die orthodoxe Lehre vom doppelten Stande Christi*, 2nd ed., Pforzheim, 1861. Turretine, *Institutio theologiæ elenticæ*, Geneva, 1689, ii. 361–363: "De Duplici Christi Statu." Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, Edin. 1866, pp. 288–295. Lipsius, *Lehrbuch der evang.-protest. Dogmatik*, Brunswick, 1876, pp. 471–475. Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik*, Freiburg, 1892, pp. 461–465. Strauss, *Die christliche Glaubenslehre*, Tüb. 1841, ii. 135–153. Gerhard, *Loci theologici* Berlin, 1864, i. 592–601: "De Statu Exinanitionis et Exaltationis." Grimm, *Institutio theologiæ dogmaticæ*, Jena, 1869, pp. 351–354. Schmidt, *Doppelten Stand Christi*, in Herzog,[2] xiv. 595–604. Biedermann, *Die christliche Dogmatik*, Berlin, 1885, ii. 216, 217.

By the doctrine of the two states of Christ is meant the

different phases of the relation of the divine-human personality of Christ as the God-man according as the human or the divine element had prominence given it. Had the subject been the Divine Logos, we should have been obliged strictly to speak of three states or modes of existence: the pre-existent state of eternal divine being, the earthly state of temporal human existence, and the heavenly state of the glorified and exalted divine-human personality. The theological interest, however, centres in the Word made flesh, and so the Christ is considered as the subject only of two states, those of humiliation and exaltation. The entrance of the Logos into the flesh is the appearing of the Christ. The doctrine of the two states was formulated in the fourth century in the controversy against Apollinarianism, the ending of the state of humiliation being terminated with the death and burial. The descent into Hades was, by the Reformed theologians, placed as the close of the humiliation, but by the Lutherans it was reckoned as the first stage in the exaltation. This doctrine is the necessary corollary of the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum.*

§ 52. The State of Humiliation.

Literature.—Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ* (1876), 1–247. Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics* (1874), 543–563. Strong, *Systematic Theology* (1893), 380–384. Gifford, *The Incarnation: a Study of Phil.* ii. 5-11, London, 1897. Edwards, *The God-man* (1895), 113–140. Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik* (1885), ii. 217–234. Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evangel. Dogmatik* (1892), 462–465. Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, ii. 216–226. Turretine, *Institutio theologiæ elencticæ* (1689), ii. 383–396. Mastricht, *Theoretico-Practica Theologia*, Utrecht, 1715, pp. 487–568. Rothe, *Dogmatik*, ii. 66–80.

Incarnation, which has the Divine Logos as its subject, is logically antecedent to the humiliation, which has as its subject the God-man. So the incarnation may be viewed rather as an exaltation of the human, but with the manifestation of the incarnate Christ, the Word become flesh,

begins the *status exinanitionis*. The stages in the humiliation are stages in the development of the God-man, stages in the revelation of His divinity under the modes of human subsistence. Consisting in the assumption of human flesh under the load and curse of sin, Christ's humiliation is described as the wearing of the form of a servant. The several stages or acts in the humiliation have usually been given in order as follows: the conception, the birth, the circumcision, the education or intellectual growth, intercourse with men, the greater sufferings and enduring of special indignities, death and burial. The doctrine of the Reformed Church, which, as distinguished from that of the Lutheran, reckoned the *descensus ad inferos* to the humiliation, is well expressed in the Westminster Confession: "The Son of God did take upon Him man's nature, with all the essential properties and common infirmities thereof, yet without sin, being conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost in the womb of the Virgin Mary, of her substance, . . . was made under the law and did perfectly fulfil it, endured most grievous torments immediately in His soul and most painful sufferings in His body, was crucified and died, was buried and remained under the power of death." The two principal Scripture passages in which the doctrine of the humiliation is stated are 2 Cor. viii. 9 and Phil. ii. 5–9. The former passage simply describes the humiliation as a resigning of riches for poverty. In Philippians, again, the apostle describes the process by which this change was accomplished. The Son of God, who had existed uninterruptedly in the form of God, possessing the whole being and nature of God, emptied Himself not of the "form of God," but of "equality with God," which consisted in the glory and majesty belonging to His pre-existent state. He emptied Himself not of the divine nature, but of the divine state, the outward show of majesty. In emptying Himself of this He took on Him the form of a servant. The attempt to define particularly the manner in which the God-man humbled Himself led to the enunciation of the two great theories of the Krupsis and the Kenosis, wrought out first

of all by Brenz, of Würtemburg (1499–1570), and Chemnitz, of Brunswick (1522–1586), respectively, and carried on from 1616 between the schools of Tübingen and Giessen. Brenz, and after him the theologians of Tübingen, taught that during the state of humiliation the God-man put a veil over His divine majesty: "Majestatem divinam tempore carnis suæ occultavit, dissimulavit, seu ea se exinanivit, tamen nunquam ea caruit."[1] As man, even when He lay in the cradle and hung on the cross, Christ was omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and only veiled these marks of glory. This was a very prevalent view in the earlier ranks of orthodoxy, and is quite the same as the theory of Anselm, which viewed Christ as possessing, but acting as if He did not possess, the divine attributes. This theory involves a doketic view of Christ's human mode of existence, and obliterates all real distinction between the humiliation and the exaltation. Nothing can save such a theory from the charge of making Christ's life on earth a pretence and a dissembling throughout, save the understanding of it as a theory of a double consciousness, such as some thoughtful men even yet seem to regard as not inconceivable.[2] Chemnitz, and after him the theologians of Giessen, taught that there was, on the part of the God-man in His state of humiliation, an actual giving up of the use of the divine majesty. The divine nature continued in possession and use (*κτῆσις* and *χρῆσις*) of the divine attributes, and in the incarnation the human nature also entered on possession of these, but not upon the full use of them. To the human nature of the God-man in humiliation is to be ascribed possession (*κτῆσις*) of the divine majesty, but also *κένωσις χρήσεως*. There is thus a large common element between Brenz and Chemnitz. Both vigorously maintain the continued possession by the God-man of the divine attributes. Chemnitz is no kenotist in the proper sense. The only difference between the two

[1] See Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch*, p. 462.

[2] This undoubtedly is the view favoured by Reformed theologians. See Bruce, *Humiliation*, 162–166.

arises out of their way of designating the difference between the preincarnate and the incarnate life of Him who in both forms of existence was in possession of the attributes of God. The proper kenotic theory was not formally and scientifically promulgated till about the middle of the present century.[1] It was first clearly enunciated by Thomasius, of Erlangen (1802–1875).[2] Dr. Bruce has characterised the Thomasian kenotic theory as "the absolute dualistic type." Scripture represents Jesus as a man, a human ego, and again as the Logos who was with God and was God, as the divine ego; and yet there is but one ego, conscious at once of His divine and human existence as belonging to and characterising Himself. In the incarnation the Son of God assumed human nature, and in doing so imposed a self-limitation. Apart from this limitation the divine would have swallowed up the human. The Son of God circumscribes Himself within the limits of human development in space and time. The divine and human natures are left intact, and the personality of the human nature is recognised. As God-man, the Son of God parts only with the relative attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, but with none of the essential attributes. The weakness of the theory lies in its postulating the presence of a *potence* that does not operate, and a depotentiation of the Logos which fails to vindicate for itself a place in the constitution of the God-man. Another form of the theory of the Kenosis has been proposed by Gess (1819–1891). The Gessian theory has been characterised by Dr. Bruce as "the absolute metamorphic type." The outgoing from the Father is a loss of intimacy of communion with the Father; the descent from heaven means not only surrender of the relative attributes, but of immanent as well; and becoming flesh implied the

[1] The most complete and interesting account of the varying forms of the kenotic christology is that given by Dr. Bruce, in *Humiliation of Christ*, 173–247.

[2] In his *Beiträge zur kirchlichen Christologie*, 1845, and more fully in *Christi Person und Werk*, 1856, 3rd ed. 1886.

putting of Himself under the regular laws of human development. The Logos is transformed into the human soul: He became a human soul. Another form of the theory is that of Ebrard (1818–1888). Dr. Bruce characterises this form of the theory as "the absolute semi-metamorphic type." The Logos takes the place of the human soul, but this was not real depotentiation, not a loss but a disguising of divinity. Omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence remained in an applied form to be used when he wished. The metamorphosis is apparently only relative, and the theory is practically a return to the old Reformed position. Martensen (1808–1884) formulates the theory in a manner which is characterised by Dr. Bruce as "the real but relative type." In contrast to the previously described theories, the theory of Martensen regards the depotentiation as not absolute but only relative, only in so far as the incarnation is concerned. It is a theory of a double life, that of the Logos and that of the Christ. The Logos life and Logos revelation go on during the Christ life and Christ revelation on earth and in time. He lives a double life, one in the world at large, one in the man Jesus. Perhaps no single presentation of the kenotic theory is altogether acceptable, and each form of the theory as described certainly has its difficulties. This, however, seems the direction in which the solution lies. We must conceive of the Logos as self-depotentiated of all that cannot be brought within the limits of genuine, real, and full human nature; and as to what the second Person of the Trinity is doing all the while, this belongs to the mystery of the Trinity, which no theories devised by any human mind can make less than it is.

§ 53. The State of Exaltation.

Literature.—Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Edin. 1889, iv. 125–142. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, 315–329. Frank, *System der christl. Wahrheit*, ii. 211–242. Rothe, *Theologische Ethik* (1870), iii. 151–159. Strong, *Systematic Theology* (1893), 384–387. Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, ii.

226–252. Grimm, *Institutio theologiæ dogmaticæ* (1869), 354–364. Hasse, *Die Lehre des verklärten Erlösers im Himmel*, Leipzig, 1854. Wilberforce, *Doctrine of the Incarnation* (1849), 244–309. Medd, *The One Mediator* (1884), 324–408. Philippi, *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre* (1868), 168–189. See also two extremely interesting and suggestive articles by Vollert, "Die Bedeutung der Himmelfahrt für Christum" and "Die Bedeutung der Himmelfahrt Christi für die Kirche und für den einzelnen Glaubigen," in *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift*, for 1896, vol. vii. pp. 389–427, 937–963. Milligan, *The Ascension and Heavenly Priesthood of our Lord*, London, 1892.

The state of exaltation for Christ begins with the resurrection. "His continuing under the power of death for a time" belongs to His humiliation. It does not seem that there is any ground for an article *descensus ad inferos*. The preaching referred to in 1 Pet. iii. 18–20 was to the men of Noah's day, and neither a triumphant display in Hades, proclaiming doom to the lost, nor the offering of grace and salvation to those who never had a fair opportunity before. The several successive stages in the exaltation are the resurrection, the ascension, the session at God's right hand. These all fall to be dealt with in the sections on eschatology; the resurrection of Christ as the potency and pledge of man's resurrection, and the ascension and session as the presupposition of the last judgment and the final awards.

The exaltation sets Christ free, not from His union with human nature, but from the restrictions and limitations of the earthly life in the flesh. The Lutherans hold the doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's glorified body, and make this the basis of their doctrine of His presence in the Eucharist. We are taught by Scripture to think of Christ as present with us at all times and in all places, not in His divine nature nor in His human nature nor in His divine-human personality, but in His spirit, which is the Holy Spirit, the third Person in the blessed Trinity. Christ's body, though a spiritual body, is a real body and not a spirit. We are therefore compelled to regard it as occupying space; and where His body is there also must His soul be. In His

glorified Person the human nature is not deified but retains all its essential qualities, freed only from the circumscribing influences of earth.

§ 54. Transition from the Person to the Work of Christ.

Literature. — Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iii. 374–391. Frank, *System der christl. Wahrheit* (1894), ii. 208–211. Lipsius, *Lehrbuch d. evang.-protest. Dogmatik* (1876), 504–506.

In the life of Jesus, His baptism marks the point of transition at which we pass from questioning about the Person of Christ to the question of His work. His official life now begins, and as the mature and personally developed God-man He enters on the work which the Father gave Him to do. The recognition of the importance of the God-man as the personal principle of salvation in the world implies, necessarily, that salvation is His personal work. He reveals and communicates God to men by self-revelation and self-communication. The question now arises as to the form under which this work must be presented in a system of doctrine. A favourite mode of distribution has been that of the threefold office of prophet, priest, and king. It was explicitly formulated even by Eusebius. In the Reformed Church it was employed by Calvin; in the Lutheran, by Gerhard. In more recent times, it has been made the principle of distribution by Schleiermacher, Martensen, Dorner, Hodge, and a large number of well-known dogmatists. Ritschl objects to the idea of "office," and prefers the idea of "calling" or vocation. Frank pronounces strongly against it, and, as it would seem, on good grounds. The work of Christ is the work of atonement, in which no doubt the worker has certain functions of a prophetic, priestly, and kingly order; but the distribution must be according to the different aspects of His atoning work, and not according to those functions which are exercised under

each of these different aspects of the work. An analysis of the idea of atonement—what the atoning work of Christ means with reference to God and what it means with reference to man—will most adequately present in our system the doctrine of the work of Christ.

§ 55. Need and Idea of Atonement.

Literature.—Crawford, *Doctrine of Holy Scripture respecting the Atonement*, Edin. 1871, pp. 401–419. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iv. 79–89. Hodge, *The Atonement*, Edin. 1868. Lidgett, *The Spiritual Principles of the Atonement and Satisfaction made to God for the Sins of the World*, London, 1897. Kreibig, *Die Versöhnungslehre auf Grund des christlichen Bewusstseins dargestellt*, Berl. 1878. Kaehler, *Die Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre*, pp. 304–311.

The need of atonement results from the righteousness of God and the sin of man. It depends upon our doctrine of God and of sin whether atonement, reconciliation, be regarded as necessary, and whether this be held as necessary with regard to God and man, or only with regard to man. The possibility of reconciliation is provided for by the fact of the incarnation, but the nature of the reconciliation must depend upon what is necessary to restore right relations between God and sinful man. If God be conceived of in a purely deistic way, His immutable will is of such an unethical description that it can in no wise be affected by the sin of man, or by anything else. In that case no reconciliation of God can be required in redemption. But the doctrine of God's unchangeableness, which is according to Scripture and man's spiritual experience, is essentially ethical, so that, if man's sin did not affect the attitude of God toward man, this would be equivalent to postulating mutability in the divine nature. Because God is unchangeably holy, the presence of sin in man must occasion the loss of His favour and the awakening of the divine anger. On the side of God, therefore, reconciliation is necessary, for even omnipotence cannot operate

capriciously, but only in the service of the moral will and character of God. To maintain His unchangeableness, God must require satisfaction for that which has caused the loss of His favour, if that favour is to be restored. The restoration of favour by an act of free forgiveness would be the undoing of His unchangeableness. It would be the introducing of a change. Sin has caused to man the loss of the favour of the unchangeably holy God, and only as this sin and its offence are removed by an adequate expiation can this favour be restored without changing the relation of God to holiness. Such expiation, again, can only vindicate its adequacy by also bringing about a reconciliation of man to God, and bringing him into such sympathy with God's holiness as will restore that love of men to God, in the loss of which lay the very essence and power of sin. That the work of Christ as an atonement for sin must at once secure the reconciliation of God to man and of man to God, that Christ does this by His atoning sacrifice, is the doctrine of Scripture and of the Church. That man cannot expiate his own sin is the verdict of human experience as well as of God's word. Man's repentance cannot be his atonement, because it is itself the fruit of the atoning work already accomplished by Christ.

§ 56. Old Testament Foreshadowings of Atonement.

Literature.—Cave, *Scripture Doctrine of Sacrifice and Atonement*, 2nd ed., Edin. 1890. Fairbairn, *Typology of Scripture*, 5th ed., Edin. 1870, pp. 287–303, 491–496. Crawford, *Doctrine of Holy Scripture respecting the Atonement*, pp. 197–278. Simon, *The Redemption of Man*, Edin. 1889, 147–216. Lidgett, *Spiritual Principle of the Atonement*, pp. 89–120. Schultz, *Old Testament Theology* (1892), ii. 87–100. Macdonnell, *The Doctrine of the Atonement*, London, 1858, 1–113. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iii. 401–411. Keil, *Biblical Archæology*, Edin. 1887, i. 285–355. Kurtz, *Sacrificial Worship of the Old Testament*, Edin. 1863.

Though we have no account of the institution of sacrifice,

we have a history of sacrificial worship from the very earliest times. From the days of Abel onward throughout the whole of the Old Testament history we have no worship apart from sacrifice. In the patriarchal story the altar is everywhere prominent, and its erection is regarded as an essential condition to calling upon the name of the Lord. The kind of offering in which the essential idea of sacrifice finds expression is the expiatory sacrifice, and especially the sin offering. The purpose of such offering was atonement, and by means of it the outcast from the divine favour sought to secure restoration. The priest made an atonement for the people that they might be forgiven. This atonement is literally a "covering up," so that God is represented as hiding from Himself the people's sin. Yet in themselves these sacrifices, as is clearly set forth in Heb. x. 1–4, had no atoning power. Kurtz and Keil quite properly insist that all efficacy in the way of cleansing from sin and producing a sense of justification and forgiveness must be ascribed to the power of Christ's sacrifice, to which as types and symbols these Mosaic sacrifices pointed forward. It is certainly wrong to speak of the Old Testament sacrifices as purely ceremonial and external, for the distinction of ceremonial and moral, external and internal, was not then clearly made. It is quite evident that these sin offerings were not regarded by the pious as merely the blood of bulls and goats, which they knew very well could never take away sin, but, by faith in God's institution, under a deep consciousness of need and appreciation of the divine sympathy, they saw in the offering much more and something altogether different from that. Their believing performance of the sacrificial rites brought atonement and afforded that relief to the conscience, after which the sense of guilt had made them seek. That the idea of adequacy in the material of the offering was not absent, appears especially from this, that it was an essential condition that the victim should be spotless and perfect of its kind. All through Leviticus this is constantly insisted upon, that the offering must be free from blemish. Among heathen nations,

too, the best, most precious, and costly to the offerer was always regarded as most acceptable to the gods. "Surely a remarkable condition to insist on—that the objects presented as sacrifices for sin should be the best of their kind, without blemish! The representative of the offender as unlike to the offender as possible! The more imperfect and blemished the sacrificer, the more perfect and faultless the sacrifice!"[1] It can only be understood when seen to point on to one who was perfectly like those whom He represented, and yet perfect of His kind, true man yet without sin, all that the race possessed inherently acceptable to God, and therefore presented to Him as the sin-offering for man. New Testament writers regard the Old Testament sacrificial rites and ordinances as foreshadowings of the sacrifice of Christ, so that sacrificial terms are naturally applied to His person and to His death. These writers also, following the example of Christ Himself,[2] understood the Old Testament prophecies of the suffering Messiah as referring to the expiatory death of Christ. This is specially noticeable in the records of the early apostolic preaching which we have in the Acts.

§ 57. New Testament Doctrine of Atonement.

Literature.—Smeaton, *Doctrine of the Atonement as taught by Christ*, Edin. 1868; *Doctrine of the Atonement as taught by the Apostles*, Edin. 1870. Crawford, *Doctrine of Holy Scripture respecting the Atonement*, Edin. 1871, 1–195. Dale, *The Atonement*, 5th ed., London, 1876, 67–264. Lidgett, *Spiritual Principle of the Atonement*, pp. 35–38. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iii. 411–429. Denney, *Studies in Theology*, 100–124. Kaftan, *Dogmatik*, Freiburg, 1897, pp. 446–454. Oosterzee, *New Testament Theology* (1882), 268–277. Weiss, *Biblical Theology of the New Testament*, Edin. 1889, ii. 202–216.

Throughout the New Testament, in the Gospels as well as in the Epistles, the doctrine of Christ's death for the remis-

[1] Simon, *The Redemption of Man*, p. 178.

[2] See, *e.g.*, Luke xxiv. 46 f.; 1 Cor. xv. 3.

sion of the sins of men, that His death was a sacrifice unto God on our behalf, that in His sufferings He was at once our representative and our substitute, is stated with a distinctness which fair-minded opponents are constrained to recognise. This New Testament doctrine is also seen to be simply the completion of that of the Old Testament, so that Christ is described as having died according to the Scriptures. Had not the disciples been slow of heart to believe what prophets had written, and to understand the Scriptures, they would have perceived the necessity of Christ's suffering these things. Our Lord Himself represents His death as a ransom for men; He laid down His life, like a good shepherd, that those who were being pursued to death might escape; He did this voluntarily, no man having the power to take His life from Him; and the laying down of His life was not an incidental occurrence brought about by collocation of circumstances, but it was the great end which His coming into the world was intended to serve.[1] Such statements are quite sufficiently numerous and clear to warrant us in finding in our Lord's own words a distinct enunciation of the doctrine of His sacrificial and propitiatory death. But not less striking and direct is the testimony borne by Christ to the atoning and substitutionary character of His death in the institution of the Holy Supper. It was the event in His whole earthly history which He required His disciples specially to remember by means of a significant and oft-repeated memorial institution. In this solemn ordinance He represents His body as broken for us and His blood as shed for us, and the end for which this is done is the securing of the remission of sins.

That Christ died for our sins is the most prominent and characteristic feature of the teaching of Paul in his later as well as in his earlier writings. In his earliest extant writing, 1 Thessalonians, he describes Christ's death as the means of man's salvation and of deliverance from wrath. In Galatians he shows that Christ was made a curse for us in order to redeem us from the curse, that He gave Himself for our sins to

[1] See Matt. xx. 28; Mark x. 45; John vi. 51, x. 11, 15, 18, etc.

deliver us from the present evil world. In Romans he declares the gospel of Christ to be the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth, and shows that the object of the believer's faith is Jesus Christ and Him crucified. In Ephesians the children of wrath are made nigh, and Jew and Gentile are reconciled to God in one body by the cross, and peace is proclaimed by that death on the cross which has slain the enmity. The doctrine of the expiatory death of Christ is most elaborately set forth by Paul in Rom. iii. 21–26. Christ is made of God a propitiatory sacrifice, which is taken by God instead of the death of all men, so that He is shown to be Himself just and the justifier of those who put their faith in the efficacy of that death. The word here used, ἱλαστήριον, had been employed in the LXX for the lid of the ark, the mercy-seat. As the lid of the ark was sprinkled by the blood of the slaughtered victim, so the mercy-seat in the gospel scheme is sprinkled with the precious blood of Christ. According to this use, the expiatory sacrifice is a covering (Lev. xvii. 11) which protects the offerer from the wrath of God due to him for his sin by the substitution of another life. The substitute endures the suffering which otherwise would fall on the guilty. Thus the death of Christ at once reveals God's wrath against sin and the means of averting it from the sinner.[1] What Paul seeks to do, both in this passage and in chap. v. 8–10, is to reconcile the justice and the love of God as revealed in the death of Christ. For the love of God is revealed in His providing this expiation in the death of His own dear Son as the sinner's substitute, so that the sinner, by believing in Christ, is saved from wrath, while by this death also the claims of His righteous law are satisfied. In 2 Cor. v. 21, and Rom. viii. 3, Paul represents Christ as Himself without sin yet made sin and sent into sinful flesh, so that He precisely takes the place of sinners, and stands in relation to the law just as they had done. It is quite evident from the whole teaching of Paul that Christ takes the place of sinners as a whole, and that

[1] See Bruce, *St. Paul's Conception of Christianity*, Edin. 1894, chap. ix.; and Pfleiderer, *Paulinism*, London, 1877, vol. i. pp. 92–109.

so His death is regarded as an equivalent, not for the death of a sinner but for the death of all who had come under the doom of death by reason of sin. The assertion of Pfleiderer, that the undeserved death of one can only be the equivalent for one deserved death and not for the deserved death of an indefinite number, is in direct opposition to Paul's conception of the infinite value and universal significance of Christ's death. Nowhere in the writings of the apostle do we find any ground for the idea that the sinlessness of Christ simply gave Him the position of an individual member of the human race, who had preserved Himself from contracting any pollution or stain by entertaining any sinful thought or desire or committing any act of sin. We cannot possibly interpret Paul's doctrine of the work of Christ without carrying with us his doctrine of Christ's Person. The idea of His divine nature is everywhere present in Paul's christology, and by reason of this divine nature the sinless humanity of the God-man has a significance which is as wide as the humanity to which it belongs. Christ is therefore represented as made sin and entering into sinful flesh in order to indicate the equivalence of His life, and especially His voluntary self-surrender of His life, for the whole sinful race into which He came, and for the sin of all mankind which demanded expiation. The death of Christ is thus for man not in the ethical sense of exercising a constraining power over man in the direction of a higher life, but in the strictly literal sense of a substitution, so that the sinless one dies for the sinful. This death is the redemption price by which freedom from the curse of the law is purchased for those who lay under this doom. What it secures for man is reconciliation with God, the removal of that enmity which the presence of sin had occasioned. This reconciliation is proclaimed to men in the gospel, and received by them in Christ through His death. Christ's death renders condemnation impossible for the believer, because it has brought him justification. What gives significance to the death of Christ is His life of obedience, of which it is at once the result and the evidence; and it is in His life of holiness and righteousness

that the principle of the new life of the believer lies, and it is here that we are to find the constraining power of the love of Christ. It is the holy obedience of the God-man, which constrained Him to yield Himself to death for man, that constitutes the constraining power in the lives of those who are justified to live unto Him whose obedience in giving expression to the love of God for men led Him to give Himself over to death on their behalf. In the death of Christ specifically we have the vicarious expiation of the Redeemer, in which He renders unto God on our behalf that which was due from us, but rather in His incarnation, in the sending of the Son into the likeness of sinful flesh, we have the principle and ground of man's deliverance from the power and dominion of sin. It was in this life of the Son of God in the flesh that the power of sin was broken, and in this we have at once the motive and the earnest of victory.

In Rom. v. 12, 18, 19 and 1 Cor. xv. 20–22, 45–49, Paul describes Christ as the representative of the human race, as the Second Adam, the spiritual head of the new creation. It is on the basis of this idea of Christ's representative character that the apostle builds up his theory of substitution. The substitution is that not of a thing but of a person, who, in order that his acts may be substitutionary, must be the representative in nature and position of those instead of whose actions he places his own. The equivalence of these acts lies not in the acts themselves, but in the representative character of Him whose acts they are.

In Rom. iii. 25, 1 Cor. v. 7, and Eph. v. 1, the apostle speaks of the death of Christ as a sacrifice rendered to God. That the sacrificial language of these passages is to be understood exclusively in a moral and not in a dogmatic sense is maintained by several distinguished theologians and exegetes.[1] Undoubtedly emphasis is laid upon the expression given to his love by our Lord's surrender of Himself, so that this self-sacrificing love of His is held out as the fundamental principle and constraining motive for a similar loving self-surrender of

[1] See Somerville, *St. Paul's Conception of Christ*, pp. 278–280.

ourselves to God; but this by no means warrants us in understanding these passages in any other light than that of a representation of a real objective sacrifice offered as a sin-offering to God. The death of Christ is here represented not merely as a means of propitiation, but as an actual propitiatory sacrifice. That the Passover lamb was really a sacrifice should not be doubted. The distinction which some seek to make between a memorial of the death that signalised deliverance and a sacrifice proper is not a real distinction. The paschal victim represented the making of a real atonement by the presenting to God of a substitute for the guilty as a propitiation.

If this dogmatic understanding of the sacrificial language used by Paul in these passages is rejected, then the representation of the death of Christ given by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews is evidently not reconcilable with that of Paul. In Hebrews, beyond all dispute, Christ's death is viewed as a sacrifice in the sense of the Old Testament sacrifices. The argument of the writer turns upon this, that the Mosaic sacrifices are of the past, because the sacrificial death of Christ has once for all fulfilled that of which they were the types and foreshadowing. From their different points of view Peter and John present the same doctrine of the substitutionary character of Christ's death as a propitiation to God for man's sin. The doctrine of propitiation in John's Epistles is nothing more than the dogmatic rendering of the historical narrative of Christ's death and His teaching concerning it recorded in the gospel.

§ 58. Theories of Atonement.

Literature.—Simon, *The Redemption of Man*, pp. 7–68. Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ* (1876), pp. 321–400, espec. 396–399. Lidgett, *Spiritual Principle of the Atonement*, pp. 121–218, 419–488. Crawford, *Doctrine of Holy Scripture respecting the Atonement*, pp. 279–381. Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung in ihrer geschichtlicher Entwickelung*, Tüb. 1838. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iv. 1–78. Kaftan,

Dogmatik, 476–485. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, ii. 563–591. Allen, *Christian Institutions*, pp. 352–374. Dale, *The Atonement*[5] (1876), pp. 267–310. Denney, *Studies in Theology*, pp. 125–151. Strong, *Systematic Theology*[4] (1894), pp. 397–421.

In the writings of the fathers, though much is said incidentally about the work of Christ, we have no regularly developed theory of the atonement. That work is described generally in Scripture phraseology as a redemption from sin, and from the wrath of God which the presence of sin called forth; but we have no serious discussion as to what precisely this involves, or how it is that Christ's death secures the forgiveness of sins. The fact of the atonement is clearly and constantly stated, without the enunciation of any theory designed to give a comprehensive account of the grounds upon which the reconciliation of the sinner to God by the death of Christ rests. Elementary hints as to the direction in which materials for such a theory might be sought, and incidental remarks as to what the death of Christ effected for sinners, are to be found scattered throughout the writings of all the great theological thinkers of the early centuries. But in no case are these given forth as complete theories of the idea and purpose of Christ's death, nor even as tentative efforts in that direction. Yet it is very commonly maintained that the notion of a redemption paid to the devil, which finds expression under a variety of forms in the patristic writings, is such a theory, and that the fathers who make use of that conception meant to propose it as a regularly elaborated exposition of the work of Christ in man's redemption. A careful study of the works of Irenæus, Origen, Augustine, and even Gregory of Nyssa, will show that the idea of ransoming the sinner from the power of the devil is with them nothing more than a concrete way of representing the truth, that Christ's death must be considered as having a real power in eliminating evil from the nature and life of man, and overthrowing its dominion. This, however, is merely a restatement of the fact of the atonement in refer-

ence to one of its important aspects. The concrete representation of this fact led to the adoption of a certain unfortunate phraseology, which, however, ought to be regarded as simply an exaggerated use of the personification of sin, which within legitimate limits has been employed by Paul himself. The statement, which has given just cause of offence, made most distinctly by Gregory of Nyssa, that the devil was deceived into accepting Christ in the place of the sinful race of men, is simply an odd conceit by which it was supposed that certain aspects of the Saviour's work could be illustrated. There was evidently no intention on the part of those early Christian writers to go beyond a restatement of the New Testament exhibition of the work of Christ, and no thought of formulating a theory on the basis of these Scripture facts. It is only with the opening of the scholastic age that we meet with any attempt to frame a theory as to the meaning and the essential idea of the atonement. The history of the theories of the atonement properly begins with Anselm.

We propose to give here, not a chronological history of the theories of atonement, but rather a classification of the principal forms which such theories have taken. On the basis of our study of the New Testament representation of the fact of the atonement, we regard the idea of a full vicarious satisfaction and propitiation rendered to God for sin as the only one exact enough and comprehensive enough to account for the facts thus given us. We begin with the theories furthest removed from this, and end with an account of the various forms of the satisfaction theory.

1. *The Socinian Theory.* — We have here the thoroughgoing denial of any sort of satisfaction as rendered to God by the death of Christ. Socinians deny at once the necessity and the fact of satisfaction. Christ dies, not as a priest but as a prophet. His death is that of a martyr witnessing to the truth. His sufferings were simply incidental to His office as a preacher of righteousness, and show us that all suffering is not the doom of sin, and that the suffering servant

of God may have true happiness in the consciousness of the divine favour and fellowship. It is only in heaven, and by means of the heavenly life into which He entered by death, that Christ exercises a priestly office, and the expiation of our sins is not by His blood on the cross but by His presenting of Himself in heaven before God. It is the life of the heavenly Christ, in which He occupies Himself with our concerns, which expiates sin by delivering us from its penalties. God requires no satisfaction, but gives free forgiveness. The exacting of a penalty depends not on the divine righteousness, but on the divine free will, and so by an act of free will He can set it aside. Christ merely announces the fact of God's goodwill, and saves us by His example and by His help in danger and temptation. Hence Socinus places greater emphasis on the resurrection than on the death of Christ. The sufferings of Christ are of great importance as proof of His love and wisdom, but even the death in which they culminate is merely an incident in His career, and the antecedent of the resurrection in which the real motive power lies of man's higher life. He is our forerunner, who suffered and yet triumphed in order that we might be cheered and sustained in our sufferings through hope of a like victory. The expressions of New Testament writers, which represent the death of Christ as sacrificial and satisfactory, are explained as used in a merely figurative way, and as borrowed from the current phraseology of the Greek and Jewish sacrificial ritual. This theory was fully and clearly expounded by Faustus Socinus (1539–1604) in his *De Jesu Christo Servatore*. An interesting and elaborate statement of the theory is given by Martineau in *Studies of Christianity*, London, 1873, pp. 83–176.

2. *Theories which make Christ's death simply a revelation of God's love.*—These theories have this in common with the Socinian theory, that they deny the need and the fact of any propitiation being rendered to God. The sufferings and death of Christ, and generally His life and work, simply announce and reveal God's love, in regard to which sin had made men

ignorant. The atonement, according to these theories, is the moral influence which the loving self-sacrifice of Christ exerts on man in turning him from disobedience and sin to the love and service of God. Hints in this direction are to be found in Origen, but there is no attempt made by him to present anything like a theory of the purpose and effect of Christ's death. This we first have in the elaborate and subtle discussion of Abelard (1079–1142), in which he endeavours to displace the doctrine of satisfaction which had been set forth in strict scholastic form by Anselm. He represents the death of Christ as a revelation of God's love which awakens in man a corresponding love to God. He rejects as intolerable the thought that God could demand the blood of an innocent victim as a condition of His forgiving man's sin. It is the exhibition of God's love which is made unto us in that death which banishes from our heart all fear and dread of God. This same line of thought reappears in the speculation of the Mystics, where emphasis is always laid upon the effect which the manifestation of God's love in Christ has in awakening love to Him in the hearts of men, and securing forgiveness by the elimination of sin. In the writings of Maurice and Bushnell, the central idea is the love-compelling power of this revelation of divine love as shown in the self-sacrifice and sympathy of Christ. Forgiveness comes, not on condition of any price or satisfaction being paid to God, not as the consequence of any penalty borne, but as necessarily involved in the removal of that in man which had held him apart from God. To this same class also belongs the theory which is specially associated with the name of Schleiermacher. The effect of the death of Christ is purely subjective. What the redeemed obtain is a sharing in this consciousness of God the Redeemer. The characteristic position of the Redeemer is the perfection of His fellowship with God, and into this, by the moral power of His death, he lifts up those who believe in Him. Hence the atonement is not really the obedience of Christ, but the ethical result of this in the obedience of the believer. Accord-

ing to this theory, Christ is the representative but not the substitute of sinners. He is therefore regarded as doing for Himself what He does for us, and as doing this as our representative before God. In the obedience of His life and death we see an example of perfect self-surrender to God, which is rendered not as the obedience of a mere individual but as that of the race rendered in the person of its representative. This idea of Christ as Redeemer being our representative rather than substitute was wrought out in a peculiar way by Macleod Campbell.[1] In representing sinners before God, Christ makes perfect confession of men's sin, due from us and from Him as representing us. This theory was long regarded as a mere eccentricity; and, while Dr. Campbell's treatment of the doctrine of the atonement proved generally most stimulating, it did not seem as if the characteristic principle of the work, which had been hinted at by Rupert, of Deutz, and mentioned as an impracticable alternative by Jonathan Edwards, would ever be accepted by any scientific theologian.[2] Quite recently, however, one of the ablest and most independent of the Ritschlian school, Häring, who in many points approximates the evangelical position, has found in it what he regards as the true point of view for explaining the significance and power of Christ's death.[3] The difficulty which is felt by most in regard to it is that of appreciating the value or meaning of a confession of sin which does not proceed from any personal consciousness of guilt The most important and influential of all recent discussions of the atonement, which may be classed in this group of theories which regard the reconciliation as simply that of man to God, and the principle of the atonement purely in the love of God, is the theory of Ritschl. Human sin is essentially ignorance of the love of God, and it is this

[1] *The Nature of the Atonement*, 3rd ed., London, 1869, especially pp. 134–150, 287–291.

[2] See Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, Edin. 1876, p. 354.

[3] *Zur Versöhnungslehre*, Gött. 1893, p. 88; *Ueber das Bleibende im Glauben an Christus*, Stuttg. 1880. See also Somerville, *St. Paul's Conception of Christ*, Edin. 1897, p. 90.

ignorance which has to be removed by the atoning work of Christ. And this precisely is that which the death of Christ accomplishes. The idea of the need of satisfaction arises from an exaggerated notion of the legal as contrasted with the ethical in the estimate of God's dealings with men. God does not require, as man does, to call in the aid of punishment in order to secure the accomplishment of His purpose in the world. Ritschl, in common with Schleiermacher, does not find any necessity in God to punish sin. In Christ He reveals to man the spirit of sonship, and when, by fellowship with Christ, man obtains this spirit, the sense of guilt is overcome and the false ideas of God's wrath as threatening punishment, which constitute man's sin, are removed. Several of the younger members of the Ritschlian school, notably Häring, Kaftan, Loofs, and Reischle,[1] have recognised the inadequacy of the view which makes the atonement a mere subjective change in man, and insist upon a real objective significance in Christ's death, as exerting an influence also upon God. Those members of the Ritschlian school modify this theory by the admission of the notion of a satisfaction made to God, so that in their doctrine of sin and redemption they approach more nearly to the evangelical position. The teaching of Westcott, largely influenced by Maurice and Macleod Campbell, is practically in the same line as that of the theories here referred to. Christ, as the head of humanity, suffers not without us, but within us. As we live in Him, and He in us, we have fellowship in His sufferings. Hence the power which He wins by His life and death is shared in by us. In this way He communicates to us who are in Him the virtue of His work, and in this consists the reality of forgiveness. "The scriptural conception of ἱλάσκεσθαι is not that of appeasing one who is angry with a personal feeling against the offender, but of altering the character of that which from without occasions a necessary alienation, and interposes an inevitable obstacle to fellowship. Such phrases as 'pro-

[1] See Ecke, *Die theologische Schule Albrecht Ritschls*, Berlin, 1897, pp. 251–269.

pitiating God' and 'God being reconciled' are foreign to the language of the New Testament. Man is reconciled (2 Cor. v. 18 ff.; Rom. v. 10 f.). There is a propitiation in the matter of the sin or of the sinner."[1]

3. *The Governmental or Rectoral Theory.*—This theory was first elaborated by Grotius (1583–1645) in his *Defensio fidei catholicæ de satisfactione Christi adversus F. Socinum* (1617). It was adopted as the doctrine of the Arminians, and has been elaborated by the Arminian theologians Curcellasus and Limborch. In more recent times it has been advocated by the Calvinist Wardlaw, and generally by the New England school. The death of Christ is regarded as a satisfaction claimed by and paid to God, but this is not regarded as a payment in full of the divine claims. In accepting the death of Christ instead of that of sinners, there was a relaxation of the law. This is the theory of *acceptilatio.* Not the very penalty, but something which God agreed to accept in place of it, is represented in the satisfaction of Christ. And this is demanded and rendered in order to make such a judicial display as will prevent damage to the interests of the divine government of the world, which would have followed the granting of free and unconditioned pardon. It is thus assumed that divine penalties of sin are merely preventive and not retributive, and it distinguishes a justice that is merely rectoral, that is, calculated simply to serve the interests or exigencies of government and that absolute justice which is an attribute of the Divine Being. Opponents of the doctrine of satisfaction, in the full evangelical sense of vicarious substitution, have not regarded this theory as relieving any of their difficulties; while advocates of the evangelical doctrine have objected, that we can have no exhibition of justice that is not an exercise of justice.

4. *The Theory of a full Substitutionary Satisfaction.*—According to our estimate of the New Testament teaching, the death of Christ is the price of man's redemption paid to

[1] *Epistles of St. John*, London, 1883, p. 85.

God, a full satisfaction to divine justice, a propitiation and expiation for sin. This is what may fairly be called the church doctrine of the atonement. Its main outlines are to be found in the writings of all the more prominent of the early fathers. It was first carefully and consistently elaborated by Anselm in his *Cur Deus Homo.* In this little tract the chief positions of the church doctrine have been once and for all formulated. It has been objected to as hard and mechanical in its way of conceiving of and treating a subject so profoundly spiritual. Certain terms and occasional turns of thought in it may be open to such a charge, but as a whole it presents the doctrine of satisfaction in all its essential principles.[1] It is quite unfair to label it, as Dr. Strong does, as the *commercial* theory, for while it insists upon the satisfaction of God's *personal* claims, it ought to be remembered that it is the absolute divine personality that is spoken of. The principal and essential positions of this doctrine of the atonement are fully expounded and defended by Hodge, Shedd, and Crawford, and also in a thoroughly fresh and independent manner by Dr. Simon in his *Redemption of Man.* The full doctrinal contents of the idea of satisfaction will be treated systematically in the following section.

§ 59. Propitiation and Substitution.

Literature. — Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, ii. 480–543. Macdonnell, *The Doctrine of the Atonement*, London, 1858, pp. 155–183. Du Bose, *Soteriology of the New Testament*, London, 1892, pp. 279–296, 312–343. Lidgett, *Spiritual Principle of the Atonement*, pp. 219–307. Kaftan, *Dogmatik*, pp. 485–493. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iv. 89–124. Westcott, *Epistles of St. John*, London, 1883, pp. 83–85. Sanday and Headlam, *Commentary on Romans* (1896), pp. 91–94, 129 f.

[1] See Macpherson, "Anselm's Theory of the Atonement: its Place in History," in *Brit. and For. Evangel. Review* for April, 1878, vol. xxvii. pp. 207–232. Also Hasse, *Anselm von Canterbury*, Leipzig, 1852, vol. ii. pp. 485–609: "Die Satisfactionstheorie Anselms, die ll. ii.: *Cur Deus Homo.*"

Frank, *System der christlichen Wahrheit* (1894), ii. 186–207. Owen, *Death of Death in the Death of Christ*, bk. iii. chap. vii. in Works (1852), x. 265–273.

It altogether depends upon our doctrine of God and of sin whether we shall have a doctrine of propitiation and substitution. We may so conceive the character of God as to dispense wholly with the idea of the need of any satisfaction in order to secure the restoration of man to His fellowship. We have seen that the character of God has been understood by some as not necessarily requiring the punishment of sin, so that by an act of will He may remit that punishment simply, without any satisfaction equivalent or otherwise. But we have seen that Scripture and the Christian consciousness regard God as absolutely righteous in determining punishment, and that in the extreme form of death, as the necessary consequence and accompaniment of sin, which cannot be remitted but must be inflicted. It is also evident that no other attribute of God, any more than anything outside of God, can modify the exercise of this attribute of absolute righteousness. And so, when we say that God is not only righteous but also merciful, we do not mean that His mercifulness exerts a modifying influence upon Him so that His righteousness ceases to be absolute, or that He can be conceived of as doing anything which the strictest interpretation of that righteousness would not approve. Indeed, we ought not to say, God is righteous *but* He is also merciful, as though by the introduction of this quality of mercifulness the conception of the divine righteousness became in any degree different from what it had been viewed in itself. We should say rather that God is righteous and merciful. He is not less righteous because He is merciful, nor less merciful because He is righteous. He is at once absolutely righteous and absolutely merciful. The mercifulness of God manifests itself in providing a satisfaction which the righteousness of God can accept, a satisfaction which will meet all the claims of that righteousness and at the same time secure access for the sinner into

fellowship with God, so that death, which is the penalty of sin, can no longer touch Him. The penalty must be inflicted, and a real objective satisfaction made unto God, who will in no measure abate the demands of His strict and absolute righteousness.

The foundation of the doctrine of satisfaction was laid in the teaching of the early Church as to the divine and human natures of the God-man. It was on the basis of this christology that the scholastic dogmatic built up the theory of the satisfaction made to God by Christ in His life and death of holy self-surrender and obedience. In opposition to the exaggerated and false prominence given to the idea of the Church in Catholicism, Protestantism, falling back upon the doctrine of Scripture and the early Church, made Christ the central principle of redemption. In the minor of the two natures in Christ, the true basis is found for a doctrine of satisfaction. For this satisfaction can be rendered only by one who is at once God and man. As involving penal suffering, of which a Divine Person is not capable, the subject must be a man. As involving infinite worth, corresponding to the guilt for which atonement has to be made, the subject must be God, who alone possesses such worth. At the root of this conception lies the evangelical doctrine of sin, which is regarded as involving guilt of infinite magnitude, as offence against the absolute holiness of God. The God-man, as possessing at once this infinite worth and the capacity for enduring penal suffering, is the only Person capable of becoming a substitute for sinners. This God-man has in His own Person the two natures absolutely complete. His Godhead is not impaired, nor in any particular reduced, by personal union with the human nature; and His humanity is complete, no faculty or quality being left out in order to accommodate or give place to the divine nature. In him humanity has received God and God has received humanity. He represents before God all that sinful humanity is to God and owes to God, and He represents to man all that God is to man in His righteousness and redeeming grace.

And this representation in both respects is an objective reality.

The Scripture doctrine of the death of Christ represents it as a full objective substitution of the guiltless for the guilty. It further describes this substitution as one of perfect equivalence, so that no place is given to the Scotist and Arminian doctrine of *accceptilatio*. The objective merit of Christ is not more or less than what is required to satisfy the claims of God against sinful mankind. This strict rendering of the teaching of God's word has been insisted upon in Protestantism, in opposition to the doctrine of merit taught by the Roman Catholic Church. While, on the one hand, Catholicism, in its doctrine of the *meritum Christi superabundans*, introduces an exaggerated supernaturalism; on the other hand, by limiting the efficacy of this merit to atonement for original sin, and looking for other means of satisfaction for sins committed after baptism, it leads in the end to a practical denial of the full objectivity of the redeeming work of Christ. The equivalence of Christ's work as satisfaction for man's guilt must be conceived of in a spiritual, not in a mechanical, manner. It is not something quantitatively equal to the mass of human sin that is rendered by Christ to God, but something qualitatively equal, so that place is given for the idea of God's gracious forgiveness. Just as human guilt must be viewed intensively, and not mechanically, as though it could be weighed and measured, so the satisfaction rendered by Christ for this guilt has to be understood as equal, according to a similar estimation, to that for which it atones. If the grossly materialistic conception of the value of Christ's atoning work be adopted, then exclusive importance will be attached to the physical sufferings, and no proper place will be given to the life of which those sufferings were the culmination. In opposition to all such false one-sided tendencies, the church doctrine has emphasised the fact that the atoning work was the act of the Person of the God-man, not exclusively, or even characteristically, either of His divine nature or of His human nature. The

doctrine of Osiander (1498–1552), which placed the essentially atoning power of Christ's work in His divine nature, and the contrary view of Stancarus (1501–1574), which placed this in the human nature, were both repudiated alike by the Lutherans and by the Reformed. The one mediator is the God-man in the unity of His Person. In the atoning work of Christ the whole obedience of Christ, active and passive, must be included. It is quite evident that the active obedience of Christ is the presupposition of the substitutionary validity of the passive obedience. Christ, as a true human person, was in His sufferings a voluntary agent making a full self-surrender in a supreme act of love, so that the severance of the active and passive obedience is illegitimate and inconceivable. The effect of Christ's work is to secure at once the justification of the sinner and the remission of sins, which are to be distinguished but not separated. And so Calvin (*Institutes*, ii. 16, 5) rightly ascribes the removing of the enmity between God and man, and the purchase by him of a righteousness which made God favourable to us, to the whole course of Christ's obedience; while he observes that at the same time, in order more exactly to define the mode of salvation, Scripture assigns it peculiarly and specially to the death of Christ. Still, he adds, there is no exclusion of the other part of obedience which He performed in life. The exclusive attention given by Anselm to the passive obedience is not to be regarded as a defect of the true substitutionary theory of atonement, not even as a defect of the Anselmic theory, but only of Anselm's own peculiar statement of it.

The intercession of Christ is rightly regarded as the continuation in eternity of the satisfaction rendered by the work of Christ. Protestantism insists upon this moment in the satisfactory work of Christ, in opposition to the Roman Catholic doctrine of the intercession of Mary and the saints. It secures the application to men of the merit of Christ's work, and is itself the final and complete form of that work.

§ 60. Forgiveness of Sins.

Literature.—Simon, *Redemption of Man*, pp. 263–291. Dale, *The Atonement*, pp. 311–351. Bushnell, *Forgiveness and Law*, London, 1874. Kaftan, *Dogmatik*, pp. 455–465. Hermann Schmidt, art. "Sündenvergebung" in Herzog, *Encyclopaedie*,² xv. 44–51. Rothe, *Dogmatik*, ii. 262–265. Martin, *The Atonement*, Edin. 1877, pp. 169–197.

The work of Christ, regarded as an objective satisfaction to God, secures for man the forgiveness of sins. By this we mean that the consequences of sin as an offence against the law of God are remitted. The consequences of sin as transgression are guilt and punishment, and the forgiveness of sins implies remission of both. The consciousness of guilt is the feeling that offence against the moral law as the expression of the will of God has placed us in a position of hostility to God, so that our fellowship with God is broken. Wherever the distinction between God and the world is maintained, the forsaking of God for the world, on the part of man, is seen to involve guilt, which, again, is the basis for the infliction of punishment. Forgiveness of sins is not the remission of the penal consequences of sin only, but also and primarily the remission of that guilt which makes us liable to punishment. Where sin is regarded as having a physical basis, and is referred to material or sensual nature as its source, sin is conceived of not so much as guilt but rather as suffering, and consequently emphasis is laid upon the need of redemption rather than upon the need of forgiveness of sins. In the New Testament doctrine, which gives prominence to the idea of the guilt of the sinner and the need of awakening the consciousness of that guilt, similar prominence is given to the forgiveness of sins as the presupposition of all other blessings of redemption. It was in order to acquire power to forgive sins that the Son of God became the Son of Man, and during His earthly life He exercised this power, and declared that this forgiveness was a necessary condition of peace of soul and far beyond any bodily healing in difficulty and in blessed-

ness. It was to secure the power of dispensing this blessing that the Son of Man died and rose again, and in the institution of the Supper He declares that the purpose for which He shed His blood was the remission of sins.[1] Everywhere throughout the New Testament the preaching of the forgiveness of sins is the way in which the preaching of the gospel is usually described, and the obtaining of forgiveness for sinners is regarded as the immediate result and the most precious benefit of Christ's death. In the New Testament the forgiveness of sins is not the abolition of suffering, the removal of the penal consequences of sin, but essentially the removal of sin itself. Hence it is of the very essence of the gospel of redemption. Christ promises forgiveness of sins to all who believe on Him. Faith is the only condition for the forgiveness of those who have offended against us demanded in the Lord's Prayer, and the much love of her to whom much had been forgiven is evidently the proof of the reality, not the condition of the obtaining, of the divine forgiveness. But, as Kaftan says, even faith in the strictest sense is not a condition, though without faith forgiveness cannot be enjoyed. What is needed is acceptance of the call to enter the kingdom, which acceptance can be given only in repentance and faith, but being given, then to all entering the kingdom there is forgiveness unconditionally. Paul makes the forgiveness of sins the basis for that new relationship which we have to God in Christ, in which, when thus possessed of the righteousness of God, we have peace with God.

In regard to the real significance of forgiveness, difficulties have arisen in connection with the question of the need of forgiveness on the one hand, and that of the possibility of forgiveness on the other. If the forgiveness of sins is to be conceived of as a real fact in human experience, then sin must be regarded as something which can be got rid of in no other way, and can be got rid of in this way.

That sin brings condemnation from which man can be

[1] Matt. ix. 6, ix. 2 ; Luke vii. 48, xxiv. 45 ; Matt. xxvi. 28.

delivered only by a forgiveness which annuls the penalty by removing the guilt, is a fact which involves the idea of God's essential and necessary enmity against sin, and the existence in God of anger in the presence of sin. Holy Scripture, in the New Testament as well as in the Old, speaks of the wrath of God, and regards sin as that which alone calls forth His anger. Theologians have differed seriously as to the way in which this idea of the divine anger is to be understood. The dualistic conception of conflicting attributes of love and anger as present in the essential nature of God need scarcely be referred to, as representing a view advanced only by theosophical speculation, but not appearing in evangelical or scientific theology. Among theologians the two opposing methods of interpretation of the utterances of Scripture regarding the anger of God are those which view them as phrases to be explained anthropopathically, and those which view them as indicating the presence in God of a determination or state of mind corresponding essentially to anger in man. Much that is said by Origen and Augustine in earlier times, and by Martensen and others in later times, in order to make it clear that the use of such terms does not imply irritation and violent excitement, might mean nothing more than a disclaimer of the ascription to God of the sinful defects which appear in the actual manifestations of anger among men. But we find a very large number, especially in modern times, who regard the anger ascribed to God in Scripture as only another mode or manifestation of love, as that grieving of the spirit of love which passes over into compassion. It has even been described as not the displeasure which God feels, but the displeasure which God causes man to feel, toward sin, in order to lead him to repent and reform. We can readily agree that this anger is not hatred, and that it is directed *primarily* against sin and not against persons; but Scripture and the Christian experience of God show that God's anger at sin causes Him to be angry at the wicked, that is, at those who wilfully and persistently identify themselves with sin. God not only condemns sin and turns from it with

abhorrence, but manifests active displeasure and fierce indignation. Such anger can be appeased only by a satisfaction which brings forgiveness in the removal of guilt, and opens up again the way of access to Himself. Forgiveness of sins, on the basis of the satisfaction rendered to God by the atoning work of Christ, is absolutely necessary, as a remission of offence against God as well as remission of penalty incurred by that offence, if man is to be restored to the favour and fellowship of God. That wrath of God against sin makes the infliction of punishment on His part necessary. This necessity, therefore, applies also to the demand for a fully adequate satisfaction. It is not a mere act of free will which another act of free will can, without satisfaction, annul, as Arminians like Grotius maintain. Nor is it the result of a divine decree, so that apart from the decree some other plan might have been adopted, as some high Calvinists like Twisse and Rutherford have maintained. The wrath that is in God against sin can be appeased only by the atonement of Christ, which brings about the forgiveness of sins.

Then again, as to the possibility of forgiveness, difficulties have arisen mainly through the adoption of imperfect views of the nature of forgiveness. If we define forgiveness as simply the remission of the penal consequences of sin, it is seen that even in the case of those who believe many of the most painful consequences of sin remain. More particularly, it is argued that punishment cannot pass from the guilty without being executed upon him. If God is angry at sin, the effect of that anger must be felt by him in whom that sin is found. This can only be answered by a reference to the theory of substitution, according to which Christ has made Himself responsible for the sin of man by becoming organically one with him, and has in His own Person, as man's representative, borne, in full and perfect equivalence, the punishment due to the sinner. The possibility of forgiveness rests upon this, that the atonement of Christ in appeasing the divine anger operates as an ethical principle. The forgiveness of sins involves the abolition of sin itself, which is the essential con-

dition of reconciliation with God. "No one," as Kaftan says,[1] "can have received from Jesus forgiveness without having at the same time learnt to regard it as a judgment upon his sin." It is the putting out of the way that which occasions the divine anger, so that while it comes indeed with the justification of the sinner, it also presupposes the work of the Spirit in overthrowing the dominion and destroying the power of sin.

§ 61. The Sufferings of Christ.

Literature.—Kühl, *Die Heilsbedeutung des Todes Christi*, Berlin, 1890. Kaftan, *Dogmatik*, pp. 543–569. Frank, *System der christlichen Wahrheit* (1894), ii. 174–179. Seeberg, *Der Tod Christi in seiner Bedeutung für Erlösung*, Leipzig, 1895. Simon, *The Redemption of Man*, pp. 292–325. Macleod Campbell, *The Nature of the Atonement*, 3rd ed., London, 1869, pp. 255–316. Wendt, *Teaching of Jesus* (1892), ii. 218–265. Martin, *The Atonement*, Edin., 1877, pp. 76–103. Strong, *Manual of Theology*, pp. 303–306. Mason, *The Faith of the Gospel*, London, 1888, pp. 182–193. Du Bose, *Soteriology of the New Testament*, pp. 312–327.

The atonement is everywhere in Scripture associated specially with the death of Christ. We are taught that this death was necessary as the condition of our forgiveness. It is not merely as the necessary culmination of a life of perfect obedience to God, but as possessing in itself something altogether special and unique, an essential and characteristic significance, that the death of Christ is spoken of as the ground of our acceptance with God. He died for our sins, for the ungodly, unto sin. He bare our sins in His own body on the tree.[2] It is quite evidently the teaching of Scripture, that the death of Christ is, in the most exact and proper sense, the condition of the divine forgiveness. Whatever relation the facts and actions of Christ's life had and must have had to the forming of the personality of Him

[1] *Dogmatik*, p. 513.

[2] 1 Cor. xv. 3; Rom. v. 6, 8, vi. 10, xiv. 9; 2 Cor. v. 15; 1 Thess. v. 10; 1 Pet. ii. 24, etc.

who died, it is this death that is everywhere pointed to as the ground of God's gracious act in forgiving sin. The ransom lay in Christ's giving of His life. When the question is raised as to the reason why God should have made forgiveness conditional upon the death of Christ, it is clearly inadequate and altogether beside the point to say, as Kühl does, that it was foreseen by God that the preaching of Christ's death would prove the most powerful incentive, moving men to repentance. That is just the sort of answer that is no answer, which we might expect from a member of the Ritschlian school. For why should the death of Christ move men's hearts so powerfully? All that Christ's death means, according to the teaching of this school, is that as a martyr He proved faithful to His calling. And if, indeed, as Ritschl seems to teach, the atonement, as a mere subjective influence upon men, is simply another name for repentance, then the martyr death of Christ is only one of the many influences that operate in bringing about such a change. That the death of Christ was indeed powerfully influential in working repentance in men results from this, that in that death men are taught to see the exceeding sinfulness and hatefulness of sin before God. But that the meaning of it is fully stated when it is regarded simply as an exhibition of the sinfulness of sin cannot for a moment be granted, for this reason, that it evidently cannot be regarded as such an exhibition unless Christ is in some very real sense the sinner's representative, and the bearer of his sin and its curse. The death of Christ can prove an influence moving men to repentance only if men are taught first of all to look to Him as their substitutionary offering, who, by His taking upon Himself their sin, and in His bearing of it and in His suffering of its consequences in His own Person, has thus exhibited the terribleness of its nature and the deadliness of the curse which it entails. The exhibition of the sinfulness of sin is not the explanation of the purpose of Christ's death, but simply one of the results, or one of the elements in the result, accomplished by means of that death.

The real purpose of Christ's death is, as we have seen, the making a full satisfaction to God for the sin of men. But the question of main importance here concerns the grounds upon which this death constitutes such a satisfaction. How does the death of Christ afford satisfaction to God? What is there in the nature or contents of these sufferings which renders them acceptable to God as a satisfaction for man's sin? In the Old Testament and in the New Testament representations of the sufferings of the Messiah, they are regarded as the penal consequences of sins that are laid upon Him, so that He is dealt with by God as if they were His. But it is justly objected to certain forms of statement of the doctrine of substitution, that God as the righteous One cannot be supposed to punish any one in whom the sin that deserves punishment is not really found. To say that God deals with the sinless one *as if* he were a sinner is necessarily repugnant to all sense of righteousness. It is necessary, therefore, to admit that the sin which is punished in Christ is really His; and this the supporter of the doctrine of substitution really does affirm by his theory of the solidarity subsisting between Christ and the race into which, as the Son of Man, He has entered. He actually came into sinful flesh, so that by the very form of His incarnation He made Himself liable to the curse that sin had brought with it, and to that death in which that curse finds its culmination. This substitution, therefore, is no mere outward mechanical thing. Much of the opposition that has arisen against the doctrine of substitution has resulted from the mistaken notion that it involves the taking of One whose life is outside of that of the guilty ones, and holding Him responsible for the guilt of those who are outside of Himself. The false analogy of a man guiltless of a particular offence taking the place of another who is guilty of it is answerable for a good deal of this disfavour into which the theory of substitution has fallen. But it should be remembered, that it is essential to this theory that Christ is not outside of the race whose guilt and responsibilities He assumes. The solidarity of Christ and the race

of mankind is really the ground of the substitutionary validity of His work for individual believers in Him. It is possible for Him to be the substitute of each individual believer, because He has first of all as the Son of Man taken His place within sinful mankind, and, not as an individual man, but as representative of the whole race of men, taken over the burdens and responsibilities belonging to sinful flesh. He who is consubstantial with the Father is also consubstantial with us, and He suffers in our stead, because He has become one with us and has actually taken our place.

It is on the ground of the solidarity of the God-man and the race of mankind, on the basis of His consubstantiality with us, that the doctrine of Christ's death as the equivalent of the punishment of man for his sin is made to rest. What Christ suffered is actually what the sinner would have suffered had no redemption been wrought out for him. The Scripture doctrine of the doom of sin is summed up in the words: "The wages of sin is death." And this death, which is the penalty of sin, cannot evidently be a mere external thing, an infliction wholly from the outside. It must be in, through and through, the being who has sinned, just as much as the sin itself had been. For we must never lose sight of the ethical purpose in any atonement proposed by God and accepted by Him. The end to be served is the destruction of sin, so that if one be found who is able to bear the doom of sin, by his bearing of it sin itself is destroyed. But this adequate bearing of sin is possible only in one who can judge the heinousness of sin free from the dulling influence of a sinful nature that had expressed itself in personal sinful actions. It is this that constitutes Christ's unique fitness for bearing the penalty and suffering the doom of sin. Not a mere member of the sinful race, but by His incarnation identified with that race, He could perfectly acquiesce, as no one who had himself sinned could do, in God's estimate of sin and its desert. This is the truth insisted upon by Dr. Macleod Campbell, a truth of the utmost importance, which became an error only when made

the central principle of the atonement rather than a condition qualifying Christ to offer Himself in death as the substitute of the condemned. In submitting to death, He consents to the demands of God's law, and confessed that the wrath of God, which admits of no modification, is due unto sin. The God-man, as personally sinless, felt, as no member of the sinful race could ever feel, the exceeding sinfulness of sin, and in this way suffered more than all men together, were they all penitent, could suffer under the consciousness of guilt. He therefore could make, and actually did make, a perfect confession of sin, and gave expression to a perfect penitence, when the iniquity of men was laid upon Him.

It is quite evident that sufferings which bring with them or include a full realisation of the guilt of sin must necessarily be regarded as penal. But just here a great difficulty has been felt by many. The idea of associating punishment with the sufferings of the perfectly sinless One has been regarded as quite intolerable. But this has largely resulted from the adoption of an altogether false definition of the essential idea and real purpose of punishment. "In using the word punishment it is important to guard against forensic associations. The prevailing theory of punishment at the present time regards it simply as remedial and deterrent. It is inflicted in order to deter the offender from repeating—and others from committing—a given offence. Whether this is all that could be said of human punishments we cannot here inquire, but it is obviously inadequate as an account of the death of Christ. For Christ was Himself innocent; and the spectacle of an innocent man suffering for the guilty is neither remedial nor deterrent. It could at most, if this were its object, unsettle men's convictions as to the righteousness of the moral law."[1] The true idea of punishment is, that it is the reaction of God's righteousness and holiness against sin, demanding its removal or abolition. Punishment is seen in its most perfect and complete form in death. For all punishment is alienation from God, and as such is necessarily involved in

[1] Strong, *Manual of Theology*, p. 304.

the very idea of sin. And death is simply the manifest completion of this alienation. In death man feels forsaken of that power by which his life had been sustained. When, therefore, we think of Christ as identifying Himself with sinful flesh under this doom of death, we may be able to form some sort of conception of that feeling of forsakenness which constituted for Him the sting of death.

Just at this point, however, we must guard against the exaggeration of which the Irvingite party has been guilty, in representing the death of Christ as the destruction of sin in such a way that this takes place first of all in His own Person. The sinfulness of the flesh into which He came has to be destroyed by death in Himself, and then, consequently, in those who believe in Him. Besides the objection elsewhere brought against this view as a theory of the Person of Christ, it involves, as Dorner has pointed out, the strange notion of a sanctification independent of and preceding forgiveness. According to this theory, the death of Christ is not the punishment of sin, but the destruction of sin in its very roots. Ignoring the idea of guilt and the penalty of sin, this sanctification of the nature, first in Christ, then in believers in Him, of itself secures acceptance with God. A similar result follows from a view which has its origin in an altogether different source. The old and much abused notion of a ransom paid to Satan has strangely enough reappeared in modern times, and has the sanction of the name of so notable and independent a theologian as Frank. He regards the atonement as mainly consisting in the stripping Satan of his power. All suffering in the world, and no less the suffering of Christ Himself, is from the tyranny of Satan.[1] Against the idea as thus stated, Philippi[2] quite rightly raises the objection that the evils inflicted by such tyranny can be punishment only for us who have sinned, but not for Christ, whose death therefore is only that of a martyr. That Frank, however, did not intend this is admitted

[1] Frank, *Theologie der Concordienformel*, Erlangen, 1858, vol. ii. p. 45.
[2] *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*, Gütersloh, 1870, iv. 2, 136.

by Philippi, and is evident from his account of Christ's death given in his own system of doctrine. "The being placed under the power of Satan and that of his instruments, especially under death, the power of which is wielded by Satan (Heb. ii. 14), means actually nothing else than subjection under the divine will reacting against sin, under the divine penal decree, under the curse of the divine law."[1] In this sentence, and throughout the paragraph in which it occurs, we have a clear and satisfactory statement of the evangelical doctrine of Christ's death as penal suffering under the reaction of the righteousness and holiness of God against sin.

In its interpretation of the Scripture statement that the wages of sin is death, the Evangelical and Reformed Church doctrine declares that every sin deserves God's wrath and curse, both in this life and in that which is to come, and that the fall has made man liable to all miseries in this life, to death itself and to the pains of hell for ever. In view of such an explanation of the meaning and contents of death as the wages of sin, the question is raised as to the sense in which Christ's death can be regarded as an equivalent to that which was due to the sinner. That He tasted of death for us, and that thus His death is the punishment of sin, shows that He in some sense endured the wrath of God. That this wrath was against sinful mankind does not prove, as Rothe would have it,[2] that the wrath of God was not directed against Christ. It is quite evidently the New Testament doctrine that God deals with Jesus as a judge, visiting Him with that punishment which is the expression of His wrath against sin. This wrath expresses itself in its extremest form in the infliction of death, which represents the complete alienation and turning away of God from the guilty one. In determining what this death meant for Christ, it is necessary to go back upon the definition given of the contents of death as the consequence of sin. Among the

[1] Frank, *System der christlichen Wahrheit*,[3] ii. 174

[2] *Dogmatik*, Heidelb. 1870, vol ii. p. 240.

scholastic divines a distinction was made of a threefold death: *mors spiritualis*, *mors corporalis*, and *mors æterna*. *Mors æterna* is simply the continuation in eternity of *mors spiritualis*. As the death of Christ is His bearing of the consequences of sin, the question is raised as to whether this threefold death belongs essentially to the consequences of sin. It is evident that Christ, in consequence of His own nature and position, was in certain important respects distinguished from sinners. Like Adam before the fall, He had not the seeds of death within Himself, and His surrender of Himself to the power of death, assailing Him from without, was a voluntary act. Also in possessing man's original dominion over nature, He had the power of working miracles, and His refusing to use this power on His own behalf was a voluntary act. And finally, His own personal relation to the Father was such that there was no reason in Himself why He should feel alienated from God, and so His suffering in soul was a voluntary act.[1] What, then, He voluntarily bore was that which is included in the essential consequences of sin. That this included *mors corporalis* is admitted readily by all. The question is, In what sense can He be said to have endured the wrath of God as spiritual and eternal death? That eternal death does not belong to the essence of sin's consequences appears from this, that *mors spiritualis* becomes *mors æterna* only in the case of there being no redemption. Our inquiry, therefore, relates simply to spiritual death. The reply of Reformed theologians generally is that Christ suffered the same death spiritual as sinners, in its intensity but not as eternal, and with different effects upon Himself because of what in His own being and position He is. The older dogmatists were undoubtedly right in regarding the suffering of Christ as not only pain, but also punishment. They went too far, however, and took too materialistic and quantitative a view of these sufferings when they said that on the cross Christ suffered the pains of hell. This resulted from a confounding of equivalence with identity. The words

[1] See Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, ii. 276.

of Cotta, in his note on Gerhard on this point are sober and wise: "*Satis patet cum grano salis accipiendum esse, quando theologi protestantes docent, Christum in anima sua dolores infernales passum esse. Neque enim hoc de ipsis doloribus, quos damnati experiuntur, sed potius de graritate dolorum, qui cum infernalibus comparari possunt, intelligendum est.*" The eternity of Christ's Person takes the place of the eternal duration of the sufferings, so that the intensity of these sufferings makes the endurance of them equivalent to that of eternal death. This intensity is witnessed to most clearly in the cry of agony wrung from Jesus on the cross: "*My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?*" In the church doctrine, quite rightly emphasis is, on the one hand, laid upon the fact that this divine nature of Christ gave infinite worth to His sufferings, so as to render them an equivalent for sufferings on the part of man of eternal duration. On the other hand, in His human nature, in which the outward manifestation of His sufferings is made, He stands as the representative of the sinful race of mankind, and as such has taken the guilt as well as the punishment of sin upon Himself. And hence, though personally sinless, He has become answerable for sin as Son of Man; and so, though He never withdraws His loving obedience from the Father, yet the Father withdraws the manifestation of His favour from Him; and thus, just in the same way as the sinner does, but with an infinite intensity of realisation of its misery all His own, He suffers the pains of hell in the hiding of His Father's face.

§ 62. The Extent of the Atonement.

Literature. — Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, ii. 544–562. Cunningham, *Historical Theology*,[3] Edin. 1870, ii. 323–370. Owen, *Death of Death in the Death of Christ* (1647), in Works, Edin. 1852, x. 157–428. Jenkyn, *On the Extent of the Atonement in its Relation to God and the Universe*, London, 1837. Candlish, *The Atonement: Its Efficacy and Extent*, Edin. 1867. Wardlaw, *Nature and Extent of the Atonement in Christ*, 2nd ed., Glasgow, 1844. Strong, *Systematic Theology*

(1894), p. 421f. Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, Königsberg, 1863, vol. ii. pp. 282–291. Macleod Campbell, *The Nature of the Atonement*, London, 1869, pp. 54–68.

A considerable amount of confusion and misunderstanding has resulted from failing to distinguish the questions of the extent of the atonement and the extent of its application. In many particular passages, and also in its general tenor, the New Testament represents the work of Christ as of universal importance and as having significance for the whole creation. No other interpretation can be put upon such passages as these: 1 John ii. 2; 1 Tim. ii. 6, iv. 10; Tit. ii. 11. Thus in several passages the death of Christ is said to be for salvation to all who believe (Rom. iii. 22; John xvii. 20). It is the application by the Holy Spirit of the benefits of this death that is determined by God's electing love in Christ. The atonement, which in consequence of its universal unlimited sufficiency affords a basis for the unrestricted offer of salvation, is in its application limited to those who under the Spirit's guidance believe in Christ (John xvii. 9, 24; Eph. i. 4, 7, etc.). "Just as much sun and rain would be needed if only one farmer on earth were to be benefited. Christ would not need to suffer more if all were to be saved. The sufferings were not the payment of a pecuniary debt. Having endured the penalty of the sinner, justice permits the sinner's discharge, but does not require it except as the fulfilment of a promise to his substitute, and then only upon the appointed condition of repentance and faith. The *atonement* is unlimited, and the whole human race might be saved by it; the *application* of the atonement is limited, as only those who repent and believe are actually saved by it."[1] It is argued, on the other hand, that unbelief being itself a sin, Christ must have died for the unbelief of the unbeliever if He really died for all men, and that consequently all men should be saved. And Owen in particular has elaborately and ingeniously set forth the difficulties in which those who accept the doctrine of the substitutionary and satisfactory character

[1] Strong, *Systematic Theology*, p. 422.

of the atonement become involved when they say that Christ died for all men. The doctrine of a limited atonement, especially as set forth by Owen and Edwards, has been carefully examined and replied to by Dr. Macleod Campbell, who, concluding that the doctrine of a limited atonement is the true logical result of their doctrine of the nature of the atonement, rejects this view of the atonement altogether. The offensive conclusion, which seems so contradictory to such a Scripture saying as that of Heb. ii. 9, according to which Christ tasted death for every man, results largely from the quantitative estimation of what Christ endured, and the tendency to give undue attention to the purely physical aspect of His sufferings. The scriptural way of looking at the death of Christ is so little quantitative that it can only regard that death as for the benefit of man, without opening up the question as to what individuals of the race might personally share in that benefit.

The scholastic divines were accustomed quite unduly to disintegrate the effects of Christ's death so as to make the satisfaction rendered by Him correspond to the number of the elect, and to that number only. Some of them, indeed, are careful to point out that the *sufficiency* of Christ's merits may be admitted, while their *efficiency* is denied. Even these, however, hesitate to say that Christ died sufficiently for all, and efficiently only for the elect. Turretine, along with several others whose high Calvinism is unimpeachable, affirms that this hypothetical sufficiency is potential, so that Christ's death could avail for the reprobates, if God should will it to be so applied. "*Satisfactio Christi posset dici sufficiens pro omnibus, si Deo ita visum fuisset.*" But Wendelin[1] finds heresy even in the statement: "*Christum etiam pro reprobis esse mortuum, non quidem ut liberarentur, sed ut possent liberari.*"

[1] Wendelin, *Christiana Theologia*, Amsterdam, 1750, p. 367. It was generally admitted, by Reformed and Lutherans alike, that the satisfaction of Christ was sufficient for the sins of all men objectively, abstractly, ideally, *per se, quoad substantiam*; but subjectively, according to the will and intention of God and Christ, only for the elect.

The general statement of the doctrine commonly accepted by the Reformed theologians is thus clearly expressed by Wendelin (I. xvii. 5, 4), "*Christus non pro omnibus et singulis hominibus, sed pro solis electis divinæ justitiæ satisfecit.*" It seems peculiarly unfortunate that the question of election should in this way be introduced here. In the divine decree itself, the appointment of Christ as Saviour comes in the order of thought before the election as His of those who are to believe in Him (Rom. viii. 29; Eph. i. 4). God has elected us in Christ and for Christ's sake. The question, therefore, as to what Christ renders as satisfaction to God ought to be considered altogether apart from any distinctions among men as elect or non-elect, believers or unbelievers. His appointment is on behalf of *man*, He is sent into *the world*, He comes to save *the lost*. All this refers to the impetration or purchase of pardon apart from this application of that redemption to the individual by the grace of the Spirit, and the appropriation of it on the part of the individual by faith. It is interesting to notice the care which was taken by the members of the Westminster Assembly to avoid putting into the Confession any rigid statement of a doctrine of limited atonement. The great majority in the Assembly were undoubtedly in favour of the theory of a limited atonement in the strictest sense, but they certainly do not make this theory a part of the confessional statement. In the chapter on God's Eternal Decree, where it is stated that God ordains the means whereby glory is secured to those elected to glory, they sum up their position thus: "*Neither are any others redeemed by Christ, effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified, and saved, but the elect only.*" Here, I think, it is quite evident that the redemption spoken of is the impetration as distinguished from the application. If by "redeemed by Christ" we understood, "in the possession and enjoyment of the salvation purchased by Him," we should have to regard all the subsequent clauses as explanatory or as giving the contents of the first. Indeed, these clauses are useless unless they can be regarded as co-ordinated as members in an ascending series,

culminating in the application of all in salvation. The first stage, therefore, is described as redemption by Christ, that obtaining on His part by purchase which lays a foundation for all that follows. But what the Confession says is that the redemption which results in salvation is for the elect only. Dr. Cunningham says this would be stating a mere truism, but it is just such a truism as needs to be stated, which also holy Scripture condescends to state repeatedly and expressly.

The root-error which underlies all these attempts at subtle distinctions, and which occasions such laborious endeavours to guard against possible contradictions, is the failure to distinguish between expiation and reconciliation as different effects of Christ's death.[1] The older divines very commonly confounded these two, and insisted that if Christ died for all, then all were reconciled, that the end of the impetration could be no other than the application. But, on the contrary, it ought to be observed that the cancelling of the guilt by expiation is a purely objective act, in which Christ, on behalf of sinful mankind, bears in His own Person the punishment due to sin. In regard to this objective element in the death of Christ, Scripture speaks of Christ as dying for all (1 Cor. viii. 11; Heb. x. 29). Quite distinct from this is the reconciliation wrought between God and the individual sinner believing in Christ, and obtaining for reconciliation the benefit of His death. We have in this case no mere objective act as in expiation, but a subjective operation in the appropriation by faith of the benefit which the expiation had purchased. Modern theology, as represented by the most reverent and conscientious students of holy Scripture, shows itself averse to the introduction of the doctrine of election as a controlling principle in the system of Christian truth. The place occupied by that doctrine in Scripture proves that it was never intended to be so used. Hence prominence must be given to Christ's incarnation as involving His interest in and His relation to the whole race of man-

[1] See Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik*, ii. 287 f.

kind. It seems indeed a very strange perversion to give prominence to those elected in Christ rather than to Christ in whom they are elected. And further, notwithstanding the elaborate arguments and party pleading of those who favour the narrower view, it seems impossible to advance any intelligible argument or to present any satisfactory ground for the universal offer of salvation, except on the assumption that in Christ's death there has been made an expiation for sin satisfying to God, so that whosoever believeth finds that the work done by Him in whom he believes—the death which He endured—is for him before God a valid objective satisfaction, and that Christ died for all, so that all who believe might be saved.

IV.—THE APPLICATION OF REDEMPTION.

§ 63. Introductory and General.

Literature.—Kaftan, *Dogmatik*, Freiburg, 1897, pp. 493–500, 617–622. Weizsäcker, *Heilsordnung*, in Herzog,[2] v. 723–729. Grimm, *Institutio* (1869), 420–423. Lipsius, *Lehrbuch der evang.-protest. Dogmatik* (1876), 638 f. Frank, *System der christlichen Wahrheit* (1894), ii. 320–324. Kübel, "Dogmatik," in Zöckler, *Handbuch d. theol. Wissenschaften*, ii. 737 ff. Kaehler, *Die Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre*, pp. 393–397. Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics* (1874), 633–635. Strong, *Systematic Theology* (1893), 426. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine* (1889), iv. 159–164. Rothe, *Dogmatik* (1870), iii. 261–263; *Theologische Ethik* (1870), iii. 296–348. Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evangel. Dogmatik* (1892), 569–571. Mastricht, *Theoretico-Practica Theologia* (1715), 637–647. Klee, *Katholische Dogmatik*, Mainz, 1861, pp. 547–552.

The questions dealt with under this division have been variously grouped, and the division itself has been variously designated, in different theological systems. As distinguished from the subjects treated of in the previous division, they might be described as concerned with the reconciliation of

man with God rather than of God with man. But this distinction is not thoroughgoing, inasmuch as in the incarnation and the atoning work of the God-man, and especially in the personal life of the Son of Man, we already have this reconciliation of man with God, while in the justification which comes to man through faith we have prominence given to the thought of God's reconciliation with man. It is one of the important services rendered by Ritschl to scientific method in theology, that he emphasised the close connection subsisting between justification and reconciliation. On the other hand, to designate this group of subjects *The Work of the Spirit* would be to use a designation much too wide, inasmuch as such a title would involve the discussion of questions belonging to the preceding division, *e.g.* the Work of the Spirit on the Person of Christ, and would include the doctrine of the means of grace, which we reserve for a special and separate division. What is really intended is the representation of the appropriation of the redemption wrought by Christ by the individual who receives the gift provided for him. We might distinguish the previous and the present divisions as respectively *objective* and *subjective* soteriology. But, just because the redemption of Christ is also the redemption of man, the distinction of objectivity and subjectivity is only relatively true. There is a subjective element in the so-called objective soteriology, and an objective element in the so-called subjective soteriology. The term used by the older scholastic Protestant divines, *ordo salutis*, and the usual designation employed by modern German theologians, *Heilsordnung*, and even the less definite phrase, "the way of salvation," might serve fairly enough to indicate the class of subjects to which some are willing to restrict this section—regeneration, repentance, sanctification. Weizsäcker has shown that neither *calling* nor *justification*, which commonly are dealt with here, can properly be included under such a category. Calling is rather a presupposition of the *ordo salutis* than an integral part of it, and the call is addressed to man, while the operations

properly included here are wrought in him. Strictly speaking, not the calling, but only the subjective illumination or enlightenment, should be included under this category. Justification, too, is a transcendent act, as distinguished from sanctification, so that only faith as the subjective appropriating of the divine act of grace and not justification itself comes into consideration here. Kaftan has subjected the idea of the *ordo salutis* to a careful critical examination, with the result that calling is treated under the Word as a means of grace, regeneration and justification are relegated to the division which treats of the redemption of Christ, conversion and sanctification to the domain of Christian ethics, and only faith is dealt with under this special division. Frank, wishing to oppose what he regards as the *synergism* of Julius Müller and Dorner, insists upon the exclusive activity of divine grace, so that the operations of divine grace are necessary and inevitable, and man's part only a passive receiving of what is brought to him in the divine calling. Consequently, he includes regeneration and conversion under calling, so that regeneration and conversion may take place in a man without any coincident conscious volition on his part.[1]

In the earlier Dogmatics of the Reformation there was no separate *locus* for the topics usually embraced under the general heading of the application of redemption or the appropriation of redemption by the individual. In some of the Church formularies they were distributed over the sections, *de libero arbitrio, de justitia dei,* and *de prædestinatione.*

[1] See an admirable discussion of this whole question in Julius Müller's treatise, "Das Verhältniss zwischen der Wirksamkeit des heiligen Geistes und dem Gnadenmittel des göttlichen Wortes," in *Dogmatische Abhandlungen*, Bremen, 1870, pp. 127–277. It is interesting to notice that the old Scottish divine, Rollock (1555–1599), in his treatise on *Effectual Calling*, 1597, distinguishes two parts in this calling—the outward calling of God's mere grace by the publication of the covenant of grace or preaching of the gospel, and the inward faith of the called, wrought in them by the same grace and favour of God. This second part includes the enlightening of God's Spirit, as well as the very act of faith itself, and in this act of faith we are not merely passive, but work with God's Spirit working in us.

Hutter, in his *Compendium* (1610), after dealing with free will, the law, and the gospel, treats as four successive *loci*—*de justificatione, de æterna prædestinatione, de bonis operibus,* and *de pœnitentia et confessione*; while Gerhard treats successively of repentance, justification, and good works. No attempt is made by Hutter or Gerhard to group those subjects or to assign them any definite place in the system of doctrine. Calovius, in his *Systema locorum theologicorum* (1655), was the first to make this attempt, grouping the several moments of the appropriation of salvation under the title, *modus consequendæ salutis.* Quenstedt, in his *Theologia didactico-polemica* (1685), makes a similar grouping under the title *gratia applicatrix*, under which he names in succession—*vocatio, regeneratio, conversio, justificatio, pœnitentia et confessio, unio mystica et sanctificatio.* The title *ordo salutis* was introduced by Carpov, the Wolffian theologian of Jena, who gave a similar enumeration in his *Œconomia salutis Novi Testamenti,* 1737–1765. In contrast to the unsystematic and haphazard enumeration of the acts of individual appropriation of salvation prevailing among earlier theologians, the vigorous attempt of Schleiermacher, in his *Christliche Glaube,* §§ 106–110, to present a logical construction of the doctrine is interesting and helpful. Salvation is living fellowship with Christ, and this is secured by regeneration and sanctification. But regeneration viewed as the constituting of a new relation toward God is justification, and as a new form of life it is conversion. And again, conversion is brought about by repentance and faith, and faith is the condition of forgiveness and adoption into God's household, in the union of which justification consists. Nitzsch, in his *Lehrbuch der evangelisch Dogmatik* (1892), p. 592, makes regeneration the middle point, with calling and justification as its presuppositions, and sanctification as its consequence.

In order to bring unity into the treatment of this subject, and to secure for it a strictly systematic construction, it is necessary to give prominence to the work of the Spirit as the primary agent in the application of the redemption of Christ.

Calvin, in the second book of his *Institutes*, treats of the redemption of Christ, and in his third book of the obtaining of the grace of Christ, the benefits which it confers and the effects resulting from it. The benefits of Christ are made available to us by the secret operation of the Spirit. These benefits he enumerates, upon no apparent principle of arrangement, as faith, regeneration, repentance, justification, etc. Amesius, in his *Medulla* (1623), after treating of the Person and work of Christi, proceeds *De applicatione Christi*, and defines, *Applicatio hæc per singularem appropriationem tribuitur Spiritui Sancto* (1 Cor. xii. 13).

We propose here to consider the several acts of appropriation of redemption on the part of the individual as the operations of the Holy Spirit in men as a Spirit of Revelation, and as an active Principle of Life. But this must be preceded by a section on the Spirit of God as the power of divine grace in the salvation of men.

§ 64. The Spirit Applying Redemption.

Literature.—Owen, *Discourse concerning the Holy Spirit*, bk. i. chap. v., Works, Edin. 1852, iii. 105–124. Goodwin, *The Work of the Holy Ghost in our Salvation*, bk. i. chap. v. 8, Works, Edin. 1863, vi. 16–38, 51–67. Moule, *Outlines of Christian Doctrine* (1892), pp. 130–139. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, 353–362. Strong, *Manual of Theology*, Edin. 1892, pp. 308–317. Luthardt, *Die Lehre vom freien Willen und seinem Verhältniss zur Gnade*, Leipzig, 1863. Lipsius, *Lehrbuch der evangelisch-protestantischen Dogmatik* (1876), pp. 591–601. Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik* (1863), ii. 304 f., 332–335.

The objective work of Christ must be appropriated by and realised in each individual Christian as reconciliation and redemption. The subjective appropriation of the objective work is mediated by the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and from the Son. The procession of the Holy Spirit is the necessary presupposition of the application of redemption to the individual, inasmuch as it means the application of the work in which Father and Son together

have wrought out salvation for men. That man cannot make this application for himself follows from this, that the natural man is blinded as to the sinfulness of sin, so that the gospel is an offence and foolishness to him. At the very most he can attain only to a certain longing for redemption, but in no case to an actual appropriation to himself of the redemption wrought by Christ. He cannot take to himself wisdom and righteousness and sanctification, though these are provided for him in Christ (1 Cor. i. 30), but must be enlightened, justified, and sanctified. It is the work of the Spirit to enlighten, justify, and sanctify. As the Spirit of Christ, He brings to us the benefit of what Christ has wrought, so that it becomes our own. He takes what is Christ's and shows it to us (John xvi. 14). He is the one vehicle of communication between God and man, so that nothing comes from God or Christ to us but by Him. Only by the operation of the Spirit can Christ for us become Christ in us, only by Him can Christ's atonement become our salvation. The natural longing after some kind of redemption becomes longing for the redemption of Christ only by His influence exerted upon us, and it is His office to present to us Christ Himself as the living provision for our soul's need.

The Holy Spirit is distinctively the Spirit of grace, because He brings the grace of God to the sinner, and brings the sinner into a state of grace. This grace which the Spirit communicates stands in opposition to all merely human efforts, and yet the operations of grace are conducted in and upon those who are capable of gracious influences, just because they are possessed of the power of self-determination, and are, in consequence, morally responsible creatures. Hence the doctrine of grace is closely associated, and must be considered in immediate connection, with that of man's free will. In the early church doctrine, as developed by the fathers of the Eastern Church, divine grace was regarded as quite subordinate and as a mere handmaid to human freedom. So, too, Ambrose says:

"*Pœnitentia præcedit, sequitur gratia.*" This defective view, which found dogmatic expression in Pelagianism, was met by the Augustinian doctrine of grace, in which the moral nature of man and the love of God to the world was too little considered, in consequence, especially, of the formulating of the theories of *gratia irresistibilis* and *gratia particularis.* While rejecting the compromise offered by semi-Pelagianism, the Reformation theology sought to secure the right of man's moral nature, and to avoid anything that might savour of unethical coercion in their doctrine of the necessity and efficacy of the Spirit's work. Grace is rightly regarded as the only productive power, in opposition to all synergistic theories which seek to secure for the human will an active share in the initiation of conversion. The difficulty of this point is not in regard to the fact, but in regard to the nature, of human freedom. In discussing the question of the freedom of the will, we must consider the will, not theoretically and merely in the abstract, but as it appears in action and operation in human life. As thus viewed, the will is not found in a condition free from bias and without limitations from its environment within human nature itself and from the world around. Then, again, this power of will is from God, as well as the influences of grace which affect its volitions. This common origin ought of itself to suggest the possibility of action and reaction between God's grace and man's will. From its very constitution, the nature of a man as a spiritual and moral being is the fitting sphere for the gracious activity of God's Spirit. Until every trace of the divine has been banished from man's being, there is something in him which responds to the revelation which God makes of Himself in Christ. When this *gratia prævenions* awakens a real and true response in a man's will, the grace becomes operative and efficient. Thus the action is that of grace, yet not without the will, so that *gratia operans* becomes *gratia cooperans,* and, in the continuous movement of the new life, the divine and human elements appear, not separately but together. There is no action on

the part of the human will before it has experienced the quickening and renewing influence of the Holy Spirit. The presence and operation of the Spirit are conditions to the first movement of the will of man toward God. As Amesius says (*Medulla*, t. xxvi. 25): "*Voluntas tamen respectu hujus primæ receptionis, neque libere agentis, neque naturaliter patientis rationem habet, sed obedientialis tantum subjectionis*" (2 Cor. iv. 6). The Holy Spirit is rightly described as alone the efficient cause of the salvation of the individual, inasmuch as apart from His operation no movement toward God would have been made, and no step taken in the way of salvation. Yet the activity of the Divine Spirit in man, and his own moral and spiritual activity, are not to be distinguished as two outwardly distinct phenomena, but only as two different movements in a process that is inwardly and spiritually one.[1] The whole spiritual process is one wrought by the Holy Spirit in, upon, and with the spiritual nature of man,—the shedding abroad in our hearts of the love of God by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us (Rom. v. 5). In this passage "St. Paul refers all his conscious experience of the privileges of Christianity to the operation of the Holy Spirit, dating from the time when he definitely enrolled himself as a Christian."[2] We should not, therefore, speak of the human spirit as purely passive and receptive, for this persuading and enabling of the Spirit implies a voluntary and intelligent response, which is an activity of the highest kind.

It is necessary to maintain, in accordance with Scripture, the absolute and sole activity of God by His Holy Spirit in the application of the redemption of Christ, but at the same time to emphasise the ethical character of the process in the penitence and faith of the individual in whom the divine grace operates. It is one of the important services rendered by the Ritschlian school, to protest against the intrusion into dogmatics of metaphysical subtleties in regard to the relations of grace and freedom, of which no trace is found

[1] See Lipsius, *Lehrbuch*, p. 599.

[2] Sanday and Headlam, *Commentary on Romans* (1896), p. 126.

in Scripture or in the church doctrine, and to insist simply on the absence of merit in man on the one hand, and on his moral responsibility on the other.[1]

The work of the Spirit in the individual, as well as in the Church, must be regarded as the continued activity of the Risen and Glorified Lord. In the world and among men Christ exercises both a posthumous influence and a continued conscious and personal ministry.[2] He is Himself in Person wherever His work is going on. The sending of the Spirit is part of Christ's kingly office, so that the application of redemption by the Spirit is not something done by a representative of Christ, or by one who has taken up His work, but something which He is Himself actively and personally doing by the Spirit. That which the Spirit takes and shows of man is not merely what Christ in the days of His flesh had wrought, but what He is doing now as the intercessor by the power of His resurrection. And so what we say of the Spirit we say also of Christ Himself. We are Christ's because He dwells personally in us; but we may say either that Christ is in us, or that the Spirit of Him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwells in us (Rom. viii. 10, 11).

In making application to us of the work of Christ's redemption, the Holy Spirit exercises a twofold office as revealer and as operator. That which is already in the objective work of Christ an accomplished fact He shows to us, and those subjective conditions in us which are necessary for the receiving of that redemption he effectually works in us. This supplies the twofold division according to which the Spirit's activity in the application of redemption may be considered. Under these two divisions, what the Spirit reveals to us, and what the Spirit works in us, the several stages in the application and appropriation of the benefits of Christ's work on the part of the individual may be comprehensively and logically grouped.

[1] See Schultz, *Grundriss der evangelischen Dogmatik* (1892), p. 140 f.

[2] See Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iv. 142-154; and especially Frank, *System der christlichen Wahrheit*, ii. 249–252.

§ 65. What the Spirit Reveals to Us.

Literature.—Kaehler, *Die Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre*, Leipzig, 1893, pp. 393–406.

Sin has produced in man such blindness, or dulness of spiritual apprehension, that either we do not see what has been done for our restoration to God, or else we do not see or understand that it has been done for us. The things of Christ, the work wrought by Him, would remain purely objective operations, external and unrelated to us, unless the Spirit who can speak directly to our spirits brought us the knowledge of their purpose and showed us their fitness to meet the necessities of our case. That in Christ and His Gospel God has called us, justified us, and made us His sons, we cannot understand until the Spirit reveals this to us. In regard to God's calling, justifying, and adopting of us, the Spirit produces nothing new, but only reveals to us what already is, although hitherto and apart from His showing unknown to us. In the case of these operations of divine grace there is no co-operation on the part of man, even after the initiative of God, but from first to last, calling, justifying, and adopting are of God, and when shown to us are already complete. To use the homely and forcible language of Philippi, used by him in a somewhat different connection (*Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*, v. 1; 2), God has prepared these out and out behind our backs, without our knowledge and will having anything to do in the matter.

It is evident that the revelation of such spiritual facts must be made directly by God Himself, so that the revelation is not a report carried to us, nor a representation made to us, but an immediate unfolding of the truth by Him in whom that truth originally lies. God by His Spirit reveals to us what He in His Son has wrought. He makes known to us our *calling* of God, His own purpose concerning us in the work of Jesus Christ. Those who listen to the call have shown to them the justification which is provided for the

forgiveness of sins, and the new relation of acceptance and reconciliation instituted between God and the sinner. And further, the Spirit shows that the standing of the justified is that of a son of God. We treat here, therefore, of God's calling, justifying, and adopting of us, as revealed to us by the Holy Spirit.

§ 66. Our Calling of God.

Literature.—Kaehler, *Die Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre* (1893), pp. 402–404. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, ii. 639–732. Rothe, *Dogmatik*, iii. 244 f., 253–255. Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch*, p. 571.

The calling of God is the invitation which He has given and the assurance of welcome to all who will accept the benefits of Christ's redemption. It is the continuation by the risen and exalted Christ through His Spirit of His prophetic work in the revelation and declaration of God's saving will toward men. The Spirit addresses the call ordinarily through the Word to those who are not in fellowship with Christ, setting forth the benefits which flow from Him, and inviting them to enter into that fellowship. It does not bring salvation, but it declares the possibility of salvation. In opposition to an extreme and fatalistic doctrine of predestination, His calling is characterised as *seria*, *efficax*, and *universalis*. It is well to emphasise the fact of the earnestness and reality of His calling. We must also maintain that it is thoroughly fit and sufficient for producing the conversion of all men, and that where it does not prove efficient this results only through the fault of men themselves. In regard to its universality, however, some of the older dogmatists were guilty of putting an unnatural strain upon their interpretation of facts, in order to make this universality absolute in extension. They represented this universal call to have been given through Adam, and Noah, and the Apostles, so that if any peoples are now without the knowledge of that calling it is by their own fault. A universal

call of this kind is not a fact, but a mere theory invented for a purpose. It should also be remembered that this calling is not to be identified with any sort of revelation, but only with a revelation of Christ in such a form as to present Him as the ground of the possibility of salvation. The calling, therefore, has not been given universally in the historical and geographical sense, but it is universal in this sense, that whosoever hears it finds that it is meant for and suited to him.

As God's first act in the application of Christ's redemption, it is described as following from His eternal purpose (Rom. viii. 28). It is unrestricted in its offer, but man's acceptance of it depends upon his appreciation of the benefits which it holds forth. As the calling of God, it is sure and without repentance (Rom. xi. 29). It is made to all in need, and invites all such into the fellowship of Jesus Christ. As means of communication, it ordinarily uses the ordinances of Word and sacraments (Matt. xxviii. 19, 20). In respect of its ethical character it is a holy calling (Rom. i. 7; 1 Cor. i. 2; 2 Tim i. 9), and in respect of its spiritual effects, a heavenly calling (Heb. iii. 1).

An important distinction is indicated between the *vocatio externa* and the *vocatio interna*. The outward calling is by baptism and the hearing of the Word. The outward calling is fitted to become effectual as an inward calling, if the individual receiving does not by his own guilt put hindrances in the way. But just as outward connection with the Church does not guarantee real inward connection with Christ, so the receiving of baptism and the hearing of the Word do not of themselves necessarily imply the personal exercise of saving faith. This internal calling involves the response of the individual addressed in appropriating faith, and consequently the external calling is all that we have to do with here. At the same time, this external calling is not wholly external, inasmuch as it is the operation of the Holy Spirit, whose influence and presence, when acting upon man's spirit, are not merely upon and with, but really in and throughout.

§ 67. Our Justification before God.

Literature.—Buchanan, *The Doctrine of Justification*, Edin. 1867. Kaehler, *Die Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre*, Leipzig, 1893, pp. 398–402. Lipsius, *Die Hauptpunkte der christlichen Glaubenslehre*,[2] Brunswick, 1891, p. 33 f. Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik*, 575–578, 582–588. Kaftan, *Dogmatik*, 510–523. Rothe, *Dogmatik*, iii. 274 f. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iv. 192–238. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, 391–394. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, 470–483. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, iii. 114–212. Stearns, *Present-Day Theology*, 440–448. Allen, *Christian Institutions*, Edin. 1898, pp. 422–437. Faber, *Primitive Doctrine of Justification*,[2] London, 1839. Davenant, *Treatise on Justification*, or *Disputatio de Justitia Habituali et Actuali* (1630), London, 1844. Newman, *Lectures on Justification*, London, 1838. Heurtley, *Justification*, London, 1845. Garbett, *Christ as Prophet, Priest, and King*, Oxford, 1842, vol. i. 357–469.

Justification is the same thing as the forgiveness of sins, only that when we speak of forgiveness we think directly of the objective atoning work of Christ, which constitutes the ground of forgiveness; and when we speak of justification, we think of the new relation toward God into which this forgiveness introduces the sinner. The justification of the ungodly is the application by God to the individual sinner of reconciliation, and in it prevenient grace attains unto its end. It may be defined as the subjective appropriation of the reconciliation wrought by Christ, just as regeneration is the subjective appropriation of Christ's redemption. Justification is the religious aspect, while regeneration is the ethical aspect, of one and the same spiritual operation. We cannot, therefore, speak of the one coming before and the other coming after. The temporal relation does not enter here at all. Yet there is a logical sequence, inasmuch as what God does for us is the necessary presupposition of what He does in us. Justification and regeneration together constitute the transition from the *status corruptionis* to the *status gratiæ*. It is the justified and regenerated, who has passed from the

one state to the other. In the revelation to us of the new relation in which we stand to God as forgiven through the reconciliation wrought by Christ, our justification before God is made known to us. And the knowledge of this new relation to God can be made known to us only by the Spirit.

In the Old Testament the fundamental meaning of justification is the pronouncing a person righteous, in the legal sense, issuing a sentence of acquittal. This may be done in the case of a person really righteous and innocent (Ps. li. 4, cxliii. 2), or of one really and personally unrighteous and guilty (Ex. xxiii. 7; Prov. xvii. 15). In the latter case, it has a merely negative significance, to let off; in the former, an affirmative significance, to pronounce actually righteous. In the evangelical doctrine these two are combined in the sense that the justified, in the new relation to God in which he stands, is ideally righteous, and that provision has been made for the realisation of this ideal. The New Testament doctrine is that elaborated by St. Paul, especially in the Epistle to the Romans. In his teaching, justification is emphatically the objective act of God in pronouncing judgment upon all who share the benefit of Christ's work. But this judgment rests not upon their sharing in these benefits, but absolutely upon the merit of that work. In the language of Protestant scholasticism, it is purely a forensic act. In the language of modern philosophy, it is a synthetic, not an analytic, judgment. It is a purely religious act, not one in which we have a blending of the religious and the ethical. It has an ethical ground, and it has ethical consequences, but it is itself a pure religious act, as an objective act of God, without any mixture of subjective acts either of faith or of works on the part of man. The Patristic doctrine on this point is vacillating and uncertain. Even Augustine fails to appreciate the pure Pauline doctrine, so that his exposition afforded material for the schoolmen, the Romish theologians, and Osiander, in the construction of their theory of an infusion of righteousness in justification. But in Paul's doctrine, justification is the im-

putation by God of the merits of Christ's work to the individual sinner, not the appropriation of those merits, nor even the appropriation of God's imputation of those merits, by the individual sinner himself. It is therefore the distinctive message of the gospel, the essential content of the divine calling.

Much confusion has been wrought in certain systems of Protestant theology from regarding the imputation in justification as that of faith in Christ rather than the merit and righteousness of Christ. If once it be admitted that justification is an activity on the part of man, or includes any such activity, then it can no longer be maintained that we are justified *propter Christum per fidem*, but only that we are justified *propter fidem per Christum*. If justification be thus viewed, not as a purely objective act of God but as such an act modified by, or made dependent upon, our faith, then just as our faith at certain times grows, and at other times becomes obscured, so will it be with our justification. But this is altogether opposed to the revelation which the Spirit makes to us as to our justification, which stands not upon any variable subjective foundation, such as our faith or anything else in us, but as the eternal and unchanging judgment of God upon the work which Christ has done for us. Hence the church doctrine, quite in accordance with Scripture, maintains that, as an *actus Dei forensis sive judicialis*, justification is also an *actus Dei immanens, i.e.* that it represents simply a change in the view which God takes of the sinner and in God's relation to him, but not any change in the sinner himself. On the application of the satisfaction of Christ to the individual sinner, justification is usually regarded as consisting of three moments: (1) the imputation of the righteousness or merit of Christ, so that the sinner is regarded and treated as if he had himself fulfilled the law and borne the punishment of sin; (2) remission of sins; and (3) reconciliation with God, or adoption into the number of the sons of God. But justification consists rather of the first of these moments, the remission of sins being only formally distinguishable from the

imputation of Christ's righteousness, and adoption being not so much an element in justification, but a further revelation to us of what God through Christ has done for us consequent upon His justification of us for Christ's sake. The imputation of Christ's righteousness may be regarded as the positive act in justification, corresponding to the active obedience of Christ; the remission of sins or the non-imputation of sins as the negative act, corresponding to the passive obedience. Still, this distinction in scholastic phraseology is *non secundum rem*, but *secundum rationem*. They are materially one, so that "non imputatio peccatorum est imputatio justitiæ, et imputatio justitiæ est non imputatio sive remissio peccatorum." Justification consists in the remission of sins. In direct opposition to the scriptural and Protestant doctrine of justification is that of the Roman Catholic Church. According to the teaching of the Council of Trent, which, as we have seen, is based upon the imperfect and confused expositions of fathers and schoolmen, justification is not a forensic act, but involves the infusion of righteousness or inherent holiness. It is a *justificatio physica sive hyperphysica*. It is defined (*Concil. Trident*, sess. xvii. cap. 7): "Actio Dei, qua homines injusti, infusa per Spiritum sanctum caritate, reipsa et revera justi efficiuntur." It is thus not the objective act of God, but the subjective state or condition of man, a *habitus infusus*, not therefore to be distinguished from the *renovatio* or *sanctificatio* of the Protestant doctrine, which is the result of justification. The Roman Catholic doctrine thus makes faith the meritorious cause of our justification, so that faith becomes a work of merit winning salvation for us, and we are saved *propter fidem* rather than *propter Christum*. It was the consistent development of the mediæval doctrine of merit, especially as wrought out in the system of Thomas Aquinas. Justification is a process by means of which a man is transported from a state of sin into a state of righteousness by works of merit which purchase a right to eternal life.

An attempt was made within the Evangelical Church of the Reformation to restate in its essential features the Roman

Catholic doctrine of justification. Osiander,[1] in his *De Unico Mediatore Jesu Christo et Justificatione fidei Confessio*, published in 1551, identifies justification with the indwelling "life-giving" presence of Christ, substituting the Christ in us for the Christ for us. In opposition to the Romish doctrine of merit and good works, he earnestly maintained that Christ only is our righteousness, but held at the same time that justification consists in the essential indwelling of the divine righteousness, *inhabitatio essentialis justitiæ Dei*. He calls the righteousness of faith *justitia externa*, and distinguishes it from that true righteousness which proceeds from it by means of sanctification and renewal. In the Church theology, the *inhabitatio Dei* is the consequence of the *justitia fidei*, which is identified with the remission of sins, and describes the state of the justified as one of freedom from the guilt and punishment of sin attained unto by faith. It is specially characteristic of Osiander that he distinguishes redemption, as the result of what Christ did in His historical life, from justification, which implies faith on our part; so that redemption can be regarded as ours long before we have had personal being, just as we may have had freedom in the emancipation from slavery of a remote ancestor. But justification implies our personal existence and the exercise on our part of faith, so that it cannot be simply the result of Christ's historical work, performed and completed long ago, but only as He in His righteousness takes up His abode in the heart of the individual. This distinguishing of redemption and justification results from a confusion between justification and regeneration, and from regarding justification as implying a real and not merely a relative change in the sinner. Had Osiander consistently carried out the principle with which he started, he would have maintained the perfect inherency in the justified of the

[1] For interesting and instructive critical descriptions of Osiander's opinions, see Dorner, *History of Protestant Theology*, Edin. 1871, vol. i. pp.353–362, and Ritschl, *Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, Edin. 1872, pp. 214–233; Calvin, also, in his *Institutes*, bk. iii. chap. xi. §§ 5–12, gives a very detailed criticism of Osiander's views; see also, Kurtz, *Church History*, London, 1881, vol. ii. § 141, 2.

divine righteousness, so that that righteousness would be at once completely divine and completely ours. In view of the pressure put upon him by his theological controversialists, he shrank from drawing this conclusion, confessing that the indwelling righteousness of Christ is still something foreign to us, so that it must be imputed. Our righteousness, therefore, is after all not divine, and so is not acceptable to God, and for such acceptance we must depend on our imputed righteousness, which is thus something not properly inherent, but external in the sense very much of the church doctrine. Flaccius and Strigel, representing respectively the strict Lutheran and Melanchthonian schools, successfully answered Osiander in defence of the church doctrine; but Stancarus overstrained the orthodox position by maintaining that justification was grounded only upon the obedience of the human nature of Christ.

Schleiermacher regards justification as reception into the living fellowship of Christ, which constitutes a changed relation of man to God, in opposition to the church doctrine which regards it as a changed relation of God to man. Redemption is referred not to any real objective atonement by the death of Christ, but to a merely subjective dying and reviving with Him, influenced in some way by that death. This, again, from another point of view, is a confounding of justification and regeneration or sanctification, so that justifying faith is viewed as a new ethical principle. This essentially Romish doctrine of justification is represented not only in such works as Newman's *Lectures on Justification* and Oxenham's *Catholic Doctrine of the Atonement*, but also in the works of evangelical theologians like Martensen, influenced by mystical views of the relations of God and man.

That there is a connection between justification on the one hand, and regeneration and sanctification on the other, is quite evident, but the perception of this connection is not helped but only hindered by any confusion of the one with the other. The revelation of the new relation of God to us in justification is a means toward the development in us of

the new life of regeneration. The knowledge brought to us by the Spirit of God's objective act in justifying us, supplies the Spirit with a groundwork on which, in co-operation with the human spirit, He can rear the structure of a new spiritual life corresponding to the new relation of grace.

§ 68. Our Filial Relationship to God.

Literature.—Frank, *System der christlichen Wahrheit*, ii. 354 f. Bruce, *St. Paul's Conception of Christianity*, Edin. 1894, chap. x. Candlish, *Fatherhood of God*, Edin. 1866, pp. 222–248. Kaehler, *Die Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre*, 406–410. Amesius, *Medulla Theologiæ*, I. xxviii. Macpherson, *Westminster Confession of Faith*, pp. 92–94.

Adoption is not one of the moments in justification, but rather its immediate result, and, like it, an objective act of God in which we take no part. "Vocatio tamen et justificatio fundamenti rationem habet ad istam relationem adoptionis; per fidem enim et fidei justitiam jus adoptionis acquiritur" (Amesius). It is accurately defined as a gracious sentence of God, whereby for Christ's sake He receives sinners who had been without into the rank of sons. It is thus, like justification, a formal, declaratory, forensic act. And just as we cannot presuppose regeneration as the ground of justification, so also we cannot regard the actual gift and presence of the spirit in us as the presupposition of adoption. Paul's statement, "As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God" (Rom. viii. 14), cannot mean that they are made sons by the leading of the Spirit, but only that this leading is a mark and sure indication that God has given them this relation to Himself. This is clearly expressed in Gal. iv. 6, "Because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of His Son into your hearts." This sonship is grounded in the redemption of Christ, on account of which we receive the adoption of sons, and for the sake of Christ, the Redeemer, the Spirit is sent. The distinction ought to be carefully drawn between

the state of adoption and the spirit of adoption.[1] The spirit of adoption is an element in the regenerate nature, a condition characteristic of the new man, a state of the inner spiritual nature developed in the progressive life of sanctification. It is only with the state of adoption that we have here to do, as the revelation of the Spirit to us of the rank and privileges to which God, apart altogether from anything in them or done by them, has appointed the justified.

Many are inclined to regard adoption as simply a part, the second and higher part, of justification. Turretine in particular elaborated this view of adoption, and Dr. Candlish rightly objects that, as admission to fellowship on the ground of justification, it is something different from that justification which is its ground. Dr. Candlish, however, seems to be wrong in the further objection which he raises to this identification, on the ground that while justification is purely forensic and legal, adoption has nothing about it that is forensic and legal. Dr. Bruce also argues very keenly against the idea of a forensic character being ascribed to adoption, so that he would even abandon the use of a word which he believes has been misused in theology in a thoroughly un-Pauline way. But the question of the designation of man's relation to God apart from Christ is not raised by Paul at this point. God is Father, and men have to *become* sons, and adoption is the declaring of the possibility of this. Adoption, which like justification is an objective transaction and the opening of a new relation, is also, like justification, a purely forensic and legal act; and not the designation only, but also the thing so designated, is illustrated by the civil and legal process by which one outside was transferred into the rank and enjoyment of the privileges of sonship. If our justification be a strictly forensic act, so must our adoption be which is grounded upon it. It is not only true that on condition of justification we are declared sons of God, but that being justified we are sons.

[1] See Macpherson, *Sum of Saving Knowledge*, p. 129.

§ 69. What the Spirit Works in Us.

Literature.—Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iv. 164–183. Owen, *Discourse concerning the Holy Spirit*, in Works, iii. 228–242.

In one sense everything in man's salvation is referred wholly to God. He alone is the efficient cause of man's salvation. But in the divine operations, as we have seen, there is a twofold distinction, according as God acts purely for man or in and through the moral and spiritual faculties of man. God's calling, justifying, and adopting of us are all objective acts of God, of which we have no knowledge but as they are revealed to us by His Spirit. But now we have to pass on to consider those subjective changes in man's heart and nature which are mediated by the presence and activity of the Holy Spirit dwelling in and working upon us. This work consists in the winning back of the human spirit and life estranged by sin to the love and service of God. The several operations which make up this work are not to be regarded as successive and outside of one another. Much confusion has arisen from failing to distinguish between a temporal and a purely logical order of succession. The operations of the Spirit are not to be distinguished as though they stood apart from one another as before and after, so that any one of these might be discussed independently of any idea or presupposition of the others. Discussions as to the order of succession of regeneration and justification, however carefully guarded, as indicating merely a succession in order of nature and not of time, have proved utterly sterile. Such subjects were very commonly debated by our older theologians. A very good specimen of such discussion may be found in Halyburton, "A Modest Inquiry whether Regeneration or Justification has the Precedency in Order of Nature." He shows very clearly how great the difficulties are which arise under either alternative, and one would naturally have expected the conclusion that it is unwise to raise the question of precedency, because impossible to solve it. Quite unsuccessfully, however,

and necessarily so, Halyburton makes an endeavour to show that in the order of nature regeneration must precede justification. It is also quite plain that faith and repentance cannot be treated apart from one another, as though an impenitent man could believe or an unbelieving man repent. We must not therefore attempt to treat of faith without any presupposition of repentance, nor of repentance except as an element in and an accompaniment of faith.

Another matter which ought to be carefully noted here is, that in all that the Spirit works in and through us, in faith, repentance, regeneration, sanctification, there is necessarily a large ethical element which properly lies outside of the domain of dogmatics. It is the part of the dogmatist to call attention to the fact that there is such an ethical element, to show clearly what that is and how it affects and influences the dogmatic truth, but leaving the detailed elaboration of the stages of the process in life and conduct to the special department of Christian ethics. Faith, as the practical inherent principle of the new life, can be adequately discussed only in ethics; but as the spiritual and religious principle by means of which the saving benefits of Christ are appropriated and secured by the individual sinner, it has its place just here in the system of Christian doctrine. Similar distinctions fall to be made in regard to the ethical and dogmatical elements in repentance, regeneration, and sanctification.

§ 70. Faith.

Literature.—Kaftan, *Dogmatik*, pp. 622–627. Strong, *Systematic Theology* (1893), pp. 465–470. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, iii. 41–113. Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evangel. Dogmatik*, 573–575, 583 f. Stearns, *Present-Day Theology*, London, 1893, pp. 443–456. Schlatter, *Der Glaube im Neuen Testament*, Leiden, 1885. Köstlin, *Der Glaube und seine Bedeutung*, Berlin, 1895. O'Brien, *The Nature and the Effects of Faith*, 3rd ed., London, 1863. Harless, *Christian Ethics*, Edinburgh, 1868, pp. 149–163. Rothe, *Still Hours*, London, 1886, pp. 223–228; *Dogmatik* (1870), iii. 175–178, 195–207. Biedermann,

Christliche Dogmatik, ii. 129–135, 331–333, 617–620. Frank, *System der christlichen Wahrheit*,[3] 1894, ii. 344–349. König, *Der Glaubensakt des Christen*, Leipzig, 1891.

We properly begin our account of what the Spirit works in us with the chapter on faith. In the theological sense, faith is God's work in us, by means of which we are united to the Saviour and have salvation. Faith in Christ is the only means appointed by God as a subjective condition of our salvation. It is not our work, but only the work wrought in us by God's Spirit; and yet, though the Spirit's work, it is so wrought in and through our spiritual powers that these are not only ethically but also religiously affected, and so the spirit of him who believes is by his faith brought into a new relationship with God and into personal union with Him. Kaftan would banish all the other spiritual exercises usually reckoned here among the operations of the Spirit in the conversion of the sinner to God. In place of the old *ordo salutis* he would substitute faith. And what we have said as to faith constituting the one subjective condition to the enjoyment of God's salvation would seem to afford sufficient ground for such a position. But we maintain, on the contrary, that when faith has been properly defined, and when its contents are clearly understood, it will be seen that repentance, regeneration, the mystical union with Christ, and sanctification are all already necessarily implied. These must all be treated each and severally as they are implicated in the saving act of faith; and this indicates the limits within which these subjects must be dealt with in a treatise on dogmatics.

Faith, as the instrumental cause of the appropriation on the part of man of the salvation wrought for him, is an essentially Christian idea, for the statement and development of which we have to look to the New Testament. Like all the religious ideas of the New Testament, it has its roots in the Old Testament; and notions of man's spiritual relations to God, in respect of dependence and confidence originally

expressed in Hebrew phrases, pass through the vocabulary of the LXX into the Greek of the Gospels and the Epistles. In the Hebrew אָמַן and its derivatives, and in the Greek πιστεύειν and πίστις, the root idea is that of firm, unshaken, confidence in God as he reveals Himself in His commands and promises. The giving of the law and the preaching of the prophets had the special end in view of awakening and developing this faith. Everywhere throughout the Old Testament trust in Jehovah is regarded as the ideal characteristic of the people of God, and it is shown with constant iteration, both didactically and historically, that without this faith it is impossible to please God. It is, however, in the New Testament that faith is clearly and emphatically described as the one indispensable condition for the securing of the benefits of redemption. Faith in God, in the full evangelical sense, can be unfolded only in the New Testament, inasmuch as God in Christ is the true object of such a faith. In our Lord's own teaching He demands faith in Himself and in His gospel, and describes faith in His Person as the one special work which God requires of man. He declares it the condition of His working miracles and of His exercise of saving power. Deliverance from evil and the obtaining of eternal life are dependent upon the presence and exercise of faith.[1]

Throughout the New Testament the object of faith is described under a singular variety of expression. Not only, as in the passages referred to, is it described as faith in Christ's Person and gospel, it is also represented as directed to His miracle-working power, the divinity of His mission as being sent of God, the doctrine of His essential oneness with God, of His Messiahship, of His being the Son of God, of His being Jesus who redeems us from our sins, and of His having been raised by God from the dead. It is also spoken of as faith in God, who sent Jesus, and who raised Him from the

[1] John v. 46, viii. 46, xiv. 10, 11; Mark x. 15; John vi. 29; Matt. ix. 2, 28; Mark ix. 23, 24, x. 52; Luke viii. 12; John iii. 15, v. 24, vi. 47.

dead.[1] Thus both in the Old and in the New Testament God, as He reveals Himself, is the object of faith, and God reveals Himself throughout as the God of redemption. In the New Testament, however, and especially in the writings of Paul, where the doctrine of God's redeeming grace in the justification and forgiveness of the sinner is most clearly and fully wrought out, the completed doctrine of faith is presented as the one means of connection between us and Him, in whom we have redemption, the forgiveness of our sins. As viewed from its human side, faith is described in the New Testament as a work, something actually done by the man himself. It is, according to the teaching of Jesus, the one work which God demands of man (John vi. 29). So, too, Paul, in 2 Thess. i. 11, speaks of the work of faith as parallel to that goodness of the life which is pleasing to God. Yet here it is to be observed that it is a work of man and in man which God is represented as fulfilling, in the same way in which man's doing (ἐνεργεῖν) is described in Phil. ii. 13 as the result of God's doing (ἐνεργεῖν). As a human act, faith is regarded as an act of intelligence and self-consciousness, which expresses itself in the understanding (Heb. xi. 3). What faith accepts it accepts as true, though neither immediately nor mediately an object of sensible perception. It apprehends and holds its object with a firm conviction, and the ground of this conviction is the revelation of God, the witness which God has borne to Himself. So our Lord demanded faith in Himself from men for His work's sake (John x. 38, xiv. 11), or on account of the words that He spoke and their self-evidencing power (John iv. 41, 42, xii. 47, 48, xiv. 10). Faith therefore implies a seeing of the Son, a spiritual perception of the nature and character of the being who thus speaks and acts. In this way faith and knowledge of the one object, Christ, are closely and necessarily associated together. But whether faith in Christ

[1] Matt. viii. 10; Luke viii. 50; John xi. 42, xvi. 27, xiv. 10, 11, xi. 27, xx. 31, iii. 16, ix. 35–38; Gal. ii. 20; Rom. x. 9; Col. ii. 12; John v. 24; Rom. iv. 24; 1 Peter i. 21.

or knowledge of Christ is spoken of it is invariably represented as resting not on human reasoning or investigation, but solely on the authority of the divine revelation. At the same time, it is a free act of man's will in the accepting of what God presents, the assent of the intelligence and heart to that which God makes known. It is the expression of personal trust and confidence in the personal God of revelation, and as a personal act it manifests itself in willing obedience. Faith in God and obedience to Him are in the New Testament synonymous. And this evangelical, as distinguished from legal, obedience, can be regarded only as the work of faith, a work that is man's only in so far as it is wrought in man by God.

Saving faith is the instrumental cause of the sinner's appropriation of salvation. This saving faith is distinguished, in the language of theology, from faith generally as *fides specialis*, as the *certa persuasio de venia peccatorum per Christum obtinenda*. The object of *fides generalis* is *omne verbum Dei revelatum*; but the object of *fides specialis* is *Christus mediator, quatenus ut causa meritoria remissionis peccatorum nobis offertur*. In scholastic theology, and subsequently in Catholic theology as opposed to Protestantism, a distinction was introduced between *fides informis* and *fides formata*. The former was defined as *fides quæ a caritate est sejuncta*, the latter as *fides quæ a caritate tamquam forma perficitur*. Protestant theologians objected to this distinction that the so-called *fides informis* was no real faith but a dead faith, which might quite well be present in one who lived a sinful life. They insisted that all true faith is living faith, which shows itself in good works. True faith is also opposed to a merely historical faith resting on purely external authority. It is properly described as consisting of three elements—of knowledge, assent, and trust. As knowledge, *notitia*, it is a belief of something concerning God; as assent, *assensus* or *complexus*, it is the accepting of the divine testimony, especially concerning the efficacy of the work of Christ for our salvation; as trust, *fiducia*, it is an act of

the will, whereby the sinner, turning to God, looks to Him for His mercy in Christ, and for forgiveness and life for Christ's sake.[1] But while there cannot be faith without *notitia* and *assensus*, it is specially as *fiducia* that faith is saving, for in this aspect it is the apprehending and appropriating by the individual of the merits of the God-man. It is also as *fiducia* that faith appears most distinctly as the work of God's Spirit in and through the spirit of man, by which confidence is awakened which leads to the acceptance by heart and will of Christ's salvation.

§ 71. Repentance.

Literature.—Stuckert, *Die katholische Lehre von der Reue*, Freiburg, 1896. Rothe, *Dogmatik* (1870), iii. 247 f., 256–260, 270–274. Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evangelische Dogmatik*, 572 f., 589 f. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, 387–390. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, 462–464. Allen, *Christian Institutions*, Edin. 1898, pp. 409–422. Rollock, *Treatise of God's Effectual Calling*, in "Select Works," pp. 238–251.

Repentance is everywhere closely associated with faith, and apart from this connection it cannot be described as an evangelical or Christian grace. This is the special objection to be advanced against the proposal of Kaftan, to introduce the idea of repentance in the section that deals with sin. This would appear at first sight its natural place. Repentance is the turning away from and forsaking of sin, and it might be supposed that the knowledge of sin and the consciousness of its guilt necessarily involved in them all that pertains to the domain of dogmatics with regard to repentance. Kaftan maintains that whatever besides this is involved in the idea of repentance belongs not to the sphere of dogmatics, but to that of ethics. But it ought

[1] See Marckius, *Medulla Theologiæ*, cap. xxii. 16–24. For interesting discussions of the doctrine of faith in the older theology, see Ball, *A Treatise of Faith*, London, 1631; and Halyburton, *An Essay concerning Faith*, in his Works, edited by Dr. Burns, Glasgow, 1833, pp. 505–546.

to be very evident that in evangelical repentance there is something more than the consciousness of sin, and that, as the recognition and appropriation of the grace of Christ, it necessarily involves the exercise of faith and the consciousness of salvation. Nor can we admit that there is any force in the objection, that if repentance be introduced in the Christian system alongside of faith in the description of the appropriation by the individual of the benefit of Christ's redemption, then something besides and in addition to faith is recognised as necessary to salvation. Evangelical repentance is not something separate from and independent of faith, and so it is really an element of faith in the wider sense. The *fides specialis*, with which we dealt in the previous section, which lays hold upon the gospel and its promise of grace and salvation, necessarily implies and presupposes that *fides generalis* which embraces the law as well as the gospel, and demands repentance as a condition of and an element in all faith that is living and saving. Yet repentance is not faith, and faith is not repentance, although we can have no repentance without faith, and no faith without repentance. Like faith, repentance is a work wrought in man by God's own Spirit, not a meritorious work of man which God rewards. It is that aversion from sin which answers to the believing turning to God, both of which owe their origin to the one operation of the Spirit. In faith, the course of development is mainly religious, implying a gradual appropriation of divine grace; in repentance, the course of development is mainly ethical, implying a gradual casting out of the evil and incorporation of the good into the life. But here the religious is the spring and proper source of the ethical. Calvin points out that repentance presupposes saving faith, and that it is the turning of our life to God produced by our fear of God, consisting in the mortification of our own flesh and of the old man, and the quickening or vivification of the spirit.[1]

Repentance is not a mere negation or condemnatory

[1] *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, bk. iii. chap. iii. §§ 1–3.

judgment upon one's self, but involves also a positive appropriation of that which the sinful life had put aside. The *μετάνοια* of the New Testament is a complete and thoroughgoing turning of the whole mind and disposition (Matt. iii. 2; Luke x. 13; Mark vi. 12; Acts xvii. 30). It is not merely the forsaking of the old manner of life, but it is the changing of one's mind about it and his way of regarding it. It is not the outward change which is seen in the new life. That is the effect resulting from repentance. But repentance itself is purely inward, the *contritio cordis*, which is the secret spring of all development in a life of holiness. The preaching of the New Testament by John the Baptist, by Jesus Himself, and by the apostles, is a preaching of repentance; and as a proclaiming of a new beginning and an essential change, it is immediately associated with the rite of baptism. It is specially the condition of the forgiveness of sins, and the presupposition of faith in Christ. It is represented as the turning of the heart and life of man from sin, specially from sin as the general sinful condition of the individual, but also from particular and detailed offences of the sinful life. Sorrow for sin is an element in all true repentance, which was strongly expressed and vigorously insisted upon in the Old Testament (Ps. xxxii., li.; Isa. lvii. 18; Jer. xxxi. 19), and no less impressively in the New (2 Cor. vii. 9, 10). In the Church theology this is called *contritio* as distinguished from *attritio*, which is occasioned simply by fear of the consequences and penalties of sin. The motive of true repentance is the knowledge of the love of God, especially as revealed in Christ. It involves a strong endeavour to overcome evil and to get rid of it, not merely in the outer life but in the heart. Hence it is not the work of the man himself, but the operation of God within him, specially mediated by the Risen and Glorified Saviour (Acts v. 31). The Roman Catholic doctrine of repentance makes a false start by defining the idea of penitence in a purely external manner. This type of doctrine had its origin in the Roman love of law and order

as something to be enforced by strict and rigid discipline. This tendency is illustrated very characteristically in the attitude assumed by Tertullian, in whose way of regarding confession, absolution, and Church discipline generally we see the germs of that mechanical system elaborated in the disciplinary code of the Romish Church. The Tridentine doctrine of repentance distinguishes three parts in pœnitentia—contritio, confessio, satisfactio. "Contritio" is "contritio cordis, dolor cum detestatione peccati et proposito non peccandi." "Confessio" is "confessio oris, distincta et plena omnium peccatorum, quorum aliquis sibi conscius est, enumeratio coram sacerdote." "Satisfactio" is "satisfactio operis, quæ est in perficiendis bonis operibus et luendis pœnis canonicis, quibus justitiæ divinæ satisfiat." All true repentance is included in "contritio" when rightly understood as "contritio cordis"; but in Romish theology this true "contritio" was displaced by "attritio," which may be described as "contritio informis," a mere dread of the consequences of sin, which, with the use of the sacrament, was regarded as sufficient for salvation. The demand for confession to the priest and for satisfaction by personal suffering or payment as reparation for violation of the law are unevangelical and unethical additions, and have no place in the idea of repentance. The doctrine of satisfaction rests on the assumption that the *culpa* may be remitted and the *pœna*, in part at least, retained. This false doctrine of repentance reacted upon the doctrine of faith. "Penance," as Dorner well expresses it, "as a making satisfaction, pushed faith into the background, reducing it to mere *notitia*, perhaps along with *assensus*." The two ideas of repentance and faith are so closely connected that any erroneous conception of the one immediately affects the other. In the Reformation theology, repentance and faith were regarded as the two parts of "pœnitentia." If this terminology were adopted, we should simply be substituting "pœnitentia" for "conversio." It is well, however, to emphasise this close connection between faith and repentance, and to remember that it is only faith as

this faith of the penitent that is saving. In some of the older theological systems, as, for example, in Marckius, *Medulla*, faith and repentance, *fides et resipiscentia*, were included together in the chapter *De Officiis Fœderis Gratiæ*, as conditions—"opera quædam ab hominibus fœderatis exigat Deus, ad gratiæ omnis et gloriæ communionem ac certitudinem obtinendam."

It is often said that the new obedience is part of repentance. This, however, belongs to those fruits of repentance which in Scripture are clearly distinguished from repentance itself. The description of this new obedience belongs to the department of Christian ethics. The good works of this new obedience necessarily follow contrition and faith, and are therefore not conditions of salvation, but evidences of salvation in the lives of the penitent and believing. This new obedience is the evangelical equivalent of the Romish doctrine of satisfaction. Repentance completes itself in this ethical development by returning to that service of God which had been fallen away from in the life of sin. Satisfaction is not rendered by acts of penance or penal suffering, nor by payment of imposed penalties, but by a loving surrender of heart and life to the holy service of God. But the only sufficient motive for repentance leading to such results is the love of God revealed in the saving benefits of Christ's work.

§ 72. Regeneration.

Literature.— Smeaton, *Doctrine of Holy Spirit*,[2] Edin. 1887, pp. 175–216. Rothe, *Dogmatik*, iii. 243 f., 251 f., 275–277; *Theologische Ethik*, iii. 296–328. Kahnis, *System der lutherischen Dogmatik* (1868), 430–433. Kaftan, *Dogmatik* (1897), 500–510. Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik*, 572–588. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, 383–386. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, 447–460. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, iii. 3–40. Stearns, *Present-Day Theology*, 459–464. Witherspoon, *Treatise on Regeneration*, 1764. Faber, *The Primitive Doctrine of Regeneration*, London, 1840.

Scripture distinguishes a faith that is preparatory, consisting merely in conviction of the truth of Christianity, and a full, true faith which is justifying and saving. The condition necessary for raising the merely elementary faith into saving faith is regeneration or the new birth. Regeneration is the act of the Holy Spirit in which He, through the instrumentality of the Word, changes a child of the flesh into a child of God. The classical passage dealing with regeneration is the record of our Lord's discourse with Nicodemus in John iii. The agent of this great change in man is God's own Spirit. The figure of a birth is employed in order to indicate the absolute newness of the product. As that which is born of the flesh is flesh, so that which is born of the Spirit is spirit. As spiritual renewal, it is the immediate consequence of faith which unites to Christ, in whom this new spiritual life is. The faith which has not in it the germ of this new life, so that its presence does not immediately and necessarily show itself in this spiritual renewal, is a dead and vain faith. This regeneration presupposes the revelation by the Spirit of the divine objective acts of justification and adoption, so that, as those who have the consciousness of the forgiveness of sins and of admission into the sonship of God, they can now in the life of regeneration serve God without fear. The consciousness of justification or forgiveness is the psychological ground for this vital change. The witness of the Spirit to our forgiveness is the spiritual power within by means of which all the fruits of the Spirit are brought forth in the new life.

The word *παλιγγενεσία* occurs twice in the New Testament (Matt. xix. 28; Tit. iii. 5) in the sense of a complete and thoroughgoing restoration, in the one case of nature as a whole, in the other of the individual human being. It is distinguished from the *ἀνακαίνωσις* of Tit. iii. 5 and Rom. xii. 2 as the divine act which transfers the sinner from the kingdom of nature into the kingdom of grace, in contrast to the gradual process which goes on in the new man whereby the new life is conformed more and more perfectly

to the life of God. The one is regeneration, the other is renovation, and this latter is the same as sanctification. The figure of the new birth is pressed in great particularity and detail by the apostles (1 Pet. i. 3; Tit. iii. 5; Jas. i. 18). They do not merely represent the old man as assuming a new form and appearance, but the new man is a new creation of God, a new creature, and that of the most perfect type, so that the regenerate is described as a kind of first fruits of God's creatures (Jas. i. 18).

Regeneration does not effect any change in the substance of human nature. In does not add any faculty of intellect or will. It is a restoration of the whole nature to its original end in the purpose of the Creator. This is an important point, inasmuch as a different theory of regeneration leads to an altogether unevangelical view of the relation of regeneration to conversion. A very conspicuous example of this appears in the treatment of this subject by Canon Mason. He wishes to show that there need be no connection between conversion and regeneration. Under the Jewish dispensation, men were converted but not regenerated; and conversion may be before or after regeneration. "Regeneration is a metaphysical change, altering a man's nature; conversion is a moral change, altering a man's character. The one gives him new faculties, and a new sphere in which to exercise them: the other gives a new direction to whatever faculties he has. Though unquestionably regeneration, which makes us children of God, is a higher benefit than conversion, which makes us begin to be good men, yet, unless it be preceded, or accompanied, or followed, by conversion, it will avail a man nothing, or rather increase his damnation. Conversion, on the other hand, though through lack of opportunity, or through ignorance and prejudice, it may not be crowned in this life by regeneration, is assured of a true salvation hereafter." On the contrary, we regard conversion and regeneration as closely connected, the former being the manward, and the latter the Godward, aspect of the one operation of the turning of man's heart and being to God. Regeneration is not the state of

privilege to which we are admitted by baptism, but it is itself that radical change which secures admission to that state. Many of the older theologians used the word regeneration to describe the *status gratiæ*, so that it was not the new birth but the new life, which had its beginning in that birth. In accordance with the terminology of the older divines, Rothe speaks of the *process* of the new birth running its course as an ethical process through several moments in a progressive series. Later theologians have rightly gone back to the biblical use of the Word, and restrict it to that single act of God's Spirit in which spiritual life in the individual is called forth, and which in the spiritual world corresponds to the act of birth in the natural world. Regeneration is not simply the first stage in the process of sanctification, but it is this creation of that life in which the process of sanctification takes place. And this life that is created in regeneration contains in it necessarily the germs of spiritual and moral growth. And so we cannot say that regeneration is before faith, for faith is an element in the constitution of that new principle of life which is brought into being in regeneration. Hence we cannot say that regeneration is the restoration of the capacity for faith, that it is simply that which renders faith possible. This would be to identify regeneration and calling. On the contrary, there is no other possibility open to the regenerate but the life of faith. Hence we may accept this definition of regeneration given by Hollaz, which brings the new birth and the gift of faith together in one act of the Spirit: "Actus gratiæ quo Spiritus Sanctus hominem peccatorem salvifica fide donat, ut remissis peccatis filius Dei et hæres æternæ vitæ reddatur."

To identify the new birth with the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, or more generally with redemption, as is done by several modern German theologians of very different tendencies, *e.g.* by Lipsius and Kaftan, is distinctly misleading. Much that is extremely interesting and suggestive is said by both of these distinguished theologians in the sections in which they co-ordinate justification with reconcilia-

tion and the new birth with redemption. But the attempt to identify justification with reconciliation, and regeneration with redemption, results from a confusion between the work done in the personal historical life of Jesus with the result of that work objectively in God's attitude toward man, and subjectively in the change wrought in man himself. The new birth, however, is that event or occurrence in the spiritual history of man which corresponds to the resurrection as wrought in and upon Jesus Christ. The resurrection of Christ is the beginning of that new spiritual world into which the individual man is introduced by the new birth. By the new birth we mean nothing else than the introduction into this new creation, which is accomplished by means of redemption from this present evil world. And the principle of the new life which is brought forth in the new birth is nothing else than the power of Christ's resurrection, the spiritual life communicated by fellowship with the Risen One. In Rom. iv. 25; Eph. i. 20; Heb. iii. 20, 21, Christ's resurrection is the ground or condition of the spiritual resurrection of those who believe. And this spiritual resurrection is regeneration. It is accomplished in us by the same power by which it was accomplished in Christ. He who raised Christ, in doing this raises us who believe. His resurrection is the establishment of a resurrection kingdom into which all spiritually raised, that is, all born again, enter. It is that permanent union of the divine and human which is first realised in the resurrection of Christ, which appears in the new personality of the regenerate. In the new creature grace and freedom are brought together into a perfect union. Here, too, we see the connection, which is often misunderstood and misrepresented, between baptism and regeneration. Ideally, baptism is incorporation into Christ's kingdom through union with himself; and regeneration is the entering really and vitally into personal union with Christ. Baptism is properly the sacrament of regeneration, the sign and seal of union with Christ in spirit and life.

§ 73. The Unio Mystica.

Literature.—Ritschl, *Theologie und Metaphysik*, Bonn, 1881. Frank, *System der christlichen Wahrheit*, ii. 373–377. Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik*, 578, 590–592. Rothe, *Dogmatik*, iii. 249–251, 260. Kahnis, *System der lutherischen Dogmatik* (1868), 447–450. Kaehler, *Die Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre*, 406 f. Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik* (1885), ii. 339 f.

Closely connected with the idea of regeneration is that of the *unio mystica*. Kaftan would assign it, along with regeneration, to the section on the saving work of Christ. It is rather to be regarded as, like regeneration, one of the operations of the Spirit of Christ in the believer, whereby the benefits of His work are appropriated and realised. It is immediately associated with regeneration as the work of the Holy Spirit, whereby a close connection is formed between the substance of the believer and the substance of the triune God, and a union, without commixture, is effected between the believer and the flesh of Christ. The first to use the phrase *unio mystica* was John Gerhard, but only later divines employed it as a technical term in the place which it now occupies. The idea itself, however, otherwise designated, is to be found in the writings of Luther and others of the earliest Reformers. Ritschl, in his extreme opposition to every trace of mysticism, seeks to show that the idea is a worthless and misleading invention of the seventeenth century. But he is wrong in saying that the idea appears only in the pre-Reformation writings of Luther. By the scholastic divines of the seventeenth century it was assigned a place between justification and sanctification.

The *unio* is called *mystica*, but at the same time also *realis*. It means an actual substantial union with the body of Christ, and through Christ, a substantial union with God (1 Cor. vi. 15; Gal. ii. 20). And it is mystical inasmuch as such a union of the triune God with the creature must always be a profound mystery. It is not to be explained away in a

deistical manner, as is done by Socinians and Arminians, as though it meant only a gracious operative presence (*præsentia gratiæ divinæ operativa*), or a mere moral connection with God (*conjunctio moralis*), a mere harmony of the human will with the divine. Nor, on the other hand, is it to be pantheistically conceived of as a mixing and transmutation of substances (*commixtio, transformatio*). It was in this direction of a gross materialistic pantheism that the chief danger lay. Such mystical exaggeration found expression in language which tended to become irreverent. Not content with using Scripture language, such enthusiasts were wont to say, not I am in Christ and Christ is in me, but I am Christ, Christ eats and drinks through me. Schwenkfeld and Weigel indulged in all manner of exaggeration in the direction of fusing together the personality and corporeity of Christ and the believer. According to Weigel, the perfection of man is found not in the perfect fellowship of love with God in Christ, but in the identifying of man with God and in the actualising of the divine essence which inwardly had already a secret or latent existence in man. Such extravagances led many sober divines to depreciate the doctrine, so that some sought even to banish the idea itself from Christian theology. Moderate critical theologians like Nitzsch, in view of such passages as John xv. 4–7, xiv. 23, xvii. 23, 26; Eph. v. 30, 32, i. 23; 1 Cor. vi. 19, vindicate the right of the doctrine to its usual place in the Christian system, but explain it as merely a strong expression for the receiving of the Holy Spirit, which is the consequence of justification and in which regeneration consists, so that it has its right place in logical order between justification and sanctification. It is well, however, to emphasise the strong expressions, especially of Christ Himself as given in the Fourth Gospel. God the triune is represented as dwelling in the believer, not merely exercising in and over Him a spiritual influence. "While, therefore, in justifying faith man rises from earth to heaven, where Father, Son, and Spirit share with him the privileges of heaven, in the mystical union, Father, Son, and Spirit descend from heaven to earth

in order to prepare for themselves a dwelling-place in man's heart" (Kahnis). And just as it is the holiness of heaven that makes it the proper dwelling-place of God, so the indwelling of God in man's heart makes it fit for such residence by carrying on the work of renovation or sanctification.

§ 74. Sanctification.

Literature.—Smeaton, *Doctrine of the Holy Spirit*,[2] Edin. 1889, pp. 221–258. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, iii. 213–258. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, 483–490. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, 395–400. Stearns, *Present-Day Theology*, 467–472. Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik*, 579 f. Rothe, *Dogmatik*, iii. 249, 281–291: *Theologische Ethik*, iii. 329–348.

The new birth introduced the subject of it into a new life. In regeneration a new spiritual creation is brought into being, and this new creature from the moment of its birth begins to live a life which is nothing else than a process of growth and spiritual development. Regeneration from its very idea cannot be more or less, but is simply the production of a living being. But sanctification is the process characteristic of all spiritual life, which therefore begins in the moment of regeneration and goes on from less to more. The subject of regeneration was a sinner, and regeneration was simply the transference of the sinner out of that condition of spiritual death in which he lay into that of spiritual life. The regenerate had thus the principle of the new life imparted, but that principle had now to be put into exercise. Clearly the history of the development of this life of discipline, struggle, and achievement belongs to the department of Christian ethics. It is for the dogmatist to note the fact that the benefits of Christ's redemption are appropriated to the sanctifying of the life of the believer, to indicate the nature of the process of progressive holiness, to show how the fruits of sanctification in good works are necessary to salvation, and to point out in what sense and how far holiness, as the result of sanctification, is attainable in the life of the individual believer and of the Christian community.

Sanctification is the last in order of all the operations of the Spirit in the appropriation of Christ's redemption. It can begin only on the presupposition of justification and regeneration. And on the presupposition of these it must begin immediately. The subject of sanctification must be justified and regenerated. In none but those who are such can sanctification begin, but in all who are such, without exception it must begin and be carried on.

Sanctification is everywhere in Scripture described as due to the presence and power of God working in and upon the believer in Christ. It is not a mere outward change such as a man himself, by the exercise of resolution and will, might bring about in his life. It is not mere moral improvement, which may result from education and culture. It is carried out by the same power out of which the new creature had its origin. Hence we sometimes find Christ spoken of as the principle of sanctification (1 Cor. i. 8; 2 Thess. ii. 16, 17; Eph. iv. 16; Col. ii. 19), but much more frequently this place is assigned to the Holy Spirit (John xvi. 8–11; Rom. v. 5, viii. 9–16, xv. 13, 16; 1 Cor. iii. 16, 17, xii. 3; 2 Cor. iii. 18; Gal. iv. 6; Eph. iii. 16; Tit. iii. 6; 1 Pet. 1, 2). The work of sanctification is distinctively the work of the Holy Spirit in the hearts and lives of believers. Every believer must have this Spirit, for not having this Spirit is the proof that no relation subsists between such a one and Christ (Rom. viii. 9). The Spirit's indwelling in believers in Christ is so intimate that their bodies are described as temples of the Holy Ghost (1 Cor. vi. 19), which evidently teaches that His presence in them is that of a sanctifier who undertakes to sanctify them wholly. The Spirit as the sanctifier carries on His work in the heart and life of the believer by witnessing to the fulness of grace and holiness in the glorified Saviour, making revelations of the love of God and giving assurance of His faithfulness, awakening in them faith and hope and love toward God in Christ, encouraging them in all their needs and perplexities and weakness to rely upon the wisdom and strength of God, imparting to them His own holiness to

regulate and control their walk and conversation, enabling them more and more thoroughly to consecrate themselves to God's holy service, and to imitate more and more perfectly the holy pattern of their Saviour's life. And the Spirit's presence and activity in the life of the believer is conceived of as so real and personal that any opposition shown to the life of holiness is described as a grieving of the Holy Spirit (Eph. iv. 30).

On the basis of this Scripture doctrine of sanctification, the Church theology has defined it as that work of the Holy Spirit whereby He moves and incites the justified and regenerate to continued struggle against all that is sinful and to earnest striving after all that is good, making this possible by the bestowing of his own holy spiritual powers. What is required is the new obedience of the new man. The Spirit's presence as an active principle within the believer renders it possible for him to do what otherwise would have been impossible. In so far as he yields to the influence of the Holy Spirit he is able now perfectly to keep and observe the holy law of God. There is no relaxation of that law for the believer, but the possibility of obedience lies in the promise and gift of the Spirit.

The effect of sanctification, strictly speaking, is Christian liberty, the power that the regenerate man has of following spontaneously and of his own free will the suggestion and prompting of the Divine Spirit. Whatever of good as revealed by the Spirit the unregenerate may do, that is, whatever obedience he renders, if he obeys at all, he is driven to do by fear of certain penal consequences should he refuse. It is only the regenerate, with the Holy Spirit dwelling in him as the sanctifier, who is able to give a willing obedience to the requirements of God's holy law. Good works in the life of sanctification are properly the effects of this Christian liberty. The good works of the believer are everywhere described as the consequence of abiding in Christ; there can be no abiding in Him without this result. And the law which constitutes the norm for this life of new obedience is the law of Christ,

which is the law of God rightly understood as interpreted by the Spirit, not as a mere rule of external righteousness but as a spiritual law, obedience to which is motived by love, and therefore rendered by the heart and will. As thus understood, it will readily be admitted that good works are necessary to salvation. If we understand salvation as perfect spiritual fellowship with God, we shall readily acknowledge that salvation consists, negatively, in the utter destruction and removal of sin; and positively, in a life of perfect righteousness and holiness according to the pattern of the life of God. It is only when the doctrine of good works is introduced at the wrong place, so as to make them conditions of justification and not fruits of sanctification, that their necessity can be denied. In regard to the good works of the Romish doctrine which bring reward of merit and contribute to a sinner's justification, the strong denunciation of Amsdorff, *perniciosa ad salutem*, is not unjustifiable; for according to Scripture truth, reproduced in the theology of Protestantism, faith justifies not in view of the good works which it produces, but only because of Christ with whom it unites the justified. It is the life in Christ that is the indispensable condition and only ground of salvation, and all who are ingrafted into this life of necessity bring forth good works.

The question has been much discussed, especially in recent times, as to whether perfect holiness as the result of sanctification is attainable in this life, or in what sense the holiness of the believer may claim to be called perfect. It ought to be answer enough to point out that the Scripture doctrine and the recorded life experience of the most saintly of the disciples of Christ in all ages are agreed in considering the life of sanctification as one that never brings the consciousness of full attainment, but that, on the contrary, in its progress the sense of imperfection and shortcoming is deepened, and to the very last there is still a pressing on. The idea of the possibility of actual attainment to perfection rests, either in the setting of a low and unworthy standard of attainment, as in the Church of Rome, or in a mystical exaggeration of the nature

of the union subsisting between Christ and the believer as a deification or christification, wherein the partaking of the divine nature is mistakenly understood as a complete laying aside of the human. There may, of course, be a relative perfection, in proportion as opportunities of advance and means of grace are taken advantage of. But it is misleading to call this perfection. The Christian perfection of the Methodist doctrine is not perfection, as it is in God and Christ. It is all important that the Christian should keep in view the end set before him in the gospel and the aim toward which Christ has taught him to strive. But if he confines his attention to this struggle, if he gives himself whole-heartedly to the endeavour after this attainment, his own experience will tell him that he is engaged on an eternal task. But he feels no discouragement in consequence of this discovery. He knows that his task, though endless, is no mere labour of Sisyphus. As he makes use of the grace of the Spirit put within his reach, he knows that he is making real advance toward the goal, that his spiritual life is not an alternating ebb and flow, but the regular onward flow of an advancing stream. The Spirit of God dwelling within him is enabling him to die more and more unto sin and to live unto righteousness.

V.—THE MEANS OF GRACE.

§ 75. Introductory and General.

Literature.—Kübel, "Dogmatik," in Zöckler, *Handbuch der theologischen Wissenschaften*, Nördl. 1884, ii. 748 ff. Frank, *System der christlichen Wahrheit*, ii. 311–316. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iv. 270–276. Jelf, *The Means of Grace, their Mutual Connection and Combined Use*, London, 1845. Kahnis, *System der lutherischen Dogmatik*, Leipzig, 1868, p. 460 f.

The means of grace are the ordinances and institutions appointed of God for the establishment and spread of His

kingdom of grace among men. These means are used by the individual, but by him only as a member of the Christian community. What is here described, therefore, is not the subjective beginning and development of the kingdom of God in the heart and life of the individual believer. That has been already described in the preceding section on the application of the saving work of Christ, and the appropriation of the benefits of His redemption. Here we have to do with institutions and ordinances of a public character, for the enjoying of the privileges of which a certain profession of relationship with Christ and of membership in His kingdom is the presupposition and condition.

In the means of grace we have the recognition of man's need of objective channels for the conveying to him of the objective saving work of Christ. The Protestant doctrine of the means of grace takes its place between the exaggerated supernaturalism of the Roman Catholic doctrine and the abstract spiritualism of the fanatics who depreciate all outward rites in the interest of what is purely inward, and without form or expression. It therefore denies, on the one hand, that these ordinances and institutions can of themselves confer grace, as if there were any magical power in them of producing holiness. The efficient cause of salvation is God, and God only. In the means of grace there is nothing supernatural but their divine appointment and ordination, so that God is not absolutely bound to them, but uses them to serve His gracious purposes according to His own free will. These means, though most desirable and useful, are not absolutely necessary and indispensable, so that where, from lack of opportunity, or in consequence of ignorance or invincible prejudice, their aid is not secured, the loss of salvation does not inevitably follow. Yet, on the other hand, it denies with equal emphasis that these means of grace may be treated as merely accidental and indifferent, that they may be neglected with impunity, and that ceasing to observe them will entail no appreciable spiritual loss on the individual or community. In opposition to all sectarian

fanaticism, the true Protestant teaching maintains that there is a divinely appointed order according to which God's grace is applied to men through means which owe their efficacy to God's presence and activity in them, while the divine freedom may nevertheless work immediately by His own Spirit.

As to what should be included under the title the Means of Grace, considerable diversity prevails. Very often the means of grace are said to be two: the Word and the Sacraments; whereas some would even reduce them to one by representing the sacraments as the visible Word. Several dogmatists entitle this chapter, The Church and the Means of Grace, or Ecclesiology, treating the Word and sacraments as ordinances of the Church. But the Church itself is a means of grace, and *par excellence* the means of grace as affording at once the subjects and the ordinances. We propose to treat here of the Church as a community of believers and as an institution for doctrine and discipline, and then in succession of the Word, the sacraments, and prayer, dealing with them all from the point of view of means of grace.

§ 76. The Christian Community.

Literature.—Strong, *Manual of Theology*, Edin. 1892, pp. 334–365. Hort, *The Christian Ecclesia: Early History and Early Conceptions of the Ecclesia*, London, 1897. Rothe, *Die Anfänge des christlichen Kirche*, Wittenb. 1837, bk. i.: "Verhältniss des Kirche zum Christenthum an sich betrachtet," pp. 1–138. Beyschlag, *Die christliche Gemeindeverfassung*, Harlem, 1874, espec. pp. 102–112. Köstlin, *Das Wesen der Kirche nach Lehre und Geschichte des Neuen Testamentes*, Gotha, 1872, pp. 27–72. Lemme, *Die Kirche die Gemeinschaft der Heiligen*, Heidelb. 1893.

The idea of a Christian community is rightly and immediately associated with that of the Risen and Exalted Christ. During our Lord's life on earth He made no endeavour to consolidate His followers into any organised society. Nothing was done in the way of forming a Christian

community beyond the selection of the twelve special companions, who were with Him all through His ministry and were identified with Him in all His plans and pursuits. It was only after He had gone away, to be henceforth present in and represented by the Holy Spirit, that those who believed were brought together in a community. Under the dispensation of the Spirit they were all taught to regard one another as fellow members in a religious fellowship, inasmuch as they all acknowledged the same relationship of life and love to Christ, their heavenly Head. Yet even in the earliest teaching of Jesus we find that He makes it plain that the purpose of His coming into the world was the founding of a spiritual kingdom, so that the gospel of the kingdom was the one theme of His preaching, and the illustration of the nature and principles of that kingdom was the object of all His parabolic teaching.

The kingdom of God as proclaimed by Jesus is of profound and fundamental Christian significance. It is essentially the central religious idea of Christianity. But as originally proclaimed by Christ, it does not take the form of an external corporate organisation. The spiritual idea of the kingdom of God was brought forward by our Lord in direct opposition to the exaggerated externalism of the Pharisees, whose institutionalism had driven all spirituality out of the popular religion of the day. What had primarily to be done was to overthrow this false idea of a kingdom of God that consisted in statute law and formal rules, a system of enactments and prohibitions, a theory of conduct that looked on the outward appearance and the cleanness of the outside and neglected the weightier considerations that affected heart and conscience. It was necessary that the people should be convinced that the kingdom of God cometh not with observation. Hence we are prepared for the representation made by Jesus of the kingdom of God as a purely spiritual conception. The kingdom which He came to establish was at once a kingdom of grace and of righteousness. Its establishment was immediately conditioned by redemption, and its member-

ship consisted of the redeemed. The outcome of redemption is the setting up of the kingdom of God.

The self-revelation of Jesus was the revelation of the kingdom. The kingdom of God is at hand where Jesus is. He reveals Himself as the embodiment of the principles of the kingdom. By relationship with Him His disciples become members of the kingdom of God, for by means of this relationship they are loosed from the bonds by which they had been bound to the world and redeemed from the dominion of sin. The idea of redemption, which is the restoration of all things to God in accordance with the original end and purpose of creation, is realised in the kingdom of God in which the universal and absolute authority of God is recognised. So when Jesus made Himself known to His disciples as the Son of Man who gives Himself as a ransom for men, He reveals Himself as the founder of the kingdom of grace, and by calling them to Himself He calls them into the membership of the kingdom. The gospel of the kingdom is the revelation of God's love as seen in the Person and work of Christ. And in the life of Jesus there is a perfect picture of life in the kingdom of God, so that those who know Jesus by entering into living fellowship with Him thereby enter into the life of the kingdom, and do the work of members of that kingdom. Jesus expressly declares that His works are the works of God, for the Father shows everything that He does to the Son, and the Son does all that He sees the Father do. When, therefore, the Spirit of Jesus is within a man, the kingdom of God is within him, and for him the kingdom of God is come. In order to prevent misunderstanding, however, it ought here to be observed, that though the kingdom of God is represented in the preaching of Jesus in respect of its beginning and first appearing in the world as purely inward, He yet shows that in its development it becomes gradually more and more visible, that it is destined bit by bit to attract the attention of and gain recognition from the world, and to be at last acknowledged as a power which has

to be reckoned with. This idea is most distinctly set forth in the parables of the mustard seed and the leaven. In His teaching of the disciples, too, He shows that the concealment and secrecy which He enjoined upon them during His own personal ministry were not to characterise the proceedings of His followers under the dispensation of the Spirit. His own ascending to the place of power was to mark the constitution of a regular community which should bear His name and openly profess submission to His law.

This kingdom of God, which Jesus proclaimed, is not to be without any qualification identified with the Church. But the distinction which some have sought to make between the kingdom and the Church is evidently grounded on a mistaken notion of the teaching of gospels and epistles. It is assumed, not only by Ritschl and some of the members of his school but also by some who have made the cry of a return to Christ the turning-point of their teaching, that the idea of the kingdom of God proclaimed by Jesus, and the idea of the Church set forth by the apostles, and especially by Paul, are not in the same line, and that the development of the one is not the same as the development of the other. Broadly stated, the distinction sought to be made is that between a community based upon a common brotherhood of love and a society organised for worship and the orderly administration of ordinances. It may readily be admitted that Jesus in His preaching of the kingdom laid almost exclusive stress upon the requirement of inwardness and spirituality, in opposition, as we have seen, to the formalism and institutionalism prevalent in His day. But that the arrangement for regular worship and the dispensation of ordinances was foreign to His idea, or, in other words, that in the kingdom which He preached He presented an ideal ethical society, excluding the religious element, is in direct conflict with the whole drift of His teaching and with the whole attitude of His life. While, on the other hand, it is quite evident that the apostolic idea of the Church is in nothing antagonistic to that of the kingdom, but is simply that primitive, evangelical idea

developed in the direction in which our Lord Himself indicated that development must take place. Besides this, it ought to be remembered that in the Gospels our Lord speaks not only of the kingdom, but also of the Church, and that evidently without any consciousness that the idea of the Church was essentially different from that of the kingdom. He speaks about the founding of His Church as that for which His preaching of the kingdom had been the preparation, and declares that the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. In this prophetic view of the triumph of His Church He evidently implies its eternal continuance. This takes away all plausibility from the attempt of Kaftan to represent the Church as the kingdom of God in the present stage of its realisation. He would make the period of the Church the time between the exaltation of Christ and the end of the world. It is evident that such a distinction will not stand from the point of view of our Lord's own teaching.

The Christian community of the New Testament is the undeveloped beginning of the Christian Church, that out of which the Church arose and that which of necessity must develop into the Church. The Church is simply the organised community. The Christian community consists of all in whom the Spirit of Christ dwells and rules. What all the members have in common is their interest in Christ. They are those who have been with Jesus, and who therefore continue to proclaim and spread the teachings and the principles of life which they had received from Him. As He was, so are they in the world. Not only individually, but as a community, they are His witnesses among men.

§ 77. Idea and Organisation of the Church.

Literature.—Litton, *The Church of Christ in its Idea, Attributes, and Ministry*, London, 1851, pp. 29–355. Hatch, *Organisation of the Early Christian Churches*, London, 1881. Bannerman, *The Scripture Doctrine of the Church*, Edin. 1887: "Christ's Teaching regarding the Church," pp. 163–228, 243–266. Hodge, *The Church and its Polity*, Edin. 1879, espec.

pp. 5–38. Allen, *Christian Institutions*, Edin. 1898, bk. i.: "Organisation of the Church," pp. 5–278. Law, Works, 1892: "Third Letter to Bishop of Bangor," vol. i. pp. 39–113, "Nature of the Church." Denney, *Studies in Theology*, pp. 173–201. Binnie, *The Church*, Edin. 1882, pp. 1–51. Köstlin, "Kirche," in Herzog, *Encyclopaedie*,[2] vii. 685–718. Kaftan, *Dogmatik*, 570–592. Seeberg, *Studien zur Geschichte des Begriffes der Kirche* (especially idea of visible and invisible Church), Erlangen, 1885.

The idea of the Church as the organised Christian community is present in the New Testament, as might be expected, rather in references to and descriptions of historically existing churches, than in didactic exposition and scientific elaboration of principles. The apostles speak ordinarily, though not exclusively, of particular local churches. In the later apostolic writings we do undoubtedly find references to the Church as an ideal whole, if not an organised and corporate body. But from the very form which the apostolic writings assume as letters addressed to local churches, ordinarily occasioned by special circumstances, what is said about the Church is commonly determined by the condition of the particular community to which the communication is sent. This, however, does not entitle us to say that in the New Testament we have no doctrine of the Church. It is not in accordance with the method of divine revelation to give any systematic statement of doctrine; but in regard to the Church, just as in regard to any other truth of Scripture, we have the historical reports of which the doctrine of the Church is the necessary presupposition. Even in the Old Testament the idea of the Church is clearly present, though only in its most general outlines. The Israelitish people, as the people of God, was regarded as a theocratic community, and was designated the congregation of Jehovah. And the word used in the Old Testament to describe the people as an assembly or as an organised community under direct divine rule was represented in the Greek translation by the two terms, synagogue

and ecclesia, which subsequently were appropriated respectively by Jews and Christians to designate the congregation or local community of worshippers of God. The Christian ecclesiæ of the New Testament had a simple organisation, but one sufficient for all the needs of the community that had then arisen, secured for them by the appointment of bishops or presbyters. The duties to be discharged by these officers are more or less fully detailed in the Pastoral Epistles, and may be summed up under the two heads of doctrine and discipline.

In the Protestant doctrine of the Church, prominence is given to the Headship of Christ as the religious principle constituting the Church, which is made up of those who profess faith in Him. Members of the Church become such by reason of their relation to Christ as believers. Hence the Church is defined as the community or congregations of saints, in which the pure gospel is preached and the sacraments rightly administered. This definition of the Church as, on the one hand, a community of saints, and, on the other, an outward institution for the preaching of the Word and the administration of the sacraments, brought again into view the old distinctions occasioned by the Donatist and similar controversies. It seemed that there were here two different ideas of the Church set alongside of each other—the Church of true believers, and the Church of professed believers, who submit to the outward ordinances of the Church. Hence arose the distinction of the Church visible and invisible. This distinction is made in the usual way in the Scottish Confession of 1560, while in the English Articles of 1571 the visible Church is defined in terms almost identical with those given above, and no reference is made to the invisible Church. In the Westminster Confession of 1646, however, the distinction is clearly stated and the twofold idea explicitly defined. "The catholic or universal Church, *which is invisible*, consists of the whole number of the elect that have been, are, or shall be gathered into one under Christ, the Head thereof; and is the spouse,

the body, the fulness of Him that filleth all in all. *The visible Church*, which is also catholic or universal under the gospel (not confined to one nation as under the law), consists of all those throughout the world that profess the true religion, together with their children; and is the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ, the house and family of God, out of which there is no ordinary possibility of salvation" (chap. xxv. 1, 2). With this may be compared the clear exposition of Calvin (*Institutio*, iv. 1, 7): "Ac tunc quidem non tantum sanctos, qui in terra habitant, comprehendit, sed electos omnes qui aborigine mundi fuerunt. Sæpe autem ecclesiæ nomine universam hominum multitudinem in orbe diffusam designat, quæ unum se Deum et Christum colere profitetur: Baptismo initiator in ejus fidem: Cœnæ participatione unitatem in vera doctrina et caritatem testatur: consensionem habet in Verbo Domini, atque ad ejus prædicationem ministerium conservat a Christo institutum. In hac autem plurimi sunt permixti hypocritæ, qui nihil Christi habent præter titulum et speciem: plurimi ambitiosi, avari, invidi, maledici, aliqui impurioris vitæ, qui ad tempus tolerantur: vel quia legitimo judicio convinci nequeunt, vel quia non semper ea viget disciplinæ severitas quæ debebat. Quemadmodum ergo nobis invisibilem, solius Dei oculis conspicuam ecclesiam credere necesse est, ita hanc, quæ respectu hominum ecclesia dicitur, observare ejusque communionem colere jubemur." The distinction really points, not to two kinds of Churches, nor even to the content of ideal and actual or empirical, but rather only to one Church under the two moments of its true nature and finite manifestation. In making this distinction, Protestantism sought to find the proper mean between the magical and supernatural externalism of the Romish idea and the extravagant depreciation of all outward rites, characteristic of fanatical and sectarian spiritualism. The invisible Church, that is, the Church according to its true inner nature, is conceived of as possessing really the distinguishing notes of the Church—one, holy, catholic, true, in which alone is salvation. The

Catholic dogma assigns those notes to the visible Church. But these are evidently only partially applicable to the visible Church, that is to say, only in so far as through it the Holy Spirit conveys the benefits of Christ's work to men. The members of the invisible Church, to which those notes apply, are true Christians, true believers. Others, who only belong to the organisation and community which bears those notes externally, are simply mixed up with the true members in a way that is inevitable in the Church on earth. The wicked do not and cannot belong to the true Church, even though outwardly they are enrolled as members of it. The invisible Church exists here and now, yet not by itself, but only in the visible. Ecclesia invisibilis non extra visibilem est quærenda, sed illa huic est inclusa. We therefore do not define the true Church simply as invisible. Its individual members are as such visible, but the society or community which embraces them is invisible, because it is not external. It cannot be visible or external, for the only uniting bond is the Holy Spirit, who binds believers together in the body of Christ. The true Church as a supersensible reality, an object of faith, is necessarily invisible.

In the empirical organisation of the Church, ordinances are administered with a view to further the coming of the kingdom of God. In the administration of these ordinances the Church is "the mother of believers," supplying nourishment for the life of faith, and affording means and opportunity for growth in grace. It secures for its members those supplies by bringing them into personal contact with the Holy Spirit as the source of all blessing. According to the true word of Schleiermacher, the fellowship of believers with the Church is brought about by their fellowship with Christ, not their fellowship with Christ through their fellowship with the Church.

The distinction between the Church militant and the Church triumphant is not one of great scientific or dogmatic importance. The Church militant is the Church on earth engaged in conflict with foes spiritual and material, the devil,

the world, and the flesh. The Church triumphant is the Church in heaven, the company of the glorified, completed and freed from all opposition, the perfected kingdom of God. It is certainly wrong to limit the application of the term Church to the Church militant. Seeing that the Church takes its origin from the exalted Saviour, who is its heavenly Head, it is really in the idea of the *ecclesia triumphans* that the full idea of the Church is reached, thus the end is secured for which the gifts of the Spirit are given to members of the Church on earth.

§ 78. Church Discipline.

Literature.—Bannerman, *Scripture Doctrine of the Church*, pp. 176 f., 201 ff. Allen, *Christian Institutions*, Edin. 1898, pp. 409–426. Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik* (1885), ii. 376–378. Law, Works, 1892, vol. i. pp. 113–132, "Church Authority." Steitz, art. "Schlüsselgewalt," in Herzog, *Encyclopaedie*,[2] xiii. 573–591. Buchrucker, art. "Kirchenzucht," in Herzog,[2] viii. 11–16. Otto Ritschl, *Cyprian von Karthago und die Verfassung der Kirche*, Gött. 1885, pp. 186–203. Binnie, *The Church*, Edin. 1882, pp. 98–104. Strong, *Systematic Theology* (1893), 516 f.

The exercise of discipline in the widest sense of the term is the special function for the discharge of which the Christian Church exists. The preaching of the word and the dispensation of ordinances in the communion of saints have in view the spiritual culture of the individuals composing that communion, and the discipline of their lives in self-denial and the love of God. Hence it was from the very first recognised as the duty of the Church as an organisation to exercise discipline over its members in order that this spiritual culture might be secured. The *potestas ecclesiastica* is really the power belonging to Christ, but conferred by Him upon His Church. From Christ also is the appointment of Church officers, who, under Christ's commission, represent the Church, and in the name of Christ exercise the functions, the discharge of which Christ has

committed to it. Hence the power of the keys belongs to the office-bearers of the Church, not as a *sacerdotium* coming in as a mediating order between Christ and believers, but as a *ministerium* serving under Christ and representing Him in His service. The *potestas divinum* in Protestant theology is understood in a comprehensive sense of all Church power, so as to include the *potestas ordinis* as well as the *potestas jurisdictionis*, that is, the right of preaching the gospel and administering the sacraments, as well as that of exercising discipline in the narrower sense of the word. The power given by Christ to His Church to bind or to loose consists only in the preaching of the gospel, proclaiming from the word what are the conditions of receiving the forgiveness of sins, and conveying the assurance of this forgiveness upon the fulfiment of these conditions. The *disciplina ecclesiastica* is, according to the Reformed doctrine, one of the notes of the Church, by means of which, in conjunction with the preaching of the word and the dispensation of the sacraments, the spiritual health and well-being of the community is secured and maintained. For this purpose, in the Reformed order of Church government, there are elders or presbyters, as well as pastors and preachers, on whom the duty of carrying out this discipline is specially laid.

The purpose of Church discipline is twofold: the immediate spiritual good of the individual member dealt with, and the general spiritual culture of the community. The judgment passed on the individual had in view the saving of that individual from condemnation in the final judgment (1 Cor. v. 5). That this is a principal purpose in the exercise of discipline is also shown by the detailed instruction given by Christ to His disciples as to the gradual patient way in which He would have them proceed in dealing with an offending brother (Matt. xviii. 15–17). If by private exhortation and remonstrance he can be convinced of his fault, so that he repents of it and forsakes it, the latter is gained, the object is secured in his penitence, which is his salvation. But even in the case of his stubborn refusal

to acknowledge his fault and repent of it, rendering an appeal to the judgment of the Church necessary, and ending in exclusion from its membership, the offender is to be treated as an outsider in order that a yearning after lost privileges may be awakened in him, and a spirit of repentance and faith developed within him, which shall bring the wanderer back. He has been put out because his conduct and spirit showed that he was not really within; and if in no other way he can be made to see that he is really without, public exclusion must be tried as a means of showing him this. But besides the benefit thus contemplated in the case of the individual dealt with by discipline, the advantage of the whole community is considered in the exercise of this Church function. It is essential to the very existence of the Church, that it should hold up a high standard of moral excellence before its own members and before the world. Laxity of discipline implies the absence of any keen appreciation of holiness and righteousness in the life; and failure to understand that life in the Church as distinguished from life in the world is the imitation of Christ in accordance with the holy perfection of God Himself. Hence carelessness in the discharge of this duty is injurious alike to the spiritual life of the members of the Church, and to the influence of the Church as a missionary agency in the world.

In the earlier years of the Church's history, the idea of the discipline of the Church was kept very prominently in view, and a system of discipline was elaborated which seems to us now not only rigorous in an eminent degree, but also in its essential character formal and legalistic. In judging of the penitential discipline of the early Church, it is necessary to remember what the moral condition was of that society out of which the membership of the young Christian Church was drawn. The condition of society in the world in that age will simply account for, though it may not justify, the extremes of Montanism and Novatianism. The desire of the Church was to secure as pure a membership as was possible, while avoiding the risks against which

Christ gives warning in His parable of the tares of the field. The Church kept a sharp eye upon the conduct of its members, and when that conduct in any individual case proved the absence of the Spirit of Christ, the offender convicted of the offence was unhesitatingly excluded. It was the error of enthusiasts, often sincere and deeply spiritually-minded men, grieved in heart at the formalism and externalism growing up in the Church, to endeavour to go beyond this, and to demand from the membership of the organised Christian community, not only a sound profession of faith and an outwardly correct and blameless life, but purity of heart and real surrender of spirit and will to God. The demand was made for an absolutely pure communion, through the exercise of a judgment by the Church upon the secrets of the heart, which is the strictly preserved prerogative of God. It is well that from time to time protests should be raised by extremists within the Church against latitudinarianism, especially in the department of the Christian life, in order that the ideal of the Church's moral and spiritual perfection may not be forgotten or pass out of view. But it must always be remembered that it is the nursery for young and spiritually immature Christians, who must not be driven out or discouraged, but must be cared for and helped forward by the means placed at the Church's disposal by its heavenly Head.

§ 79. The Word of God.

Literature. — Müller, "Das Verhältniss zwischen der Wirksamkeit des heiligen Geistes und dem Gnadenmittel des göttlichen Wortes," in *Dogmatische Abhandlungen*, Bremen, 1870, pp. 127–277. Lipsius, *Lehrbuch der evangelisch-protestantischen Dogmatik* (1876), 712–719. Grimm, *Institutio Theologiæ Dogmaticæ* (1869), 434–427. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, pp. 400–415. Kaftan, *Dogmatik*, 596–602. Philippi, *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*, v. ii. 1–67. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, iii. 466–485. Hase, *Evangelisch-protestantische Dogmatik*,[6] Leipzig, 1870, pp. 323–361. Rothe, *Dogmatik* (1870), ii. 288–297. Kahnis, *System der lutheranischen Dogmatik*,

Leipzig, 1868, pp. 361–363. Gottschick, "Wort Gottes," in Herzog, *Encyclopaedie*,[2] xvii. 326–338. Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, bk. iii. chap. i., and chap. ii. §§ 1–7.

"The Word," says Lipsius, "is the most general and most indispensable means of grace in the Christian community. Not only the Reformed, but Luther also, repeatedly declare that in certain circumstances man may be saved without a sacrament, but not without the Word." As a means of grace the word is regarded from a different point of view than when it is considered as the means of divine revelation. It is now conceived of as the instrument whereby the Holy Spirit provides spiritual nourishment and edification to those who have accepted the divine call. It is not with the *principium cognoscendi* that we have here to do, but with the *medium salutis*. It is, however, in both cases the same Holy Scripture.

As means of grace, the Word is distinguished as consisting of two parts, law and gospel. This division by no means corresponds to the dispensational division into Old and New Testament. For this division is not of the same interest in the treatment of the word as a means of grace as in the treatment of the word as a source of revelation. The division of law and gospel is one that applies to the Old Testament as well as to the New. The law comprehends everything in Holy Scripture which is a revelation of God's will in the form of command and prohibition. The gospel is the proclamation in the word of the reconciliation of God to man, and of the redemption He has wrought in His grace by Christ. The law seeks to awaken contrition in men on account of their sins; the gospel seeks to awaken in them saving faith. The use of the law as a means of grace is partly preparatory, inasmuch as the law, by threatening outward penalties, may restrain man from the committing of wicked offences, and further, as it awakens conscience and makes sin appear sinful, so that help and deliverance are sought in Christ (Gal. iii. 24). But, strictly speaking, as a means of grace the word regarded as law operates within the Church among those who are believers

in Christ. Just because they still live in the world, the use of the law is ever necessary in the lives of the regenerate to extinguish every evil desire that arises, and to secure obedience to all ethical requirements. The law sets before them and keeps before them a perfect exhibition of what the will of God concerning them is in regard to the ordering of their life and conduct. This law of God is revealed in measure in reason and conscience, as these are enlightened in the new man by the indwelling Spirit of God; but the revelation is fullest and clearest when mediated by Holy Scripture. For Christians the moral law is at once defined and enforced by the spiritual exposition of it given by Christ. The gospel, again, as the means of grace has been in operation in the world as long as the law. The Protevangelium, whether we speak of it as a *fœdus gratiæ* or not, was already issued in paradise. The whole gospel is summed up in the promise of grace. In faith resting upon this promise Old and New Testament believers obtained possession of salvation.

It is characteristic of Christianity as pre-eminently the spiritual religion, that it should give the first place among means of grace to the word of God. Our Lord represents the word as the seed of the heavenly kingdom, and it is faith in His word as that of the Son of God that secures eternal life (Matt. xiii. 3–9; John v. 24). With Peter and Paul the word is the means of regeneration and salvation (1 Pet. i. 23; Rom. x. 14). The contents of Scripture as means of grace correspond to and are summed up in the revelation which God makes of Himself in Christ; but this not as a matter of the communication of doctrinal knowledge, but as a spiritual impartation in the life and experience of believers.

A highly important question is that of the relation of the Holy Spirit to the word in the efficacious use of the word for purposes of spiritual edification. It is evident that we must not conceive of the word as something existing apart, with independent spiritual efficacy inherent in it, and over against it and separate from it the Spirit of God as another influence or power; but that in some way these two must be

regarded as working together as one, the word in its contents being the vehicle through which the Spirit works. This truth was taught with great accuracy and sobriety by the older theologians of the Reformation, and continued to be so taught in the Reformed theology. The inner and the outer word are not identified; and though it is held that the inner word is not ordinarily given without the outer, yet this does not happen of necessity, but an immediate influence of the Holy Spirit on the spirit of the man is added to the outward word. Apart from the Spirit's working on the heart of man, the word has no power. The word has spiritual efficacy only as the instrument of the Spirit. In opposition to this moderate and rational doctrine, some later Lutherans have developed a doctrine of the real presence of the Holy Spirit in and under the word, so that though the word does not operate without the Spirit, yet the word of necessity carries with it the efficacy of the Spirit. When rigidly and logically carried out, this doctrine involves the idea of an incarnation of the Spirit in the word. In contrast to such extremes we find the position taken by Calvin a most reasonable and thoroughly consistent one. He insists upon the necessity of the activity of the Holy Spirit in every work of grace in the hearts of men. "In vain were light offered to the blind, did not that Spirit of understanding open the intellectual eye; so that He Himself may properly be called the key by which the treasures of the heavenly kingdom are unlocked, and His illumination, the eye of the mind by which we are enabled to see; hence Paul so highly commends the ministry of the Spirit (2 Cor. iii. 6), since teachers would cry aloud to no purpose, did not Christ, the internal teacher, by means of His Spirit, draw to Himself those who are given Him of His Father" (*Instit.* iii. 1, 4). But while thus stating strongly the need of the Spirit's presence and power, Calvin also insists vigorously on the importance, the indispensableness, of the word as a means of grace. "There is an inseparable relation between faith and the word, and these can no more be disconnected from each other than rays of light from the sun.

The same word is the basis on which faith rests and is sustained. Declining from it, it falls. Take away the word, therefore, and no faith will remain" (*Instit.* iii. 2, 6). The importance and power of the word as the utterance of the mind of the Spirit are so great that the simple outward manifestation of it ought to produce faith, and would do so were it not for our spiritual blindness and perversity. But our spiritual darkness is so dense, and we are so inclined to vanity, that, but for the Spirit's illumination of our spirits, the word would have no effect upon us (see *Instit.* iii. 2, 33). He also, in another place (iv. 14, 11), illustrates the need of the Spirit's activity by the comparison of wild, uncultivated land, which must be broken up and laboured upon before seed can be sown in it with any hope of a harvest.

The main point here, theologically and practically, is the certainty that the Holy Spirit accomplishes the salvation of man by means of the word. The power that is in the word is not magical or physical; nor, on the other hand, is it that merely of a moral influence. It is at once the Spirit's work and the Spirit's instrument. It was that it might be used by Him as His instrument in the work of man's salvation that the Spirit produced the word; and so it is efficacious only when it is used for this purpose, and that in the hand of the Spirit Himself.

It is of the utmost importance that care should be taken to avoid assigning anything like a magical power to the word, or so conceiving of it as to imply that there lay in it any inherent spiritual efficacy. The Spirit is not so bound to the word that whenever the word comes in an outward fashion, so that it is heard or read, spiritual power accompanies it to bless or to curse. It cannot be said without qualification that wherever the word goes, each individual who reads or hears it experiences spiritual gain or spiritual loss. As Kaftan has well said: "One is not entitled to conclude regarding everyone into whose hand the Scripture has been placed that he understands it and has received an impression from it." There are certain conditions which must be present

and operative before this can be affirmed. The reader or hearer, if he is to have any real spiritual impression from the word, must have some general understanding of Christian truth, and be disposed to receive the message of the word. But there are influences of the Spirit that are in God's hand. And so it depends upon the will of God in giving these influences of His Spirit, and not merely upon the external use of the word, whether any spiritual effects will be produced in the hearts of men.

§ 80. The Sacraments in General.

Literature.—Candlish, *The Christian Sacraments*, pp. 11–44. Paget, "Sacraments," in *Lux Mundi*[10] (1890), pp. 405–433. Scudamore, "Sacraments," in *Dict. of Christ. Antiquities*, ii. 1831 f. Steitz, "Sakrament," in Herzog, *Encyclopaedie*,[2] xiii. 264–299. Allan, *Christian Institutions*, 554–557. Hatch, *Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church*, London, 1890, Lect. x.: "The Influence of the Mysteries upon Christian Usages," pp. 283–309. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, iii. 485–525. Owen, *Dogmatic Theology*, London, 1887, pp. 383–397. Strauss, *Die christliche Glaubenslehre*, Tüb. 1840, vol. ii. pp. 511–526. Rothe, *Dogmatik* (1870), ii. 297–306.

The word sacrament is the old Latin translation of the Greek μυστήριον, which in the New Testament and among the earlier Fathers was made use of freely with regard to doctrines and actions in which they saw any specially rich and profound significance. The word sacrament, however, in the Western Church soon came to be specially appropriated to those distinctly ordained rites in which, by certain signs and actions, expression was given to profound religious truths. In the sacraments we have brought together the sign and the thing signified, the visible sign, *signum sacramenti*, and the invisible spiritual reality, *res sacramenti*, and those two are brought into relation with one another by the divine words of institution. The purpose of the sacrament is twofold: on the one hand, it is intended to form a bond of union in the membership of an ecclesiastical organisation;

and, on the other hand, and specially, it is intended to impart the grace to which the outward element in the sacrament points.

The New Testament, as might be expected, gives much greater prominence to the word than to the sacraments as means of grace. Even Augustine, at a time when exaggerated conceptions of the importance and significance of the sacraments were spreading, spoke of the sacrament as only a special form of the word, the *verbum visibile*. That the word is the more spiritual mode of communication between God and man is evident, and so we may fairly assume that if man had retained his original condition in which the spiritual dominated the material, the word of God would have been the only mode of communication suitable or required. In the sacraments, God suits His communications to the materialised condition and surroundings of fallen man. A communication which takes visible form appeals to man in his present state as a communication by a purely spiritual and invisible instrument like the word cannot do. So in the sacraments, God speaks to man by visible signs. It is also evident that the great needs of man, in regard to which he requires instruction, and in connection with which he longs for confirmation and assurance, are the forgiveness of sins and the subsequent gift of grace to strengthen and establish and carry on the new life. Corresponding to this twofold need of man, we have the two sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper.

A very important question arises as to the manner in which divine power attaches itself to the outward and visible sign in the sacrament. There are those, on the one hand, who regard the sacraments simply as organs or instruments by which the divine power operates, so that their power is purely objective, and their effect is entirely independent of the spirit and disposition of the receiver, and is conditioned only by the intention of the administrator. There are those, on the other hand, who maintain that the believing use of the sacraments is an essential condition to their conveying

of grace to the receiver. In the one case, the sacraments are understood to convey grace *ex opere operato*; in the other, *ex opere operante*. Thomas Aquinas may be taken as the representative of the former view, and Duns Scotus of the latter. Aquinas held that the sacrament is an instrumental course of grace, having in it an instrumental power of bringing about a sacramental effect, which power it requires for the benediction of Christ. Scotus maintained that the sacrament is not itself the cause of grace, except by a certain concomitance, and that the only power in the sacrament is the divine power accompanying it and producing the sacramental effect. The Scotist doctrine as contrasted with the Thomist is essentially that of Protestantism. The Thomist doctrine became the doctrine of the Romish Church as finally elaborated by the Council of Trent: "Si quis dixerit, per ipsa novæ legis sacramenta ex opere operato non conferre gratiam, sed solam fidem divinæ permissionis ad gratiam consequendam sufficere, anathema sit." Bellarmin modified this doctrine so far as to say that in children, but not in adults, the want of faith and a good disposition did not prevent the obtaining the grace of the sacrament. Faith and repentance he regards as conditions which, if wanting, will prevent the active course of sacramental grace from becoming operative. And so he compares the production of their effects by the sacraments to fire, which causes combustion whenever it is brought into contact with the proper materials. The doctrine of intention on the part of the administering priest is the transference of all subjective activity from the receiver to the dispenser, on whose intention the validity of the sacrament depends. It is to be observed that it is his intention to give or not to give the sacrament, and not his moral and religious condition or character, that is referred to. Donatists, and later revolters against externalising ecclesiasticism, had maintained that if the officiating priest were unworthy, the sacraments which he dispensed would not be efficacious. Protestantism is not indifferent to the character of the administrator, but

rejects equally the Romish doctrine of intention and the sectarian view, that want of personal piety on the part of the minister invalidates the sacrament to those who believingly receive it. As Winer puts it (*Confessions of Christendom* (1873), p. 248): "As, according to our fundamental principles, the sacraments have not their effect *ex opere operantis*, we may say in *this* sense that they effect their purpose *ex opere operato*. And on account of its ambiguity, Protestants have always avoided the term." On this whole subject the Reformed doctrine is very admirably and clearly expressed in the Westminster Confession (xxvii. 3): "The grace which is exhibited in or by the sacraments, rightly used, is not conferred by any power in them; neither doth the efficacy of a sacrament depend upon the piety or intention of him that doth administer it, but upon the work of the Spirit and the word of institution; which contains, together with a precept authorising the use thereof, a promise of benefit to worthy receivers.

Zwingli, who was followed by the Socinians and Arminians, regarded the sacraments simply as visible signs, and not as pledges of divine grace. Dr. Hodge has remarked that Zwingli says nothing of the sacraments that may not be said of the word, and that his reasoning if valid, would prove that neither word nor sacraments are means of grace. Strauss very cleverly characterises Zwingli's position by saying that he regards it as the function of the sacraments to assure the Church rather than ourselves of our faith. The sacraments in this view are simply badges of outward profession, tokens by which we are recognised by others as members of the Christian Church.

On the question of the number of the sacraments, opinion varied greatly, so that by one or another all numbers have been proposed from two to twelve. The occasion of the diversity of view was the uncertainty that prevailed as to the proper definition of the duties of a sacrament. The use of a term which had been applied to all sorts of mysteries in doctrine and action encouraged a loose and indefinite

notion of the range of ordinances which might rank as sacraments. The Greek term μυστήριον is applied by Paul in Eph. v. 32 to marriage, and the word *sacramentum* is used by some of the Fathers for the sign of the cross. The Areopagite names six sacraments: Baptism, the Lord's Supper, Anointing, the Consecration of Priests, Monks, and the Dead. All through the early ages of the Church, however, Baptism and the Lord's Supper as sacraments held a rank by themselves beyond all other rites. John of Damascus, for example, recognises only these two. Petrus Damiani, in the eleventh century, enumerated as many as twelve. In the following century, Petrus Lombardus enumerated seven: Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, Orders, and Marriage. This has continued to be the accepted doctrine of the Romish Church. Still Alexander of Hales speaks of the two sacraments instituted by Christ; and even in Thomas Aquinas and other writers who adopt the view of the seven sacraments, quite a special prominence is given to Baptism and the Lord's Supper. Dr. Paget, from the High Church Anglican point of view, seeks (*Lux Mundi*, pp. 424–426) to extend the use of the word sacrament to all ordinances in which God's love meets man's need at point after point in his probation. Instead of the sacramental principle, true Protestantism, taking its stand on the simple doctrine of the New Testament, gives prominence to the immediate operation and efficacy of the Holy Spirit, and regards this Spirit as working in the sacraments as He does through the word. As channels through which the Holy Spirit brings His grace sacramentally to men, we can only think of those two ordinances which were immediately instituted and appointed by Christ Himself.

§ 81. Baptism.

Literature.—Martensen, *Die christliche Taufe*, Hamburg, 1843, especially "Die Taufe als Kirchenstiftendes Sacrament,"

pp. 5–21, and "Kindertaufe," pp. 22–35. Bannerman, *Scripture Doctrine of the Church*, Edin. 1887, pp. 231–237, 364–375, 502–511. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iv. 277–302. Althaus, *Die Heilsbedeutung der Taufe im Neuen Testament*, Gütersloh, 1897. Philippi, *Kirehliche Glaubenslehre*, v. 11, 68–243. Allen, *Christian Institutions*, Edin. 1898, pp. 399–409. Stanley, *Christian Institutions*,[5] London, 1890, pp. 1–37. Marriott, "Baptism," in *Dict. of Chr. Antiquities*, i. 155–172. Wall, *History of Infant Baptism* (1705), Oxford, 1881. Dale, *Classic, Judaic, Johannine, and Christic and Patristic Baptism*, 4 vols. Philadelphia, 1867–1874. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, pp. 520–528. Mozley, *Primitive Doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration*, London, 1856. Cunningham, *Historical Theology*, Edin. 1870, vol. ii. pp. 133–142: "Baptismal Regeneration." Owen, *Dogmatic Theology*, London, 1887, pp. 358–366.

Baptism is properly the initiatory rite by which, according to divine appointment, the recipient is enrolled in the membership of the Christian Church, and admitted to the enjoyment of its privileges. In baptism God gives assurance to the individual of His will to bring to Him the blessings of His salvation. It is properly the sacrament of repentance and forgiveness of sins. It speaks of cleansing from sin, and of the consequent moral and spiritual cleanness which is acceptable before God.

The ordinance was instituted by the Risen Saviour, and the words of institution are given in Matt. xxviii. 18–20. Our Lord enjoined upon His disciples the observance of the ordinance, and indicated quite clearly its purpose as the rite which gives admission to the Christian community. The narratives of the Acts of the Apostles, and occasional allusions in the Epistles of Paul, show that it was faithfully observed by all the apostles without exception, and that in the Apostolic Church no other way of entrance into the Church was recognised but by baptism. It was acknowledged by all as an institution of Christ, and was observed in obedience to His command. The Baptismal Formula, as given in this passage, is of special interest as constituting the earliest and simplest form of the Christian confession of faith. It is the

first perfect statement of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. There is the one God, not three names but only one; and yet in this one name there are three Persons distinguished, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. It would seem that even in the Apostolic Church (Acts ii. 38, x. 48, xix. 5), baptism was administered simply in the name of Jesus; but this, no doubt, was entirely in the spirit of the original institution, inasmuch as the accompanying preaching had already shown how Jesus could not be thought of or spoken of as by Himself, but always and only as the sent of the Father and the sender of the Spirit.

In respect of form, Christian baptism may be regarded as modelled upon the baptism of John, and more remotely, perhaps, upon the baptism of proselytes among the Jews. Proselyte baptism was in all probability an adaptation of the old Levitical purifications to the special circumstances of later times. When John administered baptism to all who came to him, he intimated plainly that he regarded all alike, Jews as well as Gentiles, as in need of the same cleansing by repentance and the putting away of the pollution of sin. But in the Old Testament there is no rite of baptism. The Old Testament ordinance with which Christian baptism has any affinity is circumcision. But John himself compares his baptism with that of Jesus, and points out the difference. His baptism is a mere water baptism, while that of Christ is with the Holy Ghost and with fire (Matt. iii. 11). In this way the communication of the Spirit is associated with the administration of Christian baptism. And this is in keeping with the whole New Testament doctrine of baptism. We are baptized, according to Paul, by one Spirit into one body. It represents our being made members of the body of Christ, which is a living body by reason of the Spirit of God and of Christ dwelling in it. Baptism is essentially the sacrament of regeneration in the wide sense, which includes everything necessary to salvation, especially and pre-eminently, repentance, and forgiveness of sins. By baptism we are introduced to and made sharers of the full salvation that is in Christ.

Gradually the false views that arose in the early Church about the sacraments generally led to the introduction of exaggerated notions as to the nature and efficacy of baptism. It came to be considered as necessary to salvation, and even as necessarily conferring grace and bringing salvation. It was regarded as possessing a magical power, so that it brought the forgiveness and removal of original sin. As it soon became the current belief that baptism washed away all previous sins, however accumulated, and also that mortal sins after baptism were unpardonable, baptism was often postponed till death was approaching. Yet protests against the magical view of the efficacy of baptism, as though it was altogether independent of the spiritual disposition of the receiver, were raised from time to time. Jerome said that those who did not receive baptism with full faith, received not the Spirit but water. In the Reformed churches the spiritual significance of baptism was distinctly insisted upon. And in keeping with this spiritual doctrine, the notion of the necessity of baptism was modified, so that not the privation, but the contempt of baptism was held to bring condemnation.

In regard to the subjects of baptism, it is evident that not only in the Apostolic Church but also in the ages immediately following, the majority of the cases of baptism must have been those of adults, who received the ordinance upon profession of their personal faith. It is sometimes argued that in the baptism of families referred to in the New Testament, we must assume that children, at least in some cases, must have been included. But it may fairly be objected, that only on the assumption that baptism of children was customary could it be conclusively argued from the baptism of households that the children were included. It ought to be noted, however, that there is nothing in the New Testament narratives that can at all support the position that baptism of children did not take place in New Testament times. Oosterzee, however, has shrewdly pointed out that we find no trace of apostles baptizing adults whose parents were already Christians. The most convincing and

satisfactory arguments in favour of infant baptism are derived from the place given in Christianity to the family and the Christian education and culture of children. It was only after a Christian community was formed, consisting of believers, that the question as to the standing of the children could arise. It is the duty of Christian parents to train up their children for God as children whom God claims for His own. At this point we see the perfect correspondence between circumcision as the initiatory sacrament of the old covenant and baptism as occupying a similar position in the new. In either case the rite must be practised in order to secure admission to the membership of the community. "The church," says Dorner, "cannot be poorer than the synagogue." What was true under the old dispensation was true under the new. The promise, says Peter, is to you and to your children. It should also be observed, that in the institution of the ordinance by Christ, the order of His injunctions implies the necessity of teaching the baptized, and is applicable to children as well as adults; while the command to make disciples of nations, who then are to receive baptism, seems meaningless if children are excluded. In this connection, also, our Lord's commendation of the spirit of children and His bestowing His special blessing upon them are not to be overlooked.

The connection of baptism with regeneration has naturally enough been the subject of much discussion and of elaborate and subtle reasoning. On the part of sacramentarians there has been produced a literature of a mystical and mystifying kind, which none but members of that school have ever pretended to understand. As the sacrament of forgiveness and regeneration, baptism has a real and intimate connection with those great spiritual experiences of man. Care must be taken, on the one hand, to avoid representing baptism as a mere sign of membership in an outward community, and, on the other hand, to avoid representing it as though *ex opere operato* it effected any spiritual result. It is the error of the High Church sacramentarian party to affirm that baptism, as though it were not a mere ordinance of God, but rather

the third Person in the Godhead, actually brings us into membership of the Incarnate Son of God, so that baptized persons are children of God as no unbaptized one can be. "Each baptized person," says Canon Mason, "is a kind of fresh incarnation of Christ." Through His humanity we in baptism receive the divine. The same writer goes on to remark that in baptism the union of the human and divine natures has taken place, but that it requires the eye of faith to discern this. It seems to require a credulity that is by no means to be honoured with the name of faith. That he means to affirm that regeneration has been bestowed in and accompanies baptism, whatever the character of the baptized may be, is evident when he says: "When we are *true* to our regeneration, the effect is perceptible, even to unbelief." So that to faith it should be evident even where we are not true to our regeneration. In opposition to all such teaching about sacramental grace, we must hold firmly to the New Testament notion of the sacrament, which represents it as a symbol and seal, representing vividly what the nature of the grace is which God bestows, and sealing the blessedness and comfort of that grace to all who by faith receive it.

§ 82. The Lord's Supper.

Literature.—Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine* (1889), iv. 307–333. Strong, *Systematic Theology* (1893), 538–553. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics* (1866), 432–443. Nevin, *The Mystical Presence*, Philad. 1867 (one of the very best expositions of the distinctive doctrine of Calvin). Ebrard, *Christliche Dogmatik* (1863), ii. 633–690. Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik* (1892), 562–569. Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik* (1885), ii. 361–368. Stanley, *Christian Institutions*, 5th ed., London, 1890, pp. 39–162. Allen, *Christian Institutions*, Edin. 1898, pp. 515–565.

While the sacrament of baptism has reference to the beginning of the Christian life in regeneration, the Lord's Supper has reference to the whole subsequent course of that life in the communication of divine grace and strength from

the continued presence of the Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. The new birth ushers us into the new life. Baptism is the sacrament of the new birth, and the Lord's Supper is the sacrament of the life into which it brings us. In the New Testament we have four reports of the institution of this holy ordinance. Three of these are parallel historical accounts in the historical record of the three Synoptic Gospels (Matt. xxvi. 20–29; Mark xiv. 17–25; Luke xxii. 14–38), and the fourth is the Pauline rendering of the same story as given him by special revelation (1 Cor. xi. 23–25). These four may be grouped into two classes, the reports of Matthew and Mark being put together as essentially the same, and those of Luke and Paul as containing in common certain points omitted by the earlier evangelists. The one statement of outstanding importance which is peculiar to the reports of Luke and Paul is the command to continue in all following ages the observance of this holy ordinance: "This do in remembrance of Me." That this is a true report of what was actually said by our Lord on that solemn occasion can scarcely be doubted. It was not copied by Paul from any eucharistic liturgy of the first century, for no such liturgy existed, and when such a liturgy was constructed this saying received place there, because on the authority of Luke and Paul, with probably the support of other primitive witnesses, it was regarded as an authentic saying of Christ. Only on the hypothesis that such a command had been given by our Lord can we understand how this ordinance came to be observed at once and continued to be observed universally without dispute or question by any one. In all three narratives it seems to be very clearly shown that what Christ intended in this ordinance was to associate the thought of the life of His disciples with that of His death. It is His death that is set forth as the covenant sacrifice. According to the synoptical accounts, the institution took place while Jesus with His disciples was celebrating the Passover festival. Harnack, Spitta, and some other modern theologians, seek to represent the meal as the prominent idea, so that the

elements are of little importance and of no symbolical significance, and the Agape is the appropriate reproduction of the original ordinance. It is also maintained that there was no Passover observance, and that it was simply the last meal that Master and disciples had together. There is no ground whatever for questioning the evangelical tradition that it was during the celebration of the Paschal feast that the feast of the new covenant was instituted, and that it was the Lord's intention to associate the new ordinance with the old, and to make the suggestion, afterwards explicitly developed by Paul (1 Cor. v. 7), that in His death He is Himself our passover, and that His redemption is the true deliverance. The elements used in the ordinance are bread and wine. The attempt of Harnack to show that, according to Justin Martyr, the custom in his day was to celebrate the Lord's Supper with bread and water has not commended itself to the scholars. That water was mingled with the wine in the cup is all that can fairly be concluded from Justin's words. The symbolical significance of the elements is very plainly stated in the words of institution. Both bread and wine, especially in the sacramental actions of breaking and pouring out, point to the Redeemer's death as a sacrifice rendered to God on our behalf. Body and blood are used here not to point out His human personality generally, but that nature in which His death was accomplished. Not the physical substances, but the personality of consciousness and will lying behind, which gave ethical value to His death, are made prominent here.

At a very early period the magical view of the sacraments affected the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. Some of the early Greek fathers (Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Gregory of Nyssa), with a natural inclination to mysticism, set forth, instead of the symbolical interpretation of the elements and actions in the ordinance favoured by the New Testament and the practice of the apostolic age, a realistic interpretation according to which the bread was identified with the body of Christ and the wine with the blood of Christ, and John vi.

52 ff., understood in a strictly literal fashion, was applied without qualification to the Lord's Supper. Paschasius Radbertus, about the middle of the ninth century, who was vigorously opposed by Ratramnus, and in a rather less decided manner by Rabanus Maurus, maintained that by means of the consecration the elements of bread and wine were actually changed into the body and blood of Christ, so that the elements remained bread and wine only in outward appearance. The distinction between sign and thing signified was completely obliterated. This doctrine of transubstantiation received the imprimatur of the Church at the Fourth Lateran Council in A.D. 1215. In connection with this there was also introduced the scholastic doctrine of *concomitance*, according to which, flesh and blood being inseparably joined in one human body, in each element and in each fragment of each the whole Christ is present. It was therefore maintained that though the cup was withheld from the laity, to whom it was not allowed that they should communicate *sub utraque specie*, a full act of communion was performed when the bread was eaten. From the moment of consecration onward until every particle of all the sacred elements has been consumed, Christ's presence remains in them, and they continue to be the object of adoration. The change of the elements is nothing less than a repetition of the incarnation of God, and the Church takes the place of Christ, as being the continuation of His incarnation. It is a necessary conclusion from this, that the ordinance is not merely a sacrament but a sacrifice, so that the constantly repeated sacrifice of the mass takes the place of the one sacrifice of Christ. As the Christ, present by means of consecration, is for believers spiritual food, so He is for God a sacrifice. This sacrifice, called *sacrificium missæ*, is distinguished from the sacrifice on the cross only by this, that it is an unbloody sacrifice, and that, while the forgiveness of sins is provided for by the sacrifice of the cross, the mass, as the remembrance by the individual of that sacrifice, applies the forgiveness to the individual. This, too, avails for the absent as well as for

the present, and for the dead in purgatory as well as for the living. It is specially against this deadly doctrine of the sacrifice of the mass that Protestantism has raised its protest.

The leaders of the Reformation all took their stand unhesitatingly against the doctrine of transubstantiation and the doctrine of the sacrifice of the mass; but Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin represent the three different tendencies which still continue to be maintained and developed by considerable and influential parties in the Christian Church. Luther, while making this protest most heartily, felt strongly and solemnly the need of conserving the objective saving significance of the sacrament. Pressing the words of institution in their strictly literal acceptation, he maintained that in, with, and under the bread and wine the body and blood of Christ was truly present for partakers and not merely for believers. Christ's presence is in the elements only in their use, and so the remnants of the elements are only common bread and wine. In the use, too, blessing only comes to those who partake in faith. Luther's doctrine of *consubstantiation* has its foundation in his christological doctrine of ubiquity. Christ's glorified body is everywhere present, and the words of institution warrant the assumption that in the eucharist He is present in a special way. Zwingli objects to Luther's interpretation of the words of institution. Faith is the condition of union with Christ, and only the believing use of the sacrament can do this. The special benefit of the sacrament rests in this, that it is fitted in a more than ordinary way to arouse and quicken faith. He will have nothing of a physical and hyperphysical presence and efficacy in the elements. The eating spiritually of the body of Christ is just the appropriating the benefits of Christ by faith. Zwingli minimises the supernatural in the sacrament, and does away as much as possible with the mystery. The sacrament is an act of confession and a significant commemorative rite. Calvin mediates between Luther and Zwingli. He has a fuller appreciation than Zwingli of the mystical spiritual elements

in the sacrament. He insists upon a union, a spiritual union, between the actions, not the elements. In the act of using the natural sign, which use is ordained by divine appointment to be a pledge and sign of redemption by Christ, the redeeming act of Christ is really present in its efficacy to believers, so that a mystical spiritual union with Christ is secured. In His redemption Christ surrendered His Person, consisting of body and blood, and so the sacramental efficacy of union with Christ is a real, though spiritual, eating of the body of the glorified Christ. Independently of faith, however, Christ is not present; but as the believer bodily partakes of bread and wine, spiritually he partakes of the body and blood of the Lord.

Care should be taken to emphasise the spiritual and symbolical character of the ordinance. Under material elements it is the pledge of a spiritual blessing. It reminds the believer of his continued dependence for life on the Risen Saviour, and of the sufficiency of the benefits of Christ's death to supply all his needs. It is the visible word, the gospel presented under visible signs. It speaks, too, of union with Christ and union with fellow-believers; and points on to the festive joy and perfection of fellowship in the kingdom of God.

§ 83. Prayer.

Literature.—Löber, *Die Lehre vom Gebet*, Erlangen, 1860. Kaftan, *Dogmatik*, 171–173; *Die christliche Lehre vom Gebet*, Basel, 1876. Lemme, *Macht des Gebets*, Barmen, 1887. Herrmann, *Communion of the Christian with God*, London, 1895, pp. 159–161. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, iii. 692–709. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, 415–418. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine* (1888), ii. 122–124. Rothe, *Theologische Ethik* (1870), iii. 493–499. On Ritschl's doctrine of prayer and modified views of members of the Ritschlian school, see Ecke, *Die theologische Schule Albrecht Ritschls*, Berlin, 1897, pp. 303–307.

Prayer on the part of man answers to revelation on the part of God. As in revelation God opens up His heart to

man and makes Himself known in His fulness and grace, so in prayer man opens his heart to God and makes himself known in his neediness, his dependence, and his trust. The exercise of prayer is evidently not the beginning of the Christian life, for it implies a certain previous discovery of God, a discovery which God has made of Himself to the soul. It is the fact of this revelation of God to the consciousness of the individual which forms the basis for that man's turning to God in prayer. It is religion that expresses itself in prayer, and so the man who would pray the Christian prayer must do so on the ground of an already existing relationship with God in Christ. Prayer is necessarily the prayer of faith. It is simply the exercise of faith in maintaining communion with God. And so he who prays must believe that God is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him (Heb. xi. 6). The reality of God's being, and the fact of His revelation of Himself to man, are the objective truths on which the subjective disposition rests which finds its expression in prayer.

As a means of grace, prayer must be distinguished as individual and common prayer. As an exercise of private devotion and personal religion, prayer is an element in the Christian life, and the discussion of it belongs to the department of Christian ethics. But as common prayer, as prayer engaged in by the religious community and in behalf of the interests of the kingdom of God, it falls to be treated here alongside of the Church, the Word, and the sacraments. True Church prayer has its perfect model in the prayer which Jesus taught His disciples. He gave to them this prayer for Church use, to show what the themes are which must always find place in the prayers of the community. What is essential, first of all, to prayer that will find acceptance is the recognition of the supreme position of God and the interests of His kingdom, — the confession that the world and its inhabitants can be blessed only as they become the kingdom of God and His Christ. In the opening petitions of the prayer there is the full surrender of heart and

will to God, so that God is acknowledged as all in all. This prayer is rightly called the prayer that teaches to pray, since it begins by teaching this lesson of the supreme significance of the divine will and the all-embracing claims of God's kingdom. Only on such a basis can prayer for temporal good and even for personal salvation and help vindicate its claim to be regarded as religious. The mere asking for personal good, apart from the fulfilling of God's will and without respect to the interests generally of God's kingdom, can only be irreligious and heathenish. Asking for self can be saved from selfishness only when it is subordinated heartily to the divine will and purposes.

One of the great difficulties, which has caused perplexity to many, has arisen over the question as to the effect which prayer for temporal good can have on the action of God in providence when it is considered that God is confessed to be the Unchangeable One. Is it possible to suppose that, in consequence of a believer's supplication, any event in providence or in the province of the natural life, any event in that department commonly understood to be under the rule of natural law, can assume a form other than it would have assumed had not that petition been offered up? On the one hand, the true doctrine of the divine unchangeableness does not place God under the dominion of any necessity other than His own will; and then, on the other hand, the believer's prayer cannot be for anything that is in opposition or contradiction to the divine will. The Christian doctrine of God represents the divine will as free, and it is in the exercise of that freedom that the prayer of the believer receives its answer.

Christian prayer is objectively and subjectively mediated through Christ (Rom. v. 2; Eph. ii. 18, iii. 12), and is most fitly offered in the name of Christ (John xiv. 13, 14, xv. 16, xvi. 23; Matt. xviii. 19, 20). It is only in the fellowship of Christ that prayer can be accepted by God, for it is He whom the Father heareth alway. Prayer in the name of Jesus must be in the Spirit of Jesus, from the heart of one

who is conceiving of God as Jesus did and trusting the promises as He trusted. Such a prayer must be heard, for Jesus Himself prays in him who prays thus. Prayer in the name and in accordance with the Spirit of Jesus as a means of grace answers to the *unio mystica* in the subjective appropriation of salvation. It is by the Spirit's help alone that the cry of the needy, which of itself would be nothing more than an inarticulate utterance of pain and weakness, becomes a Christian prayer that has strength to prevail with God.

VI.—THE LAST THINGS.

§ 84. Introductory and General.

Literature.—Salmond, *Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, Edin. 1895. Fyfe, *The Hereafter: Sheol, Hades, and Hell, the World to come, and the Scripture Doctrine of Retribution according to Law*, Edin. 1890. Alger, *Critical History of the Future Life*, 10th ed., Boston, 1880. Kliefoth, *Christliche Eschatologie*, Leipzig, 1886. Luthardt, *Die Lehre von des letzten Dingen*, 3rd ed., Leipzig, 1885. Dahle, *Life after Death, and the Future of the Kingdom of God*, Edin. 1896. Beet, *The Last Things*, London, 1897. Davidson, *The Last Things*, London, 1882. Frank, *System der christlichen Wahrheit* (1894), ii. 450–512. Strauss, *Die christliche Glaubenslehre*, Tüb. 1840, ii. 628–646.

Under this head we have to treat of the completion of the kingdom of God in the individual and in the community. The character of its contents has been indicated by the general designation of eschatology, or the last things (*de rebus novissimis*). Among dogmatists considerable uncertainty prevails as to what should be included among the last things. The old scholastic distribution was fourfold: death, resurrection, the last judgment, and the end of the world. But death falls to be discussed under sin, and those who treat the work of Christ according to the division of the threefold office of Christ would find place for the other subjects named here under the kingly office of the Redeemer. In the Old Testament we

have only scattered allusions to these subjects, varying greatly in clearness and in range of vision, but never set forth so systematically as to aid us in deciding what subjects should be included and how they ought to be grouped. In the case of the New Testament it is very different. There all intimations concerning the future, whether in the Gospels or in the Epistles, are determined as to form and contents by the apocalyptic idea, and are regarded from the apocalyptic point of view. In the kingdom of God on earth a new spiritual power is working toward the realisation of a purely spiritual end. The last things are all immediately associated with the reaching of this end. In them, the expectations of the prophets and their glowing descriptions of the reign of righteousness are seen to be realities. In them, we see the realisation of the end for which Christ wrought, and the benefit of His redemption made sure for ever to those who have accepted Him as their Redeemer. We see Christ at last, as well as at first, the one occasion of division, a savour of life unto life or of death unto death, a sure foundation or a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence.

The subjects which specially call for treatment here, and which cannot be conveniently and appropriately dealt with elsewhere, are: the Second Coming of Christ, the Resurrection of the Dead, the Last Judgment, and the Final and Eternal States. The resurrection of the dead and the last judgment might be discussed under the second coming as the works which Christ came again to perform. Or again, if we gave a separate place to the judgment, the resurrection might be regarded as the immediate consequence of the coming of Christ, or as the presupposition of the judgment. Its relation both to the second coming and to the last judgment rather shows that its proper place is that of a separate section between these two. At the same time, it must be remembered that these subjects shade off into one another, and especially that they are not to be rigidly distinguished in respect of temporal succession, as they all lie just on the border-line where time has already run out or is being lost in eternity.

§ 85. The Second Coming of Christ.

Literature.—Brown, *Christ's Second Coming: Will it be Premillenial?* 7th ed., Edin. 1882. Fairbairn, *Prophecy*, Edin. 1856, pp. 432–480. Strong, *Systematic Theology* (1893), pp. 566–575. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, 465–473. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine* (1889), iv. 383–401. Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik* (1892), 609–614. Russell, *Parousia, New Testament Doctrine of Christ's Second Coming*, London, 1887. Auberlen, *The Prophecies of Daniel and the Revelation of St. John viewed in their Mutual Relation*, Edin. 1856. Philippi, *Die biblische und kirchliche Lehre von Antichrist*, Gütersloh, 1877. Weiffenbach, *Der Wiederkunftsgedanke Jesu*, Leipzig, 1873.

In the teaching of Jesus great prominence was given to the doctrine of the second coming. According to the unanimous report of John and the Synoptists, He occupied a great part of the ministry of His last days among them with repeating to them assurances of the fact, while refusing all information, and indeed disclaiming all knowledge of the time, of His coming again to execute judgment and to establish a kingdom which will never be moved, in which righteousness alone will reign. The time of this *parousia* was never regarded by any of the apostles as part of the revelation that had been given them, and consequently we find nowhere in the New Testament any indication given as to the period at which this coming may be expected. As used for purposes of exhortation, whether with the intention of affording comfort or with that of giving warning, the apostolic injunction no doubt is to expect it every hour, and to live under the thought that at any moment He may come. But this manifestly is a confession of absolute ignorance as to the time of manifestation. In regard to Paul, it is quite evident that he entertained the hope, and regarded it as not only a possible but an extremely likely thing, that he himself, or at least some of his contemporaries, might live to see Christ coming in His power and glory. At the same time, it is equally evident that he makes not the least pretension to knowledge

on this subject, and that what he gives utterance to has the character simply of a hope and a longing which it was open to anyone to entertain or to repudiate. It is a purely subjective feeling, without any ground of objective revelation. Jesus and Paul alike report certain signs that the coming of the Lord is drawing near: there will be a falling away first, an apostasy, a period of lukewarmness, accompanied and followed by active and venomous opposition on the part of the enemy, the rising of the Man of Sin who sets himself up against the Son of Man, and, as Antichrist, at last places himself in the temple of God, and assumes in the world, and with the world's approval, the place of God. It is when all that is evil has concentrated its powers and has reached its culmination in a very incarnation of the principle of evil, that He who alone is able to cope with such a power repeats the miracle of His incarnation, and reappears visibly on earth to destroy utterly the evil that has concentrated itself at one point and to secure a permanent and a perfect triumph for the good. The gorgeous pictures of the Apocalypse of St. John, as well as the realistic scenes in Daniel, probably means nothing more than this. Sin hastens to show itself exceeding sinful, wickedness assumes its most aggravated forms, and then cometh the end. All this can be said without the slightest hint of a date. Prophets, apostles, early Christians, all hoped that the coming of the Messiah to end the ill and begin His reign might be soon; all knew it *might* be immediately, but all confessed that they knew not when or how.

In the early Church, chiliasm, the doctrine of Christ's coming again for the purpose of setting up a kingdom of heaven on earth before the end of the world, was generally prevalent. As entertained by the Church and expounded by the fathers, it was nothing else than a Judaistic materialising of Christ's doctrine of His spiritual return to His disciples and His reign in them by His Spirit. In the Epistle of Barnabas, and subsequently in the writings of Justin Martyr, Irenæus, and Tertullian, we have traces of a millenarian doctrine, which was elaborated by some of the gifted members

of the Alexandrian school, but condemned everywhere and always by the Church at large. In the Reformation period the Anabaptists gave endless trouble and annoyance to the wise and temperate leaders of the movement by the persistent introduction of chiliastic questions. The position taken up by the Reformers was that Scripture favoured only a return of Christ at the end of the world, and that the coming of Christ brought about the world's end. "Damnant et alios qui nunc spargunt Judaicas opiniones, quod ante resurrectionem mortuorum pii regnum mundi occupaturi sint, ubique oppressis impiis" (*Conf. Aug.* xvii.). Viewed thus in a spiritual and not a carnal fashion, conceived of as a religious and ethical movement and not as a physical catastrophe and a convulsion in the material world, the coming of Christ brings in the kingdom of God as a positive glorifying of the world and not as an absolutely new creation which takes the place of that which has been utterly destroyed. The world comes to an end by finding its end in the kingdom of God; and it is at and by the coming of Christ that the world in this way finds its end. The error of chiliasm lay in this, that it supposed the coming of Christ to earth to begin and carry on a reign in a visible kingdom to be a necessary presupposition of this spiritual victory; whereas the dispensation of the Spirit, which began at Pentecost and will continue till Christ Himself will come again, is the period during which all the conflict must be carried on. When Christ comes, according to Scripture teaching, it is to make a final award in accordance with the issue of that struggle which with His coming has been brought to an end. Much of the confusion and error that have prevailed among millenarians has been occasioned by their understanding literally a book of apocalyptic visions, and treating symbolical representations as if they were dogmatic formulæ. The charge of Judaism can be escaped only by recognising the fact, that the world which becomes the kingdom of God is the world dominated by the Spirit of Jesus.

The indispensable conditions for the coming of Christ are, that the gathering in of those who shall be saved into the

communion of the saints has been completed, and that the ethical training of the members of that communion has been finished. For the immediate purpose of this coming is to put aside those who have shown themselves unreceptive. Only He, and even He only then, can separate the tares from the wheat without damage to the wheat. For this end, according to Scripture, Christ comes again in visible bodily form, and not merely as a spiritual influence, for in this respect He has been in the world by an unbroken presence since the hour of His ascension (Matt. xxviii. 20). His presence in His second advent is indeed spiritual, but what is distinctive about it is that this spiritual presence is now sensibly discernible. It may be that, in accordance with certain hints that we have as to changes subsequent to the purging out of the wicked (1 Cor. xv. 51, 52; 1 Thess. iv. 14–17), this sensible manifestation may be no longer necessary in order that members of a redeemed humanity now perfectly spiritualised should discern the presence and recognise the Person of their Redeemer. But, be this as it may, it is quite evident that in His coming which precedes the separation of the wicked, which is the condition of the spiritualising of the accepted and approved, we must conceive of Him as coming in such a form that every eye shall see Him.

§ 86. The Resurrection of the Dead.

Literature.—Goulburn, *The Doctrine of the Resurrection of the same Body as taught in Holy Scripture*, London, 1850. Drew, *Identity and General Resurrection of the Human Body*, London, 1822. Milligan, *The Resurrection of the Dead*, Edin. 1894. Balfour, *Central Truths and Side Issues*, Edin. 1895. Salmond, *The Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, 326–338, 546–575. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, 452–457. Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik* (1892), 614–620.

The second coming of Christ is immediately followed by the resurrection of the dead. Christ comes as the Life-giver, and He exerts His power to bring about the resurrection of all the dead. All the souls of men are clothed again with

bodies which are recognised as their own. In the Old Testament we have hints of a belief in the resurrection of the body, which has a form of its own, and exhibits a type of doctrine quite different from that to be found in the sacred literature of the Parsees. Christ's doctrine of the resurrection includes plainly a doctrine of the resurrection of the body. His language implies that what is raised up is the whole man of body as well as spirit. In our Lord's teaching may be found the germs of all the elaborate discussions regarding the resurrection in the writings of St. Paul. The apostolic doctrine of resurrection is based upon the resurrection of Christ. His resurrection is not only the guarantee, but also the pattern of the resurrection of the believer. That Paul should speak almost exclusively of the resurrection of the believer is what we might have expected, for he discusses his doctrine of resurrection almost invariably in connection with his unfolding of the privileges and benefits of those who are Christ's. If any definite proof is asked of Paul's belief in a general resurrection of the just and the unjust beyond the report of his speech before Felix, we may, with Dr. Salmond, point to the fact that Paul maintains the fact of a general judgment (Rom. ii. 6; 1 Cor. vi. 2), which presupposes a general resurrection.

The doctrine of the resurrection of the body has often been stated in such a form as to call forth strong protests and to awaken vehement opposition. While the Alexandrian fathers, as well as the gnostics, carried their spiritualising tendencies so far that the resurrection which they described could be called a resurrection of the body only in a very forced and unnatural sense, the orthodox fathers as a whole, the schoolmen and the Protestant theologians, followed too exactly the crass, carnal materialism of the Jews, and conceived of the resurrection of the body as the resurrection of the identical body that had been laid in the grave, involving the restoration of every elemental particle, of the same features, of the same physical peculiarities. In a curious and interesting passage in the *Enchiridion* (chaps.

84–93), Augustine, while strictly holding by the prevailing orthodox view, maintains that the bodies of the saints will rise "without any fault, without any depravity, as without any corruption, burden, difficulty," so that they are rightly called spiritual bodies, though real bodies, because without that corruption which weighs down the soul. As to the bodies of the wicked, he does not determine whether they shall be raised in all the faults and deformities which they had borne on earth or not. He appreciates, but does not seek to solve, the difficulty of the dilemma of an incorruptible body that is capable of pain and a corruptible body that is incapable of death. Strauss,[1] in a somewhat irreverent manner, makes sport of Augustine and others who had applied Christ's saying (Luke xxi. 18), that not a hair of our heads should perish to the resurrection. Another piece of fanciful speculation, to which Augustine gives expression (*City of God*, xxii. 14, 15), afterwards repeated by Thomas Aquinas, Peter the Lombard, and other schoolmen, is that the norm of bodily perfection is the body of Christ (Eph. iv. 13), so that all the saints will receive a body corresponding to the body which they had or would have had in the thirty-third year of their age. Some Protestant theologians opposed this view on the ground of Rev. xix. 5, 18, xx. 12, where it is said that small and great shall stand before God. In contrast at once to the exaggerated spiritualising of the gnostics and the Alexandrian teachers on the one hand, and to the crass materialising of the great majority of the orthodox fathers on the other hand, we find in the profound and epoch-making dogmatic work of Origen (*De Principiis*, ii. 3) a doctrine of the resurrection of the body modelled on the Pauline illustration of the germinating seed which itself perishes, but lives again in a plant of the same kind. The resurrection body is not made up of the particles which composed the earthly body, but is such that personal identity is preserved in regard to the body as well as the spirit. It is evident that, according to the Scripture doctrine, the

[1] *Die christliche Glaubenslehre*, Tüb. 1840, vol. ii. p. 647.

resurrection body differs from the earthly body in this very essential particular, that the earthly element in it which was corruptible is no longer present. It is not a body of flesh in the sense of being subject to change and decay, but is capable of eternal duration. The phrase resurrection of the flesh in the Apostles' Creed can only be regarded as an instance of the use of popular language, where flesh is taken as equivalent to body; and it is noticeable that in the other œcumenical creeds the article is rendered "resurrection of the dead."

According to the representation given in the Apocalypse, it would seem that there are two resurrections, separated from one another by the millennial period, the thousand years' reign of Christ on earth (chap. xx. 4–6). The resurrection of the righteous precedes His reign, is indeed the condition of it, while it is followed by the general resurrection to judgment. It would be evidently absurd to treat an isolated passage in a book of symbolical representations as though it were a sober dogmatic statement in a didactic Epistle of Paul. The apostle does not assume a double resurrection in 1 Cor. xv. 23, 24.[1] This notion stands or falls with the doctrine of the thousand years' reign. In every passage of Scripture dealing with the subject, except the one referred to from Revelation, the coming of Christ is the end of the world and the beginning of the judgment.

All through the New Testament doctrine, as well as in modern theological and philosophical speculation, it is rightly assumed that the body is made for the spirit, and not the spirit for the body. It lies in the very nature of things that the spirit disembodied in the hour of death seeks to clothe itself immediately with a body suitable to its new condition and requirements. Amid its new surroundings the old body would be unfitting. It would hamper rather than help.

[1] Kaftan, *Dogmatik*, p. 632, thinks that Paul here presupposes a double resurrection. So, too, Edwards, in his Commentary. See a very careful and satisfactory discussion of the question in Salmond, *Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, 559–562.

Seeing that it existed only for the spirit, it is now laid aside and a more suitable one assumed. That the new body is an adequate clothing of the soul is all that we can maintain, and all that we are interested in maintaining. That it is material, in the sense in which we use the word, is by no means a necessary assumption. We know the style of body that the human soul requires under the conditions of the earthly life, but we can form no conception of the nature of the covering necessary for the soul in the life beyond in order that it may be clothed. It may fairly be assumed that during the period that elapses between the death of an individual and the coming of Christ, which brings with it the general resurrection, he wears a body suitable to his condition during that period, which in the resurrection to judgment is changed for that spiritual body which he will wear throughout eternity. That even the spiritual body, though the identity of it will be maintained, is capable throughout eternity of infinite development, follows from this, that it must keep pace with the progress of the spirit, to which it must always be capable of giving adequate expression. When Paul refers to the revelation obtained by him in a state of ecstasy (2 Cor. xiii. 2–4), when he was raised above all the physical conditions and limitations of this present life, he evidently regarded the fact of his personal identity as beyond all question, so that, when back again amid the circumstances and surroundings of common life, he could safely and warrantably use those revelations as made to himself and as serviceable to him in the work on which he was engaged. Schleiermacher, in particular, has dwelt upon the impossibility of our conceiving or imagining a human spirit unassociated with a body. This is a fact that it is most important that we should keep in view, if only we do not needlessly limit our conception of body to that gross material organism to which we now apply the name.

The highest and most perfect guarantee of a resurrection for the believer is the fact of his fellowship with God in

Christ, which for him must endure, so that he knows that living or dying he is the Lord's. That anything from without should break the continuity of that life which is rooted in the Eternal is impossible. In the resurrection of Christ, in whom he is, the believer has the assurance of the continuance of his own life after death. Resurrection for the Christian must mean the rising into a condition in which his development will be like that of Jesus on earth, a natural growth without the presence of sinful imperfections. Hence the resurrection of the dead is fittingly used by Paul (Phil. iii. 11) as an illustrative and allusive phrase to represent that spiritual perfection after which, all through life, he had aspired.

§ 87. The Last Judgment.

Literature.—Salmond, *Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, 265–271, 313–325. Nitzsch, *Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik* (1892), 620–625. Rothe, *Dogmatik* (1870), iii. 52 f., 78–95. Reiff, *Die christliche Glaubenslehre*, Basel, 1876, ii. 538–544. On the intermediate state: Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, 457–464; Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iv. 401–404.

The resurrection is immediately followed by the judgment (*judicium extremum*). All the partial judgments of earth and time have a relative value only in view of the certainty of this last judgment. In all those relative judgments the standards had been various and varying. In this last judgment the standard is one and invariable, the revealed will of God, which in the case of believers is the gospel, and in the case of unbelievers the law written in their hearts. The supreme, and in a sense the only, purpose of this judgment is God's glory. This glory is realised by the exercise of righteous judgment which rewards the good and punishes the evil. As judge sometimes God, sometimes Christ, is named. This vacillation in expression may be explained by this, that what Christ does He does by the

power and in virtue of the command given Him of the Father.

The need of having the imperfect judgments of this life corrected in the interests of justice led, even in heathenism, to a widespread belief that there would be at last a divine judgment in righteousness. In the Old Testament, and specially in the Prophets and the Psalms, the oppressed and disappointed are encouraged by the assurance that the Judge of all the earth shall do right, and that in the judgment day He will show Himself the just God. In the New Testament a minute description of the proceedings of that day is given by our Lord Himself; but in reading this account, as well as in reading the descriptions of the Apocalypse, we must remember that we have here in parabolic form a description of transcendent scenes which can be only relatively true, that is, in so far as human language is adequate to describe such occurrences. Yet we have here all the outstanding features of the judgment sketched and characterised. In Paul's writings we have a fully developed doctrine of the final judgment. All must appear before God, bad and good; this judgment is according to righteousness, and there is no respect of persons; each will be judged according to the opportunities which he had and the use which he made of them; and the Judge will base His decision not merely on what is seen, but also on the secret thoughts and purposes of those who stand before Him. As a prelude to the judgment, there is a disclosure of all that needs to be known, whether known before or unknown. This really determines the decision of the Judge, and the separation which straightway follows. To be in Christ gives confidence in that day (1 John ii. 28; Gal. v. 5; Eph. ii. 8).

A distinction is made between this final judgment (*judicium universale et manifestum*), which takes place after the general resurrection and at the end of the world, and the individual judgment (*judicium particulare et occultum*), which is passed upon each one at death. As to the period

that elapses between the one judgment and the other, Scripture is practically silent. The Sheol of the Old Testament, the Hades of the New Testament, represents a condition of quiet restfulness and spiritual activity. No work is done, but at least memory is in active exercise, and conscience and intelligence are busy upon the thoughts and deeds of the past earthly life. If it be so, then, that the whole undisturbed occupation of this intermediate state is introspective and reflective, it is evident that we have here at least elements which make a process of purifying possible. This, however, is very far from a doctrine of a Romish purgatory. The fire that shall try every man's work (1 Cor. iii. 13) is evidently something that takes place during the course of this probationary and disciplinary life. It is well expounded in this sense by Augustine in the *Enchiridion* (c. 68), though afterwards he adds that it is not incredible that some such thing may also take place after this life. Here we have the hint out of which the Romish doctrine of purgatory has grown. But according to the tridentine doctrine, all believers who leave the world without being perfectly purged from sin pass into purgatory. Biedermann has well defined it as "hell with an outlook to heaven." If not before, then at latest in the resurrection, they pass purified into heaven. In Protestantism, on the contrary, acceptance of Christ by faith, or rejection through unbelief during the earthly life, determines the judgment passed upon the individual at death, which nothing that happens in the intermediate state can alter. For believers, this state is a being with Christ and the first stage of eternal blessedness. For unbelievers, it is absence from God the source of all life and blessing, and therefore the beginning of condemnation.

§ 88. The Eternal States.

Literature.—Salmond, *The Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, 353–394, 579–673. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*,

473–488. Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iv. 415–434. Rothe, *Dogmatik* (1870), iii. 111–169. Frank, *System der christlichen Wahrheit* (1894), ii. 493–512. Shedd, *The Doctrine of Endless Punishment*, London, 1886.

The last judgment brings about the end of the world, *consummatio mundi*. The New Testament describes this as a catastrophe in which all things material perish by fire. This notion is set forth in a specially graphic and pictorial way in the Epistles of Jude and Second Peter. The Lutheran theologians as a whole take all this literally, and insist upon the utter destruction of the world, so that it completely and for ever disappears, and gives place to a new heaven and a new earth which are immaterial. The Reformed again describe it rather as a transformation of the qualities of the material world, so that the new world is related to the old as the resurrection body of man is to that which he had borne on earth. The latter way of looking at the matter has this to recommend it, that it maintains the parallel between man and the world, and we are taught to believe that what happens to the world is determined exclusively by what concerns and interests man.

The decision of the Judge in the last judgment determines, according to Scripture, the eternal future of all men for bliss or woe. Believers in Christ Jesus, having been justified and forgiven by God, enter as children of God upon the enjoyment of eternal life. They are brought into perfect conformity and union with God, which of itself brings blessedness. The resurrection body also, being now a perfect clothing for such a perfect soul, gives pure and full expression to the love of God. Those who are condemned for their unbelief are sent away with the devil and his angels into eternal death, a condition in which, in respect of soul and body, their original destiny is not realised. What in the Church theology is called *pœna damni* is the absolute deprivation of blessedness. The *pœna sensus*, again, of the condemned, consists in their thorough consciousness of this condition, and expresses itself in sufferings of body and soul in proportion to the guilt

of the sins committed in life. These punishments are both intensively and extensively endless. Dante expressed the mind of the theologians of the Church when he inscribed on the entrance to the regions of the condemned: "All hope abandon ye who enter here."

In opposition to the Protestant Church doctrine which maintains the eternity of both states and the fixed character of the decision in the judgment, two theories have been proposed which seek to escape the necessity of admitting the eternity of punishments,—in the one case, by the hypothesis of annihilation, according to which the persistently impenitent are destroyed by the extinction of their being; and in the other case, by the hypothesis of restoration, apokatastasis, according to which by means of a refining process, to which all who die unbelieving and impenitent are subjected, continued through a longer or shorter period, all men at last without exception are brought into the membership of God's kingdom, and God is all in all.

The theory of restoration has exercised a powerful fascination over some of the finest and tenderest natures in all ages. There is in it undoubtedly something singularly attractive. The phrase *ἀποκατάστασις πάντων* occurs only once in the New Testament (Acts iii. 21). The reference there is evidently to the period of our Lord's return, when an end will be put to the confusions of the present dispensation, and a new world will be brought forth in which moral and physical perfection will take the place of all that is faulty and incomplete. It is a restoration of the whole world to which man belongs, to that condition which it had when pronounced by its creator "very good." A whole series of passages, especially those in the Apocalypse which speak of the destruction of death and Hades, as well as those in other writings which speak of the destroying of death as the last enemy, the final subjection of all things to God who is all in all, and the gathering together of all into Christ as head, has been taken in conjunction with this idea of the *ἀποκατάστασις*, and elaborated into a theory of the final triumph of

good over evil by the conversion of all into the good. Origen (*De Principiis*, iii. 6), on the basis of the absolute freedom of the creaturely will, maintained that it was open to any creature, however deeply he had fallen, to return to the rank to which he originally belonged, and that the goodness of God would lead back all His creatures to the point from which they started, so that the end will be the same as the beginning. Long periods of purifying are required, so that the unconverted are sent from one world to another, as from one training school to another, until perfectly purified. And then at last even the great enemy of God, the devil, will cease, not as to his being, but as to being an enemy. In this way God is at last all in all, not by the crushing of His enemies by His omnipotence, but by winning them all to His allegiance. In a similar spirit and on similar lines this doctrine was developed by Gregory of Nyssa and Scotus Erigena. In later times this theory was enthusiastically supported and brilliantly restated by Schleiermacher; and, as the expression of the larger Christian hope, it here had the warm sympathy of Maurice and Farrar, and many other noble-hearted Christian thinkers and theologians.

The theory of the annihilation of the wicked, commonly called the doctrine of conditional immortality, is based upon the view held by some in the early Church that immortality was not a natural endowment of man, but only a gift of the grace of Christ. Those who do accept the gift of Christ's grace are not immortal, and so the final rejection of that grace brings about necessarily the extinction of their being. By far the most distinguished and talented supporter of this view is Rothe. He represents the intermediate state as one in which conversion is possible, but in the case of those persistently impenitent their opposition to all that is good gradually wears them out, until at last they cease to be. The most popular and comprehensive exposition of this theory is that of Edward White in his *Life in Christ*. The presuppositions of this theory are crowded with difficulties, and it has not commended itself to any considerable number of

thinking men. That the soul, though not naturally immortal, should survive death, and yet at last become the prey of death, is an unproved assumption of too improbable a kind to be accepted simply as the condition of a theoretical conclusion.

The declarations of Scripture afford only glimpses into the unseen. They do not profess to be revelations. All that Christ and His apostles, instructed by Him, undertake to say is, that the judgment of God will be according to righteousness, and that the righteousness which the divine judgment will manifest will be that righteousness of love and truth which shine forth in Jesus Christ. It shall be ill with the wicked, and it shall be well with the righteous. Whatever apparent triumph evil may have had in time, sin must be conquered and destroyed. God's purpose cannot be thwarted, and when His will is accomplished evil must have vanished for ever, and on everything will be inscribed Holiness to the Lord. How this is to be brought about, and in what special sense all will be subject to God, are points on which Scripture has no revelation for us. Only this it tells us, that the conquest is by Christ, and that the subjection is to Him who is Head over all things to His church. Throughout the whole universe of being there is One Lord and His name One.

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